



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>




DR. W. G. W. del. at 30
1925

BR
1
T42

Richard







THE
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW:

A Quarterly Journal

OF

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND LIFE.

VOL. XV. Nos. LX.—LXIII.

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
MANCHESTER: JOHNSON & RAWSON, 89, MARKET STREET.

1878.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY C. GREEN AND SON,
178, STRAND.

gt. meeting
6-17-39

THE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. LX.—JANUARY, 1878.

I.—ON THE CLEMENTINE HOMILIES.

[Printed for the Hibbert Trustees.]

THE early ages of the Church have a charm as strong as it is natural for all men to whom Christianity is something more than a name. To many minds they suggest the pleasing vision of a time in which the battle of creeds, the rivalry of sects, and the bitter enmities of zealous partizans, were unknown—a time when Christianity was flowing fresh and clear from its Fountain-head, unpolluted by the impurities which have mingled themselves with its waters during their course through the centuries. To others, who look back upon that far-off past not so much for the gratification of sentiment or to contemplate the creation of a pious fancy, as with a desire to ascertain the actual characteristics of the period in which the new religion was established, the influences by which its early adherents were affected, and the dangers to which they were exposed—to such the first centuries of the Church's history will have a different, but a deeper, because a more rational, interest. Never before has this interest made itself so manifest as in our own day, and at no other time have such painstaking efforts been made to obtain a clear and intelligible view of the obscurest portion of the history of our religion. In proof of this, it is needful only to refer to the works associated with the Tübingen school and the literature to which they have given rise. Every known writing which could be supposed to throw light upon the period under debate has been eagerly examined and

made to yield up its evidence in support of some theory or in aid of its refutation. No doubt mistakes have been made and too hasty judgments formed. Conclusions, which a few years since were regarded as all but, if not quite, final and indisputable, are now upheld only in a much modified form or are abandoned altogether by many who formerly accepted them in their integrity. But, be their conclusions final or not, the works of such men as Baur, Schweigler, Zeller and Hilgenfeld, have been of incalculable service in awakening and stimulating attention to this important subject.

It would be out of place here to enter upon any discussion of the theory* defended by Baur and his followers, that the history of primitive Christianity is the history of the opposition of Ebionitism to Paulinism, an opposition which gradually toned down and was finally merged in the unity of the Catholic Church. Those to whom the discussions connected with this theory are familiar, will remember how prominent a part is played in them by the work to which this essay is devoted. It is in the Clementine literature that the hostility to Paul finds for itself fullest expression, and that Peter is most obviously extolled at the expense of his (supposed) rival. Peter is here represented as the true Apostle of the Gentiles, and it is he who comes off victorious from a conflict† with his opponent at Antioch, the scene of the famous rebuke administered by his fellow-apostle, as reported by the latter. Clement, known to us as the fellow-labourer of Paul, is in these writings represented as Peter's firm friend, and the false apostle's determined foe. In a word, Peter is extolled as the champion of a Judaized, or, more accurately, of an Essenic Christianity, and Paul is caricatured as an artful, unscrupulous

* See Zeller, "Vorträge und Abhandlungen," p. 365; also the essays on the Tübingen School and on F. C. Baur, *passim*.

† It is not meant by this that, according to the Homilist, Peter and his opponent (Simon Magus) meet face to face at Antioch. On the contrary, Simon's influence over the people of Antioch is represented as already destroyed before Peter reaches the city, but by a plan put into execution at Peter's instigation and by one of his immediate followers. The particulars of what transpired at Antioch in this connection are given at the close of Hom. xx.

magician—in each case alike without regard to historical accuracy. Much, however, as the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions have been discussed by the authors mentioned above and by others, it cannot be said that agreement, save as to their general scope and tendency, has been arrived at in regard to the teaching of their contents. It is the more important, therefore, to pursue such an investigation with care; and restricting it for the present to the Homilies, this essay offers an analysis of their contents and a detailed examination of the system of doctrine and church-life they were intended to teach.

One or two preliminary questions naturally suggest themselves—the first as to the place, and the second as to the time, to which the composition of the Homilies should be referred.

That they were written at Rome and for Romans there can be little doubt. This appears from the fact that Peter is represented as journeying to the metropolis, from the references made to Cæsar, and from the prominence given to Clement.* Only at Rome would that name have sufficient interest or carry weight enough to warrant the author in using it to obtain currency for his work, and in assigning to Clement the important part which he plays in the narrative.

The question of date, however, is more difficult to decide—a difficulty attested by the disagreement among critics, some of whom assign the Homilies to the middle of the second century, others to the end of that century, and others again to the beginning of the third century or even later. We, for our part, are inclined to adopt the earliest date, and to assign the Homilies approximately to the year 150 A.D.

That they cannot belong to a much earlier period is shown by the unmistakable polemic against Marcion contained in them; that they must not be placed much later seems to be

* There can be little doubt that the author of the Clementines, intentionally or unintentionally, identifies the Clement mentioned in Phil. iv. 3, with Clemens Romanus, to whom the Epistles to the Corinthians are ascribed. That these Clements were quite distinct personages seems to be beyond dispute. (See "*Patrum Apostolicorum Opera*," edited by Gebhardt, Harnack and Zahn, 1875, pp. lxxxvii, lxxxviii.)

indicated by the fact that the author, in advocating an episcopal form of church government, does not venture to speak of a bishop of Rome, or to bring Peter, the bishop-maker, to Rome. Now we know from the newly-discovered and complete text* of the so-called† Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, that at the date at which it was written, (about) 150 A.D., there was at Rome no bishop in the Old-Catholic sense of the term, i.e. as distinct from and superior to the presbyters. Twice in chap. xvii. of that work, reference is made to the *presbyters* as the authorities in the Church to whom obedience is due and as the source of instruction for believers, but nowhere does the author make allusion to an *Ἐπίσκοπος*. A few years, however, after the date‡ of this Epistle (or Homily), a bishop of Rome does make his appearance in the Passover controversy in the person of Anicetus (about A.D. 160), and from this time on, though not earlier, episcopacy at Rome is an established fact. Had the episcopal system, therefore, already taken root at Rome when the Homilist wrote, he would certainly have shown that the bishopric could trace its foundation back to Peter himself; but being precluded from doing this, he only ventures to say that the apostle was on his way to the metropolis, and leaves it to his readers to infer what would have taken place had Peter reached the goal of his journey.

That there existed at Rome towards the end of the first half of the second century a party desirous of adopting an episcopal form of Church constitution, is abundantly shown by passages in the "Pastor of Hermas." There we find, in all

* This text was discovered at Constantinople in the library of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and was published at the close of 1875, the editor being Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Serræ. Six missing chapters of the First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, and the latter half of the Second Epistle, are now recovered and made known by this most fortunate and valuable discovery.

† We say "so-called," for the Second Epistle turns out to be a *Homily*, and not an Epistle. This is clear from the chapter (xvii.) to which reference has been made. Those who are addressed are there exhorted to believe, &c. not only "now . . . but also when they go home." See also note by Bryennios, p. 138, note 3.

‡ Harnack says (*Schürer's Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 19 Feb., 1876): "The Second Epistle of Clement is historically comprehensible only if its composition be placed rather before than after the middle of the 2nd century."

three books—*Visiones*, *Mandata* and *Similitudines*—traces of a struggle for the supremacy among the officers of the Church. Thus in Vis. iii. 9, these officers are represented as loving the first seats, and as striving with one another (as we may infer) for the supreme authority. But in Mand. xi. it is more plain to what the writer refers. "Audi nunc et de spiritu terrestri, vacuo et fatuo, virtutem non habente. Primum autem hunc homo putatur spiritum habere; exultat enim se et vult primam cathedram habere, et improbus est et verbosus," &c. And, again, Simil. viii. 7 alludes to the same desire for supremacy on the part of some in the Church: "At vero hi, qui virides quidem virgas, sed scissuras habentes tradiderunt, fideles semper fuerunt et boni, sed habentes inter se quamdam invidiam et zelum de principatu et dignitate. Verum omnes hujusmodi insipientes sunt et fatui, qui habent inter se æmulationem de principatu."

That the presbyterial should thus give place to a monarchic system of church government was most natural, and we may be sure that the change which the author of the "Pastor of Hermas" feared and tried to avert was helped on in no small degree by the danger into which the churches were thrown about the middle of the second century by the spread of Gnostic heresies. The need would be felt in each community of Christians to which the heretical doctrines found their way, of having some chief authority who might be regarded as the repository of the true tradition, and to whom the final appeal might be made in matters of dispute. Nowhere would this need be more strongly felt than in Rome. Rome naturally attracted to herself all who wished to gain for their doctrines something more than a local notoriety. Thither found their way men of all shades of opinion—Marcion, as well as the writer of the Homilies; and, amid the conflict of opinions, that which a few years previously had been the object merely of petty personal ambition became an absolute necessity for the Church, viz., that one man should be invested with special authority and power, and that he should represent in his person the unity of the brotherhood. To what period, then, can

we more appropriately assign the Homilies—a work strenuously advocating the “monarchic” system of church government, and professedly adducing apostolic authority in its support—than to that shortly preceding the appointment of the first bishop of Rome?

But welcome as the work would be at that time on the ground of its support of monarchic views in general, it had another claim to the consideration of the Christian community at Rome. Nothing is more certain than that from a very early period in its existence the Roman church assumed a superiority over other churches. It was the church of the metropolis, and as such would no doubt be regarded with some measure of peculiar respect. But in addition to this, it was the only one of the churches of the Western world which claimed an apostolic foundation. On that ground it assumed to be for the West what the church of Jerusalem once claimed to be for the East, the fountain-head of true Christian doctrine—a consideration which would of itself naturally tend to enhance the church’s view of its own importance. Thus we find in the (First) Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians—a work belonging to the last decade of the first century—the church at Rome asserting its authority even at that early date to meddle in the affairs of its sister-churches. The Corinthians are bidden to beware of disobeying Clement’s injunctions, and are warned that disobedience will involve serious danger (chap. lix.);* and finally a deputation of trusty men is mentioned, who are sent to enforce the views of the author upon the refractory Corinthians (chap. lxiii.). Now, in entire harmony with this assumption of superiority on the part of the church at Rome, the Homilist represents the church at Jerusalem as exercising authority over all other churches, and all bishops or presbyters as subordinate to James, the bishop of Jerusalem. We say that this is in harmony with the claims set up by the church in Rome, because at the time when the Homilist wrote, the church at Jerusalem had ceased to be of any account, and the autho-

* Bryennios’ edition.

city which it had once possessed, but was then unable to exercise, would most naturally be taken up and wielded by the church of the metropolis. This seems to be what was in the writer's mind when he speaks of James and shows the dignity of his position by making even Peter submissive to his behests. Apart from this, there would be little or no meaning in introducing the name and speaking of the authority of the chief pastor of the church at Jerusalem, for the Barkochba insurrection and the building of *Celia Capitolina* had effectually scattered the band of Jewish Christians once forming that church, and had destroyed for ever their power and prestige. Persecuted by the fierce insurrectionists because they were Christians, driven from the holy city by the Romans because they were Jews, these Jewish Christians in their low estate could no longer pretend to dictate to the Gentile churches. In the East there was no one church with paramount claims to succeed to the position which Jerusalem had occupied; but in the West there was Rome, standing alone, without a rival; and the church in Rome, as we have seen, was both willing and eager to assume the prerogatives which formerly had been exercised, as of right, by the church at Jerusalem. A work in which these prerogatives are emphasized could not but seem timely if appearing at Rome about the middle of the second century.

Upon these grounds we assign the Homilies to A.D. 150 as the year in which they were most probably composed. The matter is, however, one which cannot be finally and absolutely decided with our present sources of information, and no date can be suggested with more than a limited degree of certainty as to its accuracy.

But it may be urged with apparent plausibility that a work which is on the very face of it a fiction—which no one can for a moment suppose to have come from the hand of Clement, or to give a faithful and accurate account of the sayings and doings of the Apostle Peter—could surely find no favour or credence even in Rome, however much it might harmonize with the tendencies of the church in that city.

To this it is sufficient to reply that we must not judge of

the second century by our own. The uncritical Christians of that age, who were dependent mainly upon tradition, and, so far as we know, had as yet no recognized collection of authoritative writings by which to gauge new works pretending to embody apostolic teaching,—these were not the men to cast doubt and suspicion upon any work which coincided with their opinions and met their requirements. The men who, a few years after the establishment of episcopacy in their midst, could accept the statement of the “Muratorian Fragment,”* that the “Pastor of Hermas” was written while Pius occupied the chair of the church in Rome, would hardly hesitate to acknowledge a work because it converted the Pauline Clement into the devoted follower of a Judaizing Peter. A church which in the latter half of the second century was ready to trace back an unbroken line of bishops to Peter† and Paul as the founders of the See, would not easily be scandalized, especially if any work presented to it professed to be backed up by apostolic authority. We need, therefore, scarcely trouble ourselves with Dean Mansel’s doubt as to “whether the author had any intention of passing it [the Homilies] off as a genuine production of Clement.”‡ To speak, however, as he does of the Clementines as a “romance,” is misleading, for there is not the slightest indication that the Homilist intended his work to be regarded in any other light than as a record of historical fact. If it be objected that we thus accuse our author of a highly immoral proceeding—of a daring attempt to falsify tradition—we have only to turn to the last Homily to discover that the Homilist did not place truthfulness very high in the scale of the virtues. There (Hom. xx.) the blameless Peter, the model of all that is good and Christian (or, as the author would say, “Jewish”), is represented as inciting an old man to utter a whole string of falsehoods in order to bring about the discomfiture of the arch-heretic, Simon Magus. If, then, the “lord” of the Homilist could be conceived as doing

* See Hilgenfeld, “*Historisch-Kritische Einleitung in das Neue Testament*,” 1875, p. 89, &c.

† Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* III. 3, 2.

‡ Mansel, “*The Gnostic Heresies*,” p. 221.

evil that good might come, the "servant" would not feel himself precluded from adopting a similar course.

That such a work as the Homilies could be produced in the second century must appear to all who consider it a most suggestive and significant fact, because it throws light upon the credulity, no less than upon the internal condition, of the communities which were known to the writer. Significant, too, is the fact, that within an hundred years of his death there appears at Rome, the scene of his martyrdom, a work in which the great Apostle of the Gentiles is not merely opposed on points of doctrine, but is represented as the bitterest and most unscrupulous enemy of the religion he was the foremost to avow and the boldest to defend. That Paul's teaching should be forgotten, as it was, very rapidly, is not surprising; he wrote many "things hard to be understood," especially hard to those who were strangers to the Law and its teaching. Hence, as Zeller* well points out, the simplicity of the Jewish-Christian doctrines as compared with those taught by Paul, told largely in favour of the former, and we are little astonished to find Christianity in the second century tending to become only a new form of legalism. But what may well surprise us is the unrelenting hate of that Jewish faction, which, not content with thwarting and saddening a noble life, continued its attacks with yet greater virulence upon the dead. We are thus helped in some measure to understand how keen was the opposition with which Paul had during his lifetime to contend.

It should perhaps be noticed here that the name of Paul does not occur anywhere in the Homilies, but it is abundantly evident that he is attacked under the guise of the magician Simon. Peter's enemy, the man who depends upon visions, and not upon personal intercourse, for his knowledge of Jesus, must be none other than Paul. But, be it observed, the magician is made to play more rôles than one, and it is sometimes a little difficult to know in which of his characters he is sup-

* "Vorträge und Abhandlungen," p. 242.

posed to present himself. That he does, however, at times personate the Apostle Paul is beyond doubt, and is especially worthy of remark.

The difficult literary question as to the relationship one to another of the Clementine writings, we do not propose to discuss here in detail. Such a discussion, to be at all adequate to the subject, would require to be extended to considerable length, and it is more than doubtful if any satisfactory conclusions could be obtained. The works on the Clementines of Hilgenfeld and Uhlhorn are devoted mainly to the question whether priority is to be given to the Homilies or to the Recognitions. Hilgenfeld* gives the priority to the Recognitions, and holds that they again embody other and older writings, notably the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρου*.

Uhlhorn† takes the opposite view, and believes the Recognitions to be an altered edition of the Homilies. He further tries to show that the original work upon which the Clementine writings in their present form are based must be referred to the sects of Eastern Syria.

Ritschl, in the first edition of his "Entstehung der Altkatholischen Kirche," supported the view propounded by Hilgenfeld; but in the second edition (1857) he abstained‡ from any argument on the subject, because of the complications in which it has become involved by the controversy carried on between Hilgenfeld and Uhlhorn.

Schliemann's work,§ which preceded those just mentioned, does not deal with the literary question at any length, but it is clearly at one with Uhlhorn in ascribing priority to the Homilies.

* Hilgenfeld, "Die Clementinischen Recognitionem und Homilien nach ihrem Ursprung und Inhalt dargestellt," 1848.

† Uhlhorn, "Die Homilien und Recognitionem des Clemens Rom. nach ihrem Ursprung und Inhalt dargestellt," 1854.

‡ See Ritschl, "Die Entstehung," &c, 2nd ed., p. 264, note 1.

§ Schliemann, "Die Clementinen nebst den verwandten Schriften und der Ebionitismus," 1844.

The latest book on the subject, which we have met with, is by Lehmann,* and is an attempt to show how the views of Hilgenfeld and Uhlhorn may be combined.

We must content ourselves here with stating with all brevity what appears to be the most plausible view of the matter. The resemblance of the Homilies to the Recognitions is such as to indicate that the one work is in the main a revision and modification of the other. But it is quite possible, though this cannot be absolutely proved, that both draw from some common and older work; and if so, it is not improbable that the Recognitions, though composed somewhat later, reproduce in parts that other work more faithfully than the Homilies. That the Recognitions do date from a later period, though probably not later by more than a few years, seems to be borne out by the fact that we find in them in regard to some points, e.g. the relation of Judaism to Christianity, greater agreement with what was later on the orthodox view than in the Homilies. This advance towards harmony with the tenets of the Old-Catholic Church also accounts for the greater circulation† of the Recognitions than of the Homilies. Did we possess the original of the Recognitions, the matter might be somewhat simplified, for it is difficult to say how much license the Latin translator, Rufinus, may have allowed himself. Certainly the quotations from the Gospels, in several cases in which the same quotation occurs in both works, are given with more accuracy in the Recognitions, and this may be due entirely to the translator. But the whole question is, for our present purpose, of no great moment. It is sufficient to say here that it appears more difficult to account for the Homilies as a revision of the Recognitions, than to account for the Recognitions as a modified version of the Homilies. Both works are remarkable productions of the period to which they belong; but it will hardly be denied that of the two the Homilies contain more that is striking and suggestive, that they have the more strongly

* J. Lehmann, "Die Clementinischen Schriften mit besonderer Rücksicht auf ihr literarisches Verhältniss," 1869.

† See Schliemann, "Die Clementinen," &c., pp. 127, 128, § 1.

marked individuality. It is on this account that we desire to examine the Homilies, as being a remarkable composition, throwing some light upon the tendencies and characteristics of a period which still remains enveloped in much obscurity. What Schwegler* has said of the "Acts of the Apostles" may be applied with more truth to this work: "On the whole, then, the 'Acts of the Apostles' has the value of an historical document only for that time, those conditions and that situation, to which it owes its origin, and in this view it certainly justifies very important inferences." In like manner, the Clementines help us to judge what were the influences the author found at work in the community for which he wrote, and we shall see how he sought to mediate between opposing parties, and to provide a theological system which he hoped might prove the basis of a union. To heathenism of all kinds he naturally offers uncompromising opposition, and towards the Gnosticism of Marcion he takes up a like position; yet to those who had leanings towards Gnosticism in general he offers a Gnostic system of his own. He favours the position of Jewish Christians by contending that Christianity is but Judaism, purged from the errors which had crept into and distorted it; while, on the other hand, he conciliates Gentile believers by dispensing with the rite of circumcision, and by representing Peter as the Apostle of the Gentiles. In a word, the author becomes, so far as parties inside the Church are concerned, "all things to all men," if perchance he may thereby unite all, and avert such dangers as he saw to be threatening Christianity in general, and such especially as affected Jewish Christians in particular.

From these general observations we pass on to give an analysis of the contents of the work.† The two letters which are

* Schwegler, "Das nachapostolische Zeitalter," Vol. II. p. 115.

† In preparing this essay I have used the text of the Homilies edited by Dressel, 1853. It is hardly necessary to observe that until Dressel's discovery of the "Codex Ottobonianus," nearly the half of Hom. xix. and the whole of Hom. xx. were missing. In giving quotations from the Homilies, I have in most instances availed myself of the translation published in Clark's "Ante-Nicene Christian Library," under the editorship of Dr. Roberts and Dr. Donaldson.

prefixed to the Homilies purport to be, the one from Peter to James, the bishop of Jerusalem, the other from Clement to James. The connection between these letters and the Homilies is, however, still a disputed question. Schliemann* thinks that both belong to the Homilies, and are intended not only to lend weight and authority to that work, but also mutually to support each other. Hilgenfeld† holds that the letters come from two distinct authors, and that they refer to two separate works, and denies that the Epistle of Peter to James can have any connection with the Homilies. Uhlhorn,‡ on the contrary, urges, as we think, with much force, reasons for believing that the Epistle of Peter to James is intended to stand as prologue to the Homilies, and that the Epistle of Clement to James has a similar relationship to the Recognitions. That this latter Epistle does not belong to the Homilies seems to be clear, partly because we miss in it characteristic peculiarities of style, and also because it contains one passage (that relating to the installation of Clement as bishop of Rome) which is evidently a close imitation of Hom. iii. 60. On the other hand, the letter of Peter to James agrees well both with the style and the dogmatic position of the Homilies, and we may therefore venture to assume, without entering into a fuller discussion of the question, that it was designed by our author to stand as the introduction to his work.

The letter seems to be intended to suggest to readers the idea that the Homilies which follow contain, so far as they go, Peter's real teaching, which was and had often been misrepresented by slanderers — and furthermore to leave the impression that the author has not told all he knows, since the *full* accounts of Peter's discourse are committed only to a select few, and must not be made known to the public at large. The letter contains merely a request that James would commit Peter's writings to the keeping of trusty men, who might be relied upon to interpret them aright. Following this

* "Die Clementinen," &c., pp. 80—85.

† "Die Clem. Recog.," &c., pp. 26—44.

‡ "Die Homilien," &c., p. 78 f.

letter is an account of the steps taken by James to carry out the wishes of his co-apostle. The elders are summoned together, and James tells them the purport of Peter's communication. He then states the qualifications of the man who can be entrusted with the precious documents: he must not only be a tried man, but he must also be circumcised (a qualification not specified by Peter); he must take an oath of fidelity to his trust; and finally he is to receive the writings but part at a time. The elders agree to the conditions proposed by their leader, thank God for giving them such a bishop, and then (the narrative continues) "*we* rose up and prayed to the God and Father of all," &c. The use of the first person in this last sentence is very remarkable. Its effect is to lead us to suppose that the account of the proceedings at Jerusalem is given by an eye-witness, by a member of that primitive church which might be supposed to be best able to know what was true Christian teaching and what not. Thus, as it seems to us, some light is thrown upon the connection between Peter's letter, the "*Contestatio*," and the Homilies. That letter and the report of James' speech are to bear independent witness to the importance of those discourses of which the Homilies are the epitome. It is worthy of notice that while in the body of the work Peter is represented as using a Gentile as his amanuensis, here in the preface James will entrust only the "circumcised" with matters of importance and confidence. Would it not seem as though our author here gives expression to his own deeply-rooted preference for Jewish Christians—a preference which would lead him, did expediency permit, to surround Peter as well as James with believers of the circumcision? As this cannot be, he contents himself with giving a momentary glimpse of that primitive church in which, if Gentiles were found at all, they at any rate occupied no positions of influence or importance, and in which the authority of the bishop, now beginning to be recognized by the church of the West, was submissively and cheerfully acknowledged by all.

Hom. i. In the first Homily, Clement tells us how he was first brought into contact with Peter. From his youth up he

had been perplexed with questionings to which he could obtain no satisfactory answers from the philosophers. At length he decided to go to Egypt to consult the necromancers of that country, that so his mind might be set at rest as to the immortality of the soul. Before this plan could be put into execution, the report reached Rome that a wonder-worker had appeared among the Jews, proclaiming among them the kingdom of the invisible God. Six months later, Clement heard more particulars about this new teacher and his doctrine, and determined to go to Judæa himself, that he might inquire into the matter. He is borne by adverse winds to Alexandria, where he falls in with Barnabas,* and receives from him instruction in the new faith. Barnabas soon leaves Alexandria, and Clement follows him as rapidly as he can to Cæsarea Stratonis, where he is introduced to Peter, "the most esteemed disciple of the man who had appeared in Judæa." Peter invites Clement to become his travelling companion, that so he may be thoroughly indoctrinated with the truth, listening to the addresses which are to be delivered from city to city till the goal of the apostle's journey, Rome, is reached. Clement concurs, and Peter proceeds to give his new disciple a discourse on the Prophet of Truth, who had appeared to deliver men from the results of their wickedness, and to let in upon them the light of heaven. The Prophet shows men things as they are, and gives them the certainty they cannot otherwise obtain. Clement is fully won over to the new faith by Peter, and is commissioned by the apostle to write out the discourse he had heard for transmission to James.

Hom. ii. Next morning he receives from Peter further instruction about the Prophet of Truth, to whom men ought to trust themselves as to an infallible guide. The doctrine of that prophet is, "that there is one God, whose work the world is; who, being altogether righteous, will certainly at some time

* It is noteworthy that Clement is instructed in Christian truth by *Barnabas*, the man from whom Paul parted company, and between whom and the apostle there was probably some more serious cause of disagreement (known to the early Church, though unknown to us) than the trifling matter relating to Mark.

render to every one according to his deeds." All the principles of the universe God has divided into pairs, e.g. heaven and earth, day and night, &c. Man he has made self-controlling, with the ability to be either righteous or unrighteous. Now in the rest of creation the better precedes that which is inferior—e.g. the heavens are first created, then the earth; but in the history of humanity the process is reversed, and from the first parents onwards the worse comes first and the better afterwards—e.g. first Cain, then Abel, &c.—first John the Baptist, then Christ—first Simon Magus, then Peter. Clement expresses a wish to know more about the magician, and receives a full account of him from two young men who once belonged to the company of Simon's followers. In this account Simon is represented as an ambitious Samaritan, who studied at Alexandria, became skilful in magic, and finally gave himself out to be a power greater than the Creator. At one time he was a disciple of John the Baptist, and in fact he became the Baptist's successor. He works miracles, but in doing so he is, unlike Christ, actuated by no feeling of compassion for mankind. Peter is about to meet this magician in public debate, and proceeds to prepare Clement's mind for a right understanding of the matters to be discussed, by telling him that the Scriptures have been falsified, and that their falsification has been permitted in order that the fidelity of men to their Maker may be tested. It was with a view to this that the Master said, "Be ye good money-changers," separating what is true from what is false. Against God and just men, therefore, we must believe nothing bad, even on the authority of Scripture—e.g. Adam did not sin, Noah never drank to excess, and so on.

Hom. iii. On the following day Peter informs his attendants that Simon has changed the subject of the debate, and is going to argue that the Scriptures teach polytheism. That the Scriptures do admit of such an argument, Peter does not deny; but he asserts that all passages which lend support to any but a monotheistic conception of God have been inserted into Holy Writ by the evil one, whose office it is to find out and destroy

such as are ready to accept untrue teaching in respect of the Deity. The only infallible guide to the truth is the Prophet of Truth, who knows all things, and, unlike false prophets, speaks in clear, intelligible words, and has the prophetic spirit not spasmodically, but as a permanent possession. Those who teach error would find no credence did men rightly understand the doctrine of pairs. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the first man was created in the likeness of God, and therefore possessed the Divine Spirit, and was entirely free from sin. He has re-appeared in different forms and under different names, proclaiming the truth, but in his own time he will receive the reward of his labours and obtain eternal rest. Along with the primal man, Adam, was created another being of much inferior nature, who is the source of false prophecy. "The male is wholly truth, the female wholly falsehood. But he who is born of the male and the female, in some things speaks truth, in some falsehood." Hearing that the time has arrived for the disputation with Simon to commence, Peter goes forth, and, greeting the assembly with a salutation of peace, urges his hearers to follow that manner of life which is pleasing to God, that so they may obtain peace. God is the bestower of all good, and it is but right that man should acknowledge his Maker, and refuse to admit that any being shares the Creator's throne. Simon hereupon accuses Peter of imposing upon the people by teaching them that there is but one God, not Gods, in opposition to the Jewish Scriptures. According to these Scriptures, urges Simon, the Creator is subject to passions and characterized by defects not compatible with the nature of the Highest God. To this Peter replies that the passages adduced by Simon in support of his position "were not written by a prophetic hand." The teaching of Christ forms a test by which we may find out what in the Scriptures is true and what false—thus, e.g., Christ says that heaven and earth shall pass away, but not one jot or tittle shall fail from the Law. Now heaven and earth still endure, but sacrifices, &c., have passed away, showing that they were not true ordinances of God.

After three days' discussion, Simon runs away to Tyre. Peter sees the advisability of pursuing his enemy, but first he has to make arrangements for the church at Cæsarea. He calls the faithful together, and after pointing out the benefits accruing to a community from a monarchic form of government, nominates Zaccheus as his successor. Peter then expatiates upon the special duties, responsibilities and hopes of bishops. It belongs to the bishop to command, to the congregation to obey; to disobey the bishop is to disobey Christ. That he may be free from worldly care, the congregation should make provision for the bodily necessities of their bishop, and he is to be assisted in the discharge of the functions of his office by elders and deacons.

Obliged himself to tarry for a few days at Cæsarea, Peter sends forward Clement and two others, that they may learn what Simon is doing at Tyre, and report accordingly.

Hom. iv. Arrived at Tyre, Clement and his friends learn that Simon has made a great impression upon the people of the town, and has persuaded them that Peter is a dangerous magician. Next morning comes news that Simon has gone on to Sidon, leaving behind him at Tyre three of his followers, one of whom, Appion, is known to Clement. The remainder of Hom. iv., and the whole of Homs. v. and vi., are taken up with conversations between Clement and Appion and Appion's friends on the subject of religion. Clement justifies his departure from the creed of his fathers, and dwells upon the demoralizing tendency of heathen mythologies. There is little that is specially worthy of note in these conversations, which are brought to a close by the arrival of Peter. The apostle stays but a few days at Tyre, and then passes on to Sidon. At both towns he delivers addresses, heals those who had been smitten with diseases by Simon, founds churches, and appoints bishops. The burden of his teaching is, that men should believe in the one God, follow the precepts of the Prophet of Truth, be baptized, abstain from the use of animal food, live purely, and, finally, do to others as they would that others should do to them. From Sidon, Peter goes to Beyrout, and thence to Tripolis, where he makes a stay of three months' duration.

Hom. viii. He finds that Simon has again fled at his approach. The people of Tripolis displaying great anxiety to hear him, Peter takes occasion to remark that the "call" to hear the truth is of God, and that merely to listen to any teacher, be he Moses or Jesus, constitutes in itself no claim to reward. Further, it matters not to which of the teachers sent by God a man gives credence, for they all have one and the same doctrine to impart. But mere belief which does not issue in action is of no account; good actions springing from free will, these alone insure reward. To the multitudes assembled to hear him, Peter discourses on the fall of man. The first man, who was created in the Divine image, instructed his offspring in the ways of godliness. Men soon, however, proved ungrateful to God and forgot Him, since they had no experience of ills obliging them to seek His aid. Then the angels "who dwell in the lowest region" of heaven descended to earth to punish the ungrateful, and to show men how they ought to live. But these angels having taken upon themselves the nature of man, became subject to the lusts of the flesh, fell into grievous sin, and so lost the power of returning to their former estate. From the union of these angels with the daughters of men sprang a race of giants, who, not content with the food provided for the use of man, began to eat animals, then lapsed into cannibalism, and went from bad to worse, till at last God sent a deluge which destroyed all mankind, save only the family of one righteous man. It was then prescribed by Divine law that demons should have no power over men unless these latter willingly submitted themselves to them, sacrificing to them, or eating flesh or anything else unclean. To the people of Tripolis who had come under the power of the demons, Peter counsels repentance, and says he is commissioned to preach to them remission of sins by baptism, which is a wedding garment, fitting the wearer to appear at the supper of God.

Hom. ix. In his next discourse, Peter shows how sin revived in the earth after the flood. Noah reigned in peace and concord over his descendants for 350 years; but when he died, men began to display ambition to rule, and some, to gain their object,

practised magical arts, like Nebrod, "whom the Greeks call Zoroaster," who was destroyed by lightning and afterwards worshipped as a god. The worship of images also sprang up, and was accompanied by foolish and hideous ceremonies. In the place of such forms of worship, Peter now offers his hearers the true merchandise by which the purchaser will be freed from the rule of demons. Demons enter the bodies of men to enjoy pleasures which are beyond the reach of incorporeal spirits. Hence men should live chastely and soberly, and avoid the excesses so grateful to their adversaries. Those who obey God and bathe in flowing water, using the thrice-blessed invocation, both exorcise the demons from themselves and have power also to drive them from others.

Hom. x. In the tenth Homily, Peter reminds the people of Tripolis that though by ingratitude they have lost the blessings enjoyed by unfallen man, they may yet regain all by following the instruction of the Prophet of Truth. The single fear of God will dispel many groundless and hurtful fears—as, e.g., that of idols the work of men's hands, which can do neither good nor harm. They are guilty of great sin and will be eternally punished who venture to apply the name of God to any but the Most High. The Deity is distinguished from all other beings by this, that as He is the Creator of all, so He is also the best of all.

Hom. xi. In his fourth discourse at Tripolis, Peter especially enjoins upon his hearers the duty of respecting man, who is made in the image of God, and bids them transfer to man the honour they have been accustomed to bestow upon forms which are in no way images of the Deity. If any one ask why man was made liable to err, he should be reminded that goodness is the result of free choice, so that without the freedom which may issue in evil, there could be no true goodness. Those who act contrary to the law of God must expect punishment both here and hereafter. True, those who keep the law suffer here as well as those who rebel against God; but in the case of the former, the punishment is inflicted here and now, so that in another world the soul may be set free

from punishment. It should be distinctly understood, however, that none can justifiably entertain hopes for the future unless they be baptized. Only those who have become regenerate by plunging in the living waters can obtain remission of sins and escape eternal punishment.

At the end of his sojourn at Tripolis, Peter baptizes Clement; and having healed a multitude of sick folk, he sets out in further pursuit of Simon Magus.

Hom. xii. At Antaradus, a remark made by Clement leads Peter to make inquiry as to the former's personal history. Clement answers that his father and mother were both related to Cæsar; that soon after his own birth, his mother left Rome with her two elder sons, saying that she had been warned by a dream to leave the city for twelve years; that after her departure, no word from her reached her husband, who at length, leaving Clement alone at Rome, set out in search of her and the children, and of him in like manner nothing had since been heard. In the course of the day on which this story is told, Peter falls in with a miserable beggar-woman, whom he questions as to the cause of her sorrow, and finds that she is none other than Mattidia, Clement's long-lost mother. She explains that she left Rome to escape the unchaste overtures made to her by her husband's brother, that the vessel in which she sailed was wrecked, her sons were drowned, and she herself was cast on the island (Aradus), on which Peter found her. Here she was kindly treated by a poor widow, with whom she had since lived, and for whose support, as well as her own, she now asked alms. Naturally Mattidia leaves her island home that she may henceforth live with her son Clement. But before quitting Aradus, she insists upon going to say farewell to her widow friend. This act of kindly thoughtfulness leads Peter later on to explain to his followers the nature of *philanthropy*. The philanthropic man does good to and loves both the righteous and the unrighteous, and for all alike he wishes what he desires for himself. Such love for man as man may be called the *masculine* part of philanthropy. The complementary feminine part takes the form of

compassion shown to those in misfortune. The fear of God is the beginning of philanthropy, for such fear incites a man to do the acts of love, and doing the acts, love itself comes to him and endows him with immortality.

Hom. xiii. On reaching Laodiceæ, Peter comes up with the advanced guard of his party, among whom are Nicetas and Aquila, the two young men* who had once been among the disciples of Simon. It now turns out that these young men are none other than the twin sons whom Mattidia thought to have been drowned at the time when she and they were wrecked. They explain that they were picked up at sea by robbers, and sold to a Jewess, who had cared for and educated them. Mattidia now begs that she may be baptized without delay, that so she may be able to take her meals with her sons and enjoy unrestrained intercourse with them. Peter, however, protests that she must fast at least one day before she can be baptized.

The remainder of the Homily is a discourse upon chastity, in which Peter explains the virtues and characteristics of a chaste wife, remarking finally, that such is the virtue of chastity, that "were there not a law that no unbaptized person, though just, may enter the kingdom of God, perchance the erring Gentiles might be saved on the score of chastity alone." But, as it is, baptism, not chastity, is the indispensable passport to heaven.

Hom. xiv. The day of fasting completed, Mattidia is baptized, and afterwards takes food along with her sons and Peter. The apostle then narrates an incident that had occurred just after the baptismal ceremony: an old man had accosted him, and warned him not to be led astray by the idea that there is a God, for that "all things are subject to *Genesis*." While Peter narrates further the conversation he had had with the stranger, the old man makes his appearance, and is at once recognized by Mattidia as her husband Faustus.

Hom. xv. Next day Peter has a conversation with Faustus,

* See Hom. ii.

and tries to win him to the true faith. Faustus replies that he has been carefully thinking over Peter's doctrines, and that he cannot see his way clear to accept that relating to philanthropy. Peter tries to meet the old man's difficulties by explaining the doctrine at length. He states that there are two worlds, the present and the future, and man is left free to choose to which he will belong. If he choose the future kingdom, then he is here only by sufferance, and must seek to be pleasing to all, and be content to go without earthly possessions.

However, Peter promises that he will give Faustus a complete course of instruction in the true religion, beginning with the doctrine of the one God.

Hom. xvi. Simon, hearing that Peter is going to discourse on the "monarchy" of God, sets out for Laodiceæ, that he may confront the apostle, and if possible confute his arguments. It is arranged that Faustus shall be the umpire of the debate. Peter sets out with the assertion that "there is one God, who has made the heavens and the earth and all things therein." Simon quotes passages to show that the Scriptures teach the existence of "gods." The apostle replies by giving quotations in support of his position, and points out that "each one finds in the Scriptures whatever opinion he wishes to have in regard to God." Guided by the teaching of Christ and the traditions of their fathers, the pious Jews know how to separate what is true from what is false, and to reject all teaching which militates against the oneness of the Deity. In reply to an insinuation to the contrary, Peter affirms that Christ did not claim to be God, but he regarded those as blessed who called him *Son* of God. Between him and the Deity was all the difference that there is between the begotten and the unbegotten. After some further conversation, Simon ends the discussion for that day by saying that on the morrow he will prove that Christ did not hold the Demiurge to be the Highest God.

Hom. xvii. When the debate is renewed next day, Peter explains that our Lord did not spend his time on earth in working out elaborate arguments, but stated such opinions as

he wished to those who were able to appreciate what he said. The chief commandment he gave was, "To fear the Lord, and to serve Him only." By God, our Lord meant the Being whose face the angels evermore behold; for He has a shape, the most beautiful of all, that the pure in heart may see Him. God is the heart of the universe, sending forth as from a centre the life-giving, incorporeal power; and He is the point of rest of the universe, drawing to Himself, as the sun the mountain mists, the souls that long for Him. Simon interrupts Peter abruptly with the question, "How do men obtain knowledge most accurately, by the hearing of the ear, or by visions?" To this Peter replies, that he who trusts to apparitions may be misled by evil demons; at any rate, it is impossible to question apparitions and put them to the test in the way in which, e.g., the disciples questioned their Master. Visions are sent to the impious as well as to the pious—in fact, visions frequently are indications of God's wrath.

Hom. xviii. The next discussion is commenced by Simon, who starts by asking Peter if the Demiurge is he who gave the Law, because if so, then, *quæ* lawgiver, he is just. But the God whom Jesus revealed is good. Therefore, since goodness and justice do not harmonize, the Demiurge and the Father are not one and the same Being. Peter meets this by showing that goodness and justice are not absolutely opposed; God is good as bestowing temporal blessings upon all alike, but just as the Judge of all. But, urges Simon, Jesus evidently spoke of a God who was unrevealed and unknown when he said, "No man has known the Father, but the Son," &c. Peter answers that these words refer to those who suppose David to be the father of Christ, and do not know that God is his Father. It is evident that to some the Father has been revealed; thus Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, all had knowledge of God. Owing to their sinfulness, men have received false impressions respecting the Deity, and have accepted those Scriptures which have been written only to test their fidelity to the Creator. Yet, if all the Scriptures say were true, it would still be man's duty to worship the Creator, because He

is the Creator. By his spirit of ingratitude, Simon plainly shows that he is "the servant of wickedness." Here Simon breaks in with the question, "Whence has evil arisen?" Peter promises to discuss this subject next day, and invites Simon to come to hear him.

Hom. xix. That there is a devil the apostle does not deny, and he also affirms that the devil was created by God. It does not follow that blame is to be attached to the Creator on this account, for the existence of the wicked one may be a necessity. God produced the first four substances—heat, cold, moisture and dryness—and mixing these, formed them into a being who chooses to destroy the wicked, a choice which is taken in accordance with Divine determination. *Matter* is not opposed to God; the ills to which it seems to give rise are ills only in consequence of man's sin. Evil has not an eternal existence, for being synonymous with pain and death, it is manifestly only a negation. Upon Simon asking whether the inequality of men's lot does not seem very unjust, Peter answers that the needy and the sick are intended to prove helps to the growth in piety of the righteous, and further that those who are now humble and distressed may, if they will, some day obtain a different lot. Simon shows some anxiety to bring the discussion to a close, and promises that after three days he will return and refute all the apostle has advanced. Faustus declares Simon has been beaten by Peter, and expresses his belief that the conquered will not venture to face the conqueror again.

Hom. xx. In the concluding Homily, Peter gives his followers a fuller statement of his views as to the origin of evil and its place in the economy of the world. He sets out with the assertion that God has appointed two kingdoms, that of the present world and that of the world to come. If men do evil, they come under the power of the king of this world, whose delight it is to destroy his subjects; but those who live righteously belong to the other king, who is actuated by love to man and the desire to save. These kings are equally eager to accomplish God's will. The elements which constitute the

being of the wicked one will be re-adjusted at the end of this world, and he himself will then become good.

Sophonias, one of Peter's followers, suggests that as God is unchangeable, therefore that which goes forth from Him must be of the same substance and disposition as Himself. To this Peter answers that, though God is not changeable in the sense in which men change and grow old, yet in another sense He is most changeable, since He is capable of making Himself into whatever He desires. The good king and the wicked one are not produced by God in precisely the same way, for the wicked one, having his origin in a combination of elements, has in him something accidental; not so the good king, who is really God's Son, free from the effects of external combinations.

The Homily closes with the account of a stratagem employed by Simon to avoid being arrested by Cornelius the centurion, and of a counter stratagem resorted to by Peter, in accordance with which Faustus, personating Simon, publicly recants the slanders and heresies circulated abroad by the magician.

Our analysis has perhaps run to undue length, but a clear view as to the general outline of the work under examination will facilitate a more detailed treatment of special points in its teaching. At first sight it appears as though the author intended the Homilies to resemble the Scriptures (according to his view of them) as nearly as possible in this respect, that every one may find in them whatever doctrine he wishes to find. No doubt this was to some extent his intention, and it is only by bearing this in mind that many striking inconsistencies in the Homilies are to be explained. Anxious to influence as many parties in the Church as possible, our author makes concessions here and there—throws out sops to one and to another—to break down opposition and to put unwary readers still more off their guard. Naturally this style of procedure renders it the more difficult to discover what the writer's system really is. To find our way through the maze, it will be best to seize upon the doctrine which is most often insisted upon, and which is the centre from which the rest of the system

radiates, so that, having determined our author's conception of this doctrine, we may have a clue to guide us to a right understanding of the other parts of his system. The doctrine to which we refer is that of the *oneness of God*. The foregoing analysis will have made it abundantly evident how careful the Homilist is to emphasize this article of his creed—and naturally so, seeing that he undertakes to do battle with Gnosticism and Polytheism. The idea is repeatedly expressed in one form or another, either as coming from Christ, or as Peter's own independent conviction, that there is but one God, the Creator of the world, to whom alone man's homage and service are due (Hom. ii. 12, xvi. 5, 14, xvii. 7, &c.). "Impiety" is declared to be "to die saying that there is another God, whether superior or inferior, or in any way saying that there is one besides Him who really is" (Hom. iii. 7); and we are told that "Worthy of rejection is every one who is willing so much as to hear anything against the monarchy (*μοναρχία*) of God" (Hom. iii. 9). So far as the oneness of the Deity is concerned, we may safely assert that the Homilist (one or two peculiar passages, which will fall to be considered afterwards, not being excepted) is consistent throughout. But while it is easy to discover that the first article of our author's creed is, that "there is but one God," it is not so easy to determine how he conceives this unity—whether as a unity including or excluding all particular being. In Hom. xvii. 7, we find this passage: "Judging Him to be the All (*τὸ Πᾶν*) and man to be His image—He being unseen, but His image man being seen—whoso wishes to worship Him, honours His visible image." In chap. x. of the same Homily we read: "He [God] alone is, sometimes comprehensible, sometimes incomprehensible," &c.; and in the chapter immediately preceding this last it is stated: "One, then, is the God who truly exists, who presides in a superior shape, being the heart of that which is above and that which is below. . . . Wherever He may be, He is as it were in the centre of the Infinite, being the limit of the universe." Now this idea, that God is the heart or the centre of the universe, seems to give the connecting link between the pantheistic con-

ception of Him as "the All," and anthropomorphic conceptions which assign to the Deity a definite form and members after the fashion of a man. God is all, the Homilist would seem to mean, in so far as He is the centre from which the universe radiates, the heart from which all existence is vitalized, and the limit of the action of this vitalizing principle is the limit of being. Neither the world nor any of its parts is God (Hom. x. 20). God does not merge Himself in the world; He has an existence apart from it, though the world has no existence without Him as its heart. This being, as we understand him, our author's position, it becomes intelligible how he can at one moment speak of God as τὸ Πᾶν, and at the next as the Being who has the most beautiful shape, after the pattern of which He has fashioned man. In fact, the writer's pantheism is more apparent than real, and we shall presently see that a similar remark applies to his anthropomorphism. Being asked by Simon if he really believes that man has been moulded after the shape of the Deity, Peter answers, "I am really quite certain, Simon, that this is the case" (Hom. xvi. 19). So again in Hom. xvii. 7, "He moulded man in His own shape, as the grandest seal," &c. A few sentences before this last quotation we read that "He [God] has shape, and He has every limb primarily and solely for beauty's sake, and not for use. For He has not eyes that He may see with them, for He sees on every side. . . . But He has the most beautiful shape on account of man, that the pure in heart may be able to see Him, that they may rejoice because they suffered." Thus the resemblance in shape of man to God is, if we may so say, only of the most superficial kind, since the limitations attaching to the human are entirely absent from the Divine form. Further, God is not by His nature restricted to any one form, so that if He takes that of man it is because of His love to man. "He is able to convert Himself into whatever he wishes" (Hom. xx. 6). This being so, obviously "we ought not to attribute to God all the qualities of man" (xx. 6), these latter having bodies which are not convertible, and so on. Indeed, it appears from another passage (Hom. xix. 10) that human attributes are ascribed to

God, only because otherwise we should be doomed to silence about Him. Peter says, "If we must not, in our investigations in regard to God, give Him the good attributes which belong to man, it is not possible for us to have any thought or to make any statement" in regard to Him. So, then, anthropomorphic expressions are employed respecting the Deity as being only approximately, not literally, true in such application, and we are reminded that it is "in an incomparable way" that God possesses the better attributes of man. Unable to abide by the category of pure being, or to rest satisfied with ascribing to God existence and nothing more, the Homilist seeks to fill up his conception of the Deity by borrowing determinations from man, who, as the highest in the scale of earthly beings, may be regarded as giving, of those beings, fullest expression to the nature of the Creator.

It seems to indicate some confusion of ideas when it is said, and this very frequently, that man is made in God's image; and on the other hand, in a passage quoted above, that God has the most beautiful shape on account of man. Probably the difficulty is to be solved by understanding that man is made after the fashion of God's invisible body, but that when God makes Himself visible, He does so in a human form of transcendent beauty.

Baur* and Uhlhorn regard the Homilist's conceptions of the Deity as fundamentally opposed to one another, and account for this by saying that he had two objects in view, a metaphysical and an ethical, each demanding its appropriate doctrine of God. We have attempted to show, on the contrary, that what the writers above named consider totally different conceptions of the Deity, differ only as embracing more or fewer determinations—that which is called the "metaphysical" being the less, the "ethical" the more determined.

We start, then, with the assumption that there is one God—a Being who at once informs the universe with His life, yet

* See Uhlhorn, "*Die Homilien*," &c., p. 175.

transcends it—who knows no limit but that of His own nature, yet localizes Himself and assumes a limited, definite form.

But if God be the one, how can He be conceived as positing another than Himself—a world He can set over against Himself, as an object to be loved, punished, and so forth? How is the absolute unity to be broken up, and how are we to think the creation of the universe? In one curious passage (Hom. xvi. 12), our author represents the Deity as rejoicing with His own wisdom. So far, however, from being a person in the Deity, and so giving rise to a dualism, this wisdom, we are told, is united to God as His soul, and “is extended by Him as a hand fashioning the universe.” Then follow these words, which, if allowed to stand in their present connection, would give to what precedes them a very different meaning: “on this account also one man was made, and from him went forth also the female,” thus giving us to understand that as was the relation of Adam to Eve, so is the relation of God to His spirit. But this cannot be, since it would involve a complete dualism, and be utterly fatal to the Homilist’s favourite doctrine of monotheism. The words, “on this account,” &c., seem to us a clumsy interpolation. The harsh break they cause in the context, and the strange view they present of the relationship of Eve to Adam, oblige us to regard them as spurious.* To say that Eve went forth from Adam is in direct contradiction of Hom. iii. 22, where it is stated that “a companion was created along with him [Adam], a female nature much differing from him,” &c. Thus, instead of going forth from Adam, the female is created with him, and the relationship of the first human pair to one another affords no parallel to that subsisting between the Deity and His wisdom, or spirit. That God is represented as rejoicing in His wisdom, and as using it as the instrument wherewith He creates, seems only

* Uhlhorn (“Die Hom.,” &c., p. 172) thinks the words *ἐκ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.*, must be considered as forming a parenthesis, if indeed they are not a later interpolation; or possibly they have been taken out of their original connection, and are wrongly placed where they now stand.

intended to indicate that God is self-conscious, and that creation is the outcome of self-conscious thought.

But what conception does the Homilist form of the material out of which the universe was made? Does he adopt a theory of "creation out of nothing," or does he assume an ever-existing "Hyle," upon which God wrought as an artificer?

Certainly he speaks of the substance of the body of the wicked one as ever-existing (Hom. xx. 8), and says further that it is impossible to maintain that there was a time when God possessed nothing (Hom. xix. 17); and again, in Hom. iii. 33, it is stated that out of the one, first, simple substance, God made four elements, the combinations of which have resulted in the various forms of created beings. Now when the writer speaks of God as never being without possession, or, again, as always being a ruler, he clearly means that there never was a time when God was mere blank unity. God is conceived of as self-conscious, and as such was ever object to Himself. May not, therefore, the *ὁντία* possessed by and ruled by Him be none other than Himself—that is to say, Himself with His world of ideas? That this idea, that God becomes object to Himself, is not foreign to our author's mind, is shown by his conception, alluded to above, that the Deity takes concrete, human form, yet is not this form—i.e. He does not act through it, or limit Himself by it—in other words, He sets Himself as object in this form over against Himself as subject. But God, we have seen, has the power to change His form by means of His spirit—i.e. of His thought—and it is by this changing from form to form that the Homilist would have us think the origination, as separate existences, of the four elements—heat, cold, moist, dry—which constitute the universe. We must, however, guard against considering this as a temporal process, a succession of changes; it is rather the breaking up of the one *ὁντία*, the thought of the one as many—a conception which recurs in the doctrine that each individual man is a union of contradictories.

It does not seem correct to say, with Uhlhorn,* that in Hom.

* "Die Hom.," &c., p. 182.

xx. 6 (where God's power to change His body is spoken of), "the Hyle is conceived of as the body of the Deity;" for, on the one hand, the author is careful to avoid any mention of a Hyle, and, on the other hand, although the word *σῶμα* is used, it evidently is intended, as in Hom. xvii. 7, to be understood as indicating something purely ideal. Why four elements are chosen to form the universe, and how we are to conceive the transition from the world of ideas to that of material reality, the Homilist does not tell us. Probably he is here intentionally obscure, because, had he been more explicit, he must almost of necessity have lapsed into some sort of dualism. Uhlhorn* is certainly right when he says that the Clementines do not teach a doctrine of Emanation, since the four *δυνάμεις*, the *τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα*, proceed from God at once as four, and not in succession one after another. But when in support of this it is said that the Homilies represent God Himself as changing, and so have not, like genuine Emanation theories, an unchanged source of change, there is some misunderstanding. Uhlhorn appeals to Hom. xx. 6, where we are told that God, by His spirit and by a power which cannot be described, becomes whatever He wishes. But here it is distinctly implied that there *is* an unchanged cause of change—the Spirit which remains the same through all the forms it wills to adopt.

The unity of the primary *δυνάμεις* having been broken up, we find that the result of the disintegration is a system of opposing principles. Each of those principles, which in God loses its individuality in the harmony of the Divine unity, finds for itself distinct and separate expression. For instance, God is good and just, and in His universe there are two kingdoms corresponding to these attributes, each kingdom presided over by its characteristic ruler. "God . . . being Himself one, has distinguished all principles into pairs and opposites . . . having made heaven and earth, day and night," &c. (Hom. ii. 15). This series of pairs (or Syzygies)—"heaven and earth, day and night," &c.—is continued in the same order, i.e. the better first, the weaker or worse after, till it reaches man. The two sets of

* "Die Hom.," &c., p. 181.

principles which have thus branched out from God converge upon man and re-unite in him—re-unite, however, only to separate again, that they may return to the higher unity, God. But, starting from man, the order of the Syzygies is reversed. “Whereas from Him [God] the greater things come first and the inferior second, we find the opposite in men—the first worse and the second superior” (Hom. ii. 16). From man onwards, as regards the order of the pairs, what had been last becomes first, and the first last.

It is necessary now to inquire more particularly into the nature of the first pair of opposites—the good king and the evil, the Son and the Devil. What is their relation to God?

Distinctly they have not the peculiar attributes of the God-head. “We call Him God whose peculiar attributes cannot belong to the nature of any other” (Hom. xvi. 17). “It is the peculiarity of the Father not to have been begotten, but of the Son to have been begotten” (Hom. xvi. 16). Thus the Son has a personality completely distinct from that of the Father, a personality which distinguishes the Son also from the *Pneuma*.^{*} This latter is certainly to be thought of as impersonal. We have already seen that the mention of the *Pneuma* is introduced to convey the idea that God is self-conscious; and if the writer goes on to call this Spirit “the Creator,” this implies only that God as thinking provides the objects of His thought.

It may be well to notice here in passing that no Logos doctrine can be connected with the “Son” of the Homilist. On the one hand, this is not a Son who could say, “I and the Father are one” (John x. 30); and on the other hand, in opposition to the Logos doctrine of the philosophic schools, this Son is, as remarked above, a personality. In one point the Son here mentioned does remind us of the Logos of the fourth Gospel, viz., that in neither case is Son or Logos employed to absolve God from the necessity of working in creation, or to banish Him from immediate contact with His creatures. On the contrary, both the fourth Gospel and the Homilies repre-

^{*} See Uhlhorn, “Die Hom.,” &c., p. 184, in answer to Schliemann.

sent the Deity as Himself working in the world, and as a Being who is to be worshipped immediately, and not through any lower or substitutionary divinity.

Uhlhorn* holds that, according to our author, the Son is formed from the *pneumatic* side of the Deity, and urges that "it is impossible he can have proceeded from the *σῶμα* of God," because in Hom. xvii. 16 it is said, "No one can see the incorporeal power, not only of the Son, but even of an angel." But the construction put upon this passage is hardly borne out by the context in which it stands. A little earlier in the chapter we read: "For I maintain that the eyes of mortals cannot see the incorporeal form of the Father or the Son, because it is illumined by great light" This plainly means, not that the Father and the Son have *no* form, *no* *σῶμα*, but that they have not (when they are to mortal eyes invisible) a form or a *σῶμα* adapted to human sense. To draw a sharp line of distinction between created beings as pneumatic and somatic, does not seem to be consistent with the system of the Homilies, according to which all created things are to some extent pneumatic. All, then, that the Homilies warrant us in saying here is, that the Son has of all beings the most immediate resemblance to God, inasmuch as he is produced most immediately and with least change from God; but whether from the Divine spirit, or body, or both, was to the Homilist immaterial. Were the Son, however, pure *Pneuma*, surely he would be complete in himself, and would not be merely one member of a *Syzygy*. This last fact alone, it may be pointed out—that the Son is but a member of a *Syzygy*—is sufficient to preclude us from thinking here of a Son of God who could claim to be equal with God.

To this Son has been committed the world to come. The other member of his *Syzygy*, his complement, is the king of this world, the devil, ὁ πονηρός. The teaching of the Homilist as to this being is given, as our analysis shows, most fully in the concluding Homilies. In these Peter discusses the exist-

* "Die Hom.," &c., p. 185.

ence of the devil, partly in public with Simon, partly in private with his own friends. It is not easy to discover the apostle's position in regard to the matter from Hom. xix., and we learn from Hom. xx. 1, that his utterances were intentionally obscure. In Hom. xx., however, he professes to state his real convictions without reserve.

From what we have already seen of our author's system, we should say, that it cannot admit the existence of an evil spirit setting himself in direct opposition to God. Nor can the devil be regarded as a fallen spirit, for it is explicitly stated that man alone has the power to *become* righteous or unrighteous. The devil is, in fact, God's creature as much as the Son; nay, so close is his connection with the Deity, that if the Son is God's right hand, the devil is His left—with the one God makes alive, with the other he kills. That the evil one,* "who has been so composed as to rejoice in afflicting the impious," is not to be thought of as evil in the sense of opposing himself to God, is plain from the assertion that he serves God blamelessly. "I indeed allow," says Peter (Hom. xx. 9), "that the evil one does no evil, inasmuch as he is accomplishing the law given to him. And although he has an evil disposition, yet through fear of God he does nothing unjustly; but accusing the teachers of truth, so as to entrap the unwary, he is himself named the accuser." The devil is, according to this view, himself not morally evil, but he is the being who has been put in charge of those who are morally corrupt. He has to find out such persons by testing their allegiance to the truth, and should they prove to be unfaithful, it is his duty to inflict upon them the punishment appropriate to their guilt. So far from delighting in wickedness, he takes delight only in its punishment. But although the devil is thus shown to act in entire harmony with the Divine will, or rather to be one of the agents by which expression is given to that will, his relation to the Deity is yet declared to differ somewhat from that of the Son. The difference is, that the evil one has not derived

* Hom. xx. 3.

his disposition directly from the Father of his substance, God, but owes it to the peculiar combination of the elements of which that substance is composed. It was clearly necessary that the Homilist should draw some distinction between the composition of the two kings, and that this distinction should be an "accident" attaching to the nature of the king of this world, partly because, this world being but temporary, some provision must needs be made for a change in its king, and partly because of popular prejudice, which would be shocked, as was Micah (Hom. xx. 8), at the idea that the good king and the evil are brothers. Accordingly, we are told that when the kingdom of this world has run its allotted course and the work of Satan is accomplished, that then, "by a change in his composition," he can lose the disposition which delights in punishment and destruction, and "become good;" that is, he can become willing and fitted to throw in his lot with the kingdom of him whose delight it is to save; he will cease to find darkness his congenial element, and will be translated into the kingdom of light.

This, then, is represented as Peter's real opinion—an opinion to be expressed only in the circle of his immediate followers—that the evil one does no evil; and consequently the term *ὁ πονηρός* indicates only that the being to whom it is applied is he who has to deal with such as do evil. Our author preserves, moreover, an appearance of agreement with prevalent ideas as to the nature of the devil, by constantly speaking of him as "the wicked one," "the evil one," and so forth,—an appearance which, for the popular mind, would not be much disturbed by the utterances of the two last Homilies, many of which are carefully shrouded in dark, obscure phrases, and are thus calculated to arouse the least amount of suspicion.

When Uhlhorn* says that, according to the Homilies, "evil must be conceived of as *necessary*, i.e. must be denied," the statement seems to be open to objection. The devil, it is true, is represented as necessarily existing, but he is neither evil

* "Die Hom.," &c., p. 198.

himself nor the source of evil. He is God's punitive power, which is called into action as soon as man has sinned. In fact, in spite of the foregoing remark as to the necessity of his existence, we may say that the position of the Homilist is, that the devil is made for man, not man for the devil; i.e. the author is compelled by the actual sinfulness of man to posit the existence of a power which punishes guilt, and this power he traces up to God, and in this way regards the devil as necessary; but that the sin the evil one is created to punish is not necessary, is one of the most certain and distinct teachings of the Homilies, as we shall see by looking at their conception of man.

God and man are the two poles of the system, and all that lies between serves only as a means to connect them. If asked what are the main characteristics of man, our author would reply, first, that he is created in God's image, and second, that he is free.

We have seen above that the two lines of the Syzygies cross in man, giving him an indeterminate position such as is held by no other member of the universe. Everything else belongs by its nature to one of the two worlds—to that which is, or to that which is to be; but man can belong to either, according to his own free choice. It is not for us to say here whether this freedom of indifference is any freedom at all; it is sufficient for our purpose to know that the Homilist considers it so, and lays especial stress upon the fact that man is in possession of such freedom. But if we ask whether the first man, Adam, possessed this quality, we are told "No," inasmuch as he was fashioned directly by the hands of God—had His great and holy spirit of foreknowledge (Hom. iii. 17)—was ignorant of nothing (iii. 18)—did not sin (ii. 52); in a word, he belonged wholly to the good king, and the prince of this world had nothing in him. Not in Adam, then, did the opposing lines of the Syzygies find their meeting-point, but in his descendants, who are the offspring of himself and of the complementary member of the combination, woman. It is at this point, in his idea of woman, that our author seems to introduce disorder into his system, just as it is to woman he traces up the mani-

fold disorders of the universe. Along with Adam, we are told, was created "a female nature, much differing from him, as quality from substance," &c. (Hom. iii. 22). It might be expected that the first parents would be distinguished as belonging respectively to the future and to the present world, but it is not a little surprising to learn that "the male is wholly truth, the female wholly falsehood" (Hom. iii. 27). No such opposition has been apparent in the Syzygies hitherto; certainly no corresponding antagonism is apparent in the relation of the Son to the evil one, who are opposed only as goodness to justice, the desire to save from punishment to the desire to punish. Here, then, the Homilist seems to do violence to his system in order to introduce that element of opposition to the Deity which was needed to account for the presence of sin in the world. From Hom. iii. 24, we are perhaps to gather that the woman *became* worse than she was actually created, for it is there said that she presumed to say that there are many gods, and claimed to be one herself, and, in hope of being that which she had not a nature to be, she threw away what she had.

The offspring of the male and the female are a mixture of truth and falsehood, good and evil. The fullest statement on this point is made, Hom. xx. 2: "Man He [God] created with free-will, and possessing the capability of inclining to whatsoever actions he wishes. And his body consists of three parts, deriving its origin from the female; for it has lust, anger and grief, and what is consequent on these. But the spirit . . . derives its origin from the male, and is capable of reasoning, knowledge and fear, and what is consequent on these. And each of these triads has one root, so that man is a compound of two mixtures, the male and the female."* Through forgetfulness of God, men became addicted to sin, and were easily led still further astray by the angels, who took upon them human form and fell themselves into sin through love of the daughters of men, and propagated a race of giants. These

* See analysis of Hom. viii.

demon-men practised all kinds of iniquity, and were speedily imitated by mankind. The Flood was sent to check the growing evil, and God defined by a law the conditions under which alone demon-spirits should have power over men. Those who are ignorant of these conditions become subject to the evil guidance and the attacks of the demons. Not so, however, was it with Christ. He, owing to his knowledge, resisted the tempter, refusing to worship him, and rejecting his proffered gifts (Hom. viii. 21).

Here we notice that it is lack of knowledge which constitutes man's lost estate, and possession of knowledge which distinguishes Christ and constitutes him "the Teacher." It is not that man's nature has been corrupted by sin, for that nature remains the same it ever was, but it is the loss of the knowledge which Adam bequeathed to his descendants that renders man unable to endure the tests applied to him by the evil one, and prevents him from complying with the laws ordained for such as desire to be the subjects of the good king. His ability to do good being unimpaired, man requires no other saviour than a teacher. "Believe me, that if you will, you can rectify all things" (Hom. xi. 3), says Peter to the people of Tripolis; and in accordance with this, a doctrine of salvation by good works is constantly enforced by the Homilist.* As forgetfulness of God is man's primary error, so to honour God and to abstain from every form of idolatry is the first requirement for one who would be a true Jew; and the second is like unto it, viz., to honour man, since he is made in the image of God. "He who wishes to be pious towards God does good to man" (Hom. xi. 4). The Jew is animated by the philanthropic spirit which leads him to love and benefit every man, as man—to pray for enemies, to compassionate those who do him wrong, to wish for his neighbours that which he desires for himself; "for this is the law of God and of the prophets; this is the doctrine of truth" (Hom. xii. 32).

* It is not a little surprising to find this doctrine in the Epistle of Barnabas, Chap. xix. 10, we read that good works avail *εις λύτρωσιν ἀμαρτιῶν*.

This seems a fitting point at which to consider the Homilist's theory of revelation, and his teaching as to the persons and doctrines of the prophets of truth.

We have seen that to Adam is ascribed perfect knowledge and absolute sinlessness, but that his descendants, owing to their share in the female nature, are but partially possessed of truth, and are not wholly set upon doing righteousness. By reason of this mixed nature and the scope it gives for error and sin, the world has become filled with evils which have prevented men from looking up to God and informing themselves as to what is well-pleasing to Him. Unable to regain unaided the lost knowledge of the truth, man needs the help of one who does not share in the general ignorance, whose vision has not been beclouded by sin. "Now the man who is the helper, I call the true Prophet; and he alone is able to enlighten the souls of men, so that with our own eyes we may be able to see the way of eternal salvation" (Hom. i. 19). He who claims to be a prophet must first be tested to see if he be trustworthy, and being found true, he must be implicitly trusted in matters in regard to which he has not been or cannot be tested. The test of the prophet is, according to Hom. ii. 10, to see whether anything he foretold has come to pass. The prophet "is he who always knows all things, things past as they were, things present as they are, things future as they shall be; sinless, merciful, alone entrusted with the declaration of the truth" (Hom. ii. 16).^{*} There is but one prophet of truth, who re-appears from time to time in the world in different forms and under different names. It was he who gave their names to the animals. What need could such a being have to acquire knowledge of good and evil by eating the fruit of a tree? "But this senseless men believe, who think that a reasonless beast was more powerful than the God who made these things" (Hom. iii. 21). Did this passage stand by itself, it might seem to indicate that Adam was in some sort a divinity and the creator of the world; but read in the light of what is

^{*} See also Hom. iii. 11—15.

said elsewhere concerning the prophet of truth, we must understand it to mean only that Adam was possessed of the same spirit as that which created the world.

To whom, then, is a knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of things as they are, ascribed by the Homilist? Certainly to Adam and to Jesus. Moses also is said to have been endowed with foreknowledge, and through him God's law was delivered to the Jews—the law which Jesus appeared to reveal again in its original purity. The doctrines taught by Moses and Jesus are therefore identical; but whether the Homilist ascribes to Moses a worth such as he claims for Adam and Jesus is open to question. Much more questionable is this in regard to Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, whom some* have thought to be also identical with the prophet of truth. Of these patriarchs it is said that they were, like Adam and Moses, able to know and please God, and they are reckoned among the "seven Pillars" of the world (Hom. xviii. 14); and it is further expressly denied that Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jacob and Moses, can have been guilty of the sins attributed to them (ii. 52). But of Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, it is nowhere said that they did the work of the prophet, or even that they possessed the prophetic spirit. Moreover, Isaac and Jacob, are distinctly stated to have been born of human parentage (Hom. ii. 16), a fact sufficient, in the Homilist's estimation, to render it impossible that they can have possessed that unlimited knowledge which is the main characteristic of the prophet of truth. Thus it would appear that in singling out Enoch, Noah, &c., and ascribing to them a pre-

* Amongst others, Baur, "Die christliche Gnosis," pp. 362 ff., and "Kirchengeschichte der drei ersten Jahrhunderte," p. 221; Schliemann, "Die Clementinen," &c., p. 194; Mansel, "Gnostic Heresies," p. 229. The author of "Supernatural Religion" takes the same view. He says (Vol. II. p. 350), "According to the Homilies, the same spirit, the *Σοφία*, appeared in Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and finally in Jesus, who are the only 'true prophets,' and are called the seven Pillars (*ἑπτὰ στῦλοι*) of the world." A foot-note refers the reader to five passages in the Homilies, but in no one of these are "Enoch . . . Jacob" called the "true prophets," nor is such a term applied to them anywhere in the Homilies.

eminence among their fellow-men, our author does not mean to imply more than that these patriarchs were especially enlightened, and that to some degree they did not participate in the errors and sins of mankind in general.

But how stands the case with the other three—Adam, Moses and Christ? As to Adam, we have seen that he was all-wise and perfectly free from sin, for the reason that he was made directly by God, and had no share in the inherent weakness of his female partner in life. With this Adam Jesus is identified (Hom. iii. 18, 19)—he has come to proclaim those “things which from the beginning were delivered in secret to the worthy.” To Jesus, the term “our Father” is applied exactly in the same way as to Adam. This precludes the idea that Jesus was born of human parents, or of a virgin. A man born of woman alone could be pre-eminent among his fellows for weakness and falseness only, and would have least of all resemblance to Adam. To be placed on the same high level with Adam, it was essential that Jesus should neither come of human parents, nor experience the limitations attaching to ordinary growth and development. Hence no mention whatever is made of those who were rumoured to be the Teacher’s parents. Even the supposed relationship of James to the Lord is quietly ignored, or rather, in the only passage in which reference is made to it, it is treated as mere rumour—*Ἰακώβω τῷ λεχθέντι ἀδελφῷ τοῦ κυρίου μου, κ.τ.λ.* (Hom. xi. 35). But if we may safely conclude that our author would admit neither that Jesus was born after the fashion of men in general, nor that he was born of the Virgin, it is by no means easy to say how he does conceive the entrance of the Teacher upon his earthly course to have taken place. Probably Hilgenfeld* is right when he says that the Homilist had not himself arrived at any definite opinion on the subject. Should it be said that the forms in which Adam re-appears may be natural human productions, but animated by the one unchanging spirit of Christ, we find ourselves precluded from adopting this view

* “Die Clem. Recog.,” &c., p. 295.

by the statement that the separation of body and soul by death takes place only by reason of "spiritual adultery" (iii. 28); and as this sin could not be predicated of the true prophet, so would it also not be possible to account for the death of the forms he willed to adopt. It is true, allusion is made in the Homilies to the death of Jesus: Peter says, Hom. xi. 20, "The Teacher himself, being nailed to [the cross], prayed to the Father that the sin of those who slew him might be forgiven, saying, Father, forgive their sins, for they know not what they do." Such a passage, however, must be considered as an unavoidable concession to undeniable historical fact. Certainly neither Adam (of Adam's death, be it observed, not a word is said in the Homilies) nor Jesus ought to, or could have suffered death, according to our author's conception of death. Both being sinless, and incapable of the "spiritual adultery" alluded to above, there would be no reason why the life-giving spirit should withdraw from and leave their bodies to dissolution. In spite of the passage quoted from Hom. xi. 20, we are obliged to believe that the Homilist intended the method of Jesus' withdrawal from earth, as that of his appearance upon earth, to be regarded as something supernatural and inexplicable. It was to him the appearance and withdrawal of a spirit which comes and goes, takes form and disappears as it listeth, and none can tell whence and how it comes, or whither and how it goes.

Granting that Adam and Jesus are identical, we have to ask ourselves who, according to our author's view, was Moses? Was he the same being in a third form and under a third name?

That Moses is represented as having the prophetic spirit is unquestionable,* but this is spoken of as a gift to him, as though it did not belong to him, as to Adam, by right. It is true, Moses and Jesus have the same doctrine to impart, but nowhere are they spoken of as being one and the same *person*, as in the case of Adam and Jesus. Some indication of a differ-

* See Hom. iii. 44, 48, 49.

ence in the position and dignity of the founders of Judaism and Christianity respectively may be traced in Hom. xvi. 14. It is here said: "Yea, even Moses became a god to Pharaoh, though in reality he was a man . . . but we have but one God . . . whose Son is the Christ." Again, in Hom. iii. 70, Peter says: "Honour, therefore, the throne of Christ. For you are commanded even to honour the chair of Moses," &c. Moses, further, is not called "Father," or "Lord;" and it cannot but strike a reader of the Homilies as remarkable,* that, if the author really held Moses to be identical with Christ, he should be at so much pains to point out that Moses and Christ teach the same doctrine. We conclude, then, that the Homilist regarded Moses as a man to whom more than an ordinary measure of the spirit of truth, of the masculine spirit, was accorded, and to whom furthermore God's law was committed, that it might be imparted by him to others; but he did not hold Moses to be the Christ.

After what has been said already, it can hardly be necessary to point out, that the Christ is in no sense of the word God; indeed, we should have here but to repeat what was said about the Son (when the first Syzygy was under consideration), since the Son and Christ are one. "Our Lord neither asserted that there were gods except the Creator of all, nor did he proclaim himself to be God, but he with reason pronounced blessed him who called him Son of that God who has arranged the universe" (Hom. xvi. 15). Christ is a creature, is begotten, and as such differs essentially from the uncreated, unbegotten God. We have seen that no stress is laid upon the death of Jesus—no allusion whatever is made to his resurrection. It is said, however, that he who has appeared as Jesus is in due time to appear finally as the Christ, and that then he will obtain his rest—in other words, the series of revelations will then be complete.

Here we come back to the point at which we left the Homilist's anthropological views, and ask, what has been done for

* See in this connection Hilgenfeld, "Die Clem. Recog.," p. 229.

man by the appearance of the Christ as Jesus? The answer is, that the original law has been re-stated in its purity, so that men are now put on their guard against the corruptions which have crept into the Scriptures through the Prophetess-Spirit. The whole system of sacrifices has been abolished. This, indeed, is the crucial test by which Jesus is known to be the true Teacher, that his prophecy in respect of the destruction of the Temple and the cessation of its ritual has been fulfilled. To fear God, to love man, and to abstain from having any part in the kingdom of this world—these are the fundamental principles of the purified law.

We have already spoken of the teaching of the Clementines in respect of God and of "philanthropy;" it remains now to say a few words of their ascetic doctrines.

First and foremost, chastity is enjoined; and to further chastity, marriage is to be encouraged. "To urge the brethren to be chaste, this is the first charity" (Hom. iii. 68). The elders should persuade all, old and young, to take upon themselves the bonds of matrimony. That celibacy is not regarded as a sign of special grace in those who occupy the highest positions in the church, is shown by the fact that Peter himself has a wife who accompanies him on his travels (Hom. xiii. 1 and other passages).*

Next in importance to chastity must be ranked the necessity of avoiding "the table of demons." "The demons have no power over any one, unless he first be their table companion" (Hom. viii. 20). Hence it is necessary to avoid the use of flesh—whether entirely, or only subject to certain restrictions, seems a little doubtful, as the principal passage on the subject (Hom. viii. 19) is ambiguous; but judging from Peter's account of his own diet, and from his doctrine that those who determine to accept the blessings of the future life should here restrict themselves to what is absolutely necessary for existence, it seems reasonable to construe the passage alluded to in

* In view of the importance attached to matrimony, we should expect to hear of Clement's marriage after he had embraced the true faith. But no mention is made of such an event.

accordance with the stricter asceticism, and to believe that the author desired the absolute abolition of the use of flesh among Christians. If this be correct, it is then interesting to observe that the Homilist goes far beyond the requirements of the decree of the council of apostles, which, in respect to meats, enjoined upon believers only that they should "abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled" (Acts xv. 29). Peter's food, according to the Homilies, is of the simplest kind. It is stated on many occasions that he partook of bread and salt; and in Hom. xii. 6, the apostle tells Clement that he uses only bread and olives, and occasionally pot-herbs. Not merely, however, is care to be taken as to the viands used, but also as to the company in which meals are taken. Christians must not admit unbelievers to their table. Only after instruction in the true faith and fasting and baptism, was Clement allowed to eat with Peter, or Mattidia to sit down at the same table with her sons. Care in this matter of eating is the main safeguard against demons and the ills they inflict.

Another point to be noticed here is the condemnation of earthly possessions. "Property is theft," aptly describes our author's view in this regard. Those who belong to the future kingdom are here but strangers and foreigners, and can have no claim to a share in the possessions of those who have chosen to belong to the present world.* It is enough, then, for believers if they are provided with what is absolutely necessary for existence. Peter, having but one coat and cloak, still felt he was amply supplied; "for," said he, "my mind, seeing all the eternal good things that are there, regards none of the things that are here."† The Homilist thus seeks to inculcate an other-worldly-mindedness by an asceticism of the most minute and severe description.

* Hom. xv. 7—9.

† Cf. First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, chap. ii. (*τοῖς ἐφοδίοις τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρκούνμενοι*), and Pastor of Hermas, Sim. i., for striking parallels to the teaching of the Homilies on the subject of possessions and contentment with the bare necessities of life.

But the strictest asceticism will avail nothing apart from *Baptism*. Remission of sins can be obtained only by attention to this rite, and without baptism none can enter the world of bliss. This is the wedding garment each guest must possess before he can take his place at the king's supper. Good deeds done before baptism are good deeds with an inherent defect. Baptism is a new birth, and being an ordinance instituted by God, must be attended to by such as will do the will of the Deity. "Verily I say unto you, unless ye be regenerated by living water into the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven." Such are the words (closely allied to John iii. 5, and parallel to the quotation in Justin, *Apol.* i. 61) in which the opinion of the Teacher in respect to baptism is expressed. Again, Peter says,* "Salvation in the other world is granted only to those who have been baptized on account of their trust in Him [God], and who act chastely and wisely." But how are we to account for the appearance of this doctrine of baptism in a system in which a new birth cannot be required, since all men are represented as having within them a divine life, which requires only to be called into activity by the knowledge of the truth? We must regard this as another instance of the author's irenic tendency. He has abandoned circumcision, and makes no allusion to it throughout the Homilies, and only, as it were, by a side-wind hints, in the Epistle of Peter to James, at the special distinction it confers; but he avails himself of the Christian ordinance of baptism to re-introduce all the restrictions as to intercourse and so forth which were connected with the more ancient rite. In this view, baptism is only another form of circumcision, and as such may be expected to meet in some measure the prejudices of Jews. Baptized Christians are called *Jews*, and are regarded as persons with whom the circumcised may freely associate without contracting any legal stain. On the other hand, the Homilist adopts the view of the Gentile Christians that baptism is, what circumcision was never supposed to be,

* Hom. xiii. 13. See also xiii. 21, xi. 25.

an act of regeneration. There is no reason to doubt that baptism was very generally regarded in this light in the second century.* Thus Justin, writing probably almost precisely at the same time as the Homilist, and describing the religious rites of the Christians, says (Apol. i. 61) of converts, that after prayer and fasting, Ἐπειτα ἄγονται ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐνθα ὕδωρ ἐστὶ καὶ τρόπον ἀναγεννήσεως, ὃν καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἀναγεννήθημεν, ἀναγεννώμενται ἐπ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται. The Homilist, then, accepts and gives prominence to this idea of baptism, although it is quite unnecessary to the completeness of his system. But the writer had another object in view besides that of producing a consistent theological system; he wanted to unite opposing parties; and bearing this in mind, we see why baptism is made a matter of first importance. Had he, on the one hand, provided no substitute for circumcision, and had he, on the other hand, ignored the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, the Homilist would have failed to secure the attention of Jewish and of Gentile Christians alike. The use of the "thrice-blessed invocation" need not surprise us. The Homilist could have no objection to the formula, although Father, Son and Spirit, were terms employed by him in a sense differing from that in which they were used, e.g., by Justin in the quotation given above, and probably by Gentile Christians generally. It is worth noticing the stress which is laid upon the connection between the Spirit and *water*. "Water,"† says Peter, "makes all things, and water receives the production of its movement from spirit, and the Spirit has its beginning from the God of all. And thus . . . knowing your origin, and being born again by the first-born water, you may be constituted heirs of the parents who have begotten you to incorruption." And again (xi. 26): "There is something that is merciful from the beginning borne

* How strong the belief was that baptism is necessary to salvation, is shown by a passage in the Pastor of Hermas, Simil. ix., where we read that the "apostoli et doctores" preached to the *dead* and *baptized them*!

† Hom. xi. 24.

upon the water, and rescues from the future punishment those who are baptized with the thrice-blessed invocation." The same idea, we may notice in passing, is strongly expressed by Ignatius (Ep. ad Rom. vii.): ὕδωρ δὲ ζῶν καὶ λαλοῦν ἐν ἐμοί, ἔσωθέν μοι λέγον, κ.τ.λ.: here the spirit and the water are regarded as simply one and the same, and the action of the spirit may so be considered or spoken of as that of the water.

After baptism the convert is no longer required to take his meals apart from the company of other believers. Now it is plain that the restriction which is thus removed does not apply merely to participation in the Lord's Supper; the only question is, whether this last is alluded to at all in the Homilies. Nowhere do we find any expression used of the meals taken in common by Christians which may not be employed of the ordinary taking of food. Thus Mattidia was anxious to be baptized in order that she might take her meals* (συνεστιαθῆναι) with her sons; and as soon as her baptism has taken place, mother and sons and Peter do join in a common repast. It is true that when Peter is spoken of as breaking bread on this occasion, ἐπ' εὐχαριστίᾳ (Hom. xiv. 1), it seems at first sight as though the Eucharist is referred to. But the words are ambiguous, and that they mean no more than "after thanksgiving," is shown, as we think, by the tenor of other passages in the Homilies bearing upon this matter.† Thus, at the close of their first interview, Peter takes food by himself, and Clement by himself, and Peter is made to say to his new disciple, "May God grant you in all things to be made like unto me, and, having been baptized, to partake of the same table with me" (i. 22). Here it is perfectly clear what is meant, viz., that the unbaptized man, Clement, cannot take his ordinary food with the baptized‡ apostle; but to any kind of extraordinary feast

* Hom. xiii. 9.

† Ritsehl also is of opinion that the Lord's Supper is not alluded to, and lays stress upon the fact that the Ebionites, according to Epiphanius, celebrated the Eucharist only once a year, and then with bread and water, not bread and salt. "Entstehung," &c., p. 206.

‡ It is nowhere stated that Peter was baptized; that is taken for granted.

to be celebrated upon baptism, there is not the faintest allusion. No doubt the horror with which the table of demons was regarded, and the scrupulous care which was taken to avoid unhallowed meals and meats, would give a solemn and religious importance to the meals of believers. This is borne out by what is said in the Epistle of Clement to James (chap. ix.): "But I know that ye will do all these things [works of philanthropy, &c.] if ye fix love into your minds, and for its entrance there is one only fit means, viz., the common partaking of food. Wherefore see to it that ye be frequently one another's guests," &c. Here, then, what is implied in the Homilies is already expressed, viz., that to take meals after the fashion of Christians is as positively beneficial, as it is hurtful to eat in the company and after the manner of unbelievers. "Bread and salt," or "salt" alone, are mentioned as the articles of food in use, but nowhere are they spoken of as Justin speaks of the elements of the Eucharist: *Οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδέ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, κ.τ.λ.*, Apol. i. 66. The frequent mention of *salt*, and especially the mention of it along with that of a meal, in the expression (Hom. xiii. 8), *ὅπως κοινῶν ἄλων καὶ τραπέζης μεταλαβεῖν δυνηθῶμεν*, would seem to give to the salt a special importance, and this may easily be the case if, as we have attempted to show, the meals of Christians are, according to the Homilies, invested with religious solemnity. Salt may then be chosen to signify this religious element, in keeping with the enactment contained in the Jewish law, Lev. ii. 13: "Every oblation of thy meat-offering shalt thou season with salt; neither shalt thou suffer the salt of the covenant of thy God to be lacking from thy meat-offering; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt."

Having considered the mode of life and ceremonies to be observed by Christians, we pass on now to look at the constitution of the communities into which converts naturally group themselves. Here the author harks back again to his favourite idea of Monarchy. Order is secured where there is one leader to whom all show obedience. Thus God has appointed one king of all those who obtain eternal life, so that there may be

eternal peace. "That which tends to the government of one person in the form of monarchy, enables the subjects to enjoy peace by means of good order" (iii. 61). This "one person" in Christian communities is the *bishop*.

The mode of appointment, the duties and the dignity of the bishop, are treated of at length in Hom. iii., where an account is given of the installation of Zaccheus. Zaccheus is to fill Peter's chair, but he is to be something more than the mere representative of the apostle and the exponent of his teaching: he is the occupant of the chair of Christ (ch. 60), and he who disobeys the bishop, disobeys Christ (ch. 66), while he who honours the bishop, shows honour to Christ (ch. 70). This is an idea—viz., that the bishop is the representative of Christ—which is expressed more than once in the Epistles of Ignatius, e.g. Ep. ad Eph. vi.: "It is plain that we ought to honour the bishop as the Lord himself;" so also Ad Smyr. viii., and Ad Trall. ii. and iii.* As to the mode of appointment of bishops, we read that Peter, when about to leave Cæsarea, called his friends together, and exhorted them to pray to God to make manifest who was best fitted to take the oversight of the church (ch. 60). This reference to popular election is, however, put in merely as a passing mark of respect for the traditional system, according to which appointments in the church were made by the whole body of believers; and the Homilist then ventures without more ado to represent Peter as usurping at once the acknowledged rights of the lay members of the community. How far he is in earnest in his respect for the prevailing custom of the church, is shown by what follows in ch. 63, where Peter, without further reference to the opinions of the believers present, or to their prayers, is represented as saying: "Of those who are present, whom shall I choose but Zaccheus. . . . And having said this, he laid hands upon Zaccheus, who stood by,

* The idea which finds expression in the last three passages cited, that the presbyters occupy the place of the apostles, while the bishop is the representative of Christ, is peculiar to Ignatius, and has no parallel in the Clementines, unless, indeed, we connect the appointment of "*twelve elders*" (xi. 36) with the apostolate.

and forced him to sit down in his own chair." It is highly instructive to notice that in the Epistle of Clement to James (which we take to be of rather later date than the Homilies), when Clement describes, in close imitation of the narrative in Hom. iii., his own installation as bishop, he makes no mention whatever of any prayer preceding the election, or of any consultation with those who formed the church about the matter. Peter simply rises up suddenly, announces that the day of his death is approaching, and says (ch. ii.): "I lay hands upon this Clement as your bishop, and to him I entrust my chair of discourse," &c. ; and when Clement begs not to be appointed to so responsible an office, the apostle answers (ch. iii.): "Concerning this matter, do not ask me ; for it has seemed to me to be good that thus it be." There is, however, a higher unity still than that of the congregation living under the rule of its autocratic bishop. There is a "bishop of bishops," to whom all other prelates are subordinate. It is true, the phrase quoted occurs only in the Epistle of Clement to James, but what it involves is implied both in the Homilies themselves and in the Epistle of Peter to James. We find Peter sending reports of his discourses to James, and warning the people of Tripolis to listen to none but those whose teaching harmonizes with that of James ; thus clearly showing that he recognized in the bishop of Jerusalem the one supreme head of the visible Church.

Presbyters and deacons and catechists are also mentioned in the Homilies, but by no means so frequently as the bishops, nor are their offices so clearly defined. Evidently they are to be regarded as having no independent authority and as being, in fact, merely bishops' assistants. The elders are to see that the orders of the bishop are complied with, and the deacons are to keep watch over the bodies and souls of the brethren and to make report to their spiritual head (iii. 67).

In his theory of the constitution of the Church, then, the Homilist remains true to that principle of unity, of monarchism, with which he sets out. How, we must now ask, does he, keeping this principle in view, develop his *eschatology* ?

We have already had occasion to notice that the devil is not ever to remain a being delighting in destruction and torment. There is to come a time when his work will be accomplished, and then by a change in his composition he will lose his taste for punishment and darkness, and become a participant in the joys of the kingdom of light. But what of the subjects of the king of this world—do they share in his translation into the kingdom of the future, or are they perhaps blotted out of existence? Both of these alternatives may claim to be supported by the teaching of the Homilist. On the one hand, we are led to believe that the punishment inflicted by the evil one is corrective, and is intended to prepare those who are subjected to it for the kingdom of the Son; and, on the other hand, we learn that some men at least are to be utterly and irremediably destroyed. This apparent contradiction may perhaps be explained by calling to mind our author's theory of sin, that sin is grounded in ignorance. Now all men are to some extent ignorant, because of their mixed nature; hence all sin, and, as God is a just Judge, all receive punishment, first in this life, and, should the punishment received here not be adequate to the wrong committed, in the life to come. No amount of repentance, and not even the magical effects of baptism, avail to save the sinner from this retribution; but if he has cast in his lot with the good king, he will eventually be saved, the punishment notwithstanding, with eternal life. But those who abide in their ignorance, who merge their whole being in the false, female side of their nature, and so do not come to a knowledge of God, cannot be healed or saved. "It is not lawful to afford to those who, through want of judgment, are like to irrational animals, the good things which have been prepared for the children of the kingdom" (Hom. iii. 5). In the following chapter, Peter goes on to say: "At an appointed time a fifth* part, being punished with eternal fire, shall be consumed; for they cannot endure for ever and ever who have

* *πεντὸν* is a marginal reading of Cotelierius, and seems more likely to be right than the reading adopted in the text.

been impious against the one God." That the Homilist lays no stress upon the term *ἀσώτῳ* as applied to the fire, is shown by his statement that at a certain point of time the task of the fire will be accomplished, and the unrepentant be finally extinguished. Thus those who cannot be saved are to cease to be, the dualism of worlds is to come to an end, and the primal unity is to be realized again, when there shall be one fold and one Shepherd, and God all in all.

What, then, are we to make of such a passage as Hom. xi. 11, in which we are told that "the soul even of the wicked is immortal, for whom it were better not to have it incorruptible; for being punished with endless torture under unquenchable fire and never dying, it can receive no end of its misery"? Such a passage comes upon us quite unexpectedly, and almost, if not quite, unaccountably; for the whole tendency of the Clementines is towards *unity*, and an opposition which prolongs itself infinitely and is never overcome, runs counter to the entire system. Such a passage can, as it seems, be explained only by supposing that the writer was led astray by his desire to enforce upon his readers the enormity of the sin and of the corresponding punishment of those who dishonour God; and then, having in his mind some such phrase as "their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched," he goes on to speak of "endless torture under unquenchable fire," and of the undying, endless misery of the soul. Our previous examination of his work has prepared us to find some inconsistencies in our author's system, but it certainly is difficult to understand how he could reconcile himself to the introduction into it of a doctrine of eternal punishment. If the explanation given above be not thought satisfactory, the only alternative seems to be to adopt the suggestion of Neander,* and regard the passage quoted above as a spurious interpolation by a later hand.

We have now dealt with those points in the teaching of the Homilies which seem most to call for remark.

* Neander suggests that Hom. xi. 11 is either an accommodation on the part of the Homilist to generally accepted views, or an interpolation by a later hand. "Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme."

We have seen how, in opposition to Gnosticism in general and to Marcionitism in particular, the doctrine is laid down and enforced that there is but one God, Creator of heaven and earth, and all that in them is ; how, in opposition to Paulinism, Christianity and Judaism are declared to be one and the same religion,—Christianity, in the Homilist's treatment of it, being judaized, and Judaism christianized ; and finally, how, in opposition to the early constitution of the Church and to tendencies which soon resulted in Montanism, a system of monarchic episcopal government is recommended, as based upon apostolic authority, if not upon the authority of Christ himself.

Two questions, which do not perhaps immediately concern our subject, may be briefly discussed by way of conclusion.

1. From what source did the Homilist derive his knowledge of the teaching of Christ? Did he use our canonical Gospels? And,

2. From what quarter does the Jewish Christianity of the Homilies emanate?

As to the former question, it is at once evident that the reader must not expect to find in the Homilies any quotations avowedly given from works professing to contain authentic records of the sayings and doings of our Lord—no *ὡς γέγραπται* ushering in excerpts from writings which now find a place in our canon—for the author was distinctly opposed to the commission of the sacred law to writing. It was by this means that the Law of Moses had been corrupted, and no better fate could be expected for the Law of Christ, if it were not handed down in the one safe way, i.e. by oral tradition. True, Peter commits his discourses to writing, but this in order that they may be sent to James, and steps are taken to prevent them from falling into the hands of any but such as are already well instructed in the Christian faith. With this strong feeling against written testimony, we can quite understand that our author was careful to conceal the fact that he quoted from any Gospel, whether canonical or otherwise. It must further be borne in mind that Peter is spoken of throughout the Homilies as the "chief disciple;" as the man who, better than any

other, knew the teaching of the Prophet who had appeared in Judæa. It is hardly likely, therefore, that we should find in such a work a distinct reference made by Peter to any extraneous authority. Yet the author of "Supernatural Religion"* is apparently greatly struck by the fact, that in the Homilies "the source of the quotations is never named throughout the work, and there is not the faintest indication of the existence of our Gospels. . . . This mere fact, in connection with a work written a century and a half [?] after the establishment of Christianity, and abounding with quotations of the discourses of Jesus, is in itself singularly suggestive." Suggestive such a fact is undoubtedly, but not of the conclusions the author of "Supernatural Religion" would deduce from it; it is suggestive in respect to the peculiar standpoint adopted by the writer of the Homilies, but it in no way affects the question of the existence, be it at the middle or at the end of the second century, of our canonical Gospels. If, however, the Homilist is precluded from expressly referring to any Gospels as the source of his quotations, he yet gives us abundant evidence that he knew our Gospels either in their present or in some slightly modified form. His work teems with passages and expressions which find their parallels in our Gospels. That there are but few exact quotations is just what we should expect; indeed, the exact quotations are in the Homilies more difficult to account for than the inexact. It is quite possible the author may have made use of some Harmony, after the fashion of Tatian's Diatessaron; for it is only natural to suppose that, with numerous accounts of the life of Christ in circulation, the desire for one account, for a Harmony, would make itself felt. But while such an hypothesis might fairly be set up to account for some deviation in the Homilies from the text of the canonical Gospels, it is here quite unnecessary. That the writer knew at least the Synoptics (whether in their present form or in a Harmony we leave undetermined) would appear, had the author of "Supernatural Religion" not questioned it, unquestionable;

* Vol. II. p. 33.

and with regard to John, the matter is, now that the formerly missing portion of the Homilies has been recovered, equally certain. Such expressions as, "I am the gate of life," and "My sheep hear my voice" (Hom. iii. 52), would by themselves be insufficient to justify us in anything more than a conjecture that the writer may have been acquainted with the fourth Gospel. Moreover, the quotation, "Verily I say unto you, unless ye be regenerated by living water into the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," does not help us, striking as is the parallel to John iii. 5, for the alteration of "kingdom of God" (in John) into "kingdom of heaven" is found also in Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 61; and we are thus led to conclude that both Justin and our author quoted from the same work, and that neither of them took the words from our canonical Gospel.

The case is altered, however, when we come to the remarkable quotation in Hom. xix. 22: "Whence our Teacher, when we inquired of him in regard to the man who was blind from his birth and recovered his sight, if this man sinned or his parents that he should be born blind, answered, 'Neither did he sin at all, nor his parents, but that the power of God might be made manifest through him in healing the sins of ignorance.'" It is impossible not to agree with Hilgenfeld,* that this passage gives the clearest indication of the use of the fourth Gospel.

The author of "Supernatural Religion" labours to show that because the theological standpoint of the Clementines differs from that of the author of the fourth Gospel, that *therefore* the Homilist cannot have used that Gospel; nay, he goes even further, and asserts (Vol. II. p. 354) that "it is impossible that an author exhibiting such fundamental differences of religious belief can have known the fourth Gospel, or considered it a work of apostolic origin or authority." Obviously, if the Homilist did not "*know*" of the fourth Gospel, he did not form any definite opinion as to its authorship or authority. But

* Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1875.

we are quite unable to see why disagreement with the theology of John should indicate ignorance of the fourth Gospel. Such an argument cannot but arouse suspicion as to whether the author has not allowed his judgment to be strangely warped, so that his work, with all its marks of wide and varied reading, is itself a "Tendenzschrift" of a pronounced type.*

In matters of criticism no doubt much depends upon individual taste. Where one critic sees an unmistakable quotation, another sees but an accidental resemblance, and it is therefore of little use to set up one unsupported opinion against another. We are glad, therefore, to find our view of the matter now under consideration in harmony with that of Uhlhorn and with that also of the most distinguished living representative of the Tübingen school, Hilgenfeld. Uhlhorn says,† "The Homilies know all four canonical Gospels, follow mainly Matthew, more seldom Luke, most seldom Mark and John;" while Hilgenfeld says in reference to John (and it is only in reference to John that a serious question can be raised),‡ "From the middle of the second century, the Gospel of John comes, gradually indeed, into use, and was then employed without scruple even by opponents of the divinity of Christ, like pseudo-Clement of the Homilies. . . ." The same author takes care also to point out§ how promptly he recognized the fact of the use of the fourth Gospel by the Homilist so soon as Dressel's text was published.

That the Homilist used some other writings besides our four Gospels is most probable, but it is impossible to say with any amount of certainty what those writings were. It may be that he used, as some suggest, the Gospel to the Egyptians—or it may be, as we have already remarked, that he derived his information from some Harmony, some compilation made up of extracts from the four canonical Gospels, together with materials chosen from other sources according to the taste or resources of the compiler—much in the manner in which, if

* See also Hilgenfeld, as above, on "Supernatural Religion."

† "Die Clem.," &c., p. 137.

‡ "Hist. Krit. Einleitung," &c., p. 734. § Ibid. pp. 43 and 44, foot-note.

we are to accept the testimony of Theodoret of Cyrus,* Tatian put together his Diatessaron.

Here, however, we must leave this subject, repeating only that to expect in the Homilies precise quotations from New Testament writings is to misunderstand the entire position of the author, and that to argue from the absence of such quotations to the non-existence of our canonical Gospels, or to their non-recognition in the middle of the second century, is wholly unwarrantable.

We add now a few words as to the quarter from which a system such as that contained in the Homilies must have originated.

We find in two sects, the one pre-, the other post-Clementine, the most striking parallels to our author's position. We refer to the *Essenes* and the *Ebionites of Epiphanius*. Probably it would be more correct not to speak of these as two sects, but to call the Ebionites of Epiphanius the Christian and later version of the Essenes. It is not for us to enter here upon the much-vexed question as to the origin of the Essenes. Whether we are to regard the sect as an outgrowth of Judaism pure and simple, or whether we are to trace their characteristics to the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, may be left here, as it is in fact elsewhere, undecided.† However it arose, it is evident from the testimony of Philo and Josephus that the sect, in contrast to the Pharisees and Sadducees, partook of the nature of a monastic order.‡ To mention here some points of resemblance between the teaching of the Essenes and that of the Clementines, we may specify that the former admitted novices to fellowship at their common table only after prolonged preparation; that no member of the community was allowed to possess property; that strict obedience to the commands of superiors was enforced; that they were rigidly abstemious in

* See Hilgenfeld, as above, p. 76.

† For literature on the Essenes, their characteristics, &c., see Schürer, "Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte," 1874, pp. 599—619; Ritschl, "Entstehung," &c., pp. 178—200.

‡ Schürer, p. 600.

their habits (eating no flesh and drinking no wine); that they bathed often; that they offered no sacrifices of animals, but regarded their meals taken in common as sacrificial feasts; that they upheld the immortality of the soul. It is not hard to believe that Jews belonging to such a sect—men who had severed themselves from their fellows by rejecting the Temple services—would readily adopt as an authority the Teacher who prophesied the destruction of the Temple and the cessation of its ritual. That Christianity made but little change in the views of the Essenes, is plain from the slight modifications they undergo in the system of the Homilies.

On the other hand, we have the account given by Epiphanius* of the sect he terms Ebionites. Here we meet again nearly all the peculiar characteristics of the system of the Homilies. It is interesting to notice that Epiphanius dates the origin of these Ebionites back to the fall of Jerusalem (xxx. 2), the time when the Essenes would, as remarked above, acknowledge the prophetic character of Christ.† These Ebionites are conspicuous for their frequent washings; marriage is compulsory among them, though celibacy was previously the rule in similar sects (xxx. 2, 18); they deny the divinity of Christ, assert that he is identical with Adam, and though they use the Gospel of Matthew, it is a distorted Gospel, with the genealogies left out (xxx. 3, 14); they use the *Περὶ ὁδοὶ* of Clement, although these contain errors which Clement himself rejected in his Epistles; they abjure the Prophets and David (xxx. 18); they abstain from all use of flesh (xxx. 15); they use baptism as an initiatory rite; they assert that God has two powers, Christ and the Devil, giving to the latter the present world, to the former the world to come; they have fabricated many falsehoods about the apostles, especially of a hostile character against the Apostle Paul (xxx. 16, 21, 25); they have their goods in common (xxx. 17); they maintain the rite of circumcision (xxx. 26).

Here, then, we have evidently the sect to which the Homi-

* Adv. Hæres. xxx. pp. 125—162 of Petavius' ed., 1682.

† See also Ritschl, "Entstehung," &c., pp. 222, 223.

list belonged, as it existed in the days of Epiphanius. This Father cannot express strongly enough his detestation of the heresy, and tells, with evident satisfaction, a foolish story,* how St. John went down to a bath, and hearing that Ebion (probably an entirely mythical personage) was there, he and his attendants fled, for fear the baths should fall upon the heresiarch and themselves (xxx. 24).

Epiphanius tells us that Ebion, whom he asserts to be the founder of the sect, disseminated his error not only in Asia, but also at Rome. We may at least conclude from this that representatives of those whom Epiphanius terms Ebionites found their way at an early date to the great capital, and we have thus a confirmation of the supposition with which we set out, that the Homilies were composed at Rome. The Ebionites who found their way thither would discover that their rite of circumcision must not be made compulsory if their doctrines were to find favour among Gentile Christians, and so they leave the obnoxious rite wholly out of sight. They would meet with a party striving after an episcopal form of church government, and to win this party they were prepared to advocate with all zeal the advantages of episcopacy. They found Christianity lapsing into legalism, and the distinctively Pauline doctrines falling into obscurity, and they embraced the opportunity to extol the law, and to do their utmost to convert neglect of the Apostle of the Gentiles into bitter hatred. In a word, they found at Rome much congenial soil, and if their doctrines were not accepted in their entirety, yet they probably had no small share in influencing the development of the Western Church in the latter half of the second century. That the Homilies obtained any currency, and that they were even used in the services of the Church, is surprising to us at this day, and must be incredible to those who have not in some measure gauged the credulity of those early Christians, and realized that "nowhere is the historical memory shorter than under the official rule of tradition."†

Here we must draw this essay to a close, but not without

* The same story is told by Irenæus (*Adv. Hæc.* iii. 3, 4) of John and Cerinthus.

† Ritchl, "*Entstehung*," &c., p. 265.

the consciousness that many points have been passed over too rapidly, and that other matters of interest collateral to our subject have been left entirely untouched.

It would, for instance, be interesting to point out the parallelism between much in the Homilies and the later teaching of Mohammedanism, showing how a sect like that of the Ebionites of Epiphanius, severed alike from orthodox Christians and from Jews, was ready and waiting to throw in its lot with a reformer like Mohammed. It would be interesting, too, to dwell upon the Simon myth, and to point to it as possibly the source of the Faust myth of later times.

But, leaving such subjects as these untouched, we have perhaps succeeded in showing what is the teaching of one of the most important works emanating from the Christianity and the Church of the second century.

It may seem that in that teaching there is so little that is distinctively Christian, that we should follow the example of the Homilist himself and abstain from applying the term Christian to it at all. But if so, shall we not look in vain for any system to which the word may be applied? In its fulness and entirety, Christianity has found its expression only in Christ; but something Christian, fragmentary it may be, and seemingly rudely sundered from the symmetry of the whole, we may yet recognize in sects and parties the most opposed. Surely it was something if the Homilist had caught from Christianity only that enthusiasm for humanity, that idea of philanthropy, upon which he insists with an energy which would not be misplaced now-a-days. But, as we have said, he took but a fragment—he could not take the whole; and those who took what he rejected, he regarded as none other than personal foes. So was it in the beginning of the Church's history; so is it now; but so it shall not ever be. The truth which came forth from Christ has been refracted in the medium of humanity into manifold wavelets of varied hue; no one has in himself the whole pure ray; but each may cherish what he has, and the broken light will be gathered up again some day, and be found to display all its original purity and power.

GEORGE P. GOULD.

II.—THE CHRISTIANITY OF CHRIST.

OBJECTIONS to the use of the word "Christian" proceed from two quarters. On the one hand, it is said that persons who deny certain accredited dogmas have no right to it; and, on the other hand, that rationalists have outgrown it and ought to give it up; but on both sides we think we detect unsatisfactory indications of haste, inaccuracy, or assumption. The "orthodox" appropriators of the name have chosen to identify it with a system of theology, or even to regard it as the symbol of an ecclesiastical polity; and very "advanced" persons have allowed them to have their way. On the one hand, a man like Mr. Dale, of Birmingham, gives prominence to the statement that even the imitation of Christ depends upon the acceptance of him as God. "Why, indeed," says a writer in *The Congregationalist*, "we should imitate Christ, if we have come to regard Him only as a man, we fail to see." Then it is added: "Of one thing we are satisfied, that if faith in the Godhead be destroyed, the power of the man Christ Jesus will not survive." Here, not only is the idea of giving the name *Christian* to one who denies the Deity of Christ not even entertained, but the attempt is actually made to abolish Christ altogether as our example if we will not have him as our God! Then, on the other hand, such "advanced" men as Mr. Voysey, knowing that these monstrous statements are made, contemptuously cease to offer resistance, and allow these mediæval theologians to capture Jesus, and run away with our inheritance. And so it comes to pass that "the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."

This is surely unreasonable, and bad policy, on the part of those who have shaken themselves free from the old superstitions; though it is easy to see how it has come about. The people who believe in the Deity of Jesus and salvation by atoning blood have hitherto had nearly everything their own way, and they have given rational thinkers no cause to love them; for, indeed, they have hated his rationalism and for-

sworn his thought. But that is no reason why "advanced" men should take revenge by making a clean sweep of everything, and pulling up the wheat with the tares. For our own part, we object to the process on both sides—to the process of appropriation on the one hand, and to the process of surrender on the other. We know of no man or set of men who have acquired any right to say once for all what Christianity is or is not. The nearest approach to a settlement would be gained if we could extract from the Gospels the essential things in them; but, short as are the records, it seems that this cannot even now be done. Nor is that any disparagement, unless the difficulty be occasioned by obvious incongruity or hopeless mystery. If, on the contrary, the difficulty be occasioned, as we believe it to be, simply by our inability to master and to be mastered by the great principles by which Jesus lived and for which he died, then we have not only an explanation of the absence of agreement about the essential things, but the highest possible confirmation of the opinion that Christianity is before us and not behind us.

In like manner, we who object to allowing the "orthodox" to put their own interpretation upon Christianity and then appropriate the name, also object to burdening Christianity, from the other side, with the crimes, the follies and the cruelties of those who have assumed to speak in its name. For Christianity, like everything else in this world, is liable to be misused, badly handled, vilely caricatured, or miserably adulterated. It is a faith, an influence, a force, that will not and cannot everywhere result in the same thing. But this is true of every faith, influence or force. It may be the purest dream of heavenly beauty that ever dawned on the human spirit; it may be the sweetest hope that ever cheered the drooping heart; it may be the grandest psalm that ever burst from the inspired soul; what matters it? It may be so taken up, so regarded, so used, that it shall end in blasphemy, barbarity, lunacy. Christianity, alas! is not the only grand and beautiful thing that has been "wounded in the house of its friends." Christianity is not the only heavenly dream that has been turned

into a hideous nightmare. Christianity is not the only hope that has been transformed into a selfishness or a malediction. Christianity is not the only hymn of praise that has ended in a cry of passion or a scream of fear. Even Love itself can glow with the glory of heaven or scorch with the flame of hell; and we know what crimes have been committed in the name of Liberty; but who would surrender the one or scorn the other because men had been miserable and blind?—who, rather, would not strive to make them all-glorious, beautiful and divine?

But even though we admit that Christianity is to be surrendered to a dogma or a polity, the question arises, What dogma, and what polity? For Christendom is divided into at least two great camps; and there seems no particular reason why the word "Christian" should be given up to the one more than to the other; and certainly, if it is given up to both, there seems no reason for denying it to those who occupy a unique position between the two. If there is to be any definite appropriation of the name, why not give in to the imposing and impressive demand of Catholicism, and grant that Christianity is bound up with an ecclesiastical system based upon permanent infallibility and sacramental efficacy? There would be something solid, definite, intelligible, and, in a sense, reasonable, in that. But if we once reject that great claim, and attempt to define the limits within which the name "Christian" will apply, we shall find a territory and a population that never remain long the same. Outside of the Catholic Church, no one form of thought or ecclesiastical method has ever had any element in it of permanence; and, in our own day, nothing is more certain than that the old dogmas are all breaking up, are all either dying outright or are being transformed. How then can we logically or usefully attempt to identify Christianity with any dogmatic conclusions, beyond the three essential elements of belief in an Object of worship, trust in Immortality, and the supreme value of Righteousness?

But why seek for any definition? or why admit that Christianity is strictly definable at all? A definition is often only

a limitation ; and some of the mightiest and most real things are illimitable and undefinable. Who can tell us what Love is? We can be conscious of its thrill ; we can discern some results of its influence ; we can say a great many true and noble and beautiful things about it ; but who can define it? Nay, Life itself is in the same predicament. It is lord of all, but it eludes all, baffles all, defies all ; we see the effects thereof, but we cannot tell "whence it cometh, or whither it goeth." Such is Christianity, and this is really its charm ; and because of this, it is "not of one age, but for all time." Permanent in its spirit, its forms or expressions may vary indefinitely. To-day, its vehicle or voice may be a dogma, or a priesthood, or a ritual, or a church ; but to-morrow the dogma may be surrendered, the priesthood may be outgrown, the ritual may become useless, and the church may fall ; and yet Christianity may remain unharmed—nay, shine brighter and brighter "unto the perfect day." The Church itself is nothing but an institution for promoting an object and producing a result ; but the object and result are not necessarily dependent upon the Church ; for we might worship God without an organized "service," or love God and do our duty without a first-day discourse, or follow Jesus and carry on his work without a consecrated priest or an appointed ritual. But this assumes that Christianity is essentially related to motives, feelings, affections and actions ; and this, therefore, we proceed to shew.

For this, however, we must go at once to the Gospels. But here, in any attempt to find out what the Gospels really say, our first great difficulty is, that we inevitably go to them with all kinds of prepossessions ; or that, even though the mind be tolerably free from actual dogmatic prepossessions, our very familiarity with the record tells against us, and becomes itself a kind of prepossession. In one sense, our difficulty is that we know the Gospels too well. What we really want is, that we should be able to read them for the first time. If we could do so, and especially if we could do so without having any knowledge of the explanations that have been given of them, who can tell what our thoughts and feelings would be! We

should probably feel that there was a good deal to stagger us, and, in so far as miracles are concerned, we might at first be inclined to read the record as an idle tale. But, when once these were disposed of, five features would come into prominence—clear, bright and all-absorbing. We should see a Life, a Spirit, a Method, a Morality, and a Hope; and if we were then told that the life and teachings of this Jesus constituted the groundwork of a religion, and that these Gospels were the accepted records of that life and those teachings, we should, I have no doubt whatever, come to the conclusion that the religion in question paid exclusive attention to the life and the spirit and method of it, to a morality for the world that now is, and a hope for that which is to come. Let us consider this conclusion a little more closely, adopting it as our own.

Christianity, we say, is a *Life*. Unquestionably, the sum and substance of the Gospels is the life of Jesus, and that not only because they tell the story of his life, but because his life tells *his* story and constitutes his message. That life was unique. In one sense, it would not do to try to repeat it. In a sense equally true, the attempt to repeat it now would be unfaithfulness to it. Jesus himself would surely not repeat it if he were here now; and in proportion as we attribute to him wisdom and a desire to do good, we must say that. But the *character* of the life would have been the same. The wondrous qualities which made him so divinely lonely, so grandly poor, so strangely good, would have shone out with equal lustre, and, alas! they might have brought upon him the same sad fate.

The reader of his life, whom we just now imagined as reading the Gospels for the first time, would not fail to be struck with his amazing steadfastness, unselfishness, independence, truthfulness, benevolence. From the stable to the cross, he would see this man steadily looking at one thing—the work given him to do. He was neither boastful nor sentimental when, in answer to the appeal of those who loved him and who desired him to take food, he softly said, “My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish His work.”

That was typical of his life. He never seemed to live for the things that ordinary men live for. He had not even "where to lay his head:" his home was the encompassing presence of his Father. He lived for Him, and Him alone. But living for God meant with him living for humanity. He called not the righteous, but sinners to repentance; he shrank not from the leper; he heard the cry of the poor blind men by the way-side, above the shouts of the selfish crowd who would have silenced them; he lifted the sorrowful woman at his feet into the heaven of a renewed hope; his heart went out towards the neglected Lazarus, the lost sheep, and the prodigal son; and when he was gone, and one who loved him wished to describe him, he summed all up in that great epitaph, "He went about doing good." Such was his life; and it is not to be wondered at that even so "advanced" a thinker as the late John Stuart Mill, in his latest work, expressed the greatest admiration for that life, and confessed that he saw in Jesus "probably the greatest moral reformer and martyr . . . who ever existed upon earth,"—adding, that "religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor even now would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life." *There* is the point we are aiming at. Christianity is a life, and that life is not a hard, mechanical "model," good for initiating us into a series of moral postures and ethical performances, but what, in the next place, we say it is—a Spirit.

Christianity, then, is a *Spirit*. Jesus himself is reported to have said even of his words, that they were "spirit and life:" how much more shall we say that of his religion! His very words had far-reaching, deep, penetrating references in them. They contain germinating principles and life forces, and the very attempt to retain them in the letter may end in the utter subversion of them; for they need to be taken with constant reference to new duties, new dangers, and new hopes. In like manner, the life of Jesus was what it was because of the spirit

of it; and here we can even recover the miracles, and bring them in to testify concerning him. For in the miracle there are two factors, the deed of wonder, which may be beyond comprehension or past belief, and the spirit of the action, the intention of the doer of the work: and this will help us here, for, in almost every case, the spirit of the miracle is the spirit of mercy; the intention of the doer of the work is the intention of pure humanity and uncalculating love—and love, too, for the weak, the neglected, the despised, and the poor. The same may be said of that wonderful cluster of parables which occupy the second place of prominence in the Gospels. Of the few discourses or didactic utterances that appear in the Gospels, the same may again be said. The all-pervading spirit is a spirit of boundless compassion, and of compassion for the uncompassionated. No seeker of the rich and the prosperous, he! “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden,” he cries, “and I will give you rest.” Not to the palaces of princes did he go when he pronounced that divinest benediction, “Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven;” but to those whom his disciples would have driven away: and surely when he blessed the cup of cold water only, given to one of these little ones, his heart turned not to the courts of kings.

His was the spirit we need more than ever now, with our haste to be rich, our love of luxury, our over-anxiety to stand well with the world, our shrinking from enthusiasm, our degrading worship of mere majorities, and our adoration of success. Surely, too, we need his spirit now for that other characteristic which some have blamed him for, but which, I thank God, we do not miss—the spirit of sublime indignation against hypocrisy, treachery and fraud—the spirit which led him to fling his burning words against “Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!” He knew how they barred the way of the contrite and the humble to the heavenly kingdom: “But woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men: for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye them that are entering to go in.”

He knew how they remembered prayers, but forgot humanity: "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation." "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel." He knew how they could cover inward iniquity with outward comeliness: "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness. Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity." He knew how, while glorifying the prophets of old whom their fathers murdered, they themselves were compassing his destruction for treading in the footsteps of the prophets: "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves that ye are the children of them which killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." Not perfect would he have been without that grand possibility of wrath; yet see how, when the bolt is launched, the sweet rain falls: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" Surely for love and indignation, for pathos and force, for tenderness and passion, for mercy and judgment, we need the spirit of Jesus now!

Not less distinct is Christ's *Method*; I mean his method in those two great undertakings of a man's life—the pursuit of truth and the doing of duty. Jesus was not essentially and

in the first place a thinker; he was essentially a worshiper. It is impossible to think of him as a metaphysician or a theologian: he elaborated no system of divinity or morals; he lived in the ideal world of the feelings and affections. We do not think of him as taking any part in the social or political movements of his day: he lived alone, and with a method all his own. And what was that method? It was simply fidelity to God; what Paul would have called *faith*. 'Vague enough,' some will say, 'that only lands us over again in the old slough of despond of theological contrivances.' But this is not true; nay, the opposite of this is true; for when "God" is for a man the symbol of duty and righteousness, and when fidelity to God or faith in God means fidelity to duty and righteousness, it is no exaggeration to say that we have here the most practical as well as the most noble rule or method of life. Did Jesus desire to know what was true? Did he wish to see his duty plainly? He asked God; that is to say, he consulted the only voice of God he knew—the whisper of conscience, the calm but clear decision of his own resolute, receptive soul.

But his method was the method of many before and since. It was the method of Socrates; it has been the method of every original and self-reliant reformer since the world began. Huss and Wyclif, and Bruno and Luther, adopted Christ's method when they lifted themselves above the mass of falsities that formed the dead sea in which the church and the world of their day floated. They really asked for truth, and they made up their minds to pay the price of knowing it and speaking it. They simply disengaged themselves from "use and wont," self-interest and self-care, and sprang to meet the face that looked like the face of God.

Of course this method may lead to delusion, may induce the fanatic to cry, "Thus saith the Lord," and to give heavenly sanctions to earthly delusions. But for once that it may do harm, it will a thousand times do good: for one man that it will make a fanatic, it will make a thousand men reformers: for one that it will merely excite, it will make a thousand

resolute and heroic. Faith in Christ, then, is really faith in Christ's faith; and what was his faith but this—that truth and duty were supreme, that the will of God could be ascertained, and that they who looked to Him would never be left alone? He was never tired of appealing to God. "I seek not mine own will," he said, "but the will of Him that sent me;" and by that he only meant that he knew he was not led by self-will and passion, that he really did hold himself at God's disposal, and felt willing to go even to the cross and die, if God and duty led the way. This, also, is "not of an age, but for all time;" and this method of Jesus, the method of daring and docile fidelity to God as He reveals Himself to-day in the soul, might be the salvation of the world.

Christianity is also a *Morality*. And yet Jesus was no moralist, in the ordinary sense of the word: he was not, at all events, a moral philosopher. He was essentially intuitive, spiritual and practical. He did not argue, he acted; he did not preach to men, he inspired them; he did not construct a system, he brought us "airs from heaven;" he did not lay down propositions, he pronounced the beatitudes; he spake "with authority, and not as the scribes;" he blest above all "the pure in heart," and for these he reserved the greatest promise,—that they should "see God." From him, too, came that wonderful beatitude which blesses, not the righteous, but those who "hunger and thirst after righteousness;" and surely, if he had said no more than that, and if now men could be led to feel, believe and act up to it, he would be the greatest moral reformer even of this age; for men are made good, not by reasoning, but by inspiration; not by philosophy, but by piety; not by knowledge, but by love; not by sight, but by faith; and they who "hunger and thirst" after righteousness, and who feel that their very hunger and thirst are blessed, will have their need itself turned into "a well of water, springing up into everlasting life."

What if some of Christ's applications of his own principles look to us somewhat bizarre and impossible? It does not follow that even he intended us for all time to try to make his prin-

ciples and his applications of them go together. We ought to give him credit for at least more sense than that. If his principles are radically sound and pure ; if they reach down to the depth of our passion, and search the innermost recess of our secret sin ; if they go right up to the well-spring of being, and work there for purity, so that the stream may be clear, then have we all we need to make his moral power over us supreme. That this *is* so, that the morality of Christ, in its living principle, is far beyond us still, we do not care to argue. Men do not care to argue about the existence of sunlight on a July day, or to prove that roses are lovely and lilies sweet. We can only ask those who doubt it to go and see. The Gospels are there ; let any man read them calmly and honestly, and then say what the effect would be on his own life if the vital root ideas to be found there could be made predominant in himself, if the morality of Jesus could win and possess the well-spring of his own thought, volition and love. Read those few pages through, and then shut the book ; then suffer the transient things to fade away, and strive to get before the mind the prevailing spirit of the whole ; and then judge whether we have not in this man one who might be our leader still, in working for the moral redemption of the world.

Then, to complete the picture which we have supposed a reader of the Gospels for the first time would have before him, Christianity is a *Hope*. And yet "Hope" is too weak a word. We find Jesus, from first to last, living for two worlds—we might say, *in* two worlds. He does not do his duty for the sake of future reward, but he never seems to be oblivious of "the joy set before him." He does not deliberately sacrifice the delights of earth for the bliss of heaven ; he simply lives in both for both. Right or wrong, he has the most perfect faith in the reality of life beyond the grave. And here, again, he never tries to prove ; he announces. Hence the weight of his testimony is not so much the weight of a convincing statement as of a living, personal apprehension ; and we admit that he has no "authority" if vivid exalted consciousness is to go for nothing. He no more thinks of arguing for Immortality than

he thinks of arguing for God ; but he gives us the impressive spectacle of a great soul intensely conscious of both. His "revelation," therefore, is the revelation of an intense exalted personality, and this is why belief in what he reveals is equivalent to belief in him.

The life beyond the grave, then, was to him as real as the life on this side of it. In fact, he did not believe in death at all. "God," he said, "is not the God of the dead, but of the living." And why? "Because all live unto Him." They whom we call dead, then, he regarded as living ; they had only passed beyond the veil ; nay, hardly beyond the veil, for from their bright world they look on us and are interested in us, and rejoice when but one sinner repents. He talked of his own going thither as one talks of going to the old home ; and he cheered his sorrowful followers by saying, "I go to prepare a place for you, and I will come again and receive you unto myself." His heaven is the home of little children, too, whose faces behold the face of the Father there. 'All of which,' says the modern materialist, 'we have outgrown, as an unsubstantial dream.' Well ! small gain to us if we have outgrown it ; for, anyhow, we have found nothing to take its place—not even the assurance that our denial of it is true ; for, in any case, no one can be sure that Jesus was wrong, and that nature's leadings, so intense and vivid in him, are all misleading. Jesus *may* have been wrong, but no one can *know* that he was wrong ; and assuredly all the deepest and purest and mightiest things in us protest that he was right.

Christ's hope outgrown ! Not until we have exhausted the universe, and found no replies to the noblest and most sacred questionings of the soul ; not while one poor wayfarer goes down to die, weeping, weary and heavy-laden ; not while the heart hungers for its dead ; not while stars shine and flowers return ; not while the poverty and feebleness of man, and the grandeur and glory of Nature, leave the soul ample room for longing, and love, and dream. Jesus seems to have risen higher and seen farther than the rest of us ; and the light on his face is exceeding beautiful, even like the light of a sun-

dawn far away ; and for that, shall we, who toil up from the misty valley after him, reject him ?—for that, shall we think it a good thing to tell him we need him now no more ?

Then, when we turn from the record, and think only of ourselves and him, what are we moved to do ? Two considerations are prominent here : first, a matter of fact ; second, a point of honour. The matter of fact is, that we are actually related to Jesus as we are to no other ; the point of honour is, that we have a duty to discharge concerning him.

As a matter of fact, we come in the line of march of a “great cloud of witnesses,” and our position is what it is only in relation to a long course of events, from which we can no more separate ourselves than we can separate ourselves as Englishmen from the history of the nation into which we were born. Nor do we wish to separate ourselves from it. It is true that the history of England is partly a history of struggle and suffering and crime, and that the men of the past often wrought like men who grope in the dark : but who would like to begin all over again, or cut himself adrift from the mighty men of old ? Or, if we wished it, could we do it ? We are where we are because of what has been. The stream of life has brought us here ; and, for good or evil, we are Englishmen. It is so with Christianity ; and it is surely as unreasonable to ask us to give up Christianity because of the blemishes in the record of its history, or because of its connection with blemishes now, as it would be to ask us to cease to call ourselves Englishmen because in the past Charles the Second came after Cromwell, or because in the present the “national” Church refuses to let a Nonconformist pray to God in a graveyard under its charge.

Besides, this argument from history has a more personal reference. Most of us have received our religious training in connection with teaching and influences identified with his life and work ; and, whether we like it or not, we have been influenced by him as we have been influenced by no other, and bound to him as we have been bound to no other. We may, indeed, feel ourselves free to put in the background this

or that in our Master's application of his own principles, or this and that part of the record of his life ; but the great fact remains that we were taught religion in his name, that his cup carried to our lips our little share of the water of life, that his hands broke our portion of the bread of life. We do not know what may come. In some future age it is possible that other hands may do for others what Jesus has done for us, and then it may perhaps be well that men shall be called "Christian" no more ; but for us it is a simple impossibility that this should be so ; for our saying that we are not Christian would not make us anything but Christian, and might only be an unlovely sign that we had forgotten "the rock whence we were hewn," or that we had become ungrateful as we had become more advanced.

This suggests the point of honour referred to just now. Many of us believe that Jesus is misunderstood ; that some who speak in his name unwittingly do him grievous wrong ; that, with the best intentions, these present to the world a picture of him which he would be the first to repudiate. What, then, shall we do ? Leave him in their hands ? Permit men to declare that he was the Almighty, or that the Almighty brought him into being that he might shed his blood, and so purchase the mercy that would not otherwise be bestowed ? Surely a feeling of chivalry, to go no farther, should lead us to stand by him, to do all that in us lies to speak for him, to interpret him, to present him to the world as we believe he would present himself to the world if he were here. "They have taken away my lord, and I know not where they have laid him," said the wondering, sorrowing Mary ; and so might many of Christ's simple-hearted followers say : 'They have taken away the man of Nazareth, the children's lover, the sinful woman's friend ; they have taken away our brother, and we know not what they have made of him.' Can we, then, do nothing to bring him back—to give him again to human comprehension, to the human heart ? Can we do nothing to put him in the old place he loved to occupy, when he taught his followers to go with him to God, and to feel that

God was their Father as well as his? Can we do nothing to bring home to the human soul the full force of his own familiar teaching, that it is purity of heart, and not correctness of creed, that leads to the heavenly kingdom; that it is the love of God and man, and not entrance into a church or attention to ritual, that brings man near to God? We think we can, and feel sure that at all events we ought to try. But, if we are to try, we must be "Christians" still.

JOHN PAGE HOPPS.

III.—THE ORIGIN OF LEGEND IN THE LIVES OF THE BUDDHA.

Essai sur la Légende du Bouddha; son Caractère et ses Origines.

Par E. Senart. Paris. 1875.

Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung. Von Carl

Friedrich Köppen. Berlin. 1857.

The Life or Legend of Guadama, the Budha of the Burmese.

By the Right Rev. P. Bigandet. Rangoon. 1866.

A Manual of Buddhism, translated from Sing-halese MSS. By

R. Spence Hardy. London. 1860.

The Romantic Legend of Sākya Buddha. From the Chinese-

Sanskrit. By Samuel Beal. London. 1875.

The Wheel of the Law (including a Life of Buddha). From

Siamese Sources. By Henry Alabaster, Esq. London. 1871.

Lalita Vistara, or Memoirs of the Life and Doctrines of Sākya

Sinha. Edited by Rājendralāl Mitra. Calcutta. 1853 and 1858.

The Jātaka, together with its Commentary. Part I. Pāli Text.

Edited by V. Fausböll. London. 1875.

"Ex Oriente Lux" was the motto which the Council of the Oriental Translation Fund placed, more in hope than in triumph, under the beautiful vignette which graces the title-

pages of the works they published in the first half of this century. No one will deny that the motto has been, to some extent at least, already fulfilled. The study of Sanskrit, eldest daughter of that far-reaching group of languages now spoken by more than half the human race, has in its very infancy revealed to us in unmistakable outline the history of language, on which the so-called classical philology, through its long years, had shed so dim a light; and those strange old Vedic songs—the half-inarticulate utterances of the first hopes and fears of the child Man opening his eyes in wonder on the great powers of Nature round him—have given us at last the long-sought “key to all mythologies,” reconciling their differences, explaining their apparently immoral and needless absurdities, and throwing unexpected light on a very early, if not the earliest, chapter in the history of the development of religious belief.

It would be difficult to estimate the value of the influence which the ideas due to these discoveries have had, and will continue to have, on the gradual disintegration of certain opinions on the innate sinfulness and on the fall or rise of man, against which the school of thought represented in this Review has so long manfully struggled. But there are other questions which touch us perhaps still more closely, which affect our daily life more immediately and to a greater extent, questions regarding not so much the origin and growth of language or the first rise and development of religion, as the later progress of civilization and the later forms—especially the Christian forms—of religious belief, on which, I venture to think, we may also expect to receive “light from the East.”

In attempting to understand such later questions, we have hitherto had only one series of events from which to argue, and that the series which has resulted in the state of things by which we are ourselves surrounded; and the difficulty of forming a correct judgment on so small a basis is evidenced not only by the conflicting opinions often arrived at by really learned scholars, but by the utter incapacity of the many to receive even those results on which the best scholars are unanimously agreed.

In the history of the later institutions of India and of China, we have always another, and often two other, series running parallel with the one we have hitherto alone been familiar with,—series so completely apart from our own ideas and experiences, that we find ourselves very little hampered by prejudice in judging of their true relations and effects. In the history of Buddhism especially we find a most instructive example—a religious system the outcome of the moral earnestness and deep religious insight of one who, coming not to destroy the law, but to fulfil the law, put so new and spiritual a meaning into the older forms and creed, that the new wine inevitably burst the old bottles, and the new teaching became the starting-point of a new development—a religious system which received its first impulse from the personal influence of a single man, and then hardened into a belief regarding his supernatural origin and miraculous powers which went far to overlay and smother both his real history and his actual teaching—a religious system still remaining in some countries at this stage of belief, and perpetuated by a simple church organization in which the priests or teachers are very much on an equality; but in other countries now grown into a powerful ecclesiastical hierarchy, inculcating new ideas and worshipping new deities, the historical result indeed, but entirely antagonistic to the spirit and the letter alike, of the ancient faith.

In this last stage of Buddhism it is most striking that even the petty details of the outward services of the Church, of the dress and daily life of the lower orders of monks, of the visible pomp and power of the higher grades of the hierarchy, so closely resemble the corresponding details of the Catholic Church, that the similarity attracted the notice of early Jesuit missionaries,—not at all aware, be it added, of the vital similarities lying deeper in the two systems, or of the natural causes by which these similarities had been brought about. It is not only in its bells and rosaries and images and holy water; in its services in a dead language, with choirs and processions and creeds and incense, in which the laity are spectators only; in its mystic rites and sacraments performed by shaven priests,

... now in gorgeous dresses ; in its abbots
... many grades ; in its worship of virgins,
... its confessions, fasts and purgatory ; in
... and pictures ; in its huge monasteries
... its cardinals
... it is not in these alone that Lāmaism is a
... Popery. These things did not spring into exist-
... at birth, like a new species as some have it,
... from the head of Zeus ; and it is in tracing
... development (partly due to the influence of the
... idolatry, partly to priestly love of power, partly to
... speculations, partly to the abiding aim at edification
... than at truth) that we discover the more real resem-
... which lies in the similar causes that have produced
... similar results.

Deeply interesting as is the comparison afforded by this later phase of Buddhism, we cannot, however, stay to discuss it here ; our present object is to deal with an earlier stage in its history, which also has its points of analogy, at least equally instructive, with the corresponding stage in the history of Christianity. As the latter side of the picture is so familiar, those analogies will readily present themselves ; and I can confine myself almost entirely to the Buddhist story.

Orthodox Buddhists derive their knowledge of the life of their revered Teacher chiefly from the Three Pitakas which they believe to have been composed by the Buddha's immediate disciples soon after his death. From the small portion of the Pitakas at present published, it is sufficiently evident, from internal evidence alone, that this belief is not well founded. In the Pitaka account of Gautama's death, the Mahā Parinibbāna Sutta, he comes to the Ganges at a ferry where Ajātasattu, king of Magadha, is building a fort ; and he then prophesies that the fort will become a capital city.* It did eventually become the capital of Magadha, and was called Pātaliputta, the ancient name of the modern city Patna. When

* Childers's text, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1876, p. 13 of the separate impression.

the Buddha is about to cross the river, there are no ordinary means of getting across ; he accordingly transports himself and his disciples to the other side.* Later on, the water of the Kukushtā river, made muddy by traffic, is miraculously purified for the Teacher to drink and bathe ;† and when he talks to his disciples of his approaching death, he suddenly becomes gloriously white, and is transfigured before them.‡ After his death, the body refuses to burn until the arrival of the aged disciple, Kāśyapa ;§ and, after the cremation, the relics are divided among the neighbouring chiefs.|| To say nothing of the transfiguration, Gautama could neither have walked across the water, nor could the disciples then with him have believed that he did so. It is evident that the book was composed, or at least assumed its present shape, after the time of those disciples, after relic-worship had commenced, and after Pāṭali-putta had become the capital of Magadha. How much later, it is at present impossible to say ; no part of the Pitakas can be traced back further than the time of Asoka, the great Buddhist sovereign of India, who was crowned within a year or two of 265 B.C., about a century and a half after the death of Gautama. It is possible that parts are not even so old ; and though there can be little doubt that the Pitakas contain a good deal that had existed previously in another form—or, in other words, that they are to some extent based on earlier books, of which historical information and even literary traces are to be found in extant literature—it would be quite premature to attempt to form an opinion on the extent or age of this older material.

Besides the Sutta referred to above, no part of the Pitakas themselves, treating of the life of Gautama, has as yet been published in the original Pāli ; our knowledge of the earlier part of the life is therefore derived from later sources, of which the more complete have been specified at the head of this article. Some of these adhere much more closely than others

* Childers's text, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1876, p. 14 of the separate impression.

† Ibid. p. 43.

‡ Ibid. p. 47.

§ Ibid. p. 65.

|| Ibid. pp. 66—69.

to the older tradition, the oldest of all being that contained in the Jātaka Commentary. Some belong to the Northern, the more developed, some to the Southern, the more primitive Church; and as there has been but little communication between the two schools since the third century B.C., the details found in both may reasonably be assigned to a very early date in the history of Buddhism. On the other hand, a comparison of the accounts is sufficient to shew that many of the details given in one or another of them are certainly later than the older tradition.

But after all deductions have been made for such later accretions, the earliest form of the tradition preserved to us contains still a good deal of the miraculous, a good deal of what, on the face of it, is legendary. Before the work of M. Senart, mentioned at the head of this article, no attempt had been made to separate this legendary matter from the kernel of history which the lives are by every one acknowledged to contain; but it seems to me that it is already possible, to a very considerable extent, to do so, and it will doubtless be possible hereafter to do so more completely.

The difficulty of thus separating the true from the false is doubtless very great, but it is liable to be exaggerated. The retailers of these legends were not cunning forgers, but simple-minded men, with whose mode of thought we can put ourselves more or less *en rapport*; we are getting to know what kind of things we may put down to their hero-worship, or their admiration of the physically marvellous; and we are not without information as to what was, and what was not, historically possible in the Eastern valley of the Ganges in the fifth century B.C. The legends group themselves round a number of distinct episodes, each forming a story by itself; by comparing the different accounts of each story, it is possible to arrive at some idea of its earliest form; and it is further possible to see that much of it can be explained by religious hero-worship, by poetical imagery, by applications to Gautama of stories or traits derived from the previously existing Nature-worship, or of characteristics derived from scholastic abstractions, or by

additions made merely from the desire to edify. The time, the labour, and the care, necessary thus to acquaint oneself with the possible sources of the legends, and to think oneself back into the frame of mind in which they were composed, would not be bestowed in vain if they only enabled us to arrive at some meagre but characteristic facts regarding the principal crises in the life of one of the greatest of men, one of the heroes of humanity. But the discussion cannot fail to lead us also to some definite conclusions as to the manner in which, under such circumstances, legends naturally grow.

To M. Senart we are already indebted for a very complete examination into those portions of the story due to one idea, which has perhaps had more influence than any other upon the Legend of the Buddha—the idea of the *Chakrawarti*, the origin of which seems to me to have been somewhat as follows. Just at the period in which the legends were growing, the old framework of Indian society was being changed; the division into clans was passing into a new division into nations; and a new power had arisen—the power of the king. At the end of the fourth century B.C., we hear of the first great sovereign; that Chandragupta, who possibly met with Alexander, with whom certainly Alexander's successor, Seleukos Nikator, first fought and then entered into treaty, and whose power extended from the eastern Ganges to beyond the Panjāb, and from the Himālaya mountains down to the Vindhya range. At the same time, the Vedic hymns were becoming old and strange; the stories told of the old gods, and especially of the sun-god in his battles with the storm, had become misunderstood; the heroes of the stories were taken to be men, half human, half divine; and partly from a memory of the glorious past, partly from a wider hope and a deeper dissatisfaction with the present, there had arisen the ideal of a golden age, in which a king, irresistible and righteous, had ruled over a happy people. Is it surprising that such an ideal should be formed? Is it surprising that, like the Greeks adding the glow of the sun-myth to the glory of Alexander, or like the Romans finding their emperors divine, the Indians should have made a demi-god of their ideal king,

their Chakrawarti, and have transferred to this new hero many of the dimly sacred and half-understood traits of the Vedic gods? And when afterwards they sought for words and images in which to express their awe and love for the great Teacher whose personality had so deeply impressed them, is it surprising that they recognized in him also a King of Righteousness, and that the story of the Buddha should be tinged with the colouring of these Chakrawarti myths?

Besides the ideal King, the personification of Power and Justice and Victory, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of the Legend; and it also owed its birth at least to reminiscences of Vedic times, though it doubtless had its principal development during the later period in which the legends gathered shape. It was an old idea that holy men, by properly-performed ritual, by suitable sacrifice, could in fact compel the gods to work benefits for men; and that a life of self-denial, joined with mysterious wisdom, would give to men superhuman power. The belief in transmigration, that the efficacy of deeds done in one life could be carried over to the next, gave to this idea additional force; while among the Buddhists it received further confirmation from the supreme importance attached by Gautama to self-sacrifice and wisdom. There thus sprang up the ideal of *the Buddha*, the man who, through countless ages of heroic struggle, had at last attained to such perfect purity and perfect wisdom, that he was able, when goodness was dying out on earth and men had become more and more wicked and depraved, to extinguish by his teaching the fires of their passion, to lead them along the way of escape from the net of transmigration, and thus in that evil time to save a lost world from impending ruin. In later times, speculation added to this renovating power the power of original creation. Of the innumerable Buddhas, the last five were raised to especial honour, while they were all held to be emanations of a mystical Spirit of all the Buddhas who had existed from all eternity. This primeval Buddha evolved out of himself the Dhyāni-Buddhas, who evolved in their turn the Bodhisatvas, each of whom evolved out of himself a world—

the world produced by Gautama's Bodhisatwa being that in which we live.

It will be seen that these emanations have points of resemblance with the Gnostic Emanations or Eons, by one of which the world was created. But the divine element in the Gnostic theory of the Logos distinguishes it from the Buddhist ideal Wisdom, just as the divine and solar elements in the Buddhist ideal King distinguish him from the ideal Messiah of the later Jews. But the two Indian ideals together cover much the same ground as these two ideals of early Christianity. It will be seen also that the victorious and just King has some points of contact with the powerful and holy Sage; and it is often difficult to determine from which of the two we should derive those traits in the legend which are common to both.

To these two ideals of Power and Wisdom, the reverse of discreditable to those who formed and held them, most of the early additions to the legend are due; but other influences were by no means without weight. It is a universal tendency, exemplified not only in ancient lives of popular saints and of popular heroes, but in modern every-day life, to discover in the childhood of men who have afterwards become eminent or famous, clear prognostications of their future greatness. As these discoveries are made after the event, they are often apposite enough; and in the case of the King of Righteousness, they took the shape that he descended of his own accord into his mother's womb from his throne in heaven; that at his birth, heaven and earth united to pay him homage; while the angels sang their songs of victory, and archangels were present with their help. His mother was the best and the purest of the daughters of men, and had no other son; and his father was of royal lineage, and a prince of wealth and power. It was an edifying task to make his abnegation and condescension greater by the comparison between the splendour of the position he was to abandon, and the poverty in which he afterwards lived; and in countries distant from the place where he was born, the discrepancies between these glowing accounts and the very names of the places they contain, passed unnoticed by credulous hearers.

His mother has dreams of his future greatness, and there are prophecies at his birth that her son will become either a Chakrawarti or a Buddha, who will remove the veils of ignorance and sin from the world. In his youth he excels all his companions, and even teaches the teachers who were appointed to instruct him ; while aged saints unite to pay him honour, and sing hymns to his praise.

All these were doubtless pure inventions. But they were not due to one mind ; they were the work of time, and no one who bore a part in their creation was consciously manufacturing untruth. The early biographers did not sufficiently distinguish between what they thought ought to have happened and what did really happen, between that which seemed edifying to them and that which was true in fact ; but I cannot believe that they ever set to work deliberately to forge any part of their narrative. And this brings us to a fourth cause to which much that is legendary is due. Their natural belief that the miraculous was probable, their abiding faith in the constant presence of supernatural beings, in the constant action of supernatural causes, led them easily to see what they so fully expected to find. The struggles of Gautama's mind become the temptations of Māra, the spirit of Evil ; his moments of exaltation are ascribed to the visits of angels ; his thoughts of resolution or of triumph become songs in angel mouths ; and a few circumstances, explicable even now as natural, are related as miraculous events.

A few details, but these are later, are due to yet another cause. There were local relics to be sanctified, local legends to receive authority from the sacred story. The Ceylonese claim to possess one of Gautama's teeth and the bones of his neck ; they consequently believe and relate an episode in his life explaining how these relics were obtained.* The Burmese have another tooth and another strange story to support it ;† but none of these stories are to be found in the Pitaka account of the Buddha's death, which is indeed inconsistent with them

* *Dāthāvansa*, II. 51, 52.

† *Bigandet*, p. 343.

all.* And in a similar way stories not found in the earliest authorities occur in the later books, according to which images then existing had been actually made in the very lifetime of the Teacher.†

Finally, when all the incredible details due to the different causes just referred to have been deducted, there remain a certain number of miraculous incidents which are apparently due to the mere love of the marvellous, the origin of which cannot at present be ascribed to any more definite source than the depraved and weak imagination of the narrators, who did not perceive that these stories, so far from heightening, really veiled and lowered their idea of Gautama, and were irreconcilable with the real facts of his life.

Very interesting and instructive is it to trace the way in which legends, thus originating, grow as they pass from mouth to mouth, the simpler ones especially gathering new matter and new grace from the Chakrawarti or the Buddha ideal. Thus the temptations of Māra were gradually invested with all the glow and glory of the sun-myth, as soon as Buddhist poets began to draw their images from the time-honoured struggle of the Sun, the source of Light, with the demon of the air, the Prince of Darkness. Even without this, the development of the legend is often wonderful enough, as, for instance, in the accounts of the Buddha's precocious grace and wisdom. Whereas in the Jātaka commentary, Gautama only shews his proficiency in the twelve branches of knowledge, and his superiority over other archers,‡ in the Burmese life the account is equally simple, save that the branches of knowledge have grown to eighteen;§ the later Ceylonese books make him do wonders with a bow which 1000 men could not bend, and the twang of whose string was heard for 7000 miles, and the prince not only proved that he knew perfectly the eighteen arts, but that he was also well acquainted with many other sciences;|| the

* Parinibbāna Sutta; *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series*, V VIII. pp. 258—260; my "Buddhism," p. 195.

† Köppen, I. 99, II. 63, 102.

‡ Jātaka, I. 58.

§ Bigandet, p. 48.

|| Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 153.

Chinese account has eight pages full of the miracles ascribed to him on that occasion;* and the narrative of the poet who wrote the *Lalita Vistara* is more lengthy and more miraculous still.†

But it would be impossible within the limits of this article to do more than hint at this part of the subject. I have endeavoured to deal, not with the growth or development, but only with the origin of the Legend: and when it is considered that only twice in the history of the world have all the circumstances combined to render the origin of such legends possible, it will be acknowledged that the lessons drawn from the study of early Buddhism may be found useful also for the true appreciation of early Christianity, or, in other words, that those who are willing to discuss both religions on the same principles, may expect to find in the history of early Buddhism, not only an historical example by which they may test their methods of investigation, but an historical parallel from which they may condescend to learn.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

IV.—MATTHEW ARNOLD AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER.

Poems. By Matthew Arnold. 2 vols. London: Macmillan and Co. 1877.

Last Essays on Church and Religion. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1877.

St. Paul and Protestantism. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1875.

Culture and Anarchy. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1875.

God and the Bible. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1875.

* Beal, 83—92.

† *Lalita Vistara*, ch. xii. Much of the later forms of this legend is curiously similar to the analogous story in the Arabic *Gospel of the Infancy*.

Literature and Dogma. By Matthew Arnold. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1873.

Essays on Criticism. By Matthew Arnold. London: Macmillan and Co. 1869.

WERE it our intention to criticise Mr. Matthew Arnold simply or chiefly as a poet and *littérateur*, we should have a pleasant task, requiring us to note delightedly charms of language, delicacy of perception, acuteness and fulness of thought, and an abounding statuesque beauty and grace. His capriciousness would not trouble us, for we like a poet all the better because of his varied moods; and the more his Æolian harp responds in changeful music to the changeful breezes of Nature, the gladder are we in listening. Neither would his vagaries as a critic put us out of temper. When he roams through the world of history, and sketches admiringly the portraits of men of genius who have little in common save their genius, we rejoice at his wide sympathies, though we wonder at his seemingly equal love for unequal things, and wonder more how he manages, whenever he is in the mood, to see only what he likes, and to be blind to what he does not care for. He has rare excellences that more than compensate for bursts of petulance that would be comical in a lesser man, and for injustice that would rouse indignation if he did not so plainly wish to be fair. In the wide country over which he ranges, he never so far loses his way as to discredit himself as a guide; and if we accompany him with open, active minds akin to his own, we shall fare well.

But we deny ourselves this pleasant task, not the less pleasant because, while we should journey through many picturesque scenes, the very suggestiveness of our guide would awake trains of thought unlike his own, and lead to interpretations he would dissent from. Science, mental stirrings, and also a quickened moral enthusiasm, have made Religion once more a cardinal object of interest. After the age of hearsay and tradition, after believing without endeavouring to understand, after counting faith divine in proportion as it mocked at reason,

men are now largely emancipated ; they are full of doubt and inquiry, and are questioning—some sadly, as though they expected no answer, and some cheerfully, as though they were sure of a glad response in good time—what life and Nature and God may mean. Mr. Arnold's eyes have always been forward-looking, and history has turned into prophecy with him. In the earlier stages of his career he was a religious athlete, without consciously intending to be one ; and even while professing an indifference to the problems, then reckoned insoluble, which vex and will for ever vex the souls of men, they possessed him and shaped his poetry, and finally drove him to tell a plain tale of belief and unbelief in round, unvarnished prose. In pure literature and poetry there is plenty left for him to do. He now turns thither again as to his first love, and gives up the direct religious controversy which he began unwillingly. No one, however, knows better than himself that every literary workman whose intellect and imagination play largely and freely on the stock notions of the world, becomes thereby a religious revolutionist, and changes the mental atmosphere men breathe. Should Mr. Arnold write poetry, it will belong to the mountain heights where Obermann lived and Empedocles died, and so be a protest against a routine existence. Should criticism captivate him, he will add gems to an already crowded picture gallery, and, except when a Puritan crosses his path, be a constant inspiration to Catholicity. And this is to be, within limits, a sound religious teacher, a prophet of the modern sort, not always with deliverances that are true or that harmonize with one another, but that are invariably fresh and strong, and set us a-thinking in our turn. Having confessedly finished with controversy, he may now be reckoned ripe for judgment. Mainly, therefore, as a religious teacher we shall endeavour to estimate him ; and other observations we have made, or may make, must be considered as stepping-stones to the religious point of view from which we wish to look at and study him.

Sometimes the significance of a man may be tolerably mastered if he be taken at random at any epoch. But this is only

the case with small men, who strike twelve early, and ever after repeat themselves. Not so with Shelley, who passed through many phases. Not so with Goethe, who went through the experiences of humanity between "The Sorrows of Werther" and the second part of "Faust." Not so either in the political world with statesmen like Mr. Gladstone. Such men are organic developments; evolution is the law of their nature; and we see them in stages of growth, but never in a final stage. Take them at any epoch, and their foliage springs from roots far down, and if we would understand them to-day, we must understand their history. They are both the creatures and creators of the *Zeitgeist*. Really it is so with all men. But we are satisfied with a glimpse of the multitude as they pass. The rarer geniuses compel us to a more thorough examination. And in religious matters this is the case with Mr. Arnold—he is-so unique. Something belongs to his idiosyncrasy; partly his genesis interprets him, and partly the forces of modern life with their theological unrest, their philosophic and scientific fearlessness, and their general openings of the fountains of the great deep of speculation.

In 1849 there appeared, "The Strayed Reveller and other Poems by A." In 1852 there appeared, "Empedocles on Etna and other Poems by A." In 1853 there appeared, "Poems by Matthew Arnold." These last included most of the contents of the two preceding volumes, with some omissions and some additions. Who "A" was, was a secret, though guessed at. The name of "Matthew Arnold" explained much, if only in the remembrances it awoke of the great Master of Rugby, and his fruitless struggles to reconcile catholic religious aspirations with the uncongenial dogmas of the Church of England. At the time, the poems excited scanty interest, save in the scholarly circles of Oxford, and here and there in quarters where thought was freer than at Oxford, and more balanced and consistent, because, like Milton, it had declined to write itself a slave beforehand.* Evidently the author had drunk his fill of

* See a notice in the *Prospective Review*, No. XXXVII., 1854.

the Marah of Scepticism, then flowing through society, and quite inundating the University. The old High-church movement, so heroic and so grand by the side of the peddling Ritualism of to-day, had come and gone. Rome had absorbed the brave and logical spirits; for it, as Dryden saw, is the only legitimate bourne of Protestant orthodoxy, which babbles of creeds and articles and determines salvation by dogmas. The weaker spirits had learnt to practise, as they practise still, cunning arts of accommodation. But many of the votaries of the new scepticism, which was largely of German birth, and introduced more by Goethe than by the theologians, were too strong either for Rome or for the Anglican remnant to grapple with, and too honest to play at blind-man's-buff with the common rout of Evangelicals. Dr. Arnold's influence at Rugby had tended, unconsciously no doubt to himself, to train men who would be sure to break loose from the faith of the Prayer-book. They might like his Coleridgean theory of Church and State, in favour of which much may be said, though not enough to establish it, but the subtle Jesuits satirized in the "Provincial Letters" could not have persuaded them to take orders. Arthur Hugh Clough, one of the best of Dr. Arnold's pupils, pushed his master's free principles farthest. For him the Marah was very bitter, and not till years had elapsed did he find branches wherewith to sweeten it; and then he found them, not in a fast-and-loose interpretation of the Articles, but in the inner sanctuary where God and man meet face to face, and the light enlightening every man coming into the world is revelation.

Mr. Arnold's poems bear witness to kindred experiences. We may read between the lines of "Thyrsis" and the "Scholar Gypsy," and in these perfect works meet with traces of battles of doubt and faith which he and Clough fought in company. But these two poems are later productions, written long after the fever and fire of early conflict had died away. We catch in them the faint lingering echoes, and not the actual loud shouts of war. In his poems, Mr. Arnold has left the battle behind. We know he has been in it by scars that remain, and by a low wailing melancholy which murmurs underneath his

attempts at joyousness or at Stoicism. A marked characteristic is, that the popular dogmas are all absent. They are not argued against. He simply drops them. He has neither the savageness of "Queen Mab," nor the eloquent scorn of "Childe Harold," nor the terrific audacity of "Cain." But they are as dead to him as to Shelley and Byron, only he has tender recollections of the fables of childhood, and they serve to feed his imagination when his intellect has dissipated their reality into phantasmagoria. Christian feeling, however, is abundantly present, and so is sympathy with Paganism—not the Paganism of Mr. Swinburne, to whom Venus is supreme, but the fairer Paganism which broods on the ideas enshrined in Apollo and Pallas Athene, which loves the Graces and the Musés, and wanders on the hill of Helicon. But life seems a sad inheritance; so many illusions are lost; so many bubbles burst; and, in the desert barrenness, Homer, Epictetus and Sophocles alone sustain him. This is what we mean by Mr. Arnold's Paganism. It is not scornful; certainly it is not licentious. It is rather what he calls a "sad lucidity of soul." Perhaps his own baptismal of Hellenism would suit it best. It is a phase through which many pass, though it seldom takes such a deep and lasting hold as on Mr. Arnold. Afterwards, other influences were Wordsworth, Goethe, Heine, and, though nowhere mentioned, yet apparently often implied, Hegel. They taught him the serenity of nature, the lightsome enjoyment of fleeting moods, the strength and sympathy and larger allowance of culture, and the dream of a World-Spirit ever developing itself. And the author of "Obermann" let his mantle fall on the shoulders of his worshiping English Elisha, who followed, crying, "My Father, my Father," and longed to hide himself "in chalets near the Alpine snow," where he could watch the stars, distant and cold, and forget the storms of humanity, and be still and passionless, sharing their death in life.

In these phases of Mr. Arnold's development there is a kind of tragic fatality. Emancipated from the mechanical thinking of the Church of his boyhood, no longer able to rehearse the articles of his belief according to the formula laid down in the

Catechism, and knowing nothing apparently of free English Nonconformists, or, if he knew them, still Churchman enough to hold by the prejudice, "Nothing good can come out of Nazareth," he was set adrift to wander a truth-seeker at large. What wonder that he stumbled and groped, and plucked Dead-Sea apples, and confounded things that differed? His wildest lapses were preferable to all the old creeds. Epicurus never tempted him successfully, but even Epicurus was better than the Thirty-nine syrens with episcopal blessings and fat flesh-pots. Mr. Arnold was plastic and receptive almost to a fault. But plasticity and receptivity in themselves are virtues, and he just, and only just, avoided being too much a victim of circumstance. He retained self-lordship. After all, he is the chief factor in the creation of his own character. His peculiar genius consisted precisely of that kind of force which made him *en rapport* with the Zeitgeist, and enabled him to appropriate the floating universal energy and transmute it into a personal possession. His consciousness played freely upon it. It was the World-Spirit's. It became his own, the same and yet different. It was the sun, and he was a rainbow.

It would be cruel to demand religious consistency in any poet, and especially in a poet of Mr. Arnold's stamp. The times when he wrote were out of joint with themselves, and there was a warfare in his own soul. Latitudinarianism in doctrine, unfixedness in purpose, a "moving about in worlds not realized," and a hankering after truth and beauty, with fitful doubts as to whether there be such things, or whether, if there be, they are worth the trouble of seeking, are what we might look for, and also what we find. Still there is, if we may venture on a paradoxical phrase which alone comes near our meaning, a fluid consistency. Wave after wave of thought and feeling breaks on the shore; each seems single, and yet they are made up of the same drops differently arranged, with the sunlight differently gleaming. He is practically Pantheistic, but insists on being nameless. And together with his Pantheism, he has pious moods in which he feels God nigh, and the indifferent universal force becomes a personal Father.

He lives in all history, and believes in an indefinite religion, and this breadth makes him scorn dogmatism about things that cannot be known. Greece he loves ; for Christ he has a mystical reverence ; the English Church is the mouthpiece of an oracle no longer trustworthy ; and the true ideas which Rome once guarded without comprehending are now buried beneath the rubbish of ages. As for himself, he cannot tutor his tongue to repeat infantine prattle, and so is homeless. He has no systematic positive teaching to deliver, but throws out, half unconsciously and at random, pregnant suggestions which may easily be systematized ; and it is not going too far to say that "Literature and Dogma" and "God and the Bible" are predestinated in the religious spirit of his poems.

Throughout his profound discontent with the creeds of a world grown grey and doting in its old age, no impulse visits Mr. Arnold, up to this time, to play a prophet's part, and lift up a voice in the wilderness. Why should he ? He is sure that the light most men walk by is darkness. But what he himself trusts to may be moonshine ; and the wisest, now that Goethe is dead, may be only inspired lunatics possessed by a frenzied worship for a dead planet. A change is coming, when Reason will vindicate herself, and men will be born anew and from above. Its exact nature, however, no mortal can predict. His melancholy fancy seems to be that we are in the position of Byron assuming the rôle of Montaigne :

"So little do we know what we're about in

This world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting."

So there is nothing left for us except to criticise, and to be familiar with the best that has been thought and said, but always to avoid action for any definite religious end, and take care not to commit ourselves. As he says :

"Achilles ponders in his tent ;
The kings of modern thought are dumb ;
Silent they are, but not content,
And wait to see the future come ;
They have the grief men had of yore,
But they contend and cry no more."

To ponder in our tents, to wait to see the future come, and to "stand mute and watch the waves," is our business. Meanwhile the stars in their courses fight against Sisera. Sisera is the popular religion, sure to die; and the stars are Culture, sure to be victorious at last.

We have examined Mr. Arnold's poetry in such detail because it really furnishes the key to all his literary activity, and especially to his more recent activity in religious controversy. He has given his own exposition in "Culture and Anarchy." And here, though he is not so quiescent, such a mere straw on the waters, such a beat of the pulse of the World-Spirit, without any manful and self-conscious personal energy in fighting the World-Spirit's battle, as, in the lines we have quoted from his poem on the "Grande Chartreuse," and in his poems generally, he seems to desire us all to be, he yet looks with suspicion on nearly every kind of action, and puts his faith in Culture, that is, in Hellenism rather than in Hebraism, and in the free play of thought rather than being righteous and doing righteousness. He would have counselled Paul to continue meditating in Arabia, and warned him against the Puritan temptation of preaching or practising the gospel. He would have counselled James Watt to continue contemplating the mystery of steam lifting the kettle-lid, perhaps permitted him to write a poem on the subject, and warned him against the Philistine temptation of trying to construct a steam-engine. Latterly he has quoted Scripture freely. Some of his pages read like a transcript from "Cruden's Concordance." In these earlier poetic days he did not quote. Had he done so, his favourite text would have been, "Their strength is to sit still."

There was no mistaking what side Mr. Arnold belonged to by anybody who read him carefully. He was always plainly a Radical and a Free-thinker. And when he warbled of resignation and talked platitudes in opposition to reforms, he had a knack of implying principles which were by no means resigned and that savoured of revolution. Nor was there either any lack of moral earnestness in him. Nor did he fail to see the evil perpetuated by the popular theology. He hated its

narrowness, he hated still more its assumptions, and he hated above all its ignorance. In fact, it was because he knew so much that he shrank from saying all he knew. The world did find a working hypothesis in the systems of the orthodox churches. Society was at least held together by them. They had grown up slowly, and he deemed it best that they should die down slowly. There is much to be said in favour of his doctrine of Culture as a sovereign remedy. Its chief drawback is that it works so slowly, and men are perishing in the mean time. No doubt general criticism, a free circulation of ideas, acquaintance with fresh ways of looking at things, and the lively play of consciousness on stock notions, do, one and all, lift people out of old ruts, and impart to them an elasticity of spirit, and enable them to profit by events. Thoughtful minds ever tend to widen the circle of their sympathies, and are open and receptive. In the nature of things, a certain freedom of speculation belongs to all literature. Books and even newspapers create heretics. Poets undermine creeds. Reading men cannot stereotype their thinking. By degrees the air gets charged with new mental electricity, and we wake up some fine morning to discover that, while we imagined we were alone, the world has come round to us, and the popular theology is hastening to join the belief in witchcraft and the ante-Copernican astronomy.

All this is true enough. It is nothing new either, though Mr. Arnold has done good service in drawing attention to it. And his praise of Culture, too, as familiarity with the best that has been thought and said, is excellent. We remember reading some advice of Dr. Watts. He recommended us to seize upon truth where'er 'tis found, to bear in mind that it is a divine flower wherever it grows, and so to neglect the thistle and assume the rose. Mr. Arnold might hold that Dr. Watts, as a Nonconformist hymn-writer, would naturally take to thistles. But his own praise of Culture is another version of the good Doctor's advice; and if Bishop Wilson had been so happy as to hit upon it first, we shudder to imagine how often Mr. Arnold would have quoted it.

Yet we feel that trusting to general tendencies and to culture is slightly shabby. There is a touch of cowardice in it. It is an imposition on Providence; and at the best it is a roundabout business, and gives the enemy a longer grace than simple consciences approve of. Things must come right ultimately. It is simply a question of sooner or later. But men akin to Heine's "Knights of the Holy Ghost" are fixed on making it sooner if they can.

"This is no world

To play at mamnets and to tilt with lips;

We must have bloody noses and cracked crowns."*

And the time came when Mr. Arnold felt with Hotspur, and openly attacked the enemy with all his force. Not, however, without trying to postpone the attack, in an episode which deserves to be remembered. Here it is.

A Zulu child of culture let his consciousness play so freely on the inherited superstitions of his tribe, that they melted away into shadow-land. But still he felt religious impulses. He had a longing to know, if there was anything to be known. Then Bishop Colenso interpreted the Bible to him. The honest Zulu, following the good habit he had formed, let his consciousness also play freely upon the Bible in such a fashion that the Bishop's own vision was wonderfully sharpened. Then began the now famous critical examination of the Pentateuch. Being at first a better algebraist than theologian, and having distinguished himself by composing an Arithmetic, the Bishop applied multiplication and division to the Pentateuchal figures, and as they were inaccurate, away went Biblical infallibility and Mosaic authorship. It was not a great achievement perhaps. Still it was good to start with, and better things followed. Here was a man of culture, awake to practical duty, and serving righteousness as passionately as ever any prophet of Israel did. What happened? First there was an outcry of terror and indignation. Dire would have been the catastrophe had an English bishop so meddled with the sacred ark. Still, though but a Colonial, he was styled Judas Iscariot, and

* Henry IV., Part I. Act ii. Scene 3.

accused of betraying his Master. It was even hinted that he was red-haired, like the arch traitor of the Gospels. Holland and Germany had published most of Bishop Colenso's conclusions before. So had English Unitarians. And as for his principles of criticism, these latter had acted on them for a century. To Mr. Arnold, all was as old as the hills. And the scepticism was child's play compared with his own. Hasty men fancied that he would welcome the Bishop as a fellow-labourer, all the more because the common people heard him gladly. Not so, however; for Mr. Arnold's evolution, so far as action is concerned, has been almost supernaturally slow, and the Bishop was going too fast for him, and also carried too much of the ancient lumber in his mind, such as a personal God, and what not. Instead of awarding praise, or qualified sympathy, or helpful and correcting criticism, he cursed the Bishop by all his literary and esoteric gods. It was a sight to wonder at, to see Apollo descending from the serene abodes where he had been piping to his brother deities, and to hear him cry, "It is Marsyas murdering melody on a stolen flute; let him be flayed alive." And all because shepherds and shepherdesses liked Marsyas's music. It was a foregone conclusion that his prate should gain nothing. The honest Bishop grew in fame, and Mr. Arnold's plea for letting orthodoxy alone was not trusted by the orthodox. Was he himself a spirit of health or a goblin damned? Plainly the latter. The smell of brimstone could not be disguised, perfumes of Araby would not drown it, and men believed the evidence of their nostrils.

The licentiousness of this assault on Bishop Colenso cannot be excused. It must remain as an example, if not of deliberate going over to the enemy, at least of deserting friends in need, and mocking their earnestness with bitter taunts. When Lord Shaftesbury turned on the author of "*Ecce Homo*," and when pious Low-churchmen wept and prayed and took legal proceedings against the writers of "*Essays and Reviews*," there was a *quasi* justification for them. They thought that heaven was put in peril, and that the verities of faith were bartered away to gratify an unlawful curiosity. Mr. Arnold had no such

belief and no such fear regarding Bishop Colenso; and his conduct was as if the very advanced Dr. Jowett should disclaim communion with the very moderate Dr. Temple, or Lord Boringbroke should call on the earth to open and take Lord Herbert of Cherbury to join Korah, Dathan and Abiram. He had his reasons of course. He pleaded that Bishop Colenso was unduly negative, and that the elaborate arithmetical calculations and arguments bore no relation to the practical religious life. And still when he wants to condemn rawness, or to point out what style of controversy ought to be avoided, he brings forward the Bishop as a warning. This, too, since his own trenchant criticisms on New Testament miracles, which Dr. Colenso ventured not to meddle with. And in a note to the last edition of "Essays in Criticism," he vouchsafes the further explanation that the Bishop wrote in the interests of a scientific presentation of religion, and therefore was objectionable. With our view of Mr. Arnold's development, quick as he is in reason, slow in action, and prolific in excuses for delay, the rationale of the escapade is this. Like the Gospel madmen among the tombs, he objected to have his demons cast out, and cried, "Why art thou come to torment me before the time?" The demons are mostly, though not all, exorcised now. But the memory of the pangs of dispossession haunts him yet, and when opportunity offers he poses in his old attitudes. Nobody is deceived. It is a case of survival.

There is, as Mr. Arnold is never tired of telling us, and as he has explained with admirable force and ingenuity, a lower and a higher self in men. Roughly speaking, the apostle Paul means these when he talks of the spiritual and carnal natures, and the dogma of total depravity is founded on a misconception of his language. When we yield to the lower self, we blunder and sin and struggle against the constitution of things—we work for transitory and narrow ends where we cannot succeed, and where if we could success would be disaster and ruin, and regretted as soon as gained when once our eyes are opened to our true state. When we yield to the higher self, we are one with reason, with the permanent soul, with the

"Eternal Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," and we work on divine planes, and produce harmonious, enduring and blessed results. Now between these two selfs a constant conflict goes on, and the soul is a battle-field, and the soul is also both the combatants. It is a mystery. Be it so. We are conscious that it is a fact. The conflict is the process of evolution, and the gradual emerging of the higher over the lower. It has gone on throughout Mr. Arnold's whole career, as it goes on in every man, and it is not yet ended. We may trace it in the poems, baptized with spirit and with fire, yet passionately eschewing action; in the controversy with Bishop Colenso, replete with far-reaching heresies of his own, yet condemning smaller heresies; and in "*Culture and Anarchy*," and his various literary and social essays, pregnant, clear, masterly, and approaching perfection, yet marked by petulance and the injustice born of a privileged sect, and putting off realizing the ideal he believes in to an everlasting to-morrow. And this is why by turns he charms and repels us. But the higher self has steadily gained power, and asserted its supremacy. He professes to regard his recent religious activity as a fall. It was a new birth. The destiny that mastered him made him speak plainly. He has not yet been drawn to confess any errors. Such ordinary human weaknesses he admits in poetry, but not in prose. Nor does there seem any present likelihood of his plain speech persuading him to the equally plain actions that would be a matter of course to less subtleminded men. Yet these plain and consistent actions, which will involve, among other things, a frank repudiation of conformity to the Church of England, must come at last; and it is in vain that he kicks against the pricks. It may be for years, as the song says, but not for ever. For does not Bishop Butler lay it down that "things are what they are, and the consequences will be what they will be"?

The inward agonies passed through by the "Kings of modern thought" while God is curing them of dumbness and teaching them to reproduce the music of the waves they have mutely watched, Mr. Arnold had always imaginative insight enough

to describe if he cared, and now experience has given him personal materials. The two Newmans have written spiritual autobiographies, Mr. Froude's "Nemesis of Faith" may be counted one, and Blanco White has left a soul portrait of rare fidelity and beauty. But we are compelled to fancy Mr. Arnold's internal storms, and judge the conflicting forces at work, from the foam-splashes and the noise of the waters. "Literature and Dogma," the first fruits of his repentance, marks an epoch; "God and the Bible" is supplementary and interpretative; and "St. Paul and Protestantism" deals with a minor issue. In the first-named book we have the substance of what he has to say as a religious teacher, positive and negative both. How utterly he has changed his front, with what zest he takes to the popular methods which he rebuked Bishop Colenso for practising, is shewn by the fact that "St. Paul and Protestantism," and the opening chapters of "Literature and Dogma," appeared as solid padding between light stories in the Cornhill Magazine. He invited novel-devourers to season their dinners with theological dishes. He made a direct appeal to the democracy, more open than Bishop Colenso's, and in practical utility and skill, and metaphysical and biblical subtlety and learning, as well as in superstitions dropped and hidden meanings revealed, achieving a work of permanent value. "Literature and Dogma" lacks the acute spiritual analysis displayed in Professor Newman's pure Theistic books. It has not the burning piety and broad grasp and picturesque style of Theodore Parker's "Discourse on Matters pertaining to Religion," and there are in it only comparatively faint gleams of that all-suffusing light of poetry and philosophy which makes Dr. Martineau's writings at once consolatory, inspiring and illuminating. Most of its true statements we have been long familiar with, and most of its few new statements are of doubtful accuracy. Its main demerit is, that Mr. Arnold persistently takes a part for the whole, and gets at the supposed fundamental idea of Hebrew religion by ignoring or misinterpreting such facts as do not suit his purpose. And its main merit, which is superlative and rare, is, that he brings a fresh and

strong lay mind to the study of questions which have been too much confined to professional theologians, and according to his title lets the literary spirit breathe freely and creatively abroad. The merit and demerit might both be guessed in advance. The influences of Laleham, of Rugby, and of Oxford, notwithstanding their parade of freedom and width, were narrow; and the catholicity of nature, and intercourse with manifold historical variations of character, could not entirely counteract them. It is the peculiarity of the Established Church to dwarf the ideal of nationality down to its own level. Mr. Arnold has struggled manfully, and breathed the air of general life; but early recollections surge up in his mind, and then he forgets the wide world for the sake of the ecclesiastical nook where he was born. And hence the union of contradictions in which he glories, and also the two very different characteristics of "Literature and Dogma." The demerit is the old ecclesiastical arbitrariness obstinately refusing to die, and the merit is the genius of literature proclaiming boundless development.

The prompting to write came from the pervading soul that inhabits all churches, and that none confines. With this original universal impulse, accompanied by culture, or familiarity with much* of the best that has been thought and said, he was bound to protest against the arrogance of over-knowledge, and to seek for the roots and significance of religion in the experience and emotions, not of sects, whether ostensibly National or ostensibly Nonconformist, but of humanity. A partial aspect is all we see; a bit of the truth is all we know; a few stones for the temple are all we can bring. Talking about God "as if He were a man in the next street," is Mr. Arnold's oft-repeated description of what audacious theologians do. He complains that "our mechanical and materializing theology, with its insane license of affirmation about God, its insane license of affirmation about a future state, is really the result

* We say, much of the best. In Mr. Arnold's case, there are no signs of acquaintance with the best that Nonconformity has thought and said.

of the poverty and inanition of our minds." Now all the orthodox churches lay themselves open to this charge. In their formulas they pretend to know God thoroughly, to anatomize Him and explain His nervous system, and to be surer of the details of eternity than of to-morrow. Of course they use nonsensical words, and feed themselves on the east wind, but they get power this way. Somehow nonsense and the east wind are magical. And we are persuaded that we owe no small share of the blasphemy of the brutal portion of the populace to this "insane license of affirmation." That blasphemy is the Athanasian Creed, the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Westminster Confession, accommodated to the mob. Some time back we saw a striking illustration. A Birkenhead coal-heaver was sent to gaol for a month for kicking his wife. On leaving the dock, he said to the magistrate and policemen, "You will have to spend seven days in hell for this." We hardly know which most to admire here—the assumption of omniscience proportioned to ignorance, or the evident desire to temper mercy with justice in limiting the abode in hell to seven days. Bishops, except Dr. Colenso, and divines, except Unitarians and Universalists and a handful of Broad-churchmen and others, influenced by the more genial views which the late Mr. Maurice inherited from his Unitarian parents, are made of sterner stuff, though they may have a politer phraseology. They get hell into a periphrasis, and make it everlasting: the coal-heaver speaks of it in rugged Saxon, but makes it purgatory for a week. No doubt the coal-heaver is rude, yet we prefer him to the bishops and divines. Mr. Arnold would say with us, they know nothing about it. Their talk is presumption, *aberglaube*, lack of imagination and want of culture. So it is. And here he has rendered great service in forcing home upon us the sense of our necessary ignorance on these matters. It has been said that nobody can read Jonathan Edwards on the "Freedom of the Will" without being convinced down in the depths of his heart of the doctrine of necessity. As to that, we are not sure. But we are sure that nobody can read "Literature and Dogma" without learning

lessons in modesty, and admitting that from St. Paul downwards we "know in part and prophesy in part."

When he comes to the interpretation of the Bible, his literary faculty serves him like a fairy godmother. Professor Jowett long ago told us, in a fine Essay on the "Interpretation of Scripture," that we must read and interpret the Bible on the same principles as any other book. Mr. Arnold takes this stand too, and works from it, with wonderful ingenuity and immense success, though not with invariable soundness, as we shall shew. The religious language of the Bible is literary, and not scientific, fluid, not crystallized, thrown out guessingly towards an object, and not a photograph of it. The books are of varying value; they must be read in the light of history and personal experience. We misunderstand their origin and nature when we stupidly cry, "The Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible." All this is familiar common sense. We have known it from the days of our long clothes, and why Mr. Arnold proclaims it with the airs of a discoverer puzzles us to imagine. But his voice finds its way into quarters where elder voices and braver voices are not heard. One man sows, and another reaps. Mr. Arnold reaps the fruit of the labours of a host of predecessors, but he sows afresh, and it is not too much to say that he has done more to spread right ideas of what the Bible is, and how it should be read, than any other modern author. And this not because of any originality, but because his parentage and his position, and his happy powers of statement, have enabled him to gain the public ear. We must also add that his criticisms are all thorough, and when he arrives at half-conservative conclusions, he does so by free methods. In the Old and New Testament alike, the supernatural is eliminated, all prophecies are pictures of contemporaneous fact or vague anticipations of a good time coming, and all miracles are unhistorical and imaginative creations. He leaves no loophole for the ancient Bibliolatry to creep in again by. He has unsparing rigour and vigour.

These are his principles, and they are sound and unanswerably put. But, nevertheless, there is one notable instance

where a survival of the old man still secretly lurks, and makes itself felt in an arbitrary misinterpretation of the strangest sort. We allude to his theory of what Israel meant by God, and what is the general Bible doctrine of God. We do not mean now his theory that Israel had no idea of a personal God, but his reiterated affirmations that Israel always meant by God "an Eternal Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness."

Here we feel that he exhibits Hebrew religion accurately in its best and highest phase, yet capriciously turns his back on other phases that contradict this. At times, Israel did really worship God as the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness, and the substitution of the Eternal for Lord and Jehovah is an addition to the wealth of religious expression. At times, Israel's religion was piety and joy and strength ; it hated iniquity, and it lived for righteousness ; its piety was doing good, and its kingdom of God was triumphant virtue. The Bible overflows with deliverances to this effect. The churches make a fetish of it for false reasons, and secularists reject it because they see the reasons are false, and are ignorant of its genuine worth and its claims. Let it be read aright, and it will be intelligently loved, and cherished as a possession for ever. Mr. Arnold quotes page after page with rapture, and accumulates a heap of jewels of wise thought and deep emotion. After his exposition, we read the Bible with new eyes, and find more beauty in it than ever we found before. We frankly confess that we had no idea it was so rich until the light of his interpreting genius shone upon it.

But—and we urge the but in the interests of a wider culture and literary fair-play, and only remind Mr. Arnold of what he must well know—his glowing description is only true at times, and it is far from being the whole truth at any time. It is a one-sided version, and an error in the opposite extreme to Mr. Bradlaugh's. This admirable and almost adorable Israel is there ; the quoted passages reveal his presence. But in the same arbitrary way that Mr. Arnold pursues, and looking at passages of another complexion, Dryden discovered Israel to be

"The Jews, a stiff-necked and rebellious race
As ever tried the extent and stretch of grace ;
God's pampered people, whom debauched with ease
No king could govern and no God could please."*

And there is as much justification for one account as for the other. We should like to believe all the Hebrews like Isaiah, as we should like to believe all the Puritans like Milton, and all bishops like Wilson of Sodor and Man, if we could. The better Israel, who worships the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness, and chants joyful praises of piety as goodness comes forth in splendour in psalmists and prophets, gleams also at intervals through mists of superstition, and struggles for existence amid scenes of barbarism. Side by side with universal hopes and rejoicings of righteousness, and coming from the same lips, we have narrowness and bigotry, and breakings out of that cruel national arrogance which made the Jews in Roman days the hated of the world. Mr. Arnold has constructed an ideal Israel, what the finer souls were striving for, and what the mass were blind to, and would not have cared for had they seen it. Wherefore has he done so? To avoid Bishop Colenso's negative faults, and for the sake of edification, we suppose, and so to keep the world from moving too fast, and hurrying on changes before it is prepared to turn them to wise and profitable uses. These are excellent intentions. Edification, however, when it blinks the whole truth, will only build up a shaky kind of religious structure at the best. Mr. Arnold's negations, too, are so widely and wildly destructive to the popular mind, that this solitary affirmative relic which he violently snatches from the ruins he has caused, and exhibits as the one thing needful, must seem adding insult to injury, so far as believers in the discredited theology are concerned. They want a God who will save them from perdition, they want the council of the Trinity, they want the Calvinistic atonement, and all the rest of what he properly calls a "grotesque and hideous system." An "Eternal" who

* Absalom and Achitophel.

makes for righteousness is no comfort to them. As for us who heartily sympathize with the free spirit of "Literature and Dogma," this expurgated edition of Hebrew religious history, offered as a facsimile of the original, strikes us as one of those curiosities of criticism which partizans are prone to indulge in. Hugh Miller was driven to insanity by trying to make the six days of Genesis mean six indefinite periods. Mr. Maurice, with the Lord's Prayer before him, held it necessary to have the Prayer-book to justify him in calling God "our Father." These vagaries are eclipsed by Mr. Arnold's creation of an ideal Israel. Only Dr. Watts is a fit companion for him in this respect. The Doctor, as everybody knows, wrote a metrical version of the Psalms, and made them speak Christianity, and fixed on the 109th Psalm as typical of the example and character of Christ. Surely the Bible is strong enough to bear the burdens of its own shortcomings, and Israel, with all his faults, is one of our best, if he be not our very best, of religious teachers. But let him be painted with the warts on his face. He is more real that way, and we like him more. If Cromwell could bear it, Israel can. The exposition of St. Paul and the "sweet reasonableness" of Christ" are both fine achievements of criticism, the latter especially so, though to do more than mention them here would tempt us in our admiration to wander too far. "Sweet reasonableness" is quite a triumph in the way of religious expression.

After Mr. Arnold's display of legerdemain with Israel's belief in God as an Eternal that makes for righteousness, he hazards a number of metaphysical disquisitions, or rather assertions abundant and disquisitions scanty. He jests that he has no metaphysical faculty. Readers of "God and the Bible" will think differently. His metaphysics are not equal to his poetry, but they are acute and tantalizing enough to opponents. Saying that they are sound is another matter. They lead him to conclusions so strange for Biblical students, and apparently so utterly at variance with the Bible doctrines both in their Hebrew and Christian forms, that orthodox minds who have been temporarily fascinated by his fanciful Israel are driven to

despair by his equally fanciful God, and choose Bishop Colenso in preference. We are considering him as a phenomenon illustrative of the law of evolution, and the consistency or want of consistency between his various statements mainly concerns us. Wayward struggles for liberty, hampered by prejudices and survivals that keep drawing him back from light to darkness, meet us throughout his whole development. And naturally, when a man's progress is the result of such conflicting forces, he wanders into opposite extremes by turns, and is always compact of contradictions. His general treatment of the Bible miracles and the popular theology is free and healthy. This ideal Israel is a sop which the surviving old self throws to Cerberus. His metaphysical repudiation of metaphysical theology is again his free spirit running riot.

His contention against "an insane license of affirmation about God," we endorse heartily. And he is so convincing in it that his laudations of the Church of England, where "insane license" is supreme, are a marvel. But certain modest affirmations about God we think we may venture to make. And here, without entering on a large discussion, we will briefly point out where, as it seems to us, Mr. Arnold falls short at once of the testimony of consciousness and of Hebrew religious history.

He will have nothing asserted of God save what can be verified. Now this verifying is a matter of experience, and the interpretation of the meaning of experience. The common idea is, however it may be modified in various theological schools, that God is, to use Mr. Arnold's oft-repeated words, "an intelligent and personal First Cause that thinks and loves." This idea he rejects because, he says, "it cannot be verified." Cannot? Surely the expression is too strong. It takes too much for granted on the score of human incapacity. It is like Professor Huxley's Unknowable. Inadequately known, and not as yet adequately verified to the satisfaction of minds that, because they have infinity in them, yearn for the omniscience they can never attain, you may say; but no more than this. When we go beyond this, we topple over into the absurd with

the dogmatic theologians and their familiarity with God as if He were a man in the next street. "The Eternal that makes for righteousness" can be verified, Mr. Arnold argues. How does he verify "Eternal" except by consciousness, and the necessary laws of thought that practically compel us to infer a personal God who thinks and loves? From his standpoint it would seem that he can only verify the present thought and the present feeling. Before and after are both guess-work, more or less probable reasoning, and his verified Eternal is an arbitrary assertion. We accept the "Eternal who makes for righteousness," and we accept also the "personal God who thinks and loves," and to us they are equally verifiable and equally verified, and the argument that discredits one discredits the other.

It is the word "personal" that angers him. He pours scorn on bishops who "stand up for the blessed and glorious truth that the God of the universe is a Person," and all the while he insists that the Church of England, which stands up for God being three Persons, is "a reasonable Establishment." He is sure that the Hebrews had no idea of such a God as metaphysical Theists talk of, and that they would not have known what our phrases mean. It is true that they used personifications. However, these were only poetry. But we cannot help thinking that he seriously underrates the weight of the remarkable passage where Isaiah really reasons from man upward to God: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts" (Is. lv. 8, 9). Here we have ways and thoughts ascribed to God the same in kind as man's, but differing in degree, as much higher as the heavens are higher than the earth. Is not this equivalent to a personal God who thinks and loves? If the Hebrews had not the words, they clearly had the conception. Mr. Arnold would reply with his favourite quotation from Goethe: "Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is." Let it be, then, that Isaiah reasoned anthropomorphically. Let it be that Christ

prayed anthropomorphically to "Our Father who art in heaven." Let it be that Israel anthropomorphically "always and necessarily personified the Eternal." We know no better course to pursue. From the good in ourselves we leap, by the aid of reason and faith, to the perfect in God. We have not yet mastered understandingly the whole truth that way, nor perhaps shall we ever; but the road broadens and the prospects grow clearer as we go, and science, poetry, piety and philosophy, combine to encourage.

Suppose we take his own suggested definition of God. He says: "For science, God is simply the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being;"* but afterwards qualifies this and says, "tend to fulfil the law of their being," which is an improvement. As a metaphor, this may pass. There is suggestiveness in it. But it is open to grave objections. If Mr. Arnold means by science what is commonly meant by science, we should doubt his qualifications as a judge. And besides, men of science in this sense do not confine their ideas of God to a stream of tendency. The definition would be inadequate for Newton, Lyell and Herschel. Nor, we apprehend, would Professors Tyndall and Huxley be willing to allow the intrusion of such a narrowing word as "simply," which implies that all is already known and additions are precluded. God may be a stream of tendency, but He may also be more. And if by science Mr. Arnold means knowledge, we are equally at issue with him, and on similar grounds. If we know as much as he admits we know, then we know a great deal more; and any way the "simply" is a limitation forced upon us without authority. But this definition does not account for the facts of religious history, and there is its chief drawback. No temples or cathedrals would have been built, no great sacred poems would have been written, and no prayers or praises would ever have ascended from the human heart, had this been all that men meant by God. If religion be "morality touched by emotion," how can we feel emotion towards a

* *Literature and Dogma*, p. 41.

stream of tendency? We have tried and failed. That is, we have failed to feel any moral emotion. The case would be altered if Mr. Arnold made his stream of tendency think and love, and have any notion of what it was about. But as it stands, the name is inferior to the "metaphysical First Cause," the Theistic "Personal God," the Hebrew "Eternal that makes for righteousness," and out of all proportion to the Christian "Father." Mr. Arnold does not propose it for religious uses. There we may still follow the old anthropomorphic fashions. But how long will these fashions continue when once men are persuaded that God is simply a "stream of tendency"? However, we do not want to write a chapter on natural theology, and we certainly have no ambition to attempt an exhaustive definition of God ourselves. Mr. Arnold's does not *find* us, nor perhaps would any other. We must be content to throw out words that hint at the reality without pretending to tell all about it, and meanwhile we feel that the Presence not to be put by—

"The fountain light of all our day,
And master light of all our seeing"—

God—answers to the best there is in us, and reveals Himself as the "Perfect and the altogether Lovely." It is the function of religious science to illustrate and prove that.

We have now finished the task to which we purposely confined ourselves at starting, which was to consider the evolution of Mr. Arnold as a religious teacher. His excellences we gratefully recognize. Alike as poet and critic and teacher, he is one of the foremost of the children of light. His abundant shortcomings are all explicable; they belong to earlier stages he is outgrowing, but has not quite outgrown. The late Dr. Arnold was a representative of the best aspect of English Churchmanship. Of his sons, one was faithful to the principle of authority inherent in the Church, and seceded to Rome. Another, Mr. Matthew Arnold, inherited all the father's free tendencies, together with his spirit of compromise, which, in union and honestly interpreted, meant progress safe and slow,

and on the old foundations. Dr. Arnold's Church theory is well known. Comprehensive as it was, it excluded all who did not worship Christ.* Of the genius of Nonconformity he had next to no perception. He had little sympathy with theological doubts of a far-reaching character, and appears to have followed Keble's advice† that they should be got rid of by devotion to work. Mr. Matthew Arnold is a Broad-churchman of Dr. Arnold's type, but unfettered by subscription, and therefore free to let his inquiring tendencies have more play, and to what they led him we have seen. However, natural likings and inherited proclivities, exclusiveness on one side, compromise on another, and the self-sufficiency generated by confounding the whole stream of national life with the Anglican contributory to the stream, have beset him all through. They account for his long silence, except in poetry, where, because the heresy was vague, it did not disturb the established creeds, and for his annoyance when Bishop Colenso compelled the Church to pay some attention to modern ideas. They account, too, now that he himself has spoken, for his endeavour to rehabilitate the Church as "a national association for the promotion of goodness,"‡ and to prove that it is so, not by appeals to the authoritative standards, but by select quotations from Barrow, Butler and Jeremy Taylor. They account also for his persistent unfairness to Nonconformists, and, *mirabile dictu*, his putting Unitarians, whom he unhistorically styles Socinians, and whose true theological name he never mentions, though he lavishly appropriates their ideas, outside the Christian pale. And, finally, they account for the fact that, with revolutionary principles, his first impulse, when he is invited to action, is to cry, "Take any shape but that."

A little variety of detail will illustrate this conclusion. "I

* See a remarkable letter to the "parent of a pupil holding Unitarian opinions;" also a letter to W. Smith, late M.P. for Norwich; Stanley's *Life and Correspondence* of Dr. Arnold.

† See letter of Keble to Coleridge concerning Dr. Arnold's doubts, *ib*.

‡ Address to the Clergy at Sion College, "*Last Essays*."

myself am properly a Philistine," says Mr. Arnold, and proceeds: "Mr. Swinburne would add, the son of a Philistine."* Mr. Arnold's confession and Mr. Swinburne's addition are both true. And it is equally true that Mr. Arnold has in him, as he admits, lurking possibilities of the Barbarian, and reminiscences of ancient sympathies with popular passion, or the Populace, as he styles the third type of English society. But he is also a Philistine largely civilized by culture; he longs to be born again from above, and a follower of the ideal Israel. These various tendencies maintain in him a struggle for existence. In Biblical metaphor, the carnal man fights against the spiritual man; what he would not in his best self, that he does in his lower self; and he spends his time in praying to be delivered from the body of his old death. He appears to us like a quaint picture in one of Quarles's Emblems, a soul inside a skeleton, and agonizing to get out. Of this kind of thing in other ways, Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. E. B. Tylor have collected abundant illustrations. So he becomes to us an interesting problem in metaphysical and theological anthropology. We understand how it is that the Nonconformist Mr. R. W. Dale seems a prize-fighter, and is compared to David dancing naked before the ark. We understand how it is, too, that after praising warmly Reuss' "*History of the Apostolic Church*," and then giving thanks that a translation has recently been published, it never enters his head to tell us that the translator is the naked David of Birmingham, the prize-fighting Nonconformist, the dancer who has taken to books. And we understand the Barbarian delight with which he would pen the following Philistine sentence, and pass it off as a deliverance of Culture. "M. Albert Reville, whose religious writings are always interesting, says that the conception which cultivated and philosophical Jews now entertain of Christianity and its Founder, is probably destined to become the conception which Christians themselves will entertain. Socinians are fond of saying the same thing about the Socinian

* *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 96.

conception of Christianity. Now even if this were true, it would still have been better for a man, during the last eighteen hundred years, to have been a Christian and a member of one of the great Christian communions, than to have been a Jew or a Socinian.* These Socinians must have been wandering Poles whom Mr. Arnold has met at balls for the relief of foreigners in distress, for there are no English Socinians. If he means the English Presbyterians, who began their historical existence with Baxter, and whose intellectual and spiritual freedom has brought them round to Theism or Unitarianism, why does he not call them by their right name? If he be ignorant of their ecclesiastical history, he may be reminded of his own words, "Ignorance in literary matters is a crime." As to their not being members of a "Christian communion," what's in a name? Any way, Mr. Arnold's Christianity, whether on its theoretical or practical side, differs very little from theirs. He adopts their interpretations in "St. Paul and Protestantism." They have said beforehand the substance of the best of what he says in "Literature and Dogma." And further, as they are built on an undogmatic foundation, and are ever open to new light, and recognize no finality, they really make the nearest approach to the Church he desires to see; while the very notion of it is excommunicated by the "reasonable Establishment" which he loves and laughs at, the Establishment with the "popular science" of the Apostles' Creed, the "learned science" of the Nicene Creed, and the "learned science with a strong dash of temper" of the Athanasian Creed. Our progenitors, Mr. Darwin argues, were "hairy animals, with long ears and a tail." Many of their rudimentary organs still linger. Mr. Arnold belongs to a highly developed species. He is freed from his forefathers theologically, but hangs on to them ecclesiastically. "And thus the child imposes on the man."

However, amid his multitudinous inconsistencies, which we do not care to be very hard upon, because all men have them, it is clear that he has exceptionally strong religious feelings and

* *Culture and Anarchy*, Preface, p. 41.

exceptionally free religious opinions. His legitimate outcome would be working for a National Church where the clergy are unpledged to confessions of faith. Anything less is against the organic law of his own development. His praises of the Church as it is are a satire upon it, and his conformity we will not characterize. But the *Zeitgeist* sweeps him onward. The Ascidian meant to be a man vainly resists the "stream of tendency by which all things tend to fulfil the law of their being."

WILLIAM BINNS.

V.—M. RENAN ON THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS.

Les Evangiles et la Seconde Generation Chrétienne. Par Ernest Renan. Paris: Calman Levy. 1877.

M. RENAN continues the work that he has undertaken with unremitting diligence and with undiminished skill. His recently published volume, "*Les Evangiles*," yields in interest to none of its predecessors. Yet it had in several ways a more trying subject than any of them. The period which it covers, from 74—117 A.D., marks the subsidence of the great upheaval which attended the foundation of Christianity. There are no longer striking personalities in the foreground like St. Paul. Apocalyptic visions cease. The framework of secular history becomes comparatively flat and tame. The horrors of the taking of Jerusalem are succeeded by a sort of uneasy calm. And even this is shrouded in obscurity. Direct historical evidence of the different phases in the growth of the Christian community is almost wanting. The historian has to do the work of the critic as well. More than half his time is taken up with the examination of what in ordinary hands would be dry critical details.

But M. Renan is not an ordinary writer, and he has triumphed over most of these difficulties. He has knit together the dispersed and ravelled threads of his subject with admi-

table dexterity. He passes from analysis to synthesis, from criticism to history, from Palestine to Rome, and from Rome to Asia, by easy and skilful transitions. No seam or suture is visible. In spite of the diversities and intricacy of its parts, the work is of one piece—an even and finished whole.

Not that in this, as in other volumes, M. Renan has quite escaped the “defects of his qualities.” His style is most distinguished; but it is not the style that is most appropriate to the subject. It is too fastidiously æsthetic. It has in it a little too much of the virtuoso. It sometimes seems to forget that the Gospels are not to be judged in the same spirit as a cameo, and with the airs of a connoisseur. A chapter like that on the “Secret of the Beauties of the Gospel,” will shew at once the strength and the weakness of its author. With all its delicacy and beauty, the reader cannot help feeling that it fails to hit the right key.

And so, upon the critical side, M. Renan’s natural tact and moderation have saved him from errors into which so many of the Germans have fallen. But, like them, he is hampered by an *à-priori* rejection of the supernatural, and he has in addition the danger, which he shares with all great constructive writers, of preferring what is ingenious or picturesque to the more strictly verified results of science. It was not to be expected that M. Renan should find the time for detailed original investigation. And apart from this, a brilliant *coup d’œil* such as he has given cannot fail to be of value. Atmosphere and perspective count for much in a picture. And M. Renan’s work reminds us much of the landscapes of his own distinguished countryman, Corot. It is full of attractiveness and instruction even where it is not based upon the most exact study and elaboration of detail.

M. Renan has a faculty for catching the set of a current, and his view of the origin and composition of the Gospels does not differ materially from that which finds most favour amongst scholars at the present time. He distinguishes three kinds of Gospel: (1) original works at first hand, drawn from the oral tradition, and without the intervention of any written

document, such as would be, in his opinion, the Hebrew Gospel of which only fragments have come down to us, and the Greek Gospel of St. Mark ; (2) secondary Gospels, composed partly from previous documents, and in part from traditions as yet unwritten ; (3) artificial compositions, in no living contact with tradition, but compiled entirely out of existing writings, like the Gospel of Marcion and the apocryphal Gospels.

The common foundation of all these was laid in the earliest stage of oral tradition. Those who had seen the Lord in the flesh would naturally cherish their own private recollections, and value the privilege of being the sole depositaries of them. They would not care to make them cheap and common by committing them to writing.* They would be besides specially hindered by their belief in the immediate return of the Messiah and end of the world. Still the tradition of which they were the bearers would not suffer as, under similar circumstances, it would have done in modern times. The strength of the memory is in inverse proportion to the habit of writing. The life of Jesus was the chief nourishment and sustenance of the Church. His sayings were constantly repeated. Little groups of narrative were formed, which became stereotyped and learnt off by heart.

The *Pirkè Aboth* is a collection of the sayings of eminent Jewish Rabbis from the times of the Asmonæans to the second century of our era. The Buddhist Sudras are not biographies, but only a sort of "flying leaves"—short and fragmentary records of some discourse or parable.

Thus were formed the nuclei of the later Gospels. At first transmitted orally, by degrees they came to be set down in writing. Little by little, one fragment of narrative gathered others to it. The treatise *Edwioth* is the nucleus of the Mishna. The Sermon on the Mount is the *Edwioth* of the Gospel.

The beginning and the end of the narrative were more fixed than the rest. The intermediate space was filled with a chaos

* In the motive thus suggested we may see a touch of modern self-consciousness, which is much less likely to have influenced the first disciples.

of anecdotes. And along with the strictly historical matter were intermingled a few short comments of a kind that early occupied the attention of Christians, relating to the fulfilment of prophecy. Christian apologetics turned much upon this. The Old Testament was diligently searched and studied, and a kind of common stock was collected from which all Christians readily drew.

The oral and fragmentary process reached its conclusion about the year 75 A.D. It was somewhere about this date that the "lines of that figure were traced before which eighteen centuries have bowed down." The earliest of the works that deserve the name of Gospel was then committed to writing, as the product of the Judaizing church at Pella. It was written in Aramæan, and was in fact that Gospel "according to the Hebrews" which existed among the Nazarene communities of Syria till the fifth century, and disappeared only with their destruction.

On the whole, it closely resembled our present St. Matthew, though it was not identical with it. Its plan was more similar to our present St. Mark. The Virgin birth did not appear in it. The genealogical tables were admitted into some copies and not into others. Its symbolism was less refined, its supernaturalism more crude and gross, than that of the canonical Gospel. It placed the appearances after the resurrection all in Jerusalem. It gave, as might be expected from the quarter in which it arose, greater prominence to James, the brother of the Lord. St. Paul figured in it as the "enemy" of Matt. xiii. 25.

This original Hebrew Gospel bore no name, or, if it passed by any, it was as the "Gospel of the Twelve Apostles," or the "Gospel according to Peter." The name of Matthew was given to it later, from its resemblance to the canonical Matthew. Unlike that Gospel, its text was badly preserved. Every Judaizing sect in Syria added or subtracted something. Throughout the second century these alterations were going on. An edition of it was issued in Greek, in which use was made of Luke and the other Greek Gospels. The Gospel "according to the

Egyptians," and that which was current under the name of Peter, were allied to this Greek recension. They were all alike inferior and apocryphal.

The Hebrew Gospel in its earliest shape dates from about the year 75 A.D. Very nearly at the same time, or, as M. Renan suggests, about 76 A.D., was composed the first of the Greek Gospels, that of St. Mark, at Rome. Mark had come thither in the first instance in the company of St. Peter, as his dragoman or interpreter in Greek and Latin, and remained there after his death.

There is no reason why the Gospel that has come down to us should not be the very one described in well-known words by Papias. "The disorder of which the bishop of Hierapolis complains is only too real. The anecdotes of the life of Jesus are arranged in a manner altogether arbitrary." If the same criticism is not passed upon St. Matthew, it is only because of the completeness with which he has preserved the *logia*, which was the great point to which Papias paid attention.

The comparative brevity of the discourses is due to the somewhat dry and narrow spirit of St. Peter. The Gospel presents a sort of realism, clear and precise, but at the same time rather heavy and hard. Much importance is attached to miracles. The ideality of the character of Jesus suffers. On the whole, the Gospel of St. Mark is "not so much a legend as a biography written with credulity."

The Gospel has come to us very much in its original state. The best MSS., however, bear witness to a mutilation that it has undergone at ch. xvi. 8. The original ending has been torn off, probably as containing something "that shocked received ideas," and various other endings have been devised to supply its place. No one of these, however, was able quite to suppress all traces of the rest.

This short Gospel failed to satisfy the growing desire for fulness, and some nine years later there appeared another, based upon it, but with considerable additions and enlargements. This was our present Gospel according to St. Matthew.

There can be no doubt that the author of this work had that

of his predecessor either actually before his eyes or in his memory. The coincidences might almost tempt one to think that he had a manuscript of our St. Mark in his possession. The differences, however, in the transpositions and changes of words, and in some omissions, seem best accounted for by the hypothesis that the author wrote from memory.

The additions made by him are of two kinds: (1) the insertion of long discourses; (2) the admission of a number of traditions of more recent formation.

The discourses are inserted in the shape of long parentheses in St. Mark's narrative. The Sermon on the Mount, the group of parables in ch. xiii., the discourses directed against the Pharisees in ch. xxiii., are so many "packets," as it were, of sayings classed together on purely external grounds. The author of the first Gospel found them made ready to his hand, and he simply incorporated them in the Gospel from which he took his framework, without being too careful to guard against repetitions. Hence the various "doublets" that are found in the first Gospel.

In the legendary additions several distinct tendencies may be traced. One would be the working up of stories after the analogy of the Old Testament. Thus the treason and death of Judas is modelled on that of Ahitophel. The thirty pieces of silver were suggested by a passage in Zechariah.

Another tendency would be apologetic. If the rulers and the Pharisees did not believe on him, he found his followers among the simple and the poor. If the towns in which his miracles were done remained unconverted, their own obstinacy was the cause. It was not by Beelzebub that he cast out devils, for if so, Beelzebub was plotting against himself, &c. &c.

The Jewish story of the resurrection was a fiction set up by bribery. In regard to the nativity, two opposite currents of opinion existed. On the one hand, there was the desire to prove a direct descent from David. This gave rise to the genealogy now found in the first Gospel, taken from a Hebrew document, in all probability the work of the family of Jesus during their retreat in Batanæa. On the other hand, the desire to claim

exemption from the ordinary conditions of humanity. In this way grew up the story of the Virgin birth. This, too, with the cycle of legend to which it belongs, was of Syrian origin.

Besides tendencies such as these, may be noticed a special series of precautions on the subject of "pauperism." These were directed against the Ebionism which prevailed more particularly among the circle for whom the Gospel was written.

Other traces of development appear in the use of the word *ἐκκλησία* and the primacy of Peter, but more especially in the baptismal formula through which the germ of the dogma of the Trinity was already deposited in the sacred page.

In the great questions which divided the Church, the author of the first Gospel took no decided line. He kept himself clear as well from the exclusiveness of James as from the laxity of Paul. He is Jew and Christian at one and the same time. The anecdote of the Canaanite woman is a parable of the phase through which the Christian conscience was passing and which the first Gospel represents. The Gentile was winning his way by humility and submission to a place beside the Jew.

A similar moderation, though approached from a different side, distinguishes the next great evangelical work that has come down to us. It is true that in the Gospel of St. Luke this very incident of the Canaanite, as well as the parable of the Tares, disappears. True that there are distinct signs of an intention to exalt Gentile Christianity and its chief representative St. Paul. To this category belong a number of slighter traits,—the suppression of the primacy of Peter, the admission of the publican Zacchæus, the tolerance shewn towards Samaritans and heretics of every kind, but, above all, the invention of the seventy disciples, to whom is attributed much that in the other Gospels is reserved for the twelve.

Luke is a disciple of St. Paul, but by no means a bigoted disciple. He shews much tenderness towards the older form of belief. He has even borrowed largely from an Ebionite source, and shews a still closer relation than appears in Matthew to the Hebrew Gospel.

He, too, like his fellow-evangelist, took as the base of his work the Gospel of St. Mark. This he has assimilated almost entire ; with the exception of the portion, Mark vi. 45—viii. 26, and the history of the Passion, for which he has preferred an ancient tradition. Our present St. Matthew he had not seen. He had access to the *logia*, but in another form. Much of the matter peculiar to him is due to different recensions of the Hebrew Gospel. Much also is due to oral tradition. But he has not hesitated to give details which had less authority, or at least where tradition takes shape for the first time under his own hand. Throughout the whole Gospel, as well in the treatment of what is old as of what is new, may be discerned an attentive study of literary effect. This skill appears strikingly in the history of the infancy (in which a parallel legend is introduced to adorn the birth of John), and in that of the passion, death and resurrection.

The most finished in a literary sense of the Gospels, the third Gospel has also the least historical value. Still a comparison of the discourses in the Gospel with those in the Acts shews that in the case of the first there is a genuine groundwork of tradition.

There is no very serious reason to think that Luke himself was not really the author of the Gospel attributed to him. He wrote in Rome about the year A.D. 94, and in a circle not far removed from that to which Josephus belonged.

With the third Synoptic, the last stage is reached in the conscious redaction of the evangelical tradition. The next stage was that of *à-priori* composition, such as it is found in the Gospel of St. John. The consideration of this M. Renan reserves for his next and concluding volume.

Such is a brief outline of M. Renan's views as to the nature of the process by which the Synoptic Gospels came into being. We will make a few remarks upon some of the details, before we proceed to point out the two main criticisms to which they seem open.

The account of the transition from oral to written narrative seems to us especially interesting and probable, and the appeal

to Jewish analogies very much in point. But there is room to doubt whether the Gospel according to the Hebrews described by Jerome, and of which various fragments have come down to us, was really the earliest of these written narratives. It is true that, at the beginning of the critical period, Lessing and Eichhorn held this opinion, which was taken up after them by Schweigler and Baur; but the great majority of critics have pronounced against it. De Wette, Delitzsch, Ewald, Bleek, Holtzmann, Volkmar, Anger, Lipsius, Weizsäcker, all hold the negative view. Hilgenfeld alone remains as a solitary *vox clamantis* in support of the theory now adopted by M. Renan. And surely the characteristics of this Gospel, as given by M. Renan from the fragments, tell rather against its early composition. Should we expect the earliest of written Gospels to be distinguished by a "strange and gross supernaturalism," such as that which appears in the story of the fire playing over the waters of Jordan at the baptism; or in this—"Jesus said, My mother the Holy Spirit took me by one of the hairs of my head and carried me away to the great mountain of Tabor"? It seems difficult upon the face of it to think that the Gospel which contained such narratives as this could really be the primitive composition that Hilgenfeld and M. Renan imagine. It might have been said that this particular passage was one of the additions made during the process of corruption that went on in the second century. But M. Renan seems to give up this hypothesis by singling it out as an original feature in the Gospel; and the fact that the passage is quoted by Origen militates against it. Considering, therefore, how little we really know of the Hebrew Gospel, and that the other indications of age relied upon are all of a much slighter kind, it seems much safer to suppose that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was a corrupt and later form of the ground-stock of our present St. Matthew.

The next point at which a question might be raised, though perhaps with more hesitation, would be the statement that our present St. Mark corresponds as it stands to the work mentioned by Papias, and really marks the first stage in the com-

position of Greek Gospels. No doubt there is much to tempt us to take this view. The whole critical problem as to the origin of the Gospels would be much simpler if it could be adopted. And it may be that the difficulties are not insuperable. The "want of order" in the narratives that Papias insists upon may be as real as M. Renan supposes. We should hardly have been inclined to contend that it was not, but for the fact that it represents at least the normal order which is taken for the ground-plan of both the later Gospels. The order of our present St. Mark is that adopted both by St. Matthew and St. Luke, and where the one diverges from it, it is retained by the other. It seems strange that in the face of this Papias should accuse this one Gospel of want of order.

There are, however, other reasons to doubt whether our present Gospel as it stands can really be the original that lies at the root of the other Synoptics. The earlier sections of the Gospel to the end of ch. i. ver. 13, have very much the appearance of an abridgment. And in the passages common to all three Gospels there is almost always a small residuum of points in which Matthew and Luke are combined, and Mark diverges. Thus in the account of the healing of the issue of blood, it is they, and not Mark, who tell us that the woman touched *the hem* of Jesus' garment. It is they who record the prohibition to the disciples to take with them "silver;" they who use the word *κονιορτός*, where Mark uses the word *χοῦς*; they who call Herod *τετράρχης*, where Mark calls him *βασιλεὺς*, and so on. If our present St. Mark supplied the material out of which the other two Evangelists built, whence did they derive these *common* variations? It looks rather as if all three had been drawing from the same original, which in these few points they had preserved more closely. We should be sorry to deny that M. Renan's view *may* be the true one, but there are at least difficulties in the way of it which he seems to pass over too lightly.

Next as to the composition of the first Gospel. It is certainly a *prima facie* view to suppose that the writer inserted the "bundles of discourse" bodily in the form in which he

found them. But if so, how is it that the triple synopsis so often intrudes upon the double? If Matthew and Luke made use of the *logia* and Mark did not, and if, for instance, in the series of parables in Matt. xiii., the first Evangelist is merely inserting a chapter out of the *logia*, how is it that the second Evangelist has so much in common with him? The parable of the Wheat and the Tares, and those of the Hidden Treasure and the Pearl, are peculiar to Matthew; the parable of the Leaven is common to Matthew and Luke; but the parables of the Sower and of the Grain of Mustard-seed are found alike in all three Gospels. Whence did the second Evangelist get these if they formed a distinct chapter in a document which he did not use? We do not think the question is one that cannot be answered, but we doubt whether it has been sufficiently weighed by M. Renan.

But the two main points to which we should be inclined to take exception are: (1) the dates assigned to the three canonical Gospels; (2) the view that is taken as to the historical character of their contents.

M. Renan places the second Gospel in the year 76 A.D., the first in the year 85 A.D., the third in the year 94 A.D., i.e. the three at intervals of nine years from each other. These dates are not indeed so very far wrong. The most important of all the *data*, St. Luke's authorship of the third Gospel, is frankly recognized. But the next most important, the form of the eschatological discourse, is not quite strictly observed, and indeed M. Renan hardly seems to be true to his own principles. When the first Evangelist places the re-appearance of the Son of Man "immediately" after the great tribulation, he must be writing in full view of the destruction of Jerusalem, i.e. in 70 or 71 A.D., and not in 84 A.D. The second Evangelist removes the word "immediately," though he still places the catastrophe "in those days." This would point to a date not very far short of M. Renan's 76 A.D. But when we come to the third Gospel, it must be remembered not only that the last events are assigned to a time before the generation addressed should have passed away, but also that the Acts was

a later work, and also that the author was as early as A.D. 54 a grown-up man and a travelling companion of St. Paul. This would make the year 94 an improbably late date for the Gospel. Somewhere about the year 80 would probably be nearer the mark.

But here, further, it must be borne in mind that two at least of the Synoptic Gospels are without doubt secondary compositions. The documents on which they are based must be earlier still. We are thus taken back for the great mass of the narrative to the first half of the seventh decade of the century, and a number of indications combine to make it probable that the ground-documents belong to this lustrum, A.D. 60—65.

But if this is so, how is it possible to deal so freely with their contents as M. Renan does? Can we suppose either then, or even as low down as the canonical Gospels, so large an amount of invention and fabrication? Do not external considerations and internal considerations combine to make us accept the great mass of the Gospel narratives as historical? This is, we cannot but think, the greatest of all the blots on this very finished and skilful volume. Not that it can be insisted upon as such, because it is shared by many otherwise able writers, and to speak of it as a blot at all will only be taken in some quarters as the mark of an *arrière* in criticism. A mark of backwardness and prepossession it may be; but to one who could watch afar off the movements of modern controversy without being too much entangled in its currents, is it not possible that the same phenomena might supply only an instance of the straits to which certain exaggerated principles have brought those who profess them? It is instructive to note the struggle which is evidently going on in M. Renan's mind between his own naturally sound critical instincts and the tyrannous *à-priori* banishment of the supernatural to which the modern spirit has committed him.

"To the charming apologies that he had really uttered, and in which he had surpassed Buddha himself, were added others conceived in the same style, and very difficult to distinguish from those that are authentic and genuine. The ideas of the time took shape espe-

cially in those seven admirable parables of the Kingdom of God in which the innocent rivalries of this golden age of Christianity have left their trace. Certain persons were offended at the want of selectness in those who entered into the Church ; the Pauline Churches, with their doors thrown wide open, were a scandal to them ; they would have liked to see a choice, a censorship, a preliminary examination. The Schammaïtes in like manner wanted to admit to the Jewish teaching none but those who were intelligent, modest, of good family, and rich. These difficulties were answered by the parable of the man who had prepared a feast, and who, in the absence of the regularly summoned guests, invites the poor and the lame and the halt and the blind ; or by that of the fisherman who takes in fish both good and bad, and reserves them for selection afterwards. The eminent place that Paul, with other old adversaries of Jesus, late comers in the evangelical field, occupied among the group of the faithful, gave rise to murmurs. This gave occasion to the parable of the labourers of the eleventh hour recompensed equally with those who had borne the heat of the day. . . . The expectation of the return of Jesus inspired more than anything else lively and telling comparisons. The figures of the thief who comes when least expected, of the lightning which shines in the west at the same moment as in the east, of the fig-trainer whose young shoots announce the approach of summer, filled their minds. And, lastly, they repeated among themselves that charming apologue of the wise and foolish virgins—a masterpiece of naïveté, of art, of delicate invention. . . . *We do not mean to say that these exquisite pieces do not belong to Jesus.* The great difficulty in a history of the beginnings of Christianity is to distinguish in the Gospels, on the one hand, that which really comes from Jesus, and, on the other, that which is only inspired by his spirit. . . . In reality the contradiction is of little consequence. Jesus is the true creator of the Gospel ; Jesus has done everything, even what is attributed to him ; his legend and himself are inseparable ; he was so identified with his idea, that his idea became himself, absorbed him as it were, and made his biography what it ought to have been.”

All the dexterity of M. Renan's style—and marvellously dexterous it is—has to be employed to reconcile to his own critical conscience the rejection of such passages as unhistorical. If there is anything on which the stamp of one surpassing individuality is imprinted, surely it is on the very points

that M. Renan has selected for excision. Is it, then, so easy to catch the air and mark of genius, and for the disciple and imitator to pass off his work for the Master's? M. Renan himself knows better. He says very justly that the Acts supply the strongest testimony to the truth of the third Gospel, for the discourses in the later work shew what was the natural level of the author. How different from those of the Gospel! Yet if St. Luke did not invent these discourses, still less can we set them down to men like St. Paul or St. John. It seems to us that any criticism commits suicide that accuses the discourses of the Synoptic Gospels of fabrication. The same criticism would make out Hamlet to be a forgery, or *Œdipus Tyrannus* a product of the poetic spirit of the Periclean time. M. Renan would naturally be the last to fall into such extravagances, but he is driven into them by his assumptions. Is it still possible that he should reconsider his position, and ask himself once for all whether the premisses that lead to such conclusions can be true?

W. SANDAY.

VI.—VOLITION AND ATTENTION.

IN noticing certain facts and theories connected with Volition, it may be convenient to adopt an imaginary experimental method. We may imagine certain easily conceived situations, and examine the mental elements contained therein.

I. A man leaves his house for a walk, and goes a few yards undecided whether or not to take an umbrella. The look of the clouds suggests the probability of rain, and this idea acts as a motive for returning. On the other hand, the feeling that it would be a bore to go back or to carry the umbrella acts as a motive for going on without it. For these few yards he moves slowly, in a most uncomfortable, undecided state, feeling himself the theatre of two contending motives, neither of which has sufficient intrinsic force tho-

roughly to overcome its rival. All at once a drop of rain falls on his face, and the sensation sends him spinning round and back for the umbrella without a moment's hesitation. Had the drop fallen on the pavement, the sight of it would probably have merely acted as a strong reason why he should himself resolve to return. But falling on a sensitive portion of his own frame, the drop of rain does more than this. It produces a sensation which decides the whole matter; the man is only a conscious automaton, and has exercised no choice or will in determining the result. This situation will serve to illustrate the following propositions: (1) that two or more distinct mental elements may co-exist in consciousness, each having a variable degree of intensity; (2) that certain mental elements, for which in this article the term *motives* will always be used, are the causal antecedents of a discharge of muscular force and corresponding action; but that to produce its effect, a motive must possess the requisite degree of intensity, and in the case of conflicting motives, one of them must attain a degree of intensity far superior to the rest before any decided action can follow; and (3) that motives may produce action without any interference of the Will, or at any rate of what, in the present article, I propose to call the Will.

II. Another imaginary situation may serve to confirm these positions. You are about to cross a railway, and while you are watching a down-train, you are all but run over by an up-express. A sudden spring saves you. What is the characteristic of your state of consciousness? Is not it essentially the intensity of that state, which is a complex impression of a rushing engine and attendant horrors—an intensity which thrills your whole being, absorbs the whole consciousness, so that you cannot get completely rid of the impression for days or weeks? Now, inasmuch as between that energetic mental state and the muscles of your legs there existed a causal connection, the spring took place which saved you. (Had fear predominated, it would have paralyzed your action, but that, we suppose, was not the case.) But surely this spring was involuntary. It was the legs that carried off the man,

and he will confess, "It was ever so long before I recovered myself"—just as, I may remind the reader of the Phædo, the legs of Socrates once wanted to carry him off. Part of the machinery of the human frame has done the work. The man is conscious of the occurrence, but that is an accident, not essential; something similar might have happened in sleep-walking. We seem able to trace a series of molecular changes which account for the whole outward event. There are the vibrations of light, of the retina, and the optic nerve, a grand commotion at the nerve centres, intense agitation of certain motor nerves, involving a powerful discharge of muscular force and corresponding muscular contractions. Where is there any exercise of Will? There was no time for it previous to the spring, which was a purely reflex action. Are we, then, to look for Will in the consciousness of expended energy? Surely this cannot be maintained; there is a painful consciousness of the reverse in an attack of sea-sickness. Muscular force seems to belong to the great circle of correlated natural forces. Where the circle passes through my consciousness, I know its nature in the most direct manner, but this does not enable me to identify it with Will.

III. We may now pass to a third scene. Two students are "getting up" Conic Sections in two front rooms of University Hall, London, while a band is playing dance-music in the square. One of the two has a strong taste for mathematics, and is wholly absorbed in the figures and lines before him. The other is much bothered by the band, but by a determined and constant effort manages to go on studying. The case of the first student I maintain to be similar to that of the man whose legs jumped him out of the way of the engine. Certain visual sensations, arising from contemplating the book before him, rouse corresponding trains of ideas which possess so high a degree of intensity as wholly to absorb the consciousness. After once commencing, he studies for an hour or two without any voluntary effort. He might be an automaton. Molecular changes might tell the whole outward story. It is true that the sensation produced by the sound of the

music exist in him ; he may even be aware when the band is playing and when it stops ; but they only attain a minimum degree of intensity, being permanently kept at this low pitch, without any effort of his, by the intrinsic strength of the mental elements in connection with the pages of Conic Sections.

In the case of the second student there are two claimants for the mastery, contending on more or less equal terms, i.e. there are two antagonistic mental elements, whose proper consequents are incompatible, and each has a considerable degree of intensity. For a time they are left pretty much to themselves ; sometimes the mathematics, sometimes the band, gets the upper hand, but neither can permanently absorb the consciousness. Under such circumstances, little real work is done, and the student, becoming alive to the fact, determines that *he* will attend to the Conic Sections, and not allow *his mind* to be taken possession of by the music. And accordingly for the next half-hour the mathematical mental elements are raised to a sufficient intensity almost entirely to absorb the whole consciousness. Here we have the entrance of a perfectly new factor. It is the true volitional *nisus*, an energy of the real Ego, the effect of which is to give one particular constituent of the field of consciousness a far greater intensity than it would otherwise have possessed, and thereby to expel more or less completely all other constituents. It will not do to say that this new arrival is simply the mind's realizing that no work is being done, and that it is very important that it should be done. I appeal to every student to say whether this knowledge, this consciousness of *reasons*, may not be clearly realized at its full value without its being followed by any determined and successful effort to concentrate the attention. But we will return again to the question of reasons as the antecedents of volition. In the mean time I maintain that we do have here the true volitional *nisus*, a real act of Will ; and that we have a far better opportunity of recognizing its essence and mode of operation in a case of this sort, than in those commonly cited in psychological works, where volition is closely connected with muscular sensations. We get the volition

purser, less mixed with foreign elements, in striving to attend to a book when there are distractions, than in striving to shut a door against the wind. At any rate, it will probably be admitted that it is a fundamental prerogative of the Ego to interfere where there are two or more claimants for the mastery of consciousness, and having selected one of them, to raise it in intensity, to the detriment and exclusion of its rivals.

Now see what we have got. In the first place, we found there were certain mental elements connected with certain muscular movements, and that when one of these elements (which are here called motives) attains a sufficient degree of intensity, the muscular movement is made. In the second place, we find it is a fundamental prerogative of the Ego to increase the intensity of mental elements. It seems a proper conclusion, one in accordance with the law of *Parcimony*, to infer that the way in which the Ego executes any intention involving muscular contraction is by raising the proper motive to the requisite degree of intensity. If voluntary actions can be performed in this way, viz., by the Ego thus modifying the mechanism which in certain cases accounts for involuntary action, why assume the existence of another profoundly mysterious method? The burden of proof rests with those who reject this explanation, i.e. this simplification of the problem, whereby diverse phenomena are brought under one law.

Without dwelling on the logical consequences that might be deduced from this conclusion, I may remind my readers that this same concentration of attention on particular qualities in the objects of presentation or thought, is the basis of abstract ideas and general reasoning, so that the two functions which are peculiarly human as distinguished from animal, are shewn to be essentially alike, producing different results according to the nature of the mental elements whose intensity is increased.

There are perhaps two principal reasons which would make people hesitate before admitting that the Will produces any desired action by concentrating attention on the proper motive till it attains the requisite degree of intensity. 1st. It is far

more common for the Ego to interfere in cases where movement is required than where it is not, so that the purest type of volition is apt to be overlooked. 2nd. The link in a motive-chain on which attention is fixed is generally tolerably remote from the immediate antecedent of the movement. If there already be a firm association, such that *a* calls up *b*, *b* *c*, *c* *d*, and *d* *e*, then, though *e* be the antecedent of the desired movement, you will probably be quite ignorant of what *e* is, for it will be sufficient to *attend* to *a*, to give it the requisite intensity, and the movement will follow without the intermediate links attaining intensity, at least for any appreciable interval of time; just as when you have a row of contiguous ivory balls, and you strike the first, the last starts without the others moving. By the time we pass out of childhood, innumerable trains of this kind have been formed, and many are doubtless innate. All we can do is to notice the difference between longer and shorter trains. After learning to write fluently, your pen is guided almost entirely by the sense; but when you are first learning to write, say Hebrew or short-hand, an incessant series of little acts of attention to the ideas or perceptions of the desired shapes is required; you stop the moment the attention is taken off these shapes. On the other hand, when you are accustomed to writing, you are apt to write a letter *too soon*, omitting intermediate ones, if the idea of that letter attains premature intensity in consciousness.

IV. I must now introduce a third student, with a book on Conic Sections before him. His case, which I should like to describe in feeling terms, is as follows. He has been to a ball the night before, and, though he struggles desperately to attend to the mathematics, though the volitional *nisus* is in full activity, he cannot do it with the band playing dance-music in the square. In vain does he remind himself of the coming examination and all that depends upon it. The sound of the waltz irresistibly recalls the voluptuous emotions of a vanished scene, and at last he pitches the book away in despair. This third student, poor fellow! is required because of a dilemma on which a learned professor sought to impale me when he

kindly invited me to discuss the matter with him. He asked if a person, in spite of his efforts, could ever be overcome in the way just described. I admitted the possibility, not to say frequency, of such a case. This, he said, involved an absurdity; it made out that the part conquered the whole. On the one side were certain states of the Ego assisted by the Ego itself. On the other side were only certain other states of the Ego. And the latter won the victory! Either, he said, don't set up the Ego as a metaphysical entity at all, be content with a phenomenal series of states of consciousness, as the Sensationalists are; or else, if you will set up an Ego as a substance, and say that the series of mental phenomena are states of this Ego, then don't go and insult it by letting some of its own states knock it down. The dilemma staggered me at the time; but after thinking it over for five years, I feel profoundly convinced that the mystery or apparent contradiction gives a correct account of our actual experience. In the good old times I might have disposed of my opponent, and very probably have had him burned alive, by quotations from the 7th chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. And perhaps now it is not unscientific to appeal to the authority of one who was not only a man of the profoundest psychical experience himself, but whose expressions have been adopted by millions of his fellow-men as giving a correct account of their own condition. "For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I;" "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." Are not these words as true as any that have ever been uttered? Do they not apply exactly to our case? Is not the whole difficulty met by making a distinction between the two I's? In the proposition, "I do not do what I desire to do," the first I cannot possibly have the same denotation and connotation as the second I. What do we mean by the Ego? Shall we confine the term to the central power whose function it is to direct attention and increase the intensity of certain mental elements, or is the term to be extended to afford a logical subject for all the mental phenomena which run parallel with the molecular changes of a

particular brain and nervous system? The former alternative seems to me preferable, and is the one here adopted; but however the question of nomenclature be settled, my own inner experience absolutely refuses to accept any psychology which does not draw a clear distinction between what is here called the Ego and the individual personality, the sum-total of the mental elements. The latter may perhaps be called the mind. This use of language, if somewhat startling, nevertheless accords with our habit of speaking of "a man's mind," "making up one's mind," &c., treating the mind as part of the property of the Ego, one step nearer the latter than the body, but separated from it by a gulf perhaps as wide as that which separates mind from body. Mind and body together form a machine, over which the Ego exercises a certain control, a machine which is constantly being modified by its own actions, for whose state the Ego is therefore responsible within the limits of its control, but which invariably acts under it according to fixed natural laws, as the steam-engine does under the hand of the engineer. The investigation of this machine has been the great problem of the Sensational school. It is a strictly scientific subject, open to the methods of experimental research; and if empiristic investigators are at fault, it is not in looking here for discoveries, but in supposing that this province exhausts the whole inner man. Here, too, is the seat of mental diseases, the transmission of hereditary qualities, all constitutional differences of character, and all the intelligence which man shares with the lower animals.

Before passing to the functions of the Ego, there are a few subsidiary facts which we may briefly consider. What is called Electro-Biology, that strange influence which one person exercises over the opinions and conduct of others, ought to teach us something. I once saw Professor Stone make a whole crowd of persons (numbers were no difficulty to him) believe that there were swarms of bees buzzing about their heads. The antics of these persons were most ludicrous, and the majority were certainly not accomplices. One lad told me afterwards that the sensations were so intense as to be almost

insupportable. Now the only rational explanation of this seems to be that assigned by Dr. Carpenter in his Mental Physiology, viz., that it is possible for one person to suggest to another person ideas which acquire exclusive dominance in the latter's consciousness. When from any cause a single mental element gets complete possession of consciousness, the Will, the Ego, is powerless. In insanity this is the normal condition, and it would be interesting to know whether the various methods of curing insanity are not based upon the recognition of this fact, and are not attempts to furnish the Ego with a variety of mental elements, among which choice is really possible.*

As another illustration, we may notice the difficulty of inducing a horse, however good at jumping, to clear a solitary hurdle set up in the middle of a field. Out of a whole hunt, perhaps not one will do it. The customary motive is absent, and in the animal there is no Ego to supply the deficiency. Human beings can set up a line and *practise* jumping over it. But a determined concentration of attention is required to make the most of a given amount of muscular force, and the flutter of a handkerchief may seriously baulk the leap.

While muscular power seems one of the correlated forces of nature, the function of the Ego in raising the intensity of any selected motive, though the very home of the feeling of effort, seems to me to lie wholly outside this circle of the natural forces. The volitional *nisus* by which you attend to your work and keep down the sensation of musical sounds, cannot be transformed into heat, light or electricity. True, mental exertion implies the consumption of phosphates and waste of nervous tissue. But the psychological fact corresponding to these physiological changes is the mental element that is raised in intensity, not the Ego that raises it. Prolonged mental exertion produces fatigue, or the consciousness that natural

* My theory of Volition is so similar to Dr. Carpenter's as expounded in his Mental Physiology, that I may be permitted to state that mine was brought before the Taylerian Society in June 1876, and before I had read a word of his book.

energy has been expended till it is running short, whether the Ego has interfered or not. The expenditure varies with the intensity, and is not affected by the way in which that intensity has been produced. The first student of Conics, who studied without an effort, would be tired after three hours' work; and if the second feels more fatigued (which is not certain), it will be accounted for by the fact that, owing to there being rival claimants in his consciousness, the one he determines shall win has to be raised to a much greater pitch of intensity in order to overcome all resistance, than would otherwise have been necessary. Good work may sometimes be done at a low tension, if one mental train keeps permanently far above all disturbing elements.

I pass now to the functions of the Ego so far as they concern volition. It is at any rate clear that the Ego can observe the elements of its mind, compare them, discern preferential grounds among them, select accordingly, and give effect to its choice by an act of volition. It is equally clear that it cannot create, cannot call up a mental element which does not exist in consciousness, but only brighten those that do. The most familiar instance of this occurs in trying to remember a forgotten name. All you can do is to brighten some present mental element which you think is likely to lead by a natural chain of ideas to the desired name. A third proposition, though not equally indisputable, seems to me to be true, viz., that all motives, whether included among the blind promptings of passion, the calm counsels of prudence, or the solemn admonitions of duty, have a *common measure* in the degree of intensity which they possess in consciousness, and that if the Ego does not interfere, the conduct will be determined by their relative strengths. This natural or intrinsic intensity will be determined by internal susceptibility and outward stimulant. The susceptibility will depend partly on original endowments, partly on mental training. The outward stimulants are afforded by the environment for the time being, and will vary with its character. The more public-houses there are, the more temptation to drink. The whole province is under the reign of

natural law ; similar causes invariably produce similar effects : here is the field for the labours of moral legislation, and, to a large extent, of moral exhortation.

The questions we have finally to ask are, when and why the Ego interferes with this automatical causation. The answers are, I think, to be found in the fact that there exists another standard of measurement, another scale, by which motives may be compared, and which enables the Ego to apprehend a new preferential ground in their *worth as reasons*—a scale which, *per se*, is wholly independent of their relative strengths or intensities. It is the function of the Ego to apprehend this scale of worth, make it the ground of comparison, selection and resolution ; and then it is in the power of the Ego to increase the intensity of the selected motive sufficiently to cause the corresponding muscular contraction. Here is free or undetermined volition.

V. A man is standing before a gaming-table at Baden-Baden. Passion urges him mightily to play for the sake of winning. Prudence bids him refrain. Reason is obviously against the risk. He *may* win, but he knows that the chances are heavily against him, and that if he plays long enough he *must* lose. His Baedeker tells him that the lessee pays a rent of £16,000 a year, besides defraying the enormous expenses of the Kursaal. But these prudential considerations, overwhelming as reasons, have far less intrinsic strength than the passion for play while he is standing watching the cards. Only the true volitional *nisus* can save him ; and if he relaxes his attention, and permits the passion to absorb the whole consciousness, nothing can stop him, till some turn of events, or may be some interference of a higher Power, deprives the gambling passion of its despotic sway, and gives the Ego a new chance of exercising its own will. But perhaps, instead of yielding, he walks out of the hall or leaves the town. Then the strength of the passion will probably be indefinitely decreased, proving that change of place wholly alters the relative strengths of two motives, while their worth as reasons of course remain eternally the same. Again, his object might be, not to win money, but to get ex-

citement and amusement. Prudence cannot deny that he will get plenty of this from *rouge et noir*, and men do take it up as dispassionately as they would invest capital in Consols. But the Ego can take the future into consideration, can compare present enjoyment with future probabilities, and so, without travelling beyond the counsels of prudence, may very well find ground for deciding against gambling. Of course the motive strength of future considerations only amounts to the intensity with which they are actually realized, and in the lower animals this can never exceed their natural strength. But perhaps the most frequent occasions for the interference of the Ego are to give such future considerations a strength they would not otherwise have possessed; and in a well-regulated life the Ego will get its way, with a minimum of volitional effort, by anticipating the future, and guiding the natural impulses rather than opposing them.

VI. Lastly, there may be a struggle in which the sense of duty is involved. It could hardly have been kept out of the previous instances, but it seemed best to reserve its case for special investigation. The passion for drink is urging a man to enter a public-house; his love for his family is holding him back. Here, again, the two motives have a common measure of strength. One day, the man may go in without a thought or scruple; another day, pass by without an effort; and the third day, be the theatre of a fierce conflict. Here, again, the motives have each their respective worth as reasons, absolutely independent of their respective intensities. The principal new feature presented by the admonition of duty is the peremptory character of the ground which it gives the Ego for deciding. We have a sense of obligation wholly different from what is found in any other ground of preference. The man who sacrifices prudence to passion feels himself a fool. The man who sacrifices duty to anything else knows himself a sinner. The Ego, the man, in short, knows that he ought to decide for duty, and help it to win; and faith proclaims that he can help effectually, and that, however great the volitional effort required, he shall not find himself unequal to that effort;

not, at any rate, if he is in communication with the Source of all power and might. Here is the entrance to supernaturalism or spiritual religion.

It would thus appear that the reasons which furnish the Will with grounds of preference have nothing arbitrary in their character; they stand in immutable relations to one another, under the reign of an eternal statical law. For all this, it will hardly be questioned that a position is left for the real freedom of the Will, the freedom which is essential to true moral responsibility. On the one hand are the invariable sequences of natural causation, and it is a law of nature that the strongest motive always prevails. On the other hand is the eternal order of Reason and Duty, and the Ego has the power, if it so chooses, to procure the victory for, i.e. give the requisite strength to, the best or highest motive. Mind, with its outward organism, body, form a field to be cultivated, talents to improve, a foundation on which to build, a temple to be purified for the reception of a Holy Spirit. Self-sacrifice is not self-extinction, but the defeat of the motive which possesses the greatest intrinsic or natural strength, and the life which is promised to those who deny themselves is a life in which the highest motive has at length become the strongest.

If this theory is without prejudice to the freedom of the Will or the spirituality of Religion, so too it is opposed to the Sensationalist or Emperistic schools in little else than maintaining the existence and functions of an Ego which their favourite methods do not enable them to discover. It is designed as a contribution to that attempt to "divide the territory" which we hope will one day be successful in proving to the world at large that Science and Religion are not foes but helpmates.

HENRY SHAEEN SOLLY.

VII.—THE ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS IN BERLIN.

IN few cities of Christendom does religion present a less animated or inviting aspect than in the so-called "Metropolis of Protestantism." Not many of its churches can boast of either comfort or beauty, and though each has to serve the needs of some 30,000 people, there is generally room enough in them and to spare. On Sundays, the hours of divine service can scarcely be ascertained from the more crowded appearance of the streets, and of those who may be seen entering the sacred edifices, not a few seem to feel that they are risking their reputation for enlightenment and culture. The only churches in which one can rely on the sympathy of numbers are those into which the uncompromising advocates of orthodoxy have gathered, and those in which the preachers are of a decidedly liberal type. As might be expected, the Cathedral and the Garrison Church are also respectably filled, especially on festive occasions. But in the one case, the excellent music is a powerful attraction, and precautions have to be taken to prevent the surreptitious escape of the undevout before the announcement of the text. And it is to be feared that the soldiers scarcely appreciate the care of the Emperor for their spiritual welfare, as they are wont to speak of their attendance at the Garrison Church as "fatigue duty." The clergy, since the introduction of civil marriage about three years ago, and the withdrawal of the compulsory regulations respecting other religious rites, must have comparatively little to do. Already about 12,000 children have been left unbaptized, simple registration, or, as the comic prints style it, "civil baptism," being considered sufficient by the parents. The proportion of marriages solemnized by the clergy is very small, the statistics for 1875 and 1876 giving only 24 and 29 per cent. respectively, or, in other terms, less than one-third of those entering matrimony have their union invested with a religious sanction. The number of those who in late years have presented themselves for confirmation has not materially altered, but the proportion of adult commu-

nicants has rapidly declined, and of those who remain, over two-thirds are women. The presence of the clergy at funerals is also more and more dispensed with, the burials of about one-half of grown-up persons, and of most children, being without religious rites. It will thus be seen that the recent political and social development which has raised Berlin to the proud position of the third city in Europe, has not favourably influenced her religious condition. Possessing now about a million inhabitants, she stands unexcelled as a centre of enlightenment and political influence, and every modern social movement and every form of industrial enterprize may be found in her complex life. But religion has come to be well-nigh ignored by three-fourths of her citizens, and is regarded by not a few as merely a "survival," which has fulfilled its mission, and is destined to disappear from the stage of human progress. To a large extent, the higher grades of Berlin society (with the exception of the Court circle) stand haughtily aloof from religious observances, the promotion of the *Culturinteressen* being considered the one thing needful. The literary and professorial classes have also little sympathy or connection with the clergy, it being their favourite creed that the vastness and excellence of the German literature make it sufficient for all spiritual as well as mental needs, and that the day has come for dispensing with costly ecclesiastical organizations. Indeed, not a few of this class openly advocate the breaking up of the Berlin theological faculty, or the entire exclusion of theology from the Prussian Universities. The commercial classes as a rule devote their spare time and thought to political questions, and of late the *Culturkampf* has absorbed any interest they have had to bestow on ecclesiastical affairs. The majority of the working men, being Socialists of a very pronounced description, are enemies of the Church on principle; while amongst the poorer and more dependent part of the population, many look askance at the clergy as men who have rarely done much to better the condition of their less fortunate brethren. The religious life of Berlin cannot therefore be described as either healthy or vigorous, and it is well that pastoral visiting is

a thing almost unknown, as the clergy would find themselves as unwelcome in the mansions along the Thiergarten as in the homes of the artizans of Moabit.

But there is no reason to fear that there, or elsewhere in Germany, organized religion is doomed to gradual extinction. Nor is it either just or generous for the orthodox of both hemispheres to point the finger of scorn continually at Berlin as the Chorazin or Bethsaida of Christendom. Her citizens are certainly more intent on the unification of Germany and the perfection of her military organization, than on building up the kingdom of God. The majority of them, it is true, are Protestants only in name, and may seem ungrateful in casting aside the Protestantism to which Berlin owes so much, as a garment they have outgrown. But much may be said in excuse of her present spiritual decadence. She can scarcely be said to have had a fortunate ecclesiastical history, and during the last half-century she has been more sinned against than sinning. Many of the benefits which Protestantism was calculated to bestow upon her, have been needlessly lost, or to a large extent neutralized. The Reformation paved the way for her future greatness by the downfall of the Teutonic order, freed her from the bondage of a corrupt religious system, stopped the idleness and immorality of the Catholic festival-days, and offered new facilities for education and enterprize, but left her hampered by a Church constitution which has for three centuries made the pulse of her religious life beat feebly. This constitution placed almost all power in the hands of the Government, the Consistories and the Clergy, and with well-meaning but mistaken zeal set up the Augsburg Confession as a safeguard against doctrinal laxity, and a bulwark against the encroachments of Rome. This naturally intensified the evils inseparable from all State churches, transformed the clergy into little else than Government officials, closed every field for the religious activity of the laity, and barred the way to healthy development in matters of faith and doctrine. The prejudicial effects of this shortsighted policy are but too plainly visible on every page of the ecclesiastical

history of Prussia. And it should not be forgotten that the people of Berlin can urge in their own defence, that the present aspect of religious affairs is due less to their own or their fathers' irreligiousness than to the yoke imposed upon them three centuries ago. They have had to bear the double burden of an ecclesiastical bureaucracy and the authority of dogma, instead of the supremacy of the Pope.

But the greatest misfortune of Berlin (as, indeed, of all Germany) was that of losing the golden opportunity which presented itself for religious reform about half a century ago. The war of Independence had been fought and won, and the burning words of Fichte and the saintly influence of Queen Louisa still swayed men's hearts, and kept alive the flame of religious patriotism. Berlin had been chastened by misfortune, and had no desire to return to her former delight of decking herself with the laurels of Frederick, and playing with the witticisms of Voltaire. The new generation had to be born of the Spirit, as Schleiermacher was wont to say, if the country was to have a great future. The work of Stein and Hardenberg, to be effectual and complete, must be accompanied by the inspiration of a free and enlightened faith. The old orthodoxy seemed to have gone to its grave; pietism had ended by its votaries seeing visions and dreaming dreams; and rationalism had fallen into contempt through building toy-houses out of the Bible narratives. A nobler faith was needed to touch men's hearts with ideal hopes and aims, and to introduce a golden age of religion. And the foundations of that faith were being firmly laid within her walls by a prophet whose real greatness Berlin was slow to recognize. Her gruff watchmen little thought, as they saw him wending his way homeward over the execrable pavements from the salons of Henrietta Herz, and nicknamed his lantern the glowworm, that the name of Schleiermacher would yet take rank with those of the great Reformers. Unfortunately, the Hohenzollerns knew not the time of the national visitation. Before the death of Schleiermacher in 1834, the current was flowing the wrong way, and threatening

to lose itself in a stagnant slough. And long before the constitutional struggles culminated in the fierce conflicts of 1848, conservatism, loyalty and orthodoxy, had become almost synonymous terms. The "City of Intelligence" had received its religion once more ready-made at the hands of its kings, and the theology of the sixteenth century had to do duty for the people of the nineteenth. But the Hohenzollerns are not omnipotent even in their own capital. And though they took good care to have their subjects duly baptized and confirmed, they soon found to their dismay that the gospel of the Augsburg Confession was being preached to the whitewashed walls and empty pews of the city churches.

When the present Emperor of Germany succeeded to the throne of Prussia in 1861, his nobler nature and better judgment shewed him that something ought to be done to prevent the further decline of religious life in the capital. Though standing firmly by the orthodox faith of his father and brother, he was free from their suspicious and half-persecuting spirit, and was prepared to make some concessions to the needs of the time. He is said to have consulted the Court preachers on the subject, but found that they viewed the spiritual desolation with supreme complacency, all the more perhaps as their own positions and salaries were secure. The faithful remnant, they admitted, was small, but they had purified the sanctuary and averted a total eclipse of faith. Hence the work of reform was postponed for a dozen years, during which the population of Berlin was almost doubled; but the wealthier citizens refused to contribute for the building of new churches, and the working classes unmistakably declared their adherence to the Socialistic gospel of Lassalle. A few preachers of rather more liberal tendencies received appointments in the city churches; but still, as a rule, when a vacancy occurred, orthodoxy was found to cover a multitude of defects. Gradually, however, the people of Berlin became restive under the rule of a supercilious hierarchy. And when, in January, 1873, the Consistory decreed the ejection of Dr. Sydow from the Jerusa-

lem-Church for heresy, a burst of popular indignation compelled them to recal the decree, and shewed them and the Government that they were playing with fire. The granting of a constitution to the Protestant Church of Prussia was now at last resolved upon. And, doubtless to the deep disappointment of the dominant party, one portion of this was sanctioned in the same year, and the first elections held in January, 1874. This new constitution, which is now inscribed in its entirety on the statute-book, seems rather cumbrous and complicated, but it is a vast improvement on the old régime. It empowers all adult parishioners to elect a number of representatives to look after the ecclesiastical affairs of each parish. These again elect the district synods, by whom in turn the provincial synods are chosen. The general synod or ecclesiastical parliament is partly elected by the provincial synods and partly by the King, the General Superintendents being members *ex officio*. Various precautions are taken to prevent the undue preponderance of the lay element in the synods, and power is given to the local councils to exclude any despiser of Scripture or well-known heretic from the lists. But in spite of these restrictions, the result of the new law in Berlin and in most of the large Prussian towns has been to place the real power in church matters in the hands of the parishioners. At the first elections in the capital, chiefly through the activity of the *Protestantenverein*, a liberal majority was returned in nearly every parish, although only about one half of the voters availed themselves of the privilege. Naturally the orthodox felt aggrieved at finding themselves placed in the background by men who are more conspicuous at the polling-booths than at the Sunday services or the communion-table. However, the first election of a clergyman under the new constitution, namely, that of a successor to Sydow and Müller at the Jerusalem-Church, passed off without dissension; but the second has gained for those connected with it a world-wide celebrity.

The vacancy in this instance was in the Church of St. James, where orthodoxy of the severest type has reigned undisputed

since the formation of the parish some forty years ago. Its pulpit has been open only to preachers whose belief was above suspicion, and to youthful aspirants for fame who meekly walked in the old paths under the guidance of Hengstenberg and Dorner. The only extravagance permitted to its pastors was the occasional indulgence of a harmless play of fancy round the prophecies of Daniel and the visions of St. John. It is, therefore, needless to say that nothing less than holy horror was pictured on the faces of the faithful when they heard that Licentiat Hossbach, junior minister of St. Andrew's Church, and a prominent member of the *Protestantenverein*, was to preach as the invited and favoured candidate of the liberal church council on the Sunday before Whitsuntide last. Nevertheless, on the appointed day, either from curiosity or less justifiable motives, the orthodox members of the church assembled in large numbers, though they somewhat suspiciously shewed a decided preference for the gallery. Hossbach, little dreaming what a thunder-storm was about to break, announced as his subject, "The Unity of the Spirit" (Eph. iv. 3), and commenced his discourse by depicting, in a singularly graphic way, the principles and tendencies of the two schools of religious thought, candidly acknowledging that his own theological standpoint was that of the new or modern theology. In the face of these differences, he continued, the unity of the letter was not to be attained, and we must fall back on the unity of the spirit. Or if any one looked upon uniformity of belief as absolutely necessary, he had better seize the pilgrim's staff and betake himself to Rome, there to cast himself at the feet of the infallible Pope. These frank and courageous words found a ready response in the breasts of his more liberal hearers, but to the "watchmen of Zion" it seemed as if Antichrist himself actually stood where his speedy coming had often been predicted. From sudden impulse, or more probably by preconcerted agreement, they rushed noisily down the stairs and along the aisles to escape from the desecrated building, some giving vent to ejaculations more suited to the Scribes and Pharisees than to the followers

of Christ. Hossbach fortunately allowed neither his equanimity nor his eloquence to be disturbed by this unseemly demonstration, and the heartiness with which the closing hymn was sung assured him of the allegiance and sympathy of those who remained. Both sides prepared at once for a keen contest, the orthodox party turning for help to the Court preachers, whose influence is known to be great in high quarters, and also to the members of the Brandenburg Consistory and the Supreme Church Council. The liberals, nothing daunted, prepared to contend for their rights, considering it only reasonable, as St. James had already two orthodox preachers in full activity, that the views of the third should correspond to those of the vast majority of the parishioners. The liberal representatives, therefore, took good care to be present at the election, and Hossbach was chosen by a large majority about three weeks after the scene described. Thus far the quarrel had been confined to the parish of St. James, and had been nothing more, as a Berlin paper stated, than "a family feud between the children of Isaac and Ishmael." But family strifes are proverbially bitter, and apt to inflame the passions of the bystanders, and so it proved in the present instance. At the meeting of the Synod of the Cölln district of Berlin, held on June 5th, a resolution expressing disapproval of the demonstration in St. James' Church was discussed with considerable warmth and acrimony, and carried by a majority of twenty-eight liberals to eight conservatives.

Baffled on this ground, the reactionary party proceeded to make what capital they could out of an overture respecting the use of the Apostles' Creed, which Pastor Rhode laid before the Synod. The reading of this Creed at every service was, not without a vigorous opposition, made compulsory in 1829, and the request now submitted was simply to make its use optional, as in the Lutheran Church of Saxony. The occasion was certainly inopportune for the calm discussion of so important a matter, as feeling had run extremely high in the previous debate. And it is not therefore surprising that the orthodox minority

had to submit to a severe castigation, and that, with such able and distinguished men as Professors Pfleiderer and Weber on the liberal side, it was not difficult to prove that the theological knowledge of the Court preachers who led the opposition was as limited as their Christian charity. In vain it was asserted with vehemence that the Emperor, Bismarck and Moltke, believed the Creed; and to strengthen this cumulative evidence, Stöcker, the *enfant terrible* of the Dom-theologians, declared that he literally believed every word of it from beginning to end. This zealous defender of the faith has ever since had cause to sigh over the wisdom of the children of this world. All the marvellous modern knowledge of early Christian *Cultusformen* possessed by several of the speakers, was brought into requisition to convince him that he had immolated his understanding on the altar of his faith. But against the orthodoxy of Stöcker and his colleagues, ridicule and persuasion spent themselves in vain. "Touch not the banner of the King of kings; under this banner no battle has ever been lost," cried one of the Court preachers. "I can no longer listen while our Saviour is insulted, and the palladium of our faith is trodden under foot," cried another.

A hasty settlement of the question being considered inexpedient, the overture was set aside, as falling under the scope of the higher church courts; but the storm that had been raised was not speedily stilled. The Court preachers not only strained every nerve to turn the Emperor's influence to account on behalf of their party, but on the following Sunday got up a dramatic scene in the cathedral, the congregation on their knees repeating the Creed after them, and Scripture texts being read in support of its various clauses. The Government organs also took up the cue, and delicately reminded the Emperor of his high responsibility as standard-bearer of the Protestant faith. The Supreme Church Council enjoined the Consistory to keep a watchful eye over the doings of the obnoxious synod, and to warn Pastor Rhode that the retention of his office depended on his better behaviour. And, to crown

all, the Emperor threw his sword into the scale, and by sundry utterances shewed very decidedly on which side his sympathy lay. The resignation of Hegel, President of the Consistory, which had been forwarded on account of differences with the more liberal members of the Oberkirchenrath, was also declined, and the Cultus Minister and other high officials were informed that the Emperor reckoned on their fidelity and best services at a time when the national faith was being undermined and assailed. Meanwhile the orthodox minority in St. James' had been by no means idle. A protest and petition to the Consistory was carefully framed in order to obtain its veto of the appointment of Hossbach. Even servant girls and school children were asked to sign this document; but only 937 names out of 34,400 parishioners were obtained by the malcontents, and of these only 341 were men.

The conservative victory now appeared complete, and for several weeks the liberals were somewhat crestfallen, and astonished to find themselves in such evil repute. But, little by little, public opinion recovered from the shock, and expressions of sympathy for Hossbach and his supporters came from all parts of Germany. The keen logical sense of the people of Berlin shewed them that there was not much to choose between the infallibility of the Pope and that of their own *summus episcopus*. The memorable letter which Kaiser Wilhelm had sent to Pius IX. was re-read in the light of the Emperor's own recent doings, and a glaring inconsistency was revealed. Here, in fact, was a Protestant Pope installed within fifty yards of Berlin's own boasted University, the centre of the world's enlightenment. The new Palace had become a new Vatican, and the Brandenburg Consistory had been transformed into a college of Cardinals. The watchword of the *Culturkampf*, "We are not going to Canossa," had been invested with a fresh significance and a painful personal interest. The new constitution of the Protestant Church had been turned into a "formula of discord," while Rome stood by and sneered. Before the end of August, public feeling had so far veered

round that considerable self-restraint was needful to tone down the leading articles in the liberal papers to the proper pitch of decorous moderation and loyalty.

The protest against the appointment of Hossbach came before the Consistory on Sept. 27th, and, mainly on the ground of his acknowledged adherence to the new theology, his election was declared null and void. Seldom has a weaker case been made out by any public body for such an unwarrantable step. Stripped of its verbiage and legal phraseology, it lays down the doctrine that the *believing* part of a congregation constitutes the church, that liberal majorities have no rights because they have no faith, and that liberal preachers and professors ought without exception to be expelled from their offices. Both theologians and lawyers have found legal flaws in this decision, and Hossbach has appealed to the Supreme Church Council. To strengthen this appeal, a large and enthusiastic meeting of the parishioners of St James was held in one of the city halls to express their unwavering support and allegiance to him, and he has received many other proofs of public sympathy and esteem, among which may be mentioned his appointment as Vice-president of the Synod of Berlin. This body, which is thoroughly liberal, met on Oct. 31st, and in view of what they considered the unjust treatment of Hossbach and his supporters, and the illegality of the consistorial decree, exercised the power which they have over the church exchequer, by refusing to vote the grants for the Berlin churches. This has brought matters to a dead lock, and, as Hossbach's appeal to the Oberkirchenrath is not likely to be speedily decided, the "crisis" bids fair to be still of considerable duration. Meanwhile the Court preachers sit once more in the cold shade of popular disfavour, bewailing the "*kannibalisches Heidenthum*" into which Berlin has sunk, but using every effort to keep their liberal brethren from instituting needful reforms. In the earlier stages of the conflict they used their ammunition so lavishly that they have now to shrink defenceless under the ægis of their Imperial master. A feeble protest

against the declaration issued by the *Protestantenverein* at its annual meeting on Oct. 10th, and a querulous complaint against Dr. Schwarz, of Gotha, for his public use of their well-known sobriquet of "Byzantine Court theologians" (in reference to the influence of Hosius and his colleagues over Constantine in the disputes concerning the Nicene Creed), have been of late their only signs of vitality. It is well that the orthodox clergy of the city are not all of this sort, and that Berlin has a few preachers such as Mullensiefen of the Marienkirche, who shew that men may be orthodox, and yet be tolerant of others views.

It would be rash to predict how this struggle is to end, but it is evident that the old will not yield to the new without a sharp conflict and a stiff-necked opposition. Some slight sympathy must be felt for the conservative party, whose rigid attitude and tenacious defence of their position is no doubt partly due to their alarm at the extreme radicalism of the multitude, and their open denunciation of Christianity. But Berlin cannot allow any body of men, however earnest or influential, to reduce her church life to an antiquated and barren formalism. Nor can she stand idly by and see her church courts abdicate their higher functions, and come down to do police duty and stand sentinel over the noblest and most gifted of her spiritual guides. Far less can she afford to smile at the incongruous alliance between the orthodox Protestant leaders and those who take their political as well as religious instructions from the Vatican. The present dispute is one that involves far graver issues than at first sight seem apparent, for it is nothing else than a contest with Ultramontanism wearing a Protestant mask, and it may therefore be regarded as an unexpected fulfilment of the old prophecy that the final struggle between the spirit of Protestantism and the spirit of the Papacy would be fought on the sands of the Mark of Brandenburg. The immediate future of religion in Prussia will be shaped in great measure by the outcome of this struggle, and much will depend on the turn events may take, for she can retain her

supremacy in Germany only by moral and spiritual influence, and not merely by mental power and military skill. And if this conflict is to end in a victory for the better cause, the citizens of the capital will have to overcome their besetting sin of indifference, and help the band of devoted men who are struggling for spiritual freedom, and making it the work of their lives to bring about a rejuvenescence of the Protestant faith.

ANDREW CHALMERS.

VIII.—SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS.

A SUDDEN turn of fortune has altered the legal position in the Church of England, greatly to the jubilation of the Ritualists. The two chief prosecutions undertaken under the Public Worship Regulation Act have failed on points of law. It was discovered, in the case of Mr. Pelham Dale, of St. Vedast's, that the Bishop of London, who referred it to the Archbishop of Canterbury, was patron of the living, and therefore legally disqualified from acting. On this, the conviction was quashed, and Mr. Dale restored to his benefice. The discomfiture of the prosecution in Mr. Tooth's case was still more signal and dramatic. The Public Worship Regulation Act enacts that the Archbishop may direct any cause to be heard "at any place within the diocese or province, or in London or Westminster." But the instructions issued to Lord Penzance ran, "at any place in London or Westminster, or within the diocese of Rochester." As a matter of fact, the case was heard in the Library of Lambeth Palace, which is neither in London nor Westminster nor within the diocese of Rochester; so that Mr. Tooth was perfectly justified in refusing to appear before a tribunal sitting where it had no right to sit, and the whole proceedings were null and void. Perhaps the most absurd part of the whole transaction is, that the instructions to Lord Penzance are in exact accordance with the Rules of the Court, which were signed, among others, by the very Judge who quashed the conviction, Chief Justice Cockburn.

But a more important point than any involving mere personal interests, was raised, and to a certain extent settled, in the course

of the hearing. Mr. Benjamin, Q.C., appearing for Lord Penzance, urged that the learned Judge had sat as Dean of the Arches, and as such could lawfully hold his Court in any part of the Southern Province. The importance of this point will be at once seen, when it is recollected that the identity of the new Judge with the old Dean of the Arches, whose jurisdiction is undoubtedly spiritual, is the ground on which the obedience is claimed of those High-churchmen who refuse submission to a merely temporal Court created by Parliament. But all the Judges, Chief Justice Cockburn, Mr. Justice Mellor and Mr. Justice Lush, were unanimous and quite decided on this matter. The following dicta of the first-named Judge expressed the mind of the Bench :

"I quite concur with the argument of the counsel for the applicant, that the statute created a new jurisdiction, and the mere fact that the Dean of the Arches, as connected with the Province of Canterbury, existed long before the Act, does not touch the question. It is not as Dean of the Arches that the Judge exercises this jurisdiction. It is a mere accident that the Judge happens to be the Dean of the Arches. The jurisdiction is the creation of the statute."

And again :

"Before the Act was passed, the complaint was to the Bishop, who, no doubt, might refer it to the Archbishop, but might hear it subject to appeal ; and now a new jurisdiction is created, under which, unless the parties accept the Bishop's decision as absolute and without appeal, the case must go to the Archbishop. That is an entirely new authority and jurisdiction, and it must be exercised entirely in accordance with the statute which creates it."

So that, after all, the Ritualists from their own point of view are right. They refuse to obey any Court created by Parliament, and the Judges declare that the new Court is such an one. They have always stigmatized as unsound and fictitious the theory that the spiritual character of the Dean of the Arches had been transferred to the new Judge, and Chief Justice Cockburn speaks as decisively as ever they have done. No wonder they are jubilant. Meanwhile Mr. Tooth, having officiated once at Hatcham, announces that he does not intend to bring actions for false imprisonment against those whom this judgment makes liable to them, and withdraws to the care of his Orphanage near Croydon. The Church Association is for the present checkmated ; sensible men who doubt the expediency of prosecutions in any case, have no doubt about the inexpediency

of prosecutions that break down ; and Protestant riots have begun again at Hatcham.

This is the moment, at which "quietness and confidence" should be, if ever, the strength of the High-church party, which Mr. A. H. Mackonochie, of St. Alban's, has chosen for an almost contemptuous defiance of the Bishop of London in regard to a picture of the Virgin which is exhibited in his church, and honoured with flowers and candles. If, as seems inevitable, another ecclesiastical suit is the result, it will be well to postpone any detailed narrative of the circumstances. But the following extract from the Bishop's letter to Mr. Mackonochie puts in a clear light the untenableness of the extreme Ritualist position :

"Again, I must venture to ask how the position you have taken up can be reconciled with any theory of the discipline of an Episcopal Church? I suppose that it will be conceded that in any such Church the Bishop has some authority and the Presbyters owe him some obedience. This authority may either be coercive, exercised through the Church Courts, from which, by the constitution of our own Church, an appeal lies in all causes in the last resort to the Queen's Majesty; or it may be exercised in what may be called, for convenience' sake, the Bishop's *Forum Domesticum*, the sanction of which is the divine law of obedience to rightful authority and the oath of canonical obedience. The Courts Ecclesiastical as now constituted you have already declined to obey. You have disobeyed the Court of the Province; you have disobeyed the Queen as advised by the Privy Council; you have expressed publicly, if I am rightly informed, your inability to obey the Provincial Court, as modified as to its mode of procedure by the Public Worship Act. You have, therefore, declared yourself independent of all coercive jurisdiction at present existing in the Church to which you belong.

"You have heretofore, I readily admit, complied with my direction, as Ordinary, to remove some screens which had been erected in your church, without authority, for the purpose of hearing confessions. You now, if I understand you aright, decline to obey a similar direction, not on the ground that the direction is unlawful, but that it is inexpedient. Is this, then, the inference that must be drawn—that a clergyman is bound to obey his Bishop in things lawful only when the Bishop's judgment happens to coincide with his own? And, if so, what is such obedience worth? And what is Episcopal Government but a misused name in a Church in which a Presbyter holds himself at liberty to disobey its Courts if he dislikes their decisions, and his Bishop if he differs from his opinion?"

It is, however, only fair to add that the unreasonableness of Mr.

Mackonnochie's conduct is deeply felt by many of his own party, and that strong efforts have been made to induce him to yield the disputed point. No other new prosecutions have been undertaken up to this date; and the law, as laid down in the Ridsdale Judgment, is everywhere disobeyed with perfect impunity.

Both University Commissions have begun their sittings; but, with exception of the temporary suppression of two out of three fellowships offered for competition at All Souls', no sign of their activity has yet reached the public eye. We append an outline of the Act, which is to be known as the Oxford and Cambridge Universities' Act, 1877, or otherwise as 40 and 41 Victoria, ch. 48.

The general purpose of the Act is indicated in the preamble:

"Whereas the revenues of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are not adequate to the full discharge of the duties incumbent on them respectively, and it is therefore expedient that provision be made for enabling or requiring the Colleges in each University to contribute more largely out of their revenues to University purposes, especially with a view to further and better instruction in art, science, and other branches of learning, where the same are not taught, or not adequately taught, in the University:

"And whereas it may be requisite, for the purposes aforesaid, as regards each University, to attach fellowships and other emoluments held in the Colleges to offices in the University:

"And whereas it is also expedient to make provision for regulating the tenure and advantages of fellowships not so attached, and for altering the conditions on which the same are held, and to amend in divers other particulars the law relating to the Universities and Colleges."

It may be sufficient to say in this place, that to carry out the purposes above indicated, the largest and most various powers are entrusted to the Commissioners. Subject to the final approval of Queen and Parliament, they may do what they will. Both the Universities are, as it were, thrown into the crucible, and if they emerge at all in the likeness of their former selves, it will be owing, not to any lack of amplitude in the instructions given to the Commissions, but to the natural conservative instincts of the Commissioners.

The Commissions are constituted as follows, the first named in each case being the Chairman: For Oxford, Lord Selborne, Lord Redesdale, Right Hon. Dr. Mountague Bernard, Mr. Justice Grove, Rev. Dr. Bellamy, President of St. John's, Professor H. J. S. Smith

and Mr. Matthew White Ridley. For Cambridge, the Lord Chief Justice, the Bishop of Worcester, Lord Rayleigh, Right Hon. E. P. Bouverie, Professor Lightfoot, D.D., Professor Stokes, Mr. G. W. Hemming, Q.C. No objection is to be taken to these names on the score of political party, though it is manifest that the interests of the Church have been carefully looked to. At the same time, the academical eminence of most of the Commissioners may, it is hoped, be a guarantee that, in case of conflict, those interests will not be suffered to stand in the way of real educational reform.

The powers of the Commissions are to last till the end of the year 1880, or, under special circumstances, for one year more. Until the end of 1878, both Universities and Colleges may make statutes for themselves, to be laid before the Commissioners, and not to be valid till approved by them : after that date, the Commissions may make statutes for any College. But when the constitution of any College is under consideration, three delegates elected by that College are to sit with the Commission and take part in their deliberations and decisions. Statutes so made are to be submitted to the Queen in Council, who, if any statute be petitioned against by any person or body having a *locus standi* defined by the Act, may refer the same to a Universities' Committee of the Privy Council, a body which is to consist of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellors of the two Universities (if members of the Privy Council), and either one or two members of the Privy Council to be specially appointed. If the Universities' Committee so advise, the Queen may disallow a statute or any part of a statute. But if no appeal is made against a statute, it is to be laid before both Houses of Parliament ; and should twelve weeks elapse without an address to her Majesty praying her to withhold her consent, it becomes law, by an order in Council. In addition, the above-named Universities' Committee is established as a standing court of appeal in University matters, in so far that statutes previously to be referred to the Queen in Council are now to be brought under its notice. What will be the result of this very comprehensive measure will chiefly depend upon the spirit in which the Commissioners set about their task. There is almost nothing that they cannot do. At the same time, general public opinion is so apt to look at our ancient seats of learning in a conservative light, as to make it very unlikely that the views of the newest University reformers will receive much recognition. We will take care to

chronicle accurately what the Commissioners actually do, but at the present moment it is safest to refrain from prophecy.

Much commotion has been caused among the Independents by a Conference which was held at Leicester on the 16th of October last, during the meeting of the Congregational Union in that town, of ministers and others who feel "that agreement in theological opinion can no longer be held to be essential to religious communion." The Rev. Mark Wilks, of Holloway, was in the chair, and a paper, which formed the chief basis of discussion, was read by the Rev. J. A. Picton. It is not easy to estimate the exact amount of concurrence manifested in the object of the meeting, for the members of the Congregational Union, fearing lest the evangelical orthodoxy of that Society should be compromised, not only assembled in force, but manifested an inclination to suppress the movement rather by preponderance of noise than weight of argument. This tendency, however, was successfully repressed, chiefly by the manly rebuke administered to the friends of close communion by Dr. Simon, and the discussion proceeded, though not very profitably, to its natural close. Ever since it has been made the subject of warm discussion in the religious newspapers, especially in the *English Independent* and the *Christian World*. The result has been to shew quite plainly, at least to an outside observer, first, that the number of Independent ministers and laymen who are prepared to accept the principle of the Leicester Conference and to carry it into practice is very small; next, that there are a considerably larger number in more or less sympathy with them, who are restrained from manifesting that sympathy by the prevailing tone of the body; and lastly, that the religious liberty, the possession of which the Congregationalists have so loudly asserted, is a good deal of a sham. For we are now told in every variety of phrase that it has always been understood to be liberty within bounds. These bounds are not indeed defined in any written document, but are not on that account the less real. Liberty, to use a very common and very deceptive epigram, is not to be construed as license. The common-sense and general assent of the Independent body is always ready to say to the too daring inquirer, "thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." To ourselves, all this is no news; but we are not sorry to have the plain facts of the case stated by authoritative pens; nor are we sure that the burthen of a written may not be less difficult to bear than that of an unwritten creed. We shall watch the further progress of this movement with

the deepest interest. On the one hand, we are informed that the promoters of the Leicester Conference intend to persevere in the path on which they have entered. On the other, the Congregational Union of 1878 will be under the kindly and liberal chairmanship of Mr. J. Baldwin Brown, a fact which, combined with its own looseness of constitution, will make it very difficult to take any effectual steps in opposition to this new movement.

Some slight agitation on an analogous subject has been created among the Unitarians by a pamphlet, "An Attempt to define Unitarian Christianity," the author of which is Mr. James Hopgood, a thoughtful and liberal layman. The agitation was not, however, caused by the contents of the pamphlet, which are of an entirely unobjectionable kind, but by the fact that it was circulated by Mr. Hopgood among a certain number of ministers and laymen, with a circular, of which the following is the first paragraph :

"In forwarding you the accompanying preliminary issue of my 'Attempt to define Unitarian Christianity,' I venture to ask you to favour me with your opinion whether, *broadly and generally*, I have correctly stated the leading opinions of Unitarian Christians on matters of religious belief. So far as regards the expediency of publishing any such statement I take the responsibility solely on myself, as I well know opinions differ greatly on this subject. My sole aim is to ascertain whether I am so far correct in my facts that I may fairly say (if I publish the statement) that it may be taken as an accredited one, and not merely one depending on my own opinion."

In many quarters it was felt that if this attempt to gather opinions of weight and authority succeeded, the "accredited statement" which might follow might in time grow into the position and exercise the evil influence of a creed. Nor was this apprehension lessened by the fact that a certain reaction against the complete and consistent theological liberty practised among the free churches which are commonly known as Unitarian, had made itself manifest on the part of some who, never having felt the bondage of a creed, seemed anxious to put on chains, which others, less fortunately situated, were trying to throw off. Mr. Hopgood, though still adhering to his conviction of the desirability of an "accredited statement" of Unitarian belief, has refrained from publishing in detail the answers which he received to his circular, and the newspaper controversy, which at one time seemed likely to become acrid, has died away.

We have received the following very interesting communication from our correspondent in Scotland :—"Nobody can deny that in one feature at least the Church is a merely human institution—it becomes terribly dull during the long vacation. Who can maintain a white heat of orthodoxy for twelve months together? Nature demands a periodic lull; and so even the grim Calvinistic pastors of Scotland unbend the rigour of their minds at the seaside, and some of the more wealthy depart out of their native Zion and enjoy a good holiday amidst the Sabbath-desecration and other naughtinesses of Continental life. It was at one time doubted whether a minister might lawfully let his manse during the summer months. But this has been settled by a legal decision, and those who have searched for country quarters in Scotland know that the minister's house is often the most convenient available. It is only when the early winter begins, when, as Byron would say, the climate changes from 'chilly' to 'cold,' that the natural leaders of the Church are gathered together, and joint action becomes once more possible. But, so far, not much has been done. The Committee appointed by the United Presbyterian Church to consider what amendments on the Confession of Faith are desirable, have held many meetings with closed doors. It is known that some very startling suggestions have been submitted, but it is not known what will be the result of the deliberations. When a Church with a good deal of earnest piety and a little theological learning, has seriously addressed herself to the task of revising her fundamental standards of belief, the process of revival may indeed be a tedious one, but we are certainly entitled to expect that at the least those dogmas will be ultimately rejected which everybody admits to be no longer believed in by the great majority of the members of the Church. In the Established Church, however, a very different view on this subject has been expressed. Professor Flint, who has written powerfully on the 'Philosophy of History' and on 'Theism,' and who is the successor of Dr. Crawford in the chair of Divinity at Edinburgh, in an address recently delivered to his class, has announced the perfectly novel principle—a principle capable of the most dangerous expansion—that there are many senses in which the Confession of Faith may lawfully be subscribed.

"One man thought that when he declared his assent to '*the whole doctrine*' of the Confession, he avowed his *belief* in every proposition of the Confession; another, that he pledged himself to something less, *indefinitely less*, than this, although to something more, *indefinitely more*, than what

the terms 'doctrine' or 'doctrinal system' would have committed him to. . . . When a man argued, 'If any minister of the Church thinks himself free to believe that the formation of the world was an exceedingly slow process, then *I* may preach a justification by works or deny predestination,' I can neither admit the logical principles nor admire the moral principles on which he proceeds.

"Some things are fundamental, he says, and others are not; and there is nobody but the subscriber who can say for himself which is which. The Professor then, with a painful inconsistency, denounces those who refuse to accept what he considers to be fundamental; and goes on to congratulate himself on the fact, that many of his own pet heresies are not inconsistent with the Confession as he reads it, although the Church has read it in a different manner. What can be more melancholy, what more discreditable, than that a man of undoubted power, filling a public and responsible position, should thus 'palter in a double sense,' and represent the most solemn act of the highest life to which man can dedicate himself as a systematic deception practised upon everybody who is interested in religious truth? The pen of Pascal is silent, but the lay world still hates the policy of mental reservation. It is sternly condemned by the Confession itself in the chapter upon oaths; and yet this principle of accommodation is delivered in 1877 by a Professor to his students, whom he has undertaken to qualify for preaching what they call the 'Gospel of Truth.'

"In the Free Church, the Robertson-Smith heresy case has not made any progress towards the judgment of Presbytery, and the general interest has been diverted to the more serious case of Dr. Marcus Dods, a popular minister in Glasgow. 'I, for my part, do not care what meaning a man attaches to the word 'Inspired,' nor, indeed, whether he says these Epistles are inspired or not, so long as he accepts their teaching.' This passage occurred in a printed sermon on the subject of Inspiration, which Dr. Dods at first refused to withdraw from circulation. The question was, whether he ought to be prosecuted; and the large and influential Presbytery of Glasgow has just decided by a majority of 54 to 51, three declining to vote, that there is to be no prosecution, but they find that the sermon is open to grave objections in point of style, and recommend him to withdraw it. The other motions were of a sterner cast. On this Dr. Dods writes to the Presbytery explaining that, if they had found his sermon to be contrary to the Confession, he would not have withdrawn it, but in deference to the judgment of his brethren

he will now withdraw it, although the views it expresses are those entertained by the profoundest theologians and the most philosophical apologists ! Such are the straits to which able and earnest men are brought by the attempt to reconcile modern ideas with documents which have only an historical value. But the subject was a great one for the accomplished hair-splitters who abound in Glasgow. What is involved in the notion *Dictante spiritu Dei* ; where human character ends and divine influence begins ; whether the *modus operandi* of the Spirit is inscrutable in inspiration as in regeneration and miraculous gifts ; whether it extends only to doctrines and moral principles, and not to facts of chronology, geography and grammar, or whether the writers are merely the pens of the Deity, who has revised the proof-sheets of his published works ; whether inspiration affected the handwriting of St. Paul, as the venerable Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, seems to think ; what are 'sinless deficiencies,' and what are 'trivial inaccuracies ;'—here are questions which might occupy the Church throughout all the world without much hope of arriving at any intelligible conclusion. The Report on this sermon stated that it tended to *lower* the idea of inspiration, because it represented inspiration 'as operating like enthusiasm, love, purity of intention, and a high aim in life.' How long are these Churches to spit on the sacred things of man ? There is no use in criticising this judgment. The Confession speaks of the will of God being wholly committed unto writing, and of the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, and therefore authentic. But the Confession will always mean what the majority of a noisy Church Court think and feel for the time. You cannot expect a judicial interpretation in religious matters ; the human interest is too strong.

"It will scarcely be credited that what is known as the 'Raspberry Vinegar' question, or whether fermented wine ought to be used at the Communion, is making some progress, chiefly among teetotallers, in the United Presbyterian Church. And it would be quite incredible, were it not the fact, that a human being has written an essay, in which, after minutely examining the process of fermentation as regards solids and liquids, he points out the obvious typological significance of the colour and perfume of fermented wine, which he contrasts with the incomplete fermentation of unleavened bread, and founds a triumphant argument in favour of the established practice on the probable *post-mortem* condition of the blood of Christ.

"If there has been a certain stagnation in doctrinal discussion, there has been, on the other hand, a very large crop of political questions. Lord Hartington's address at Edinburgh in the beginning of November flushed the Disestablishment party with hope. It is true that the Whig leader said nothing very definite, and asked for support without pledges. But his anxiety to separate the questions of the Scotch and English Churches, and his promise to consider the first without undue reference to the second, go far, as the *Times* has already admitted, to bring Disestablishment in Scotland within the region of practical politics. The Edinburgh speech was received with enthusiasm, but since its date there has been no very powerful agitation on the subject. A Scottish Council has been formed of the *Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Patronage and Control*. In their opening address they sum up the situation thus :

"Reduced by secession and disruption to the position of an undoubted minority—in many districts a scarcely discernible minority—of the Scottish people, and national only as deriving support and authority from the State, the Kirk has abated nothing of its pretensions and aggressions. It has asserted and enforced the most extravagant claims of prescription and statute; levying from every available source of teind or rate exactions for stipends, manses and glebes; dipping annually into Exchequer for supplements to the smaller emoluments, and for the administrative expenses of its Assemblies; besides tenaciously holding to the function and perquisites of the proclamation of banns of marriage, the possession of seats at Parochial Boards, and clerical exemptions from school and poor rates.

"There is nothing very dignified in this declaration of war. Money grievances are set forth in great plenty, but the document does not rise to those principles of pure religion and abstract political justice which inspired the Voluntary controversy in Scotland half a century ago. At that time, the logic of the subject was threshed out by men in comparison with whom we live in a generation of pigmies. Outside the Kirk, argument is no longer required. Let us hope that the former arguments will not be forgotten. But is the voluntary principle understood or truly accepted by Dissenters who see no inconsistency in the endowment of religion in the schools? The morality of such people changes with geographical divisions: what is accursed in the kingdom is good and right in the parish: injustice may be done piecemeal, but not all at once: by a School Board, but not by Parliament. Then, although the Free Church have recently made a great clamour against the Kirk, and have fostered

the Disestablishment agitation in every possible way, yet when the practical issue is put before them, they utter an extremely uncertain sound. Lectures on the subject have just been delivered by Principal Rainy, Lord Moncreiff and Mr. Taylor Innes, but these you will search in vain for any frank statement of a policy. There is, on the contrary, a singular tone of reserve which justly excites the suspicion that if the Free Church can drive the Kirk into a corner, they will not be indisposed to attempt a re-arrangement of the endowments. Fortunately, this is not politically possible. But the Free Church have certainly not abandoned their claim to be the true Kirk, and, while they will sacrifice the principle of a connection between Church and State rather than endure much longer the existence of a rival, even the most enlightened of their leaders sometimes dream of the near approach of a re-established National Kirk. The defenders of the old fortress are also making their preparations. They have significantly announced the learned and liberal Principal Tulloch as the Moderator of their next Assembly. It is singular that he should accept so representative a position at this particular juncture of affairs, and in immediate succession to an obscurantist like Dr. Phin. But the reason of his being asked is quite apparent: it is thought that he will restore the Kirk to the confidence of the more educated portion of the laity. In these times of Disestablishment darkness, they desire, even at the expense of a little honesty, to put their most attractive man in front. There is also the minor advantage that the Moderator takes no practical part in the debates of the Assembly. No proposal has yet been made for the application of the funds now employed for the support of the Kirk. But as the Report of the Endowed Schools' Commission, and the Report (not yet issued) of the Universities' Commission, will necessarily lead to legislation on secondary education of a comprehensive kind, these funds will probably receive an educational destination.

"Closely connected with the general question of Disestablishment is the movement for throwing open the Chairs of Theology in the Scotch Universities. In the University Councils of both Edinburgh and Glasgow, very respectable minorities have supported resolutions in favour of admitting to these Chairs members of any of the three large Presbyterian communions. At present you cannot become a Professor of Divinity, Biblical Criticism, Church History or Hebrew, at any of the Universities, unless you are a minister of the Established Kirk, and have signed a declaration of your belief in

the Confession of Faith, which you promise not to impugn in your teaching. It was only in 1853 that the declaration was made unnecessary in the case of lay Professors : they still declare that they will teach nothing contrary to the Confession. Imagine, what really occurred, Huxley teaching Natural History on this grotesque condition ! This half-hearted reform has properly been defeated ; and a strong feeling exists that these important chairs ought to be put on a sound and just scientific basis by repealing all dogmatic tests. Even Positivists will admit that nothing more affects the permanent welfare of a nation than its religious teaching. There seems, therefore, to be no reason why the best men should not be secured. The suggestion of admitting all Presbyterians and excluding Episcopalians is not worthy of the nineteenth century. It is forgotten that after the Revolution settlement the Universities lost many of their best Professors by driving the Episcopalians to England. Professor Edward Caird, the latest expounder of Kant, moved the Glasgow resolution. He ought to know better, and he is not wanting in courage.

“Among minor matters must be noted that the Churches continue to agitate for the continuance, with increased powers, of the Scotch Board of Education, which has shewn marked proclivities for the encouragement of Latin and Greek in the public schools, these subjects being thought indispensable to the training of young men for the ministry. This agitation is supported by a number of gentlemen connected with the teaching profession who desire to raise their social *status* by securing exceptional privileges. While the Hertford College case is exercising the Judges of the Court of Appeal at Westminster, a singular question has arisen in the Scotch Law Courts. A dissenting minority of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, which last year amalgamated spiritually with the Free Church, are trying to get hold of a large ecclesiastical charity called the ‘Ferguson Bequest.’ Of course the minority, founding on a document published before the Revolution, called the ‘Informatory Vindication,’ say they are the true Church, faithful to the second Reformation, and repudiating the settlement of 1688 ; acknowledging the perpetual obligation of the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant ; asserting the divine right of Presbyterian church government as the only form of government appointed by Christ ; and denouncing the Treaty of Union between Scotland and England. The people who have got the money say in answer that the Free

Church holds all these startling principles too ; they also say that the Reformed Church is illegal because its Testimony declares that none of its members are to take the oath of allegiance, enter Parliament, or exercise the political franchise. It seems that this consistent minority still glory in these voluntary disabilities."

E.

IX.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. SOME PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS.

THEISM* is hardly likely to receive thoroughly sympathetic treatment from a writer who is bound by the exigencies of his position to place Christianity and Theism in somewhat antithetic relations, and to shew that "mere Theism is insufficient," and requires to be supplemented by the abnormal Revelation contained in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. A belief in the infallibility of these sacred books, and in the cardinal doctrines of orthodoxy, is probably a necessary qualification in a Baird Lecturer, but it appears to us to be a somewhat serious disqualification in one who aims to expound a true philosophy of religion. Such a philosophy must, we think, regard Judaism and Christianity as integral parts of the normal religious life of humanity ; and, if it distinguishes "natural" and "revealed" religion, must see in the latter an unveiling of spiritual truth to the pure in heart, conspicuously rich and precious, indeed, in certain ages and in certain men, but at the same time never wholly absent from mankind, never failing to manifest itself in prophetic teachings and in divine lives.

The perusal of Professor Flint's treatise has confirmed our previous impression that lectures delivered under such auspices would not take a very prominent place in the religious literature of our age. We are bound, however, to admit that the Lecturer has done his work better than could reasonably have been expected from one thus trammelled by dogmatic restraints, and has produced a book which, notwithstanding its fundamental error of principle, deserves to excite more than an ephemeral interest, and is likely to be of real service in revealing the unsound character of much of the specu-

* Theism : being the Baird Lecture for 1876. By Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D. W. Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1877.

lation which passes current as science, and in preparing the minds of thoughtful men for a grander and more catholic view of the nature and foundations of religious faith than our author himself is competent to furnish.

There is one feature in the book which will prove attractive to students of every shade of theological opinion—we mean the numerous appendices at the end of the volume, in which will be found tolerably copious and, we think, trustworthy references to the chief English and continental writings bearing on the questions discussed.

We may also single out for especial mention an able lecture on “Darwinism and Design,” in which it is shewn that theology has nothing to fear from recent science; that the researches and speculations of the Darwinians have left the Design argument unshaken; nay, have even enriched it by admirable descriptions of beautiful contrivances and marvellous adjustments; and that the principles of “natural and sexual selection,” so far from superseding design, appear to be the best conceivable arrangements for ensuring the progressive improvement of organisms, and their constant adaptation to their changing environment.

The three main arguments on which Professor Flint relies for the truth of Theism are, the principle of causality, the teleological argument, and the argument from conscience. It is only by the union of the first and second of these (he says) that we can establish the principle that God is “not only the ultimate Cause, but also the Supreme Intelligence.” We feel some hesitation in following him here, and are inclined to maintain that the axiom of causality alone compels us to refer everything phenomenal to the action of a spiritual energy, which is not only volitional, but also intelligent, and intelligent because it is volitional. “If,” says Professor Flint, “we did not know ourselves as causes, we could not know God as a cause; and we know ourselves as causes only in so far as we know ourselves as wills” (p. 65).

This we heartily endorse; but our author goes on to explain that to know God as a will is not necessarily to know Him as intelligent. We are aware that here he is at one with Schopenhauer, but we must still think that both the Scotch theologian and the German pessimist do violence to psychological fact. Surely we never feel ourselves to exercise true volition, to originate, and therefore to be responsible for, our activity, unless we intelligently purpose that activity. Those who speak of “unconscious and unintelligent will” seem to us to be guilty of a *contradictio in adjecto*; and the admis-

sion of the abstract possibility of referring any phenomenal changes to a primal cause thus purposeless and blind, is, we think, unwarranted by sound psychology, and needlessly exposes the Theistic position to dangerous criticism. The causality of which we are conscious in ourselves is confessedly the only possible clue to the nature of the Power which originates and sustains the universe. If, then, we accept this clue as trustworthy, let us keep close to the fact of personal causation, and that fact is, that we never know ourselves as causes (i.e. as exercising volition) without at the same time knowing ourselves as self-conscious, and as intelligently aiming at an end in view. Those who ignore this consideration are obliged to put a strain upon the Design argument, which that argument, admirable and powerful as it is for purposes of illustration and confirmation, is, we think, hardly competent to bear.

The evidence for Theism furnished by our moral consciousness is ably presented by our author, but, as might be expected from the emphasis with which he dwells on the marks of design in nature, he does not assign to conscience that exclusive position as the sole organ of spiritual insight which it occupies in the systems of such writers as Kant and Schenkel. At the conclusion of this portion of his subject, he cites that truly sublime passage in which Robertson, of Brighton, speaks of the blessedness of the man who, amid all the tempestuous darkness in which scepticism at times enwraps the soul, still dares to hold fast to the grand, simple landmarks of morality :

"In the darkest hour through which a human soul can pass, whatever else is doubtful, this at least is certain,—If there be no God and no future life, even then it is better to be generous than selfish, better to be chaste than licentious, better to be brave than to be a coward. . . . Thrice blessed is he who, when all is drear and cheerless within and without, when his teachers terrify him and his friends shrink from him, has obstinately clung to moral good. Thrice blessed, because *his* night shall pass into clear bright day."

"There is a great and solemn truth," says Professor Flint, "in these words. But it is only a half-truth, and it should not be mistaken for the whole truth ; for it is as possible to doubt of the authority of conscience as to doubt of the existence of God" (p. 262). Hence he proceeds to argue that the moral sceptic may escape from his scepticism "by holding fast his faith in Divine goodness." Our own feeling is entirely with Robertson on this question ; for we believe that no one can possibly lose his faith in the authority of

conscience without losing at the same time all genuine faith in the existence and goodness of God.

We can but glance at those defects in the book which necessarily arise from that false antithesis between Natural and Revealed Religion to which our author has committed himself. In the first place, we think that to this erroneous principle is mainly due Professor Flint's constant asseveration that belief in God is always gained by way of *inference*, and that there exists no *immediate* apprehension of the Divine Presence, such as we conceive to be involved in our intellectual, moral and spiritual experiences, and which culminated in that vivid and intense God-consciousness which characterized the Hebrew prophets, and especially the Prophet of Nazareth. Had not our author been wont to regard the religious life and the religious insight of these beloved sons of God as entirely abnormal and *sui generis*, he could hardly have failed to see that all our truest and deepest knowledge of the Father of our spirits is given in the immediate feeling of His presence and His sympathy, and finds, not its genesis, but only its confirmation, in the inferences we intellectually draw from the effects of His activity in the world within us and the world without.

To the same cramping influence of our author's view of Christianity we must attribute the fact, that in comparing the idea of God set forth in the Bible with those expressed in other Theistic scriptures, he omits to consider that most important process of *development* through which the Theistic conception is observed to pass as we trace it upwards through the ascending strata of Jewish and Christian culture.

As another of the curious aberrations in the book which are due to the mischievous effects of Bibliolatry, we may mention the needless difficulty which Professor Flint imports into the problem of the existence of moral evil. It is usually admitted that, so far as human discernment goes, not even God could create minds capable of moral merit and demerit, without at the same time admitting the contingency of abused free-will, or moral evil. Our author, however, does not see why God could not have created beings who, "like the arch-angels," would be sure to keep their first estate. We need not comment on this naïve reference to angels and archangels, and their assumed inability to sin. We should have expected, however, that the same authority that supplies Professor Flint with the evidence for their existence, would have reminded him also that in one notorious instance at least they shewed themselves quite capable of

abusing their free-will ; or if the story of Satan's defection be fortunately mythical, and these exalted beings neither are nor ever have been liable to sin, then of a surety our admiration for them must drop the ethical and assume the æsthetic character. Probably we have said enough to let our readers see that, though this is a really good and useful book, yet in their study of it they must be watchful to separate the valuable utterances of the thoughtful philosopher from the mischievous alloy which is due to the creed-bound theologian.

In reading Dr. Drysdale's pamphlet* we are reminded of those ingeniously concocted novels in which the readers are led to expect a certain sad dénouement to the plot, when lo ! as they draw near to the close of the third volume, the unexpected re-appearance of some one long supposed to be dead reverses entirely the gloomy picture which their over-hasty imaginations had bodied forth. "It is a very nice ending," they exclaim, "but who would have thought it !" This was precisely our predicament ; for after glancing through several pages of this Inaugural Address, and seeing every paragraph bristling with alleged reasons in favour of Materialistic Atheism, we had regretfully concluded that here was another able man hopelessly caught up in the vortex of scepticism, when to our profound astonishment, on turning to another page, we discovered that the President of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool was a strongly pronounced believer in the truths of religion. How had this wonderful rescue been effected ? Why, by nothing other than a firm belief in those Biblical miracles whose evidential value had, we thought, been long extinct in the scientific mind, but which, strange to say, Dr. Drysdale still regards as "the very essence of Christianity," and as giving to the teachings of Jesus that authority "which the so-called internal evidences, valuable as they may be, are wholly insufficient to impart" (p. 54). We made this discovery with mingled pain and pleasure—with pleasure at the thought that an able *savant* and well-informed writer like Dr. Drysdale should still retain that faith in God and immortality on which so many of his scientific confrères appear to be relaxing their hold ; with pain, as we reflected how frail and transient is this tenure, and how

* Is Scientific Materialism compatible with Dogmatic Theology ? The Inaugural Address delivered before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, 1st Oct., 1877. By John Drysdale, M.D. Liverpool : Printed for the Society by D. Marples and Co., Lord Street. 1877.

unlikely it is that men of Dr. Drysdale's type will long be able to regard this as a secure anchorage.

To turn to the scientific teaching of the Address : Dr. Drysdale maintains that the evidence at our command supports the view that protoplasm is not only competent to fashion the organic structure of the body and the brain, but that it possesses in some states the unique property called consciousness. Scientific materialism is therefore in his view the necessary outcome of recent investigations. He admits, however, a qualified amount of moral responsibility in us all, but renounces any attempt to explain it physiologically. The arguments of the intuitional philosophers do not move him. When, however, he turns to the Scriptures, he learns that *ruach* and *πνεῦμα* on the one hand, and *nephesh* and *ψυχή* on the other, have distinct meanings ; that while the latter correspond to what we may call the "animal soul," the former appear to indicate a non-material substance which may possibly exist apart from the body. It is only the *ψυχή*, then, which is a property of protoplasm, and theology and religion may claim the *πνεῦμα* for their own. We have before explained in this Review that we think that science and philosophy afford some ground for this distinction ; and here as elsewhere what Dr. Drysdale accepts on the authority of Revelation alone, we are disposed to regard as the rational conclusions of a sound spiritual philosophy.

With regard to the Design argument, again, we should find ourselves quite at one with Dr. Drysdale if for "supernatural revelation" he would allow us to substitute "a due appreciation of the facts of man's spiritual nature." "Without the authoritative power of revelation," he says, "teleology has but a feeble hold on the scientific mind, and in our day has been unable to resist the weight of the Evolution theory in favour of Pantheism and Atheism in a large class of men of the highest intellectual powers. It is only when Nature is illumined with the supernatural light of revelation, that natural theology takes again its rightful place, and thus the whole universe becomes one grand poem in illustration of the glory of God" (p. 10). We firmly believe that the "natural light" which is kindled by a careful study both of the phenomena of nature and of the experiences of the soul, will quite suffice to restore to teleology its rightful and powerful influence. But in studying the experiences of the soul, we shall certainly not fail to give due prominence to such eminently spiritual men as Isaiah, Jesus and Paul.

There must be considerable mental activity among the members

of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, for we have before us another pamphlet, which is an enlarged form of a paper read before that Society,* in which the author displays no little ability in contesting Dr. Carpenter's account of the faculty of Free-will. We do not think that Mr. Guthrie is successful in his attempt to overthrow that doctrine as explained in the treatise on "Human Physiology," but he does point out with considerable shrewdness the difficulties which arise when we attempt to harmonize the idea of a "Self-determining Power" with the recognized influences of heredity, education and development. The term "causation" is used by Mr. Guthrie to indicate the law of uniformity of sequence which appears to obtain throughout the sphere of nature, and his contention is, that the actions of this so-called "Self-determining Power" are related to antecedent states of consciousness in the same uniform way in which the members of any natural sequence are related. We must enter a passing protest against this perversion of the natural meaning of causation, but in favour of it Mr. Guthrie can no doubt appeal to the usage of many recent writers of wide repute. Though a thorough-going Determinist, Mr. Guthrie thinks he has a right to say that in certain of our actions we exercise Free Choice, or Free Will. We are free when the predominant element in our action is the Practical Reason rather than impulse or emotion. "Practical Reason," says Mr. Guthrie, "is the recognition of the nature of the activities of the individual in the largest sense, and the recognition of the circumstances of the present and future environment, and it concerns itself with the adjustment of each to the other in the utmost degree" (p. 30). In our view, the Freedom of Choice does not consist in the government of our conduct by this Practical Reason, or, in other words, by a calm consideration of what is our highest good, but in the power inherent in the spirit of man to choose between surrender to unworthy impulse, and resistance to impulse in favour of some higher invitation. But we must not now plunge into this interminable controversy, and can only tell our Determinist readers that Mr. Guthrie has argued their cause valiantly and well.

C. B. U.

* The Causational and Free-will Theories of Volition : being a Review of Dr. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology." By Malcolm Guthrie. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

2. MISCELLANEOUS.

The second volume of Mr. Erskine of Linlathen's Letters,* extending over the period from 1840 till his death in 1870, not only sustains but deepens the impression made by the first. It was not the time of his literary activity, which almost all lay in the first half of his life, but one in which he exercised those functions of a lay apostolate, for which he was so eminently fitted both by saintliness of character and by social position and connection. These letters touch less frequently than those of the first volume upon controverted points of divinity, and perhaps on that account are even fuller of spiritual life and fervour. Such struggles of mind as Mr. Erskine passed through—always very gradual and never stormful—are gone by; the convictions to which he has attained are full of peace and inspiration; and he is not only able to meet the troubles and bereavements which old age necessarily brings with it, in firm and quiet reliance upon the inexhaustible love of God, but out of his own store to minister strength and consolation to others. The picture is a very beautiful one, and such as cannot but be helpful to many more, even though they are tried by difficulties and have to meet doubts which, in the strength of his one central principle, Mr. Erskine succeeded in passing by. Nor is it impossible that the inability to comprehend the importance of certain pressing critical questions, which may make these letters distasteful to some minds just now, may be the very quality which will assure their permanent value. For while critical difficulties change their shape from time to time, and the problems and solutions of one age are neither the problems nor the solutions of another, the fundamental relations of the soul to God remain the same. The experiences of the saint have a more enduring religious worth than the disquisitions of the critic.

We have sometimes thought that biography would be much more instructive than it is if we were oftener permitted to see the reverse of the medal. It has become the fashion to print personal reminiscences of men by admiring and affectionate friends, but the picture would be more complete if to them were added the recollections of others who had watched and criticised them from the outside, uninfluenced by the glamour of love. In this volume we have reminiscences of Mr. Erskine by the Dean of Westminster and

* Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, from 1840 till 1870. Edited by William Hanna, D.D. Edinburgh: D. Douglas. 1877.

Principal Shairp, which add many interesting personal traits to the brief interludes of memoir with which Dr. Hanna strings together the letters. And it is curious to compare with them the recollections of a writer in Blackwood a few months ago, who tells how he in his youth, being afflicted with religious difficulties, received a visit from Mr. Erskine, and how disappointed the kind old man was to find that there were "minds diseased" to which his favourite religious thoughts could minister no remedy. The sketch is that of one who, acknowledging all Mr. Erskine's sincerity and goodness, yet found him for his own needs no prophet; and the contrast between its tone of half-regretful criticism, and the warm personal appreciation which shines upon every page of this volume which is not the production of Mr. Erskine's own pen, is very instructive. Against this, perhaps, we may fairly set the impression which Mr. Erskine made upon a man who came to him out of a very different world, M. Prevost-Paradol. Mr. Erskine preached to him as he seems to have preached to everybody. Dr. Lorimer, in his account of the interview, says:

"He poured out to him his own deep and simple faith; he cleared away the needless superfluities with which tradition and dogmatism have obscured Christianity, and told him that pretty nearly all that Christ himself had enjoined on us was that we should love God. 'Love God,' he repeated, over and over again, 'that is about the whole of it.' I cannot of course recall what he said, and if I could, it would be needless to you. It was the doctrine he taught us all; but I, who knew him much less than you did, never heard him put it with so much power and simplicity. Paradol was very much struck with it, and with the man altogether. He did not know what to make of him. When we got down into the street, he was eloquent in his expressions of his wonder and admiration. I had told him before who he was, but he insisted on hearing it over again. That he was a member of the bar who had succeeded to a good family estate, and that his 'two books' were Plato and the Bible, was all that I could tell him. He was bewildered and awe-struck at the appearance of a personage so far elevated above the negative and colourless conception which he had formed of an English country gentleman. He was so simple, so considerate, and yet he was so dignified and authoritative, and he dismissed him with something so like an apostolical benediction, that he could not get over it. When he left us a few days after on the pier of Leith—for, unlike a Frenchman, he went up to London in midwinter by sea—he thanked me specially for taking him to see 'that kind of old prophet.'—II. 332.

One special attraction of this volume is furnished by four letters from the pen of Thomas Carlyle, by whom Mr. Erskine was greatly loved and honoured. We have read nothing finer of their kind. They

confirm an expectation, which we have long entertained, that if Mr. Carlyle's correspondence is ever published, a work of both singular interest and perennial value will be added to English literature.

"The Classic Preachers of the English Church,"* and "Masters in English Theology,"† are two volumes of lectures, by distinguished divines, delivered in 1877, the first at St. James' Church, Westminster, the second at King's College. They proceed from the same stratum of Anglican thought and feeling. When we say that the orators of the first are Canon Lightfoot, Professor Wace, Dean Lake, Prebendary Clark, Canon Farrar and Dean Goulbourn,—and of the second, Canon Barry, Dean Church, Professor Plumptre, Canon Westcott, Professor Cheetham, and again Canon Farrar,—it will be enough to recommend these volumes to the favourable attention of students of English theology and ecclesiastical biography. They differ somewhat in character. The lectures on "Preachers" at St. James's are decidedly more popular than those on "Masters" at King's College. The latter indeed are avowedly confined to the seventeenth century, and their editor, Dr. Barry, points out, in an excellent historical preface, the "moment" of development which each is intended to illustrate, and assigns each its proper place in the general history of religious thought. This limitation in time naturally excludes Bishop Butler from Dr. Barry's scheme, though it may be taken for granted that he will appear in the volume which we are encouraged to look for next year. But why does the author of the "Analogy" take his place in a series of "Classic Preachers"? Every one of course thinks of the great Sermons on Human Nature; but whoever has tried to read them knows very well that they are great, not as sermons, but as philosophical dissertations. And the Dean of Norwich, in his somewhat ponderous lecture on Butler, has considerable difficulty in proving his thesis that the "Sermons" have much right, beyond that which inheres in their title, to be considered such at all.

These lectures, as need hardly be said, are of various merit. None of them are without, some possess a very high, value. Canon Lightfoot on Donne, Dean Lake on South, Dean Church on Andrewes, are altogether admirable. On a somewhat lower level of literary worth than these brilliant essays, and yet not far below

* The Classic Preachers of the English Church : Lectures delivered in St. James' Church in 1877. With an Introduction by J. E. Kempe, M.A. London : Murray. 1877.

† Masters in English Theology : being the King's College Lectures for 1877. Edited, with an Historical Preface, by Alfred Barry, D.D. London : Murray. 1877.

them, is the mass of the contributions to the two volumes. Canon Farrar's two lectures on Jeremy Taylor and Bishop Wilson are very interesting. Professor Cheetham seizes with great distinctness of grasp upon the characteristics of Bishop Pearson. Dr. Barry on Hooker, Canon Plumptre on Chillingworth, Dr. Westcott on Whichcote, and Professor Wace on Barrow, are solid contributions to English Church biography. Altogether we have rarely read more satisfactory volumes, or which displayed fewer blots of conception and execution. One editorial slip in the "Classic Preachers" we have noticed. It is certainly a mistake to give a lecture to Bishop Beveridge as the "Scriptural Preacher," and then to allow Canon Farrar to speak in the very next of his "orthodox dulness." And we can only suppose it to be a printer's error when South is spoken of as "a warm supporter of Sacheverell in 1670."

Professor Tiele's "Outlines of the History of Religion,"* which forms the seventh volume of "The English and Foreign Philosophical Library," is a very valuable contribution to the literature of the new science of comparative theology, which as yet has excited less interest in England than on the continent. The author, in his preface to the English edition, describes his book as "outlines, pencil sketches, nothing more;" and on that ground defends what some might call its brevity and incompleteness, against the criticism of his friend and colleague, Dr. H. Oort. To us, the value of the book seems to consist in its condensed statement of what is certainly known of all the chief religions of the world up to the rise of Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, which are qualified as universal religions; and the opportunity which it thus affords to the student of making original and more minute investigations from a starting-point of unquestioned fact. In this lies its superiority to Professor Max Müller's "Introduction to the Science of Religion," which, while containing many suggestive observations, and more attractive in form than Professor Tiele's book, is much inferior to it in scientific precision. The "Outlines," too, are rendered still more valuable by the copious bibliographical notes prefixed to each section, in which not only necessary books are enumerated, but an indication is given of their respective worth. On the other hand, it appears to us that the limits within which Professor Tiele has confined himself, have necessarily made his work less interesting and valuable than it might

* *Outlines of the History of Religion to the Spread of the Universal Religions.* By C. P. Tiela. Translated from the Dutch by J. K. Carpenter, M.A. London: Trübner. 1877.

have been. Religions are living organisms, each with a subtle characteristic spirit of its own ; and much remains to be done—if the reader is to understand their likenesses and differences—after their gods and goddesses have been enumerated, and their chief myths described. Dr. Tiele looks at his religions too much from the outside : describes and classifies them, rather than exhibits their comparative anatomy : treats them, we will not say too philosophically, but not sympathetically enough. At the same time it is a somewhat ungracious task to find faults in a work which absolutely fills a gap in our theological literature, and which every student ought to make his own. The translation, by Professor J. E. Carpenter, is admirably executed, and the book a model of pleasant and correct typography.

The Society for promoting Christian Knowledge has rendered good service to the study of comparative religion by publishing a series of manuals on "Non-Christian Religious Systems."* Of these, three have been already issued : one, on Buddhism, by Mr. Rhys-Davids, the well-known Pali scholar ; a second, on Hinduism, by Professor Monier Williams, of Oxford ; and the third, on Islam, by Mr. Stobart, Principal of the La Martinière College at Lucknow. These little books vary considerably in value. The first is a singularly good specimen of a really scientific discussion of a religious subject, which is at the same time full of popular interest. Much that to the ordinary reader has hitherto been enigmatical in Buddhism is here clearly explained. The student of Mr. Rhys-Davids' lucid pages only needs a little patience to penetrate the secret of that strange form of faith—or might it not be better to say, of ascetic philosophy ?—which, however remote from Western thought, furnishes motives of action to a third of the human race. Mr. Rhys-Davids' standpoint is everywhere strictly scientific ; it is neither evidential, nor apologetic, nor hortatory. His object is simply the clear delineation of a powerful movement of human thought, which, once explained and illustrated, he leaves to make its own impression on his readers. We should find it difficult to speak in too high terms of this admirable little book ; a series of monographs conceived and executed in its spirit would be of the greatest value in dissipating the prejudices with which ordinary Christians are too apt to regard ethnic religions. If Professor Williams has been somewhat less fortunate, the fault possibly lies more in his subject than himself. With exception of

* *Non-Christian Religious Systems.* Buddhism, by T. W. Rhys-Davids ; Hinduism, by Monier Williams, M.A., D.C.L. ; Islam and its Founder, by J. W. H. Stobart, B.A. London : Society for promoting Christian Knowledge.

a single passage at the end of his book, where he seems to think it necessary to assume the attitude of Christian edification, he is faithful to the scientific conception of his task. But it is too great to be accomplished within the limits to which he is confined. The double line of development, into a coarse material polytheism and into many and subtle systems of philosophy, through which the old Vedic religion passed, furnish to the historian a vast mass of detail, which is hardly kept sufficiently distinct, or enough animated and held together by the clear display of great ruling principles. At the same time, Professor Williams' little book is one of great and permanent value, and will take its place as a useful introduction to the more minute and thorough study of the subject. We regret that we are compelled to speak in quite different terms of Mr. Stobart's *Islam*. It is best described by saying that it belongs to the pre-scientific period. It is written from the point of view of a sound believer in evangelical Christianity, who does not believe that science in any shape has anything to do with the narratives of the Pentateuch. When, in addition to this, we say that the narrative shews none but a superficial acquaintance with the facts of Mohammed's career, and no great insight into his character, it will be plain that the book stands on a very different level from its compeers. Real students of Islam can learn nothing from it, and those who approach the subject for the first time would do well to drink at a purer fountain of information.

Mr. Bullinger's "*Concordance of the English and Greek New Testament*"* has evidently been a labour of love, and may no doubt prove serviceable to the class of Biblical students for whom it is intended—those who, knowing little or nothing of Greek, wish to obtain for themselves some critical insight into the precise force of the language employed by the several writers. It would also be useful to those who were desirous of forming a critical estimate of the Authorized Version, exhibiting, as it does at a glance, the various Greek words which are rendered by the same English representative, and the various English words by which the same Greek term is translated. Considered as an English Concordance, it has the usual advantage of referring to all the passages where a word occurs, with the additional one of giving the Greek equivalent in each instance; but it has the serious drawback of not quoting the leading words in

* A Critical Lexicon and Concordance to the English and Greek New Testament, together with an Index of Greek Words, and several Appendices. By the Rev. Ebelbert W. Bullinger, St. Stephen's, Walthamstow. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1877.

the several passages, so that for the purpose of simply finding where some remembered sentence occurs it is very inferior to Cruden. As a Greek Concordance, it involves in many cases a circuitous and tedious process of search, and cannot for a moment be compared with Bruder's. The work is beautifully printed, and, if we may judge from a few samples taken quite at random, is on the whole correct. Among these few samples, however, we have noticed an error under the word "blessed," where Luke i. 42 is omitted, and another under the word "ear," where the reading in Matthew xxvi. 51 is given as *οὐς* instead of *ὠτίον*.

Dr. White has issued the "Gospels in Greek, with a Lexicon,"* for the benefit of those "who wish to retain, amidst the avocations of life, an acquaintance with the Evangelists in the original language." We are not told on what principle the text has been constructed, but passages which we have tested shew that it does not invariably follow the Textus Receptus, Griesbach, or Tischendorf's last edition. In many instances the Textus Receptus is corrected; sometimes its reading is given, but enclosed in square brackets; and sometimes it is retained without any mark of doubt, where the critical authorities are opposed to it, as in Luke xi. 2—4. Each Gospel is preceded by a very elementary introduction, which moves serenely above the difficulties of "modern criticism." At the end of the volume is a Lexicon, in which the words are carefully and clearly explained, and brief notes given on the most important points. On the whole, the work seems well suited for its purpose, and will be useful to beginners as well as to those for whom it is immediately intended.

We cannot now give Dr. Giles's two large volumes† as lengthened a notice as they deserve. The work treats of the literary history of the books of the Bible; it is free, candid, laborious, and, within certain limits, scholarly. More use might however with advantage have been made of the labours of German critics. The tone of the whole, and the plan of giving quotations in full instead of merely referring to them, as well as the translation appended to all passages quoted in Greek and Latin, denote that the book is intended for popular use. The author states his object to be—"to shew in the

* The Four Gospels in Greek, with a Lexicon. By the Rev. John T. White, D.D. Oxon., Rector of St. Martin, Ludgate. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1877.

† Hebrew and Christian Records; an Historical Inquiry concerning the Age and Authorship of the Old and New Testaments. By the Rev. Dr. Giles, Rector of Sutton, Surrey, &c. 2 vols. Trübner and Co. 1877.

first volume that the whole of the Old Testament, as it now appears, both style of language and order of events, is due, not to the first establishment of the Hebrews in Canaan fifteen hundred years before Christ, but to the re-establishment of the nation five hundred years before our era; and in the second volume, that the historical books of the New Testament were not in their present form before the year 150 after Christ" (Pref. viii). For establishing the negative parts of this thesis he depends very much on internal evidence; in regard to the affirmative portion, there is a want of discrimination in the treatment of the several books, and of detailed criticism, especially as to portions of the New Testament. The book, as a whole, deserves a hearty welcome from those who desire that the Bible shall be studied with combined learning, freedom and reverence.

"The Survival"* is a curious revelation of the spiritual history of one who seems to unite the tendencies of a mystic and a rationalist. The origin and purpose of the work are thus explained in the Introduction :

"A man who had been oscillating from his fifteenth to his forty-second year between atheism and a barren deism, coming at last by what seemed to him sufficient evidence that Cosmos is the creature of a paternal Creator, derived from it a faith that excited and, to the extent of possible obedience, enabled and obtained a life regularly conformable to what he conceived to be the will of God. . . . The faith thus elicited neither adopted nor rejected Christianity. . . . It seemed to be supernaturally sanctioned, and especially by the visits of a spirit so like the Paraclete, that, if vouchsafed to a Christian, he could not doubt that his heart was for the time a temple. It lasted about fourteen years, and then one night *exhaled in sleep*. . . . To make known the strange event is the primary object of this work."

The author had been accustomed "to make minutes of characteristic psychical events, indicative of success or failure, or suggestive of rules of conduct." These notes, containing a record of thoughts and feelings during seventeen years, form the body of the book. The writing of the notes may have been useful, though they often indicate a morbid self-examination, but the good taste of publishing such private memoranda may well be doubted. Some of them are trifling and even ludicrous; for instance, remarks on the effect of a dose of chloroform, or an unwonted indulgence in wine, in producing charitable feeling and pious emotions. There are some valuable thoughts and suggestions scattered among the entries of the journal;

* The Survival. With an Apology for Scepticism. London: Remington and Co. 1877.

a selection of these, unaccompanied with the record of the daily moral struggles of the individual, would have been acceptable.

"The Mount"* contains a series of disquisitions on the meaning—often a hidden meaning—of Shakspeare's poems, with allusions to other writers and thinkers. The author considers that art, in the highest sense of the word, includes all true philosophy and religion, and finds its noblest revelations in the writings of Shakspeare. He condemns, as utterly unsatisfactory, all previous criticisms. His style is affected and obscure in the highest degree, as one sentence may suffice to shew :

"The undoubted materialist or positivist, for these two are one, that he [Swedenborg] was, quite as much as a Tyndall or Darwin of our day, if not more so when they claim the benefit of their higher moods, who used to wait for the third day after a burial to see the soul rising, let us not be deceived, doing so on scientific, or, rather, because such science is partial, not universal, on scientist principles, from the body, never will have but pedants as worshippers in his temple, the men of head with a minimum of heart ; and as these natures are wisely an infinitesimal minority in humanity, Emerson's wish of reconciliation is not more deeply founded than this, that earth's truest prophet or poet priest needs knowledge as one indispensable part of his equipment for the genuine work of beauty which gives all men entrance to the paradise that is our longed-for home."—P. 31.

But the style is even less offensive than the matter. There is something very repulsive in the supercilious tone assumed towards other writers, and the manner in which he treats, as though manifestly inferior to himself, every thinker to whom he alludes, especially scorning the eminent scientific men of the present day. There may be some truths in the book, but it is doubtful if they will repay the labour of digging them out from the mass of unmeaning verbiage, or will counterbalance the disgust produced by the vulgar vituperations and conceited prejudice with which the author treats men who ought to be spoken of with respect, whatever verdict may be passed on their opinions.

The two volumes of the Theological Translation Fund Library†

* *The Mount : Speech from its English Heights.* By Thomas Sinclair, M.A., Author of "Love's Trilogy," "The Messenger," &c. London : Trübner. 1878.

† *The History of Jesus of Nazara, freely investigated in its connection with the National Life of Israel, and related in detail.* By Dr. Theodor Keim. Translated by Arthur Ransom. Vol. III. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

Paulinism : a Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology. By Otto Pfeiderer. Translated by Edward Peters. Vol. II. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

are continuations of works that have been already noticed in these pages. They bring before the attention of the English reader theological works which have been highly valued in their original German. The fourth volume of Mr. Philip Wicksteed's translation of "The Bible for Young People"* traces the history of the Hebrews "from Josiah to the supremacy of the Mosaic law," and concludes the notice of the books and contents of the Old Testament. Those who have found the preceding volumes interesting and useful—and we know that there are many such—will not be disappointed with the present one.

Among pamphlets which we have received we may enumerate the following. Two by Mr. Hopps† contain a simple and eminently popular treatment of the important questions to which they refer, and cannot fail to be useful. We especially like the one on the Bible. In both it is pleasing to note the tone of tender, reverential feeling with which old beliefs are treated, even when they are openly opposed and argued against. Mr. H. Richard's two addresses at the meetings of the Congregational Union of 1877,—the first entitled, "The Relations of the Temporal and Spiritual Power in the different Nations of Europe;"‡ the second, "On the Application of Religion to Politics,"§ are vigorous speeches on subjects which touch the author's heart very strongly, but which he does not treat with much subtlety of thought or novelty of illustration. Mr. Edward White reprints from the *Christian World* a "Reply to Rev. J. Baldwin Brown's Lectures on Conditional Immortality,"|| to which three letters on the same subject, by the Rev. Samuel Minton, form an appendix. "Whom do Christians now Worship?"¶ is the title of a pamphlet

* The Bible for Young People. By Dr. H. Oort and Dr. J. Hooykaas, with the assistance of Dr. A. Kuenen. Vol. IV. Authorized Translation. Williams and Norgate. 1877.

† The Plain Truth about the Bible. By John Page Hopps. London: Trübner. The alleged Prophecies concerning Jesus Christ in the Old Testament. Five Lectures. By John Page Hopps. London: Trübner.

‡ The Relations of the Temporal and Spiritual Power in the different Nations of Europe. By H. Richard, M.P. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1877.

§ On the Application of Religion to Politics. By H. Richard, M.P. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1877.

|| Life and Death: a Reply, &c. By Rev. Edward White. London: E. Stock. 1877.

¶ Whom do Christians now Worship? By Rev. Stephen Jenner, M.A. London: Longmans. 1877.

in which the Rev. Stephen Jenner proves, much to his own satisfaction, that the true object of Christian worship is the God-man Christ, not the man Jesus, and consequently that the frequent use of the word Jesus, in hymns and elsewhere, savours of irreverent familiarity. "The Counter Reformation Movement,"* is a reply to the Pastoral Letter of the Bishop of Gloucester by lay members of the Church Union in his diocese, in which are advanced the usual arguments to prove that the Church Courts have no real claim upon the obedience of Ritualists. In "God or Force?"† Mr. J. B. Crozier, who seems to belong to the medical profession, offers an argument of considerable force and originality against scientific atheism or agnosticism. Mr. Hopgood's "Attempt to define Unitarian Christianity"‡ we have spoken of elsewhere. Taken as a personal expression of religious opinion, we have only words of praise for the spirit of thoughtful liberality which pervades it. Mr. Alfred Hood selects from the Synoptic Gospels, under the title of "The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ,"§ a series of lessons for families and schools. The selection is well made, and may be recommended for the purpose for which it is designed; but Mr. Hood does not seem to us fortunate when he deviates from the Authorized Version. The last pamphlets on our list are, a good sermon by Mr. Page Hopps, called "The Kingdom of God in the Spirit of Man;"|| and a little devotional manual,¶ intended for the use of a communion class, by Mr. Charles Strong, the minister of the Scots' Church, Melbourne. Nothing could be broader than the spirit of this little work, which might be advantageously used in churches of any communion.

E.

* The Counter Reformation Movement, and Suggestions for the Solution of present Difficulties: a Reply, &c. By Lay Members of the English Church Union. London: The Church Printing Company.

† God or Force? By J. B. Crozier, M.B. London: Houlston and Sons. 1877.

‡ An Attempt to define Unitarian Christianity. By James Hopgood. London: Williams and Norgate. 1877.

§ The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ, &c. By Alfred Hood. London: W. Kent and Co. 1877.

|| The Kingdom of God in the Spirit of Man: a Sermon. By J. Page Hopps. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association.

¶ Thoughts on Spiritual Religion, &c. By Charles Strong. Melbourne: Robertson. 1877.

THE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. LXI.—APRIL, 1878.

I.—THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH.

FOR some time past, the Westminster Confession of Faith has been, and still continues to be, in Scotland, the land of its adoption, the subject of keen criticism and eager controversy. There have been proposals for revising it, for abolishing it, and—for letting it alone. Some object to it on account of its theology, and some because of its bad English. Some say it contradicts science in its doctrine of the creation of the world; while others maintain that in many and more important respects it is at variance with Scripture, and therefore untrue. Some, like the Rev. Dr. Cunningham, of Crieff, the Church historian of Scotland, would wish to relax the formula of subscription, which is now of the most stringent kind, requiring the subscriber to acknowledge “the whole doctrine” of the Confession as the confession of his (individual) faith.* Others, like the Rev. George Gilfillan, of Dundee, would go still farther, and have the Confession itself “simply and silently taken away, and laid on the historical shelf for occasional consultation only.” In the United Presbyterian Church, however, of which Mr. Gilfillan is the ornament, revision is at present the order of the day, and a committee to consider the question was actually appointed by the Synod last year. Principal Tulloch, on the other hand, in his last utterance on the subject, deprecates any revision of “the venerable theo-

* Lecture on the Westminster Confession, as reported in Scotsman, January 23, 1877.

gical document," and says that "the real mode of meeting the intellectual and spiritual growth of the Church is to be sought . . . in the free and moral, rather than formal and fixed, relation of the Christian mind to all the best thought of the Church expressed in its creeds,"*—which looks like another and grander way of saying what Mr. Gilfillan has expressed in his own strong and idiomatic phrase. Then, lastly, we have Professor Flint, of Edinburgh, in November last, repudiating the famous comparison which he was understood to have made a year before, of the Confession of Faith to Euclid, denouncing dishonest subscription as "a grievous sin," and at the same time (a little inconsistently, one might think) proposing (apparently, however, for the benefit of minds less subtle than his own) that by "the whole doctrine" shall be understood something less than the whole.† In the mean time, it is probable that the average reader, who may have gathered from his newspaper some hints of the ecclesiastical storm (should it so prove) now brewing north of the Tweed, especially the average English reader, has but very dim and hazy notions of the actual character and contents of the document in question. Indeed, Mr. Gilfillan has gone the length of saying that even in Scotland very few (ministers and elders, it may be presumed, are to be excepted) "have ever seen the Confession, far less read it, far less studied one of its chapters;" and if this be so in the native home of Presbyterianism, how much more likely is it to be the case in England! It is true, the Confession is accessible enough to any one who may care to read it for himself. A very trifling expenditure of solid cash will procure a copy. Neither is it so elaborate, or abstruse, or obscurely-worded a composition, that any one need be deterred from the task. It might easily be read through in an hour. It is written in very tolerable English; and if it contains a few grammatical solecisms, it has at least one passage which almost rises to eloquence. As to the matter of it, it is intelligible

* Principal Tulloch on the Confession of Faith, as reported in the *Scotaman* of November 14, 1877.

† *Scotaman*, Nov. 9, 1877.

enough, always provided it be allowed that the authors meant what they say. Nevertheless, it has been thought that a short account of this celebrated creed would not be at the present moment unseasonable; and if these pages shall only bring together a few of its more characteristic propositions, they will not perhaps be altogether without their use.

The Westminster Confession of Faith, it is well known, is a digest, and a very full and elaborate one too, of the Calvinistic scheme of divinity, to which every minister of each of the Presbyterian churches of Scotland is obliged to subscribe at his ordination, as well as every elder before entering on his office. Historically, it was the product of the Puritanism of the seventeenth century, in its attempt to secure uniformity of religion for the whole island, and naturally enough it bears marks of the time in which it appeared. If it is not more Calvinistic than the Confession of Knox which it displaced in Scotland, or than the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church, it at least gives greater emphasis to some of the more repulsive doctrines of Calvinism; while the Puritan Sabbath, of which there is not a word in the earlier creeds, is strongly insisted on.* It was drawn up by the Assembly of "learned, godly and judicious divines," who, in virtue of an ordinance of Parliament, began their sittings in King Henry VII.'s Chapel, in Westminster Abbey, on the 1st of July, 1643, and continued their labours till the 22nd of February, 1649, "having sat five years, six months, and twenty-two days, in which time they had held one thousand, one hundred and sixty-three sessions."† The Assembly itself consisted of one hundred and twenty-one divines, chosen, it is believed, from the several counties of England, "by the Members of Parliament for those

* As this may be disputed in regard to Knox's Confession, I shall quote here his summary of the works of the first table: "To have one God; to worship and honour him; to call upon him in all our troubles; to reverence his holy name; to hear his word; to believe the same; to communicate with his holy sacraments." (Works by David Laing, II. 106.) The omission of the Sabbath here is surely as significant as any express statement on the subject could have been.

† Hetherington's *History of the Westminster Assembly*, 4th edition, p. 310.

counties, and the burghs within them ;”* and of thirty lay assessors, ten peers and twenty commoners. Thus its constitution was catholic enough, no less than four bishops being actually called, and five who afterwards became so, and only the extreme Laudian party excluded ; but of the divines summoned, about twenty-five never appeared, others left, and it was not long until the Puritan element became altogether predominant. The first ten weeks of the Assembly were taken up with a discussion on the Thirty-nine Articles, with a view to their amendment ; but the arrival of six Commissioners from Scotland gave a new turn to events, and it was not till well on in the year 1645 that the work of preparing the Confession of Faith was seriously entered on. That the Scotch Commissioners, who included the well-known names of Henderson, Gillespie, Rutherford and Robert Baillie, being the clerical members, exercised an influence in the Assembly out of all proportion to their number, there can be no doubt. Gillespie, in particular, took a prominent part in the debates ; and of the Committee appointed to prepare and arrange the propositions to be debated in the Assembly, they formed nearly the half.† Still, the Westminster Confession of Faith was clearly of English rather than of Scottish origin ; and whether the Scotch did wisely in exchanging for it the much shorter and simpler statement drawn up by their own great reformer, may surely be doubted. It was accepted, however, by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in the year 1647, and was afterwards ratified by Acts of Parliament in 1649 and 1690.‡

* Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, Introduction, p. xxviii.

† Hetherington, p. 284.

‡ The Westminster divines do not seem to have made much use of the Scottish Confession, though traces of it, I think, may be found. The Thirty-nine Articles, at least the earlier ones, have had more influence, and the second Article in particular is almost verbally incorporated in chapter viii. section 2 of the Confession, which, however, has greatly enlarged it. Thus where the Article reads, “so that two whole and perfect Natures, that is to say, the Godhead and Manhood, were joined together in one Person, never to be divided,” the Confession, reading, “so that two whole, perfect and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person,” adds, defining more minutely, “without

Before we proceed to examine the Confession itself, the reader, perhaps, may not object to have a glimpse of the Assembly in session. Baillie's graphic description has, indeed, naturally enough, been repeatedly copied, but it does not follow that it is known to all the readers of the Theological Review. I modernize the spelling, but leave the grammar untouched.

"The like of that Assembly I did never see, and, as we hear say the like was never in England, nor anywhere is shortly like to be. They did sit in Henry 7th's Chapel, in the place of the Convocation ; but since the weather grew cold, they did go to Jerusalem Chamber, a fair room in the Abbey of Westminster, about the bounds of the College fore-hall, but wider. At the end nearest the door, and both sides, are stages of seats as in the new Assembly-house at Edinburgh, but not so high ; for there will be room but for five or six score. At the upmost end there is a chair set on a frame, a foot from the earth, for the Mr. Prolocutor, Dr. Twisse. Before it on the ground stands two chairs for the two Mr. Assessors, Dr. Burgess and Mr. Whyte. Before these two chairs, through the length of the room, stands a table, at which sits the two scribes, Mr. Byfield and Mr. Roborough. The house is all well hung, and has a good fire, which is some dainties at London. Foranent the table, upon the Prolocutor's right hand, are three or four ranks of forms. On the lowest we five do sit. Upon the others, at our backs, the members of Parliament deputed to the Assembly. On the forms foranent us, on the Prolocutor's left hand, going from the upper end of the house to the chimney, and at the other end of the house, and back side of the table, till it come about to our seats, are four or five stages of forms, whereupon their divines sits as they please, albeit commonly they keep the same place. From the chimney to the door there is no seats, but a void for passage. The Lords of Parliament uses to sit on chairs, in that void, about the fire. We meet every day of the week but Saturday. We sit commonly from nine to one or two afternoon. The Prolocutor at beginning and end has a short prayer."

conversion, composition, or confusion." It has lately been shewn, however, that, to a much greater extent, and especially as regards its general arrangement, and its doctrine of predestination and God's eternal decree, the Confession is drawn from the Irish Articles of Archbishop Usher, rather than from any foreign source. See the Rev. A. F. Mitchell's Introduction to the Minutes of the Westminster Assembly.

And here worthy Mr. Baillie makes some remarks not very complimentary to the Chairman, whose prayers he does not hold in high esteem, and who he suspects has been placed where he is "of purpose," on account of his incapacity.

"Ordinarily," he continues, "there will be present above three score of their divines. These are divided in three Committees; in one whereof every man is a member. No man is excluded who pleases to come to any of the three. Every Committee, as the Parliament gives order in writing to take any purpose and consideration, takes a portion, and in their afternoon meeting prepares matters for the Assembly, sets down their mind in distinct propositions, backs their propositions with texts of Scripture. After the prayer, Mr. Byfield, the scribe, reads the proposition and Scriptures, whereupon the Assembly debates in a most grave and orderly way. No man is called up to speak; but who stands up of his own accord he speaks so long as he will without interruption. If two or three stand up at once, then the divines confusedly calls on his name whom they desire to hear first: on whom the loudest and maniest voices calls, he speaks. No man speaks to any but to the Prolocutor. They harangue long and very learnedly. They study the questions well beforehand, and prepares their speeches; but withal the men are exceeding prompt and well spoken. I do marvel at the very accurate and extemporal replies that many of them usually do make. When upon every proposition by itself, and upon every text of scripture that is brought to confirm it, every man who will has said his whole mind, and the replies, and duplies, and triplies are heard; then the most part calls, To the question. Byford, the scribe, rises from the table, and comes to the Prolocutor's chair, who from the scribe's book reads the proposition, and says, as many as are in opinion that the question is well stated in the proposition, let them say I; when I is heard, he says, as many as think otherwise, say No. If the difference of I's and No's be clear, as usually it is, then the question is ordered by the scribes, and they go on to debate the first scripture alleged for proof of the proposition. If the sound of I and No be near equal, then says the Prolocutor, as many as say I, stand up; while they stand, the scribe and others number them in their mind; when they sit down, the No's are bidden stand, and they likewise are numbered. This way is clear enough, and saves a great deal of time, which we spend in reading our catalogue. When a question is once ordered, there is no more

debate of that matter ; but if a man will vaige (*wander*), he is quickly taken up by Mr. Assessor, or many others confusedly crying, Speak to order, to order. No man contradicts another expressly by name, but most discreetly speaks to the Prolocutor, and at most holds on the general, The Reverend brother, who lately or last spoke, on this hand, or that side, above or below. I thought meet once for all to give you a taste of the outward form of their Assembly. They follow the way of their Parliament. Much of their way is good, and worthy of our imitation : only their long-someness is woful at this time, when their Church and Kingdom lies under a most lamentable anarchy and confusion.”*

The Bible is the acknowledged foundation of all the Protestant symbols, and the Westminster Confession logically makes Holy Scripture the subject of its first chapter. And here it may be pointed out that in regard to the inspiration and authority of Scripture, the authors of the Confession took up a position which, as compared with that of the English Articles, or, perhaps, even Knox's Confession, indicates retrogression rather than advance. Knox, indeed, speaks of the Old and New Testaments as “the written word of God ;” but except so far as this phrase implies infallibility, he does not otherwise affirm it, and contents himself with saying that in the Scriptures are “sufficiently expressed” “all things necessary to be believed for the salvation of mankind.” No doubt the title-page speaks of the “infallible Word of God” as that on which the doctrine of the Confession is founded ; but it does not say that this word is co-extensive with the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, though Knox may have thought so. But the well-known sixth Article of the Church of England, of which so much was heard in the Broad-church controversy of a few years back, whether designedly or not on the part of its authors, leaves as wide a latitude as could well be desired, and having affirmed that “Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation,” then, putting the matter negatively, merely adds that “whatsoever is *not* read therein, *nor* may be proved thereby, is *not* to be required of any man

* Letters and Journal of Robert Baillie, Vol. II. pp. 107—109.

that it should be believed as an article of faith, or thought requisite or necessary to salvation." Of course, one easily sees that this language was directed against the usurped authority of Rome, and it was not likely to satisfy those who, it may be, saw other dangers besides Popery threatening the faith, and at any rate were evidently determined, on their own part, to leave no important point open to dispute. Accordingly, the Westminster Confession not only names Holy Scripture "the Word of God written," as Knox does, but after enumerating the books of the Old and New Testaments as they are generally received, it adds that they are all "given by inspiration of God to be the rule of faith and life." Moreover, the Confession expressly names God the author of Scripture: "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God." Again, it is said that the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek are "immediately inspired by God," and that "being by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, they are therefore authentical." The Westminster divines thus seem to claim for the original Greek and Hebrew text a supernatural immunity from corruption,—a claim on which the 30,000 variations in the MSS. of the Greek Testament, since shewn to exist, are surely a singular comment;* but no doubt they admitted the possibility, and even the fact, of errors in the translation. Finally, they lay down a rule for the interpretation of Scripture, which shews how completely they took the whole Bible for one book, and how little allowance they were inclined to make for the various conditions of time, place, circumstance and authorship, under which the separate books were written. "The infallible rule

* I observe, however, that a speaker in the Free Presbytery of Glasgow (Speeches in the Rev. Dr. Dods' case, by the Rev. Robert Bremner, M.A., p. 18) explains "pure" as equivalent to "preserved from the introduction of any error in doctrine or fact;" and whatever may have been the original meaning, this, I believe, is the accepted explanation.

of interpretation of scripture is scripture itself; and therefore when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.* If now it should be asked on what the authority of Scripture is itself supposed to rest, the Confession does not leave us entirely without an answer, though it will be found that the proof it offers is a purely subjective one. No doubt many particulars are enumerated—such as “the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof”—by which, we are told, “it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God;” but these, inasmuch as their existence is open to dispute, obviously prove nothing; and accordingly we are finally assured that “notwithstanding our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.”† The proof is certainly very satisfactory to the believer, to him who has this inward witness; but it leaves him who has it not very much where he was before. This,

* Here Knox’s Confession may be compared: “When controversy then happeneth for the right understanding of any place or sentence of Scripture, . . . we ought not so much to look what men before us have said or done, as unto that which the Holy Ghost uniformly speaks within the body of the Scriptures, and unto that which Christ Jesus himself did, and commanded to be done.”—Works, edited by Laing, II. p. 111.

† It is obvious that the Confession of Faith, narrow as its doctrine of inspiration certainly is, leaves the way clear for questioning or correcting traditional views as to the age and authorship of particular books; and Mr. Mitchell (*ubi supra*, p. 1) tries to shew that this was the intention of the authors by a comparison with the Belgian Confession, which begins its canon with “the five books of Moses.” Deuteronomy, for example, might be infallibly inspired, though the author were Jeremiah. The difficulty would be with a book like Daniel, which records as history events which never took place, or 2 Ep. Peter, which, if it is not by the apostle, can hardly be anything but a forgery. An important case, now on trial, obviously depends very largely on the latitude of this kind which the Confession of Faith can be held to permit.

however, is the genuine doctrine of Calvinism, which ascribes all saving faith to the free grace of God. It is the doctrine of Calvin himself as set forth in the first book of his Institutes, except that, writing as a scholar, Calvin sees that the Bible is not uniformly excellent in style, and remarks, with a *naïveté* which to us sounds a little grotesque, that the Holy Spirit was pleased to introduce some passages of surpassing beauty, merely to shew that he was not wanting in eloquence.*

There is no need here to re-state the Calvinistic scheme of divinity, or to follow the Confession of Faith through all the three-and-thirty chapters into which it is divided. But in order to shew its true character, and the thoroughly uncompromising nature of its Calvinism, it will be necessary to lay before the reader a few of its leading doctrines; and that there may be no suspicion of misrepresentation, it will be best to do so in its own words, than which, indeed, none plainer could be found. Of God's eternal decree, then, the Confession teaches that "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass;" that "by the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death;" and that "these angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Also, that "those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature as conditions or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace." "The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his

* Inst. I. viii. 2.

own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.*

It is scarcely conceivable that human language should say more plainly that the Sovereign of the universe, having it in his power to secure the happiness of all his creatures, yet deliberately chose to doom certain of them, before they were even created, to eternal misery, and that he brought them into existence for that purpose; and no saving clause affirming that this is so, "as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures," can mitigate the iniquity of the decree, any more than any enumeration of the wonderful perfections of God could render such a Being worthy of either love or worship. Calvinism has the credit of being a supremely logical system, and to a great extent the character is deserved. But this does not prevent it falling into self-contradictions. If God has unchangeably ordained "whatsoever comes to pass," he is certainly the true author of whatsoever comes to pass, and therefore of sin, and no array of scriptural texts in support of contradictory propositions can prove anything but that the writers of Scripture are not always consistent with one another.†

The Confession farther teaches that in consequence of the sin of our first parents, and the corruption of our nature from them inherited, "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made

* Chap. iii. 7. These words (for their sin) may shew that the doctrine of the Confession is Sublapsarian rather than Supralapsarian; and assuredly no enemy need press upon it the more odious doctrine. For the benefit of non-theological readers, let me distinguish the two doctrines. *Sublapsarian*—God damns all mankind for the sin which he foresees, and then out of his free grace elects some to salvation. *Supralapsarian*—God damns a certain number of mankind for no sin at all, and elects a certain number for no faith or merit of theirs, but in both cases just because it pleases him. If either doctrine could be reconciled with justice in God or liberty in man, it might be admitted that the distinction was important.

† No doubt it is a sound principle in theology that any proposition is capable of being reconciled with any other which does not directly negative it; and sometimes even then. I only venture to think it would tax theological ingenuity to shew that the propositions quoted above are not contradictory.

opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil ;” and that “man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost any ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation ; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.”

It teaches of the non-elect that “they never truly come unto Christ, and therefore cannot be saved ; much less,” it adds, “can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they ever so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature and the law of that religion they do profess ; and to assert and maintain that they may is very pernicious and to be detested.”*

It teaches that “God did from all eternity decree to justify the elect, and Christ did, in the fulness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification.”

It teaches that “there is no sin so small but it deserves damnation” (chap. xv. 4).

And—to pass over many other matters—it leaves us in no doubt what is to be understood by damnation ;—“the wicked, who know not God, and obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ, shall be cast into *eternal torments*, and be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power” (chap. xxxiii.).

Add to all this that the Confession distinctly sanctions and enjoins persecution, affirming that it is the duty of the civil magistrate “to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship or in discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered and observed” (chap. xxiii.), and you have a pretty fair synopsis of those passages which are just now proving most offensive to the more enlightened minds of the churches of Scotland, and which are causing the present agitation for reform. One

* Compare Art. xviii. of the English Prayer-book.

other passage, objectionable on different grounds, that relating to the creation of the world, will be noticed by and by.

Such, then, in its more striking features, is the formula which, as has been said, every minister of each of the Presbyterian churches must sign at his ordination. Probably it is not generally known how extremely strict the form of subscription actually is. It may not be amiss, therefore, to insert here the first two of several questions which the candidate is required to answer in the affirmative. The form for elders, it seems, is different. The italics, of course, are mine.

"1. Do you believe the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments *to be* the Word of God, and the only rule of faith and manners ?

"2. Do you sincerely own and believe the *whole* doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith, approved by the General Assemblies of this Church, and ratified by law in the year 1690, to be founded upon the Word of God ; and do you acknowledge the same as the confession of *your* faith ; and will you firmly and constantly adhere thereto, and to the utmost of your power assert, maintain and defend the same, and the purity of worship as presently practised ?" &c.

Can we wonder if there are weak brethren who desire some relaxation of the bondage to which this formula subjects them ; if the souls of good men fret and chafe under the yoke of this iron theology ; if clever and conscientious youths are deterred from making the ministry their profession by the conviction that they could not honestly and without mental reservation take this solemn oath ; if the whole conscience of the country is beginning at length to rise in revolt against a system which makes God—so the unconverted man at least must think—an omnipotent Tyrant, and man a mere puppet in his hands ? It is to little purpose to inquire whether the doctrines of the Confession are as truly in accordance with Scripture as they claim to be, because the view of the authority, and especially of the unity, of Scripture, which such an inquiry implies, is so remote from the critical one. The advocates of revision have naturally enough directed their attack

against those doctrines of Calvinism which are most offensive to the moral instincts of the natural man ; but on the ground of scriptural literalism, the doctrine of the Trinity is certainly more open to attack than that of election and reprobation. The entire system, it may be hoped, will ere long be repudiated, as to a growing extent it already is ; but whenever that shall take place, it will hardly be possible for the Bible much longer to be received as an infallible rule of faith ; and consequently those who are now attacking the Confession are in reality—it may be quite unconsciously—fighting, not indeed against the Bible, but rather for a more rational and juster view of the Bible than has hitherto prevailed. Meantime there are three points to which special attention has been recently drawn, which have been held up as examples of the unscriptural character of certain parts of the Confession, and on each of which, therefore, it will be desirable to make one or two remarks. These are, the creation of the world in six days, the non-salvability of the heathen, and the damnation of non-elect infants. Mr. David Macrae says these things are all taught in the Confession, and therefore asks that the Confession may be revised and brought more into conformity with Scripture. Professor Flint says he cannot find them there ; but even if they were there, acting on his principle that “the whole” may mean less than the whole, he would not turn any one out of the Church on account of them. On the other hand, there are probably those—believers of the old school—who find them both in the Confession and the Bible ; and as they would not tamper with the one, so would they leave the other also untouched. Principal Tulloch does not inform us whether they are there or not—which is very unkind, as he must certainly know ; but he says our criticism of the Confession ought to be “well-informed,” and that unless we are “trained theologians” we have no chance of understanding it. It is not very clear what Principal Tulloch means. If there is anything in the history of Puritanism, or in the writings of the Puritans or other representatives of Calvinism, which would suggest any other sense

for the statements of the Confession than the obvious one, he would do well to produce it.* Until then, without being trained theologians, we may venture to think we understand plain English, and may look at the matter for ourselves.

1. First, then, as to the creation of the world in six days. It is not easy to conceive by what ingenuity of interpretation the Confession can be made to yield any other meaning, on this point, than that the whole universe was brought into existence in a space of time equivalent to six natural days of twenty-four hours each. Its words are, "It pleased God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create or make out of nothing the world and all things therein, whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days, and all very good" (chap. iv. 1). Yet if the equally plain words of Scripture are to be tortured to speak the language of modern science, why should not the same process be applied to the Confession? The excuse in the case of Scripture, however, is, that a document assumed to be divinely inspired must be so interpreted as to contradict no truth of science; but no one pretends that the Confession is divinely inspired. It may be said that the authors, making their statement on the authority of Scripture, must have meant whatever Scripture means; but unless it can be shewn independently that they were acquainted with the discoveries of modern geology, it is only reasonable to suppose that they meant just what they say. It may, however, be equally true that they meant what Scripture means. For no unprejudiced reader could well doubt that according to Scripture the world was created in six natural days, and that God

* Scotsman, Nov. 14, 1877. It is perhaps only fair to say that the report of Principal Tulloch's address, on which these remarks are made, is an obviously imperfect one. Principal Tulloch may have explained himself more fully than appears. If, however, he was only suggesting that the doctrine of the Confession was Sublapsarian, whereas a superficial reader might think it was Supralapsarian, or that its apparent doctrine that Christ died for the elect only, might possibly be extended to mean that he died even for those whom it was impossible for him to save, these points might be conceded without the concession producing much effect on heretics like the Rev. David Macrae, to say nothing of those of an extremer type.

himself kept the first Sabbath-day by resting from his work. But unless we are to prefer the fancies of a Hebrew poet to the results obtained by the labours of generations of truth-loving and conscientious investigators, it is impossible to believe that the world was really made in six days. And it is surely nearly time for even "trained theologians" to admit that of all the ingenious attempts which have been made to reconcile the first chapter of Genesis with geology, not one has succeeded. Here, then, may be a very excellent reason for revising the Confession of Faith, but it is an equally good reason for disowning the authority of Scripture; and we have in this instance therefore a very striking proof of the difficulty of taking the one step without taking the other also.

2. Pass on now to the second point, the non-salvability of the heathen. This is another doctrine which Professor Flint says he cannot find in the Confession. Well, if the Confession does not say in so many words that no heathen can be saved, it all but says that if any are, it will only be in the very rarest instances. There is here, it may be admitted, a loophole for escape from what might at first seem the inevitable consequence of the Calvinistic scheme of redemption. For although the Confession affirms that no man "not professing the Christian religion can be saved in any other way" than "by Christ through the Spirit," it does not perhaps forbid the charitable hope that some, even unknown to themselves, may be saved in *that* way (i.e. if they are elect), for the Spirit, we are told, "worketh when, where, and how he pleaseth" (chap. x. 3, 4). But to ascribe such a meaning to the authors of the Confession is to interpret their words by the thoughts and feelings of our own age, and to ascribe to them a liberality of view which they did not possess. That this was not their meaning, and that when they speak of "elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word," they were thinking only of children and imbeciles, is proved by the sixtieth question of the Larger Catechism, which runs thus: "Can they who have never heard the gospel, and so know not Jesus Christ nor believe in him, be saved by their living accord-

ing to the light of nature?" The answer is in the negative.* But even if it were consistent with the Confession to believe that certain of the heathen may have been from all eternity elected to salvation, and may be saved by a Christ of whom they never heard and by a faith of which they are unconscious, after all this is but a side issue. It is not only any extreme consequences that seem to flow from the doctrine of election, it is the doctrine of election itself—the doctrine that, in the exercise of his sovereign right as Creator, God fore-ordained some of his creatures to eternal life and others to dishonour and wrath—which is so repulsive to the natural heart and conscience. But no doubt it is said that the doctrine of election is scriptural; and in a certain sense this must be admitted. It is precisely here perhaps that Calvinism is most securely rooted in Scripture, both according to the spirit and the letter of it. Election pervades the Old Testament from end to end, and is everywhere represented as the principle of God's dealings with mankind. Nor is it easy to conceive how the doctrine could be more clearly stated than it is by St. Paul in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." "Hath not the potter power over the clay?" &c. (Rom. ix. 18, 21). But this, of course, is the concern of those only who regard the Bible as an infallible rule of faith.

3. And now as to the third point, that there are infants who are lost. This too, we are told, is not in the Confession; and perhaps it matters little; for even if it were there, we should probably, as in the case of the six days, be told the same thing. The Confession of Faith, it is true, does not say in so many words that any infants are lost; and it is pleasant to think that modern Calvinists are so much more humane than their ancestors, who used to gloat over the idea of infants a span long creeping on the floor of hell, as to wish that it did not imply it. The implication, however, is unhappily too clear. After

* For this reference to the Catechism, I am indebted to Dr. Cunningham's lecture before quoted. By the way, Dr. Cunningham must surely be a "trained theologian," and he says the Confession teaches the non-salvability of the heathen.

stating in general terms that "all those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased effectually to call," the Confession continues: "Elect infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, where, and how he pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word." Can any stretch of language possibly make these words mean that all infants dying in infancy are elect and will be saved? Surely the meaning is just the opposite.* The natural inference from the first paragraph would be, that all infants must be lost—for how can they, having no understanding, be effectually called?—and the authors of the Confession, to guard against so extreme an inference, insert the reassuring clause, shewing that even infants *may* be saved; but in order to be so, of course they must be elect. Others are passed over with a silence which is surely as significant as any words could be, and what becomes of them is not open to doubt. Calvin's cruel theology leaves but the one alternative; it provides no charitable *limbus infantum*, where children removed from the world ere they had reached the years of understanding, might creep away their eternity, excluded indeed from the presence of God and his saints, but suffering no pain; but dooms them, like the vilest of sinners, to eternal torments in hell for ever. But here again the point, after all, is of but secondary importance, and only serves to divert attention from the main issue. There is, of course, something peculiarly atrocious in the damnation of helpless babes who have not so much as learned to breathe a curse against their torturer; but it is not more *unjust* than the damnation of any other innocent person; and those who believe that the Sovereign of the world is so arbitrary in his dealings that he would condemn to endless torture any number of his rational creatures, or even one, have no need to scruple about the tender years of infants. If a person is fore-ordained

* Alas! the Minutes throw no light on this interesting topic. I find only this tantalizing entry: "*Sess. 534. — November 13, 1645. — Thursday morning. Proceed in debate about elect of infants.*"

to eternal misery before his birth, and quite irrespectively of his life and worth, it does not seem to make any essential difference either to himself or as regards the character of the act of fore-ordination, whether he dies in infancy or grows to man's estate—the injustice is the same, the cruelty no less; and so long as the doctrine of election is retained in any form, it may be doubted whether it is possible, or, in the interests of logic, desirable, to spare even the tiniest babes. At the best, the exception could apply only to the children of Christian parents, and it would be a poor charity which, provided they were rescued, could look with complacency on the destruction of the millions of the heathen world. Those, therefore, who desire to eliminate this doctrine from the Confession of Faith will do well to change many other things at the same time. They may plead, indeed, that in this case at least they have Scripture on their side, and that a doctrine so horrible is but little consonant with the tender spirit of Jesus. But however true that may be, those who see in Christian theology only the development of those ideas and principles which, first expressed in the Old Testament, were afterwards seized and expanded by St. Paul, St. Augustine, and finally by Calvin, who gave them their most consistent form, will perhaps not regard the Being who, for his own glory, ordains some to life and passes others by, and who puts millions of his creatures, men, women and children, into hell, to feed the fires of his omnipotent wrath, as a wholly unworthy successor of the great War God of Jewry, who commanded the massacre of the children and sucklings of the Amalekites, and gave his blessing to those who dashed the little ones of Babylon against the stones.

And now, to conclude;—what is likely to be the upshot of the present agitation? Will it pass away, leaving things very much as they were before? Will the Confession of Faith come forth in a revised form, purged of its more offensive matter; or will the churches of Scotland, or any of them, have the courage, once for all, to throw off their dogmatic trammels, and enter on a career in which science and religion shall go hand in hand? Time will shew. There is, indeed, no reason

in the nature of things why a Confession of Faith should not be revised, but it may well be doubted whether that of Westminster will very readily lend itself to the process. It is an admittedly complete and carefully worded statement of that form of Christian divinity which it is intended to represent. No competent judge will refuse to admire its logical arrangement, its completeness of statement, the dignity and appropriateness of its style, and, generally speaking, its close adherence to Scripture, with an array of texts from which each of its propositions is fortified. To excise any part would be to mar its symmetry. To modify its language, while leaving its essential principles untouched, would be merely to make it less consistent and clear than it is. To put a new Confession in its place, would be only to lay up fresh agitation for some future day. If the time has not yet come when it may be securely "laid on the historical shelf," surely the wiser course would be to do in Scotland what has already been done in England with regard to the Prayer-book,—relax the formula of subscription. Certain it is that unless some step of the kind be taken, the Church has no chance of keeping pace with the advancing intelligence of the country. The Confession of Faith belongs to a past age, and it is not reasonable that it should be imposed as a yoke on the necks of each new generation. The attempt to do so will, however, in all probability, only hasten the religious revolution which those who are watching the signs of the times most closely, believe is in progress in Scotland.

ROBERT B. DRUMMOND.

II.—MR. DRUMMOND'S "JEWISH MESSIAH."

The Jewish Messiah. A Critical History of the Messianic Idea among the Jews, from the Rise of the Maccabees to the Closing of the Talmud. By James Drummond, B.A., Professor of Theology at Manchester New College, London. London: Longmans and Co. 1877.

It is a strange and regrettable circumstance that so little attention has yet been given to the Jewish literature of the period between the Maccabees and the foundation of Christianity. How can we possibly understand the state of mind with which Jesus Christ had to deal—how can we possibly estimate the amount of creative originality in the Saviour himself, without a minute examination of the records of the stage during which the most wonderful of all revolutions was prepared? Far be it from us to underrate the interest which a belief so singular, so absurd (from an irreverent, modern point of view), as the Messianic is fitted to inspire. There is no doubt a pathos, as Professor Drummond remarks, even in men's errors and dreams, to which no thoughtful man can be insensible, and to the historical student the Messianic belief has an additional interest from its connection with still unsettled problems of the genesis and history of extinct religions. But to all of us whose lives are coloured, whether we will or no, by that "measureless hope" which has "traversed the earth" in Jesus Christ, the study of the post-Maccabean Jewish literature should possess a peculiar attractiveness. There are questions which students of the Gospels often ask each other, and which cannot be answered from the Gospels alone—such questions as these: How can we account for the difference (already present to the Emperor Julian) between the conception of the Messiah in the Old Testament and the picture of Christ in the Gospels? Or reconcile the popular expectation of a Messiah pre-supposed in the Gospels, with the indifference, if not the complete silence, of Josephus and Philo? Were

the attributes which belonged to the Messiah in the mind of Jesus Christ, such as were natural at that particular stage of the Jewish religion? How far may we venture to say that Jesus was intellectually moulded by circumstances, and how far that he counteracted them, or impressed his own stamp upon them?

It is too soon to give a definite answer to these questions, and a premature attempt to do so can only disturb the balance of the critical judgment. Notable instances of this have been given in Germany: it may be enough to mention the biassed and audacious criticism of Volkmar. Professor Drummond carefully avoids the most distant allusion to the problems of the genesis of Christianity; it would be impossible to ascertain from the work before us to what religious or historical school he belongs; scrupulous impartiality characterizes all his discussions. It is only in the preface that he permits himself the following remark: "It [the Apocalyptic literature] possesses also for the Christian student the advantage of proximity to the Christian era. It thus furnishes a sample of the soil in which Christianity was first planted, and may assist those who have the courage for the task, to strip off the ephemeral popular conception from the permanent nucleus of spiritual truth."

It would be unfair to comment on these words, which are capable of various interpretations, and open a vista of theological controversies for which (perhaps) neither the scholars nor the religious public of this country are fully ripe.

Professor Drummond is clearly a conscientious student, and possessed of that trained common sense which ought to be a characteristic of English scholars. He has not produced a "generally interesting" work; he has not revolutionized the aspect of his subject; but he has made it possible for theological students to investigate a most important branch of their literature which has hitherto among ourselves been unwisely ignored.

The "Jewish Messiah" is divided into two parts, headed "Sources" and "History" respectively. The nature and

contents of the writings from which the later Messianic beliefs of the Jews are to be drawn are so unfamiliar, and some of them have given rise to so much difference of opinion, that the author deemed it necessary first of all to analyze the material before him. The Jewish apocalyptic writings naturally come first, "the strange product of blended political and religious enthusiasm." The author fully admits the uncertainty as to the date of some of these works, but thinks—and the position is a very safe one—that we may fairly use them for one phase of Jewish opinion at the opening of the Christian era. In this chapter the sections on the Book of Enoch and the Fourth Book of Ezra are worked out with special fulness.

The hopes excited by Daniel were very far from being fulfilled by the Maccabean victories. The enemies of Israel held up their heads again, and the divine world-empire of the Messianic period was still unrevealed. But this comparative disappointment failed to shake the faith of the Jews, who had long been accustomed to changes in the "perspective of prophecy." It even seems to have increased their interest in everything that assumed the character of a revelation. The third book of Sibylline Oracles in Egypt, and the book of Enoch in Palestine, developed the germs of the apocalyptic substitute for prophecy in a manner suited to the altered circumstances of the time. The value of Enoch, as a link in the literary and religious history of the Jews, has no doubt been exaggerated, though to reject it completely, with Jost, seems ultra-scepticism. Like so many other Jewish writings, it is not only of composite origin, but has been subjected to interpolation; for to affect a doubt on this subject, after the discussions of Hilgenfeld and Professor Drummond, would be unreasonable. A summary of the contents of the so-called Second Similitude (chaps. xlv.—lvii.), given by the latter (pp. 65—68), shews how much the connection is improved by the omission of the Messianic passages. Professor Drummond, it is true, thinks the original form of the interpolated portion is more nearly preserved than is supposed by Hilgenfeld, but this constitutes no essential difference between them. Omit-

ting the interpolated portions, we obtain a tolerably compact and intelligible book, free from any suspicious resemblance to Christian phraseology,* except in one passage (almost certainly interpolated) where the Lord calls the Messiah "my Son" (cv. 2). The date of the book seems to be fixed by the historical survey in the dream-vision of chaps. lxxxv.—xc., in the time of John Hyrcanus, 135—106 B.C. This is a purely apocalyptic work; its object, like that of Daniel, is the encouragement of the strictly pious Jews, the Ἀσσιδαῖοι. It does indeed refer to the Messiah (xc. 37), but clearly regards him as of purely human origin. The other doctrinal inferences from Enoch (if we may use the phrase) are carefully registered by Professor Drummond in the second part of his work. On the whole, I cannot help thinking that the study of "Enoch" in Dillmann's translation, and with Professor Drummond's critical chapter on the book, would be full of instruction to Biblical students. Let me take only one or two side-points. The (original) author of "Enoch" abhors the second temple, and denies the Divine presence within it. Does not this illustrate Isaiah lxvi. 1—3 and Mal. i. 6—10? And do not the various stages through which the text of the book (still more, however, that of the Sibylline Oracles) has passed, present instructive analogies for the composition of the Pentateuch?

Perhaps the best summary of the contents of 4 Ezra has been given by Dr. Westcott,† who also points out the fundamental difference of tone between "Enoch" and "Ezra," and the striking parallel between the apocalyptic visions of the latter and the teaching of parts of the New Testament. Dr. Westcott, however, adopts the view of Hilgenfeld that the book is of pre-Christian origin. After an examination of this and other conflicting theories, Professor Drummond comes to the conclusion that it was rather composed in the last quarter

* Professor Drummond is needlessly literal when, following the German of Dillmann, he quotes a phrase of "Enoch" as "the son of the woman" (lxii. 5, &c.). The Ethiopic means rather "woman's son;" comp. Job xiv. 1. So, too, it might be better to render "Lord of spirits" (not "Lord of the spirits").

† Introduction to the Study of the Gospels, 3rd ed., pp. 103—108.

of the first century A.D. The key to the book is in the famous vision of the eagle, the difficulties of which are unusually great, and cannot here be discussed. But even apart from this, no one can deny that the phenomena pointed out, for instance, by Dr. Westcott, agree exactly with the melancholy period to which Ewald and Professor Drummond have assigned it. It is unfortunate that the text of 4 Ezra has been tampered with by Christian hands. Indeed, it is perfectly extraordinary to what an extreme the unscrupulousness of transcribers and editors has gone in those parts of the apocryphal writings which have any direct bearing on contested doctrines. Geiger, it may be observed, has pointed out remarkable instances of this in the Book of Ecclesiasticus.

Another interesting chapter is devoted to the Psalter of Solomon, a work which has called forth such extremely divergent opinions, Abraham Geiger regarding it as "a colourless production, without one characteristic 'moment,' one definite allusion to contemporary events;" while Ewald, Hilgenfeld, and many other critics, argue with great positiveness from the supposed allusions in the poems. The fact is, however, that the contemporary references are both numerous and diversified. Geiger approaches his subject with a ready-made hypothesis on the position of the Jewish parties, which will not fit in with the allusions in the Psalter. The situation of parties pre-supposed in these poems is exactly that which is revealed by an impartial study of the course of Maccabean and post-Maccabean Jewish history. "It is the antithesis of the 'church party,' the genuine representatives of the community of the second temple, and the worldly, political party, which had become considerable through the War of Liberation (Ps. i. 1—8), the antithesis of the adherents of God and the adherents of the king, of the true Israel and the usurpers, who threatened to drive the people into a wholly different course,"*

* Wellhausen, "Die Pharisäer und die Sadduceer" (Greifswald, 1874), pp. 119—120. Geiger's views of the Pharisees and Sadducees, embodied as they are in Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," have perhaps received too much acceptance among liberal theologians.

—in other words, of the Pharisees and the Sadducees,—not, however, the Pharisees and the Sadducees as they are represented by Geiger. As to the date, Professor Drummond ranges himself on the side of Hilgenfeld in preference to Ewald, and ascribes the completion of the book to the years following the death of Pompeius (48 B.C.). Wellhausen substantially agrees: he thinks that the Psalms were not all by one poet, and do not all imply the same circumstances, and that the composition spreads over the period from about 80 to 40 B.C. The notes appended to his translation of the Psalter contain an elaborate justification of this view. While speaking of the translation, I may express a hope that Professor Drummond will be completely converted by Wellhausen to a belief in the Hebrew origin of the Greek Psalter, and a wish that the latter scholar's translation, based on a restoration of the Hebrew, may become better known in England. The first Psalms must of necessity lose much of their beauty in a bad Greek translation. The Psalms of Solomon are but a poor echo of the older Psalms, yet one at least of them (Ps. v.) is really very beautiful. For the purposes, however, of the history of the Messianic belief, Ps. xvii. is by far the most interesting, as it contains the first example in the later Jewish writings of the phrases, "Son of David" and the "Anointed of the Lord," for the Messiah (vv. 20, 23). It is very noteworthy that this distinct affirmation of Messianism should proceed from a circle hostile to the Asmonean princes. For, as Keim remarks, in the flourishing period of the Asmonean family, the present time seemed to (many to) approach so nearly to the ideal, that the house of David was superfluous.*

Two valuable chapters are devoted to the Targums and the Talmud respectively. The author informs us that he has no pretensions to independent research, but that Dr. Schiller-Szinessy, of Cambridge, most kindly verified and corrected the numerous extracts in the second part of "The Jewish Messiah." It is hardly necessary to follow this part of the author's

* Keim, "Jesus of Nazara," Eng. transl., I. 317.

historical sketch, which claims to be no more than a careful compilation. I am a little surprised to find that till Kuenen's pamphlet on the Great Synagogue appeared, Professor Drummond agreed with Jost that "the great Kenéseth" was really a synagogue, viz. the synagogue of Jerusalem. Surely Derenbourg's lucid work on the History of Palestine contained a more probable view.

After completing his survey of the authorities, the author proceeds "to unfold the contents and trace the development of the (Messianic) idea itself." Instead of taking the books in their chronological order, and endeavouring to present in one view the Messianic picture which each contains, he adopts the plan of at once resolving the Messianic idea into its elements, and following each of these separately through its historical changes. He begins with a brief sketch of the idea as it is presented in the prophetic books of the Old Testament,* on which I will only remark that, in his quest of brevity, he omits one of the most remarkable epithets given to the ideal king,—I refer to the description in Zech. ix. 9: "*poor*, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt, the foal of an ass." I hasten to add that at a later point Professor Drummond describes this passage as "probably" the germ of the later doctrine of a suffering Messiah. Not much light is to be gained from Sirach as to the existence of a Messianic belief before the rise of the Maccabees. Yet in xlvii. 25 (22) we find a "root of David" mentioned. The passage in xlviii. 10, 11, quoted by Professor Drummond, is partly interpolated, as has been shewn by Geiger. The really important part of this section of the work begins at Chap. iv., which deals with the divisions of the world's history assumed in the apocalyptic literature. These divisions appear to have varied with different writers, and the divergence rendered it inevitable that "signs" (sometimes called "the birth-pangs of the Messiah") and precursors should be sought for, by which the approach of the last times might

* The Psalms are not here considered, but from p. 297 it seems to follow that the author regards Ps. ii. as directly Messianic. It is an agreeable proof of his independence of mind.

be recognized. Chap. vii. introduces us to an important and much-debated subject, "the conception of the ideal kingdom without a Messiah." Professor Drummond is of opinion that the famous passage in Daniel's vision of the four beasts, "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like a son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him" (vii. 13), refers, not to the Messiah, but to the people of Israel. No one can say that the arguments on the other side are treated with disrespect or inattention; Hengstenberg's arguments, indeed, are quoted *in extenso*. I could wish that the representative of this side had been a writer of a more critical turn than the great Berlin theologian. Hengstenberg's arguments may be "simply worthless," and yet his supposition may not be wholly incorrect. A note in Professor Riehm's republished essays on "Messianic Prophecy,"* would have been worth at least a brief consideration. I do not presume to ventilate my own view of the matter, which coincides with neither of the views prevalent among Biblical critics. I will only say that so far as his present purpose is concerned, Professor Drummond seems to me more nearly right than Hengstenberg. Equal care and impartiality is devoted to the critical discussion of the difficult passage, Dan. ix. 24—27. The subject is too intricate to treat upon here, and indeed, in the present state of the Hebrew text, a fully satisfactory explanation is perhaps impossible. The author's result is—"that the Book of Daniel, though it portrays an ideal kingdom, fails to place its sovereignty in the hands of a Messiah;" and further on he remarks, and here there can hardly be a difference of opinion, that the belief in a personal Messiah was by no means general among the later Jews. When R. Akiba [one of the grandest characters of Jewish history] acknowledged the Messiahship of Bar-Cochba, Rabbi Yochanan ben Toretha said to him, "Grass will grow on thy cheeks, and the Son of David will not have come" ("Jewish Messiah," p. 272).

* T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

Did the Jews believe in a supernaturally pre-existent Messiah? The question is important. "We should, indeed, more easily understand how the Church, in its first stadia, so quickly advanced to the idea of the pre-existence of Christ, if the Jews had already been led on to the same point, prior to the appearance of Christ, by the Old Testament idea of the Messiah."* There are no doubt passages in 4 Ezra, referred to by our author, in which the Messiah is spoken of as kept or reserved unto the end (xii. 32, xiii. 26), and in another place it is said that "my son the Christ shall be revealed" (vii. 28); the same phrase is used in the Apocalypse of Baruch. But our author thinks that these passages do not imply a supernatural Messiah, but only that he was to be withdrawn after his birth into a place of temporary concealment. Indeed, "the fact that the writer of Fourth Ezra [like Trypho] makes the Messiah die like all other men, shews that the qualities which he attributed to him, however marvellous, were not in his judgment beyond the attainment of saintly men." Certainly this view of the Messiah as issuing unexpectedly from a place of concealment was a natural supplement of the descriptions of the prophets; and possibly when St. Paul says that the second Adam was "[the Lord] from heaven," he implies a similar conception, and does not mean to identify Christ with the heavenly Adam of later Judaism.† It was also a natural inference from Dan. vii. 13, so soon as the distinctly Messianic interpretation of this passage became prevalent.

The concluding chapters of the book contain much interesting matter for students of the New Testament. The author sees no reason to believe that the phrase "the kingdom of God," or "the kingdom of heaven," was ever used by the Jews as synonymous with the kingdom of the Messiah. He remarks that the confident Messianic expectations of 4 Ezra and the Apocalypse of Baruch (written after 70 A.D.) can be naturally accounted for as an inference from Daniel ix., which places the

* Dörner, "The Person of Christ," I. 418.

† Comp. also John vii. 27: "When the Christ cometh, no man knoweth whence he is" (quoted by Mr. Drummond, p. 282).

ideal age in immediate sequence to the destruction of the city and temple. He also indicates in the Apocalypse of Baruch (chap. xxix.), what is probably the original form of the absurd passage quoted from Papias by Irenæus as a saying of Christ's. A chapter, perhaps too short, is devoted to the singular belief in the secondary Messiah, the son of Joseph or of Ephraim, in contradistinction to the son of David. The reader would gather no adequate idea of the importance of this belief in the Jewish tradition, nor of the obscurity of its meaning. Professor Drummond holds what is probably the prevalent view, that the belief was produced by a reluctance to ascribe suffering and death to the triumphant king, the Son of David. But some account of the views of Bertholdt, De Wette, Grätz, would have made the chapter both more complete and more instructive. The chapter on Resurrection and Judgment contains a very full catena of passages from the Books of Daniel and Enoch to the Talmud. Very noteworthy is a Talmudic extract, which by its resemblances and contrasts cannot fail to remind us, as Professor Drummond remarks, of the description of the judgment in Matthew xxv. The nations of the world are asked, one by one, what they have done in the world. The excuse appended to their statement is very original, and reminds us of nothing so much as of the ironical justification of the ways of the gay Paris world, in a passage of M. Renan's "*Dialogues Philosophiques*." "Lord of the world," replies the Roman empire, "we have fitted up many market-places, erected baths, collected gold and silver; and all this we have done to favour the children of Israel, so that they could busy themselves with the Law undisturbed."

Professor Drummond's professed object has been to trace the stages of the growth of the Messianic belief. In the course of his History he has also found occasion to throw light on the outward form of various other dogmas common to the Christians and the Jews; but into this part of the subject there is even less ground for me to enter than into that referred to at the beginning of this article.

Special scholars in the department of later Hebrew will no

doubt find fault with some parts of the work, in spite of the valuable assistance given to the author by Dr. Schiller; and those who look for a vivid historical picture of the times which produced the Messianic ideal will be equally disappointed. What we have before us is an *Einleitung*, never careless, never absolutely meagre, and sometimes admirably complete, to the literary sources of information, followed by a kind of index, arranged under heads, of some of the most important contents. The list of modern works on the subject is sufficiently full to be of great service to the student. One misses, however, Alexandre's earlier work on the Sibylline Oracles, Herzfeld's "Geschichte," Fritzsche's "Libri Pseudepigraphi," Hilgenfeld's "Die Propheten Esra und Daniel," Wellhausen's "Die Pharisäer und Sadducäer," and above all, Castelli's brief but authoritative work, "Il Messia secondo gli Ebrei." It may be worth noticing that Wünsche has thoroughly changed his point of view since writing "Die Leiden des Messias." He still thinks that isolated teachers of the synagogue taught the doctrine of a suffering Messiah, but no longer deduces from them those extremely conservative opinions which he once deemed of essential importance.* A paper in Geiger's "Jüdische Zeitschrift" (1870, pp. 35—43) on "Menahem, the Messiah, the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost," may perhaps be found suggestive on a collateral point.

I part from the book with renewed respect for the author, and for the home of independent theology in which he is a Professor.

T. K. CHEYNE .

* "Der lebensfreundige Jesus" (Leipzig, 1876), p. viii.

III.—BISHOP THIRLWALL'S REMAINS.

Remains, Literary and Theological, of Connop Thirlwall, late Lord Bishop of St. David's. Edited by J. J. Stewart Perowne, D.D. Vols. I. and II. Charges. Vol. III. Essays, Speeches, Sermons, &c. London: Daldy, Isbister and Co. 1877-78.

DR. THIRLWALL'S "Remains, Literary and Theological," so far as they have yet seen the light, consist of two volumes of Charges to the Clergy of the Diocese of St. David's, delivered between the years 1842 and 1872, and a third, containing Essays, Speeches and Sermons. These, it is announced, are to be followed by two volumes of Letters, one to be edited by Dr. Perowne, the editor of the present volumes—the other by the Dean of Westminster. What is the justification of so singular an arrangement we are not told, nor on what principle the division of the late Bishop's correspondence between the two editors is to be made. For the solution of this riddle our literary curiosity must be content to wait: so far, Dr. Perowne has shewn himself an unobtrusive editor, willing to let the Bishop speak for himself, and not encumbering his text with unnecessary notes. With regard to the Charges, his duty was quite plain. He had only to reprint them in their chronological order. There could be no question in regard to any of them of curtailment and omission. But when we come to speak of the third or miscellaneous volume, we confess that we should like to know more accurately than we do the extent and character of the materials from which Dr. Perowne had to select, before we commit ourselves to an unreserved approval of his choice. We find here the famous "Essay on the Irony of Sophocles," reprinted from the Cambridge Philological Museum—an essay which younger scholars must often have heard praised as a masterpiece, but which few, until the present publication, can have seen. We have eight sermons and five speeches, the latter including two well-known addresses in the House of Lords on Jewish Disabilities and

the Irish Church, and another, in Convocation, on the Athanasian Creed. Of two letters, the second is that very remarkable one which the Bishop wrote to the Primate on the Pan-Anglican Synod of 1867. But while these "disjecta membra" are sufficient to give the reader some not inadequate idea of the Bishop and the Scholar, it is impossible not to feel that they supply little evidence of the mental development of the man. We should like to have been told something of that early translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on the Gospel of Luke which has been shrouded so long in decent silence. We should like to have seen the pamphlet advocating the admission of Dissenters to the Universities, and deprecating the system of compulsory attendance at chapel, which led to Thirlwall's resignation of his Assistant Tutorship at Trinity College, Cambridge. Possibly the external events of Bishop Thirlwall's life were such as might easily be told in a few pages; though no one can doubt that he was a man with a marked mental history well worth the telling. If the veil were lifted, there might be no more to see than we have already referred to; but even this is sufficient to shew that he dallied for a while with German rationalism, and was enough of a liberal to dare a quarrel with his College. Are the letters so divided as to throw this part of the work on the Dean of Westminster? He will at all events execute it with a more sympathetic hand than Dr. Perowne, who, carefully as he may keep his own personality in the background, strikes us as much more in harmony with the Bishop's habitually guarded orthodoxy, than with his occasional divergence into regions rarely trodden by episcopal feet.

Nothing is more remarkable in these writings of Dr. Thirlwall's, and especially in the Charges, than the weight of intellect that they exhibit. The reader feels that he is in presence of a very massive mental strength. Not only is each successive point, as it is taken up, stated with singular lucidity and force, but the impression is conveyed that the subject has been looked at from every side, and all possible objections anticipated. The style does not attract attention by any special

felicity of phrase, and certainly cannot lay claim to lightness or grace of movement; but it is clear, grave, copious; not without the charm of a sober eloquence, and sometimes provoking a quiet smile by a subtle and subdued irony. The Bishop's wisdom is eminently of the judicial kind: his lawn sleeves are to him a species of ermine, which he is never able to forget: even if his natural prepossessions strongly urge him to take a side, he cannot condescend to be a partizan. He states opposing views with conspicuous fairness, finding a side of truth in each; he balances argument against argument, and often ends with an "*in medio tutissimus*." His was a bar before which, we should think, men of a hot party spirit must often have stood rebuked; even if they did not care to acknowledge the fact openly, or to alter their public position, they must, under the influence of that strong intellect, that cool and unwarped judgment, have had an uncomfortable suspicion that all extreme positions were unsound, and all uncompromising affirmations at least half untrue. With this it is perfectly consistent that Dr. Thirlwall never greatly moved men, unless indeed Dr. Rowland Williams, to anger and resistance. That is the advocate's, not the judge's part. It almost involves uncompromising affirmations, and extreme positions, and one-sided views of truth—everything, in short, that was contrary to Dr. Thirlwall's intellectual nature. The impartiality of a judge always gives eager and enthusiastic men a feeling of chill. He is too calm, they think, to care much about anything. The image of Truth which he labours to set up is not the rough-hewn goddess whom they have been wont to worship; and if they bow down before her at all, it is with "maimed rites" and a disappointed adoration.

A Judge who upon the Bench makes jokes, good or bad, is felt to derogate from the dignity of his ermine. But there is a kind of grave irony, of self-restrained satire, inspired and controlled by an ethical purpose, which great magistrates have sometimes used with singular effect. Of this, Bishop Thirlwall was a master. None could be so fit to investigate the Irony of Sophocles as he who had learned the lesson so perfectly.

The instances of it, to be found at least in his published writings, are not very numerous, for sparingness of self-display is a characteristic of the faculty. The weapon would lose its peculiar temper if it were too often brought out of its sheath. Sometimes the irony is conveyed in a mere passing suggestion, the pregnancy of which almost requires a second thought for its discovery. Alluding, for instance, to Dean Stanley's well-known apology for "*Essays and Reviews*" published in the *Edinburgh Review*, Dr. Thirlwall says: "The main drift of the apology in the *Edinburgh Review* is to shew that the public had been entirely mistaken in its notion of the work, and that, with a possible immaterial exception or two, it had only freely handled questions on which a great latitude of opinion had always been allowed, and exercised by many eminent divines of our Church." Then, after some general criticism on this position, he continues: "The other admitted exceptions are represented as trifling, because contained in 'a few words.' Yet four monosyllables have sufficed for an important proposition, which it would be difficult to bring within the limits of devout belief. Ps. liii. 1." The reference sends the reader with excited curiosity to his Bible, where he finds the words, "There is no God." We hardly know which is most happy, the terse exemplification of the possible theological importance of "a few words," or the device for concentrating attention upon the example. Of Bishop Thirlwall's skill in the extended use of irony, our space forbids us to give more than one specimen. It occurs in his letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury on the Pan-Anglican Synod:

"It is quite true that such a Meeting would not be competent to 'make declarations or lay down definitions on points of doctrine,' in the sense that such declarations or definitions would have the slightest degree of legal authority or practical effect, or, as affecting the doctrine of the Church, would be worth more than blank paper. Indeed, this is so true, and so evident, that I can hardly believe your Grace can have meant your statement to be understood in this sense, in which, as a general proposition, it is superfluous, and if considered as bearing on actual circumstances, presents no guarantee

that it will have any effect on the proceedings of the Meeting. We hold in this sense that the Pope was not 'competent' to define the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. And yet he did so. In the same sense, the subscribers of the Oxford Declaration were utterly incompetent to make it. And yet they did so. I hope, indeed, that the rebuke which your Grace has incidentally, and perhaps unconsciously, administered to the authors of that Declaration, will make a wholesome impression on them. That which your Grace declares to be, beyond the competency of the Meeting which you expect to receive at Lambeth, even if it should include every Bishop of our communion, was treated by them as within the competency, not only of grave and learned Doctors of Divinity, but of the youngest curate just admitted into Holy Orders. But there is a sense in which it cannot be denied that they were competent to do, not indeed that which they affected to do, but that which they actually did; for it was nothing more than as free-born Englishmen they had a clear right to do. In that sense, they were fully competent to do it. It may have been a mere waste of ink and paper. But what law forbids an Englishman to waste his paper and his ink?"*

But there was another and a very real sense in which Dr. Thirlwall was a judge. He administered a system. He never forgot that he was a ruler in a Church established by law, with doctrinal boundaries more or less distinctly drawn, and a definite ecclesiastical polity. In these Charges, the first of which was delivered in 1842, the last in 1872, he passes in review all the controversies which in the intervening thirty years agitated the Church of England. The Tractarian Controversy in all its phases, the Endowment of Maynooth, National Education, the Gorham Case, the Revision of the Liturgy, Essays and Reviews, Dr. Colenso, Ritualism, the Athanasian Creed,—these, with many minor subjects, come successively into the field. But they are all treated with one reference. What does the Church teach? How can her system be brought into accord with fresh exigencies? To what extent will her formularies, fairly interpreted, cover new views? And so it happens that while these volumes are a repertory of sagacious

wisdom to Churchmen, a most persuasive Eirenicon to all who care to listen to the voice of peace, their value is indefinitely less to those who are unaccustomed to think within limits, and whose characteristic question is, not, What does the Church say? but, What is true? We may even affirm that the abiding sense of Dr. Thirlwall's intellectual strength of which we have spoken, is accompanied, in the minds of such readers, by a feeling of disappointment that it should have accomplished so little of permanent worth. The religious questions which are really agitating the minds of thoughtful men are not touched in these volumes. We have an undefined feeling that the Bishop knew all about them, and could speak wise and convincing words if he would; but they do not come before him judicially, and he refrains his tongue. So the book is a contribution rather to the religious history than to the theological thought of England. It will be carefully consulted hereafter for knowledge of what men were thinking and saying in a period of recurrent crisis. But it will supply no principles for future guidance, except those maxims of critical compromise and conciliation to which hot-headed partizans never listen. Controversy has swept onwards into new phases, and the Bishop's wisdom, great and genuine as it undoubtedly was, is left hopelessly behind. Moderate men unfeignedly lament that no Prelate now upon the Bench can sit in his seat of judgment; but none, with a true perception of the necessities of the hour, will add that "he, being dead, yet speaketh."

In the essential limitation of his thought, his constant tacit reference to bounds which are not to be over-passed, his bringing of all new views to be tested by a previously existing artificial standard, Bishop Thirlwall was the true child of the English Church. No one can have read much Anglican divinity without being struck with the fact, that one of its chief characteristics is a moderation which borders on timidity. Its principle seems to be, that truth is always to be found in a mean between two actually existing extremes. It balances itself with the greatest care and circumspection, as if the ground it occupies were too narrow to be walked upon with

a less cautious gait. It usually follows the statement of a general principle, with an enumeration of the cases in which it does *not* apply, and a limitation of the sense in which it is to be understood. It rarely permits itself to follow out any truth to its logical consequences: the gulf of Calvinism yawns on one side, the precipice of Romanism goes sheer down on the other, and the slough of infidelity besets the path not far off. Its worship and its methods of action (we are speaking, be it remembered, of good old-fashioned Church-of-Englandism) answer to the same idea. Its ceremonial is emphatically decent. It despises fripperies. It has certain ancestral canons of taste to which it strictly adheres. It hates any attempt to imitate Romanist gorgeousness of ceremonial on the one side, and on the other thinks extemporary prayer rather low. It had almost rather not save souls than do it in an irregular way, or by imitation of Dissenting methods. Whatever can be done with the Prayer-book and the Catechism may be done; but all beyond that savours of fanaticism. Even the outward garb of the true Anglican clergyman, at the time of which we are speaking, told the same tale: you could not mistake him for a Catholic priest, but he was just as clearly distinct from a layman. He had the *cachet* of his Church upon him in look, gait, dress, manners, modes of action. What he was and did depended largely upon her unwritten traditions. It was quite in order that he should be a well-educated gentleman, but not, nearly so much so that he should be even a decent preacher; so he often was the first, and very rarely the second. He was an exclusively insular product, not to be found out of England, and, even there, grown to perfection only at Oxford and Cambridge. Though the word be no older than Newman, he was long before Newman wrote an incarnated "*Via Media*."

The beginning of this state of things lies far back in the circumstances of the Reformation. That convulsion was in England so deeply influenced by personal and political considerations, was so little the result of deep national convictions working themselves out in their own way, that its real and

abiding character did not make itself apparent until the first ferment of change had passed. We may take Hooker as the earliest conspicuous type of the English Churchman as he was destined to be, actually engaged in controversy with advancing Puritanism, and yet not less anxious to fortify his ecclesiastical position against the assaults of Rome. The name of honour by which he is universally known is the "judicious Hooker:" to be judicious has, consciously or unconsciously, been the highest praise at which Anglicanism has since aimed. But judiciousness implies caution of statement, and avoidance of extremes, and a wary look-out whither one is going, and a regard for old landmarks, and something like timidity towards whatever is new and strange. The generation of divines who immediately succeeded Hooker kept a very careful watch Romeward, for on the side of Geneva they knew that they were not in danger. Laud, whatever superficial critics may say, was as little Romanist as he was Puritan; but he was so like a Romanist on the outside, that to keep himself clear from suspicion of Romanism needed all his power of careful distinction and discriminating statement, while his unrelenting enmity towards Puritanism was the most patent fact of his life. Indeed, it was the work of many years and more than one great scholar to reduce the Anglican position to form and intelligibility: to shew that the English Church as it existed under Charles I. was the same Church as had existed under Henry VII., and yet a reformed and independent Church: to repress the natural sympathies of a reformed Church of England with reformed Churches abroad, and at the same time to maintain the controversy with Rome: to vindicate on one side the true apostolical succession, and on the other the right of the people to a vernacular service and a free Bible. And it is on the side of Rome that the cautious and discriminative faculty of the Church of England has been most needed and most exercised. The type of men whom we now call Evangelical have never greatly cared to maintain their connection with Christian antiquity, and have been little hindered by any rigid theory of the Church from following their principles to their

legitimate conclusion. At first, the Puritans were a party struggling for supremacy in the Church of England, rather than a constituent element of it: in 1662, they left it to found the various Dissenting communions: again, in the 18th century, the preaching of Whitfield and the Wesleys ended in what Churchmen would call schism. Except during the century which has now almost passed away, there has been little need to draw the line between Evangelicals within and Evangelicals without the Church; and the line, when actually drawn, has been determined more by habit and practice than by theological theory. But there has always been a necessity for shewing why a Church which was Episcopal should not also be Roman: why it should admit a Real Presence, yet reject Transubstantiation: why it should insist upon apostolical succession, yet refuse communion with the Pope: why it should recommend occasional, yet discountenance habitual confession: why it should invest its ministers with the sacerdotal character, yet accept its Bishops at the hands of the State. So the typical Anglican divine has lived inside a system which he has done his best to perfect and round off, and make intellectually habitable. But till quite recent years he had lost the habit of looking outside of it to the general relations of things, and the possibility of more absolute truth.

Something of the same effect has been produced by the standing difficulty of maintaining the internal equilibrium of the Church. It was a compromise from the first, with this additional circumstance, that it was also a case of arrested development. How much farther the Reformation might have gone in the Protestant direction if Edward VI. had lived, it is impossible to say: the imperious will of Elizabeth turned back the tide of change, and left consistent Puritanism no other choice than that of ultimate rebellion. But with a Prayer-book based upon the Breviary, a Liturgy which was moulded on the Canon of the Mass, and Articles deriving their ancestry from the Confession of Augsburg, each party in the Church had its own standing-ground, which it was not slow in fortifying against its enemies; while the peacemaking and sys-

tematizing men who arose from time to time found themselves in face of the all but impossible task of reconciling types of doctrine which existed side by side, though incapable of living cohesion. The result has been, not only that the Church has always contained parties, but that these parties, in view of each other, have cultivated the habit of cautious and moderate statement. An Evangelical Nonconformist throws himself boldly upon Scripture and the Spirit: an Evangelical Churchman, unless of the most ignorant sort, cannot quite cut himself loose from antiquity and Church authority. Just now the Evangelical party, not without reason, are furiously incensed against the extreme High-churchmen, and cry out for their immediate expulsion from the fold; but up to a quite recent period they managed to find a *modus vivendi* with the old High Church, and did not seem to suffer any strain of conscience. They were content if their position could be justified out of the legal documents which were the common basis of the Church, and granted other parties the right of the same appeal. That they had also the supreme warrant of Scripture for their form of faith, was an advantage which belonged to themselves alone, or which at least they shared, in part, with other Evangelicals outside the pale. They were faithful to the Articles, and made the best they could of the Prayer-book; nor did they greatly grumble if others were faithful to the Prayer-book, and made the best they could of the Articles.

The same tendency to abide contentedly within the artificial limits of a system is curiously shewn in the history of the third party which has grown up in the Church during the last forty years. The standing-ground of the Broad Church is neither in the Articles nor the Prayer-book, but in the omissions of both. A new class of theological questions has come up in the nineteenth century, of which the sixteenth was profoundly ignorant, and which it could not by possibility anticipate. The Thirty-nine Articles have a very close and direct reference to the controversies of the time at which they were drawn up, but when brought into contact with the controversies of to-day,

they naturally err both by excess and defect. In addition to this, the stress of subscription to them and to the Prayer-book has been greatly relaxed during the last few years, so that the principal requirement now made of a clergyman is, that he should be able to use with a clear conscience the Church's formularies in the Church's worship. That Broad-churchmen should be able to do this, is an unfailing cause of wonder to Nonconformists, especially of the freer sort, who, while they are disposed to recognize the necessity of a common form of prayer in a National Church, and to admit that it cannot correspond with absolute accuracy to every peculiarity of individual conviction, find a difficulty in understanding how men can habitually read prayers, the underlying principles of which they not unfrequently controvert in the sermon which follows. But the oddest part of it all is, that Broad join with High and Low Churchmen in deprecating any alteration in the Prayer-book. That each of the two latter parties should agree in fearing a change which might be made in the interest of the other, is quite intelligible. But the Broad-churchman knows that the Ritualist, whom he fears, has an inexpugnable fortress in the Office for the Ordering of Priests, and in that for the Visitation of the Sick. He knows, too, that the Evangelical, whom he more than half despises, rides securely at his anchorage in the Articles. He cannot but know that the whole tenor of the Prayer-book becomes daily less in accord with those results of Biblical criticism and scientific research to which he pins his own faith. It is difficult to believe that he does not see that the comprehensiveness which in his eyes is one of the Church's greatest merits, would for the first time be put on a firm basis by the removal from her public services of documents and expressions which are susceptible of strong party interpretations, or belong to bygone stages of faith. But sooner than face the difficulty and the danger of altering the Prayer-book, he will not only continue to do violence to language and logic in his own interpretation of it, but he will face the tremendous peril of a triumphant Ritualism within the Church. Even he

has lived so long in an artificial tenement of belief, that he dare not trust himself in the fresh air and beneath the open canopy of heaven.

During the last few years, however, a gradually growing strain has been put upon the union of these ill-assorted parties in the same Church, and the tie which holds them together has been stretched almost to the breaking-point. This has not only been coincident with a remarkable revival of the Church's vigour and national influence, but in part caused by it. Times when convictions are lightly held, and nobody cares to push principles to their results in practice, and the fire of religious life burns with but a feeble and flickering flame, are the times when parties easily make concordats and live peaceably side by side. But we doubt whether, in spite of Nonconformist zeal on the one hand and scientific incredulity on the other, the Church was ever a greater force in England than at the present moment. The sum that has been spent during the last few years in building new churches and restoring old ones is enormous. Gifts of money for ecclesiastical purposes, which not long ago would have been thought impossible, are freely and frequently made. Congresses, diocesan synods, ruridecanal meetings, the revival of Convocation, the unabated prosperity of the old Church societies, the frequency and bitterness of ecclesiastical debates in Parliament,—all bear the same witness. The Church has got a hold upon the primary education of the people, which, however inconsistent we may think it with sound national policy, has been legitimately acquired by hard work and liberal expenditure. But the result of this great and various revival has been, that each party in the Church, though in different degree, has become more conscious of the logical results of its own principles, and, while clinging with equal tenacity, till within a very recent period, to the idea of an Establishment, has advanced private pretensions, with the recognition of which common life in an Establishment is hardly possible.

In this new crisis, the Broad Church goes for very little. Such influence as it continues to exercise, is that of individual

ability and eloquence, much more than that of a party. The young honour-men of Oxford and Cambridge who would naturally recruit its ranks, look askance at subscription, loose though it be and loosely interpreted, and turn aside to other professions. The contrast between the liberty of the layman and the bondage of the clergyman is so marked, that however those who have assumed the burden of orders may persuade themselves that it is not a galling intellectual load, it is not wonderful that others, still unpledged, should refuse to run the risk. Nor have the Ecclesiastical Courts, which have been complaisant after a sort to High and Low, been very favourable to Broad Churchmen. The freest treatment of Scripture they will permit, but will allow little doctrinal license. Mr. Heath and Mr. Voysey had to go out. Mr. Wilson and Dr. Williams were saved by the skin of their teeth. Of the old leaders, some, like Mr. Jowett and Mr. Mark Pattison, live on safe academic eminences: Dr. Colenso is banished to South Africa, and also to a kind of ecclesiastical Coventry: Mr. Wilson's health permanently shuts him out from active life: Dr. Rowland Williams died in the firm conviction of his own orthodoxy and the expectation of a Welsh Bishopric. Among younger men, some prefer University to parochial work: Dr. Stanley is in the happy position of being a Dean who has no Bishop over him: and Mr. Stopford Brooke rejoices in the safe obscurity of a proprietary chapel. For some years there always has been, and there is likely to continue to be, a succession of men who will try to reconcile official position in the Church of England with a frank acceptance of the results of science and criticism; while laymen who, not caring to break with the public profession of religion, prefer the National Church to any of the sects, will rally round teachers who, whatever their intellectual inconsistencies, exercise a genuine ethical and spiritual influence. But the Broad-church party—so, at least, it seems to us—lose ground daily: first, because they are no longer backed up by the vast and growing forces of scientific inquiry, which are quite indifferent to all Church parties, and like one as little

as another ; and, secondly, because they profess and practise a theory of comprehension which is at once too esoteric for common people to understand, and prevents them from making their intellectual influence felt. They prefer interpreting the Prayer-book to altering it. They apologize for the Creeds, instead of frankly recognizing them as the expressions of an ancient and outworn faith. The result is, that they leave the direction of the Church of England as a religious force to men who accept the Prayer-book literally, and own the Creeds as the perpetual and immutable law of Christendom. Free thought, rationalistic criticism, scientific inquiry, do not cease to be active influences in moulding the faith or unfaith of the English people, but the fulcrum from which their force is exerted is for the most part outside the Church.

The chief factor in the crisis which is undoubtedly drawing near, is the rapid development of High-church views and practices. As we have already said, these are not without their justification in the Prayer-book. The Office for the Ordering of Priests contains everything that a defender of sacerdotalism can possibly want. The Communion and Baptismal Offices easily lend themselves to high sacramental interpretation. Occasional confession is expressly permitted, and the transition to habitual confession is not difficult. The Ornaments' Rubric hardly bears to plain men the interpretation which, by the help of Queen Elizabeth's advertisements, the Court of Appeal recently succeeded in putting upon it. We will not allude to the argumentative *tour-de-force* by which Dr. Newman attempted to shew that the Thirty-nine Articles were not irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine : High-churchmen have ground enough of their own, without trespassing on that which more properly belongs to their Evangelical brethren. But it is only necessary to take the data which we have enumerated above, and to reason from them without reference to the presence in the Church of other data of a different kind, to arrive at the point at which things now are. There is a large and increasing party in the Church of England who occupy that sacerdotal and sacra-

mental ground of things which hitherto we have been accustomed to call Roman ; who insist that this is and always has been the true position of the Church ; who look upon the name Protestant with loathing and disgust ; who heap contumely on the memory of the Reformers ; who call Morning Prayer, Matins, and the Communion, Mass ; who imitate, so far as they dare, Roman ritual ; who encourage confession, and advocate a celibate clergy, and invoke the Virgin and the Saints ; who, if they deny Transubstantiation, vigorously affirm a Real Presence ; who eagerly look forward to the reunion of Christendom, excluding, of course, English Non-conformists and the Protestant churches of the continent ; and who, notwithstanding all this, and the constant passage of converts from the English to the Roman Church, declare that their existence as a party is the one sufficient bulwark against the encroachments of Rome. And to them, as far as can be now foreseen, belongs the future of the Church. They are zealous, self-denying, full of faith in themselves, audacious in their defiance of the law. What is to be done with them, no one can tell. The new legislation, which in a fit of Protestant indignation Parliament expressly levelled against them, is a confessed failure : legal proceedings have again and again broken down, and when they succeed have about them an unpleasant flavour of persecution. It is impossible to direct a constant battery of episcopal warning, judicial inhibition, temporary suspension, final deprivation, against a large number of clergymen, who resist one by one, who have all of them a certain reputation for earnestness and hard work, and who are backed up by zealous congregations. At this moment the situation approaches to a dead-lock. Bishops are paralyzed : Parliament is thinking of other things : Lord Penzance has nothing to do : and Ritualism goes on its way rejoicing.

Once more : the High-church party has taken up a position in reference to the State to which it is hard to find a parallel in English ecclesiastical history. We pass by pre-Reformation times : there can be no true parallel between the relations of a purely English Church to the English State, and those, to

the same State, of a Church which was only a branch of a great communion extending through all Western Christendom, and administered on a uniform system by its acknowledged head at Rome. But it means much that the first lines of the relation between Church and State, after the Reformation, were laid by the personal will of our imperious Tudor monarchs. If to a certain extent the Church was independent of Parliament, and legislated for herself in Convocation, she made up for it in the attitude of servile, almost abject, submission which she assumed to the Crown. Elizabeth ruled the Church with a rod of iron, wielded often with a man's vigour and a woman's caprice; but perhaps the highest flood-mark of profane and foolish flattery was reached by the Bishops, who bowed and cringed in the ante-chambers of the Scottish Solomon. In Charles the First's time, the Church stood for the Crown against the people, with a loyalty which in the next reign formulated itself in Filmer's patriarchal theory of the Divine Right of Kings. But at the Revolution, this particular school of Churchmen became Nonjuring, and in many cases Jacobite, leaving the majority of clergymen—especially after Convocation was silenced, as men thought for ever, in 1717—apparently quite content with the autocratic government of King or Prime Minister. Nothing is more remarkable than the cynical way in which, throughout the reigns of the Georges, the Church is regarded as a branch of the Civil Service, containing just as many sinecures and abuses and profitable anomalies as any other. Men in power use it for their own selfish purposes. If any reform is attempted or accomplished, it is by the purely secular agency of Parliament, which consists only of nominal Churchmen. There are no prosecutions for heresy, for the simple reason that nobody cares much about orthodoxy. A clerk has need to be very "criminous" indeed, if the machinery of the ecclesiastical courts is to be put in operation against him. But the Church acquiesces in this state of things. It receives patronage, protection, privilege, from the State, and repays it with a frank subjection and complete obedience. Perhaps it

has proclivities towards the Supremacy of the Crown, as a kind of ill-defined personal prerogative residing in the Defender of the Faith. But it is quite amenable to the control of Parliament too, of which in the spiritual Peers it feels itself an integral part.

How completely all this is changed now, every one knows. The Church has awakened to a conviction of its own essential independence. It denies the right of Parliament—which consists to an appreciable extent of “Papists, Jews, heretics and infidels”—to legislate for it. It asks for the independent regulative action not denied to the meanest and newest of the sects. It is even disposed to define and limit that Royal Supremacy, before which, in former times, it bowed down in such unquestioning loyalty. It will acknowledge the jurisdiction of no courts of law which are tainted with a Parliamentary origin, and declares that only spiritual men can rightly decide in spiritual causes. This is of course the contention only of the extreme High-churchmen, and even in them may, without a grave breach of charity, be put down quite as much to a desire to evade an inconvenient pressure of the law, as to a new and deliberate conception of the law's obligations. They rebel against Lord Penzance; they decline to plead before the Judicial Committee; and at the same time they flout all Bishops in turn, and overwhelm the Primate with a virulence of abuse quite unknown in secular politics. We have no intention of criticising their theory, which, without much trouble, might be shewn to be at once historically untenable, and incapable of being reduced to practice. But it is obvious that it introduces a new element into our present religious position. The basis of the settlement in Church and State has hitherto been, that the clergy, not only as citizens, but as clergymen, were under the control of the law, framed by Crown and Legislature, and administered in duly constituted courts. The claim now made by clerical persons, to have a right of choosing between courts, of saying that they will obey this and will not obey that, is one which cannot be admitted without impairing the general force and

obligation of law. Nor if the claim be denied is the remedy for the grievance far to seek. If Churchmen envy the religious freedom of Nonconformists, let them take up the Nonconformist position. A certain abatement of freedom is the price paid for privilege. It is a little unreasonable to want to have both the privilege and the freedom.

The effect of these things upon the Evangelical party in the Church may be best described by saying that they are in a condition of wild anger and blind terror. They know that, numerically, they are probably the largest party in the Church; sometimes, half unconsciously, they reckon the Dissenting allies at their side, and so feel that, from the religious point of view, they are entitled to think themselves the representatives of English opinion. And yet, like one of the giants of nursery fable, who is too big to be strong, they see themselves every day deceived, outwitted, undermined. They have never at any time been a learned party: the natural tendency of learning is to make a man a High or a Broad, but rarely a Low Churchman: so they are poorly represented on the Bench of Bishops, and are obliged to see stations of ecclesiastical influence occupied by men of other schools. They are without power in the literary world: they read few books but their own, which the general public, in turn, passes by with unconcealed dislike: and they are involved in a feud with science, which they do not know how to begin to reconcile even if they cared to do it. Their ancient power over the masses is beginning to forsake them: what is best in their methods, other schools have appropriated and are using with success: they are finding out that they cannot work miracles of faith by repeating the old shibboleths of Cecil and Romaine and Venn. One thing remains to them: their strong conviction of the essentially Protestant character of the Church of England. But it is here, in their very tenderest point, that they are chiefly wounded. They see the Church being carried over to the Roman side in doctrine and practice before their faces. Such a fact as the secession to Rome of Newman and his followers, they could behold with calm, almost with com-

placent, eyes : it was well that traitors should go to their own place, relieving the Church of their birth from the weakness and pollution of their presence. But it is a widely different thing to have Rome planting her colonies in the midst of the English Church—for a faithful minister, who still preaches pure gospel truth, to have on one side of his parish a church in which the Stations of the Cross are set up, and on the other, one where confessions are daily heard in the vestry. And it is eminently characteristic of the intellectual and spiritual feebleness which has fallen upon the Evangelical party, that their only idea of resistance seems to be a recourse to legislation and prosecution. There is no fresh activity in the literary controversy with sacramental theologians. There is no outbreak of zeal in preaching and teaching. There are no symptoms of alliance, on the common Protestant ground, with Evangelical Dissenters. There have been the passing of the Public Worship Regulation Act, and the repeated prosecutions of the Church Association. What these have done for the party and for Protestantism needs no telling.

It is no part of our self-imposed task to predict, even in the most general terms, the future course of events in the English Church. There is no doubt a strong tendency within her borders to represent the state of things which we have attempted to describe as due to temporary causes, and therefore likely to settle down again into a condition of well-ordered repose. Such reasoners declare, as indeed we have ourselves admitted, that the disturbance is largely due to the Church's re-invigorated life ; that it has in many ways been productive of real good, and under careful and kindly administration, and with the exercise of general forbearance, may be trusted to pass away. Our own view is directly contrary to this. The forces which are at work now are of secular operation, and have produced disruption before. Puritanism got the upper hand in 1645, and the birth of Dissent in 1662 was the result. All through the reigns of Charles II. and James II., High-churchism gathered strength, till in 1689 it found it could no longer live within the fold, and founded the Nonjuring Schism.

The eighteenth century for the most slept upon religion, or, when at brief intervals it woke, rioted with Sacheverell, disputed with the Deists, cast out Wesley and Whitfield, drove Priestley to America. Now the nineteenth inherits, in forms only slightly changed, the struggles and the controversies of the seventeenth. Both the old parties are aroused to a sense of irreconcilable opposition: each feels that the complete triumph of its enemy would be its own extinction. A third party, whose existence was only dimly shadowed forth in the Cambridge Latitudinarians, weak in clerical but strong in lay support, supplies a distinct element of disintegration. Outside is the Dissenting clamour for Disestablishment, crying for it knows not what, yet not so much weakening the Church as drawing it together in the recognition of a common foe: and the far more dangerous disregard of a large and thoughtful class for all forms and organizations of a religion which they look upon as practically outworn. We know that institutions that can count twelve hundred years of growth are not dissolved in a night, and the end is not yet. But the days in which the life and thought of the English Church could be controlled by the compromise of the 16th century are for ever passed. There is a sense in which Bishop Thirlwall, though the grass be hardly yet grown upon his grave, is as obsolete as Archbishop Laud. Yet he was a wise and a good Bishop: one who was an honour to his Church and a blessing to his diocese: a profound scholar and a sagacious politician: among the greatest, perhaps also the last, of the truly great Bishops who have administered the curiously balanced system of the English Church.

CHARLES BEARD.

IV.—THE CAMBRIDGE COMMISSION.

THE circumstance that we have once more entered on a period of academical legislation, and after a brief interval are again experiencing all the protracted throes and linked bitterness of long-drawn-out reform, is one which the judicious friends of our national Universities—those who take a genuine interest in their due development and healthy progress—can scarcely regard with either unqualified satisfaction or unmixed regret. It is difficult to exaggerate the disturbance of normal, educational work involved in preparing to meet the requirements of a Commission. University Professors and College Heads, tutors, lecturers and bursars, are forced for the nonce to make the progress of their pupils and the despatch of business a secondary consideration, while they devote their attention to the comparative merits of conflicting schemes by which all things are to be made new. Ordinary administrative work falls inevitably into arrears; recondite studies have to be temporarily abandoned; the hours spared to much-needed recreation are sensibly curtailed; and even that bugbear of reformers at a distance, “the idle Fellow,” has to be up and doing. He is perhaps a rising junior at Lincoln’s Inn, or possibly engaged on some important literary work in the metropolis; but when statutes are to be altered, briefs and papers must take their chance; College meetings, always sufficiently frequent, become almost perpetual; and the Great Northern Railway, which runs a branch to Cambridge, does a thriving trade in season-tickets. The air is filled with the murmur of rival interests; every busybody has his special project; people with panaceas swarm in all the combination-rooms.

On the other hand, we are free to admit that an occasional overhauling of the machinery, with a view to its adjustment to the shifting necessities of the business, and its improvement by the light of enlarged experience, is, from some points of view, as desirable in a large educational establishment as in a

Birmingham factory. It was well remarked from the University pulpit, on the last anniversary of the University Commemoration, by one of the ablest and most respected exponents of academical Conservatism, that the times when the most real and honest work has been done at Cambridge have not been those when the University was most free from external pressure. The consciousness that public opinion is directed to the character and efficiency of a public institution often proves a healthy stimulant to those who are responsible for its administration; and unsparing criticism from without seldom fails to produce increased activity within. Many of the best features in University life at the present day—the atmosphere of healthy competition, the multifarious intellectual energy, the vigorous pursuit of many branches of knowledge once neglected or despised—may be traced in great measure to the Royal Commission of 1852, and the adoption of the recommendations contained in its Report. When Mr. Gladstone in 1872 appointed another Commission to inquire into the amount of College and University revenues, and the method in which they were administered and employed, both Colleges and University felt themselves in a condition to bear the most searching scrutiny. The Commissioners, as is well known, after an exhaustive inquiry, reported that there appeared to be little room for improvement in the matter of fiscal management; and when that Report was issued, the general feeling seemed to be one of surprise that so much sterling work was accomplished with means of which the comparative exiguity was then for the first time publicly revealed. At the same time, there were many who felt that there were other matters in which change was not only desirable, but urgently required; and that feeling still continues. The comparative unfruitfulness of College Headships has rendered them an object of persistent attack; and it has been complained that while a large proportion of the revenues of the individual Colleges is devoted to the maintenance of useless sinecures, the University, regarded as a corporation distinct from the Colleges which compose it—a distinction which, for

the benefit of those of our readers who are unacquainted with the details of academical organisation, we shall endeavour to elucidate on a later page—is seriously crippled by want of means to encourage the prosecution of studies of a nature not immediately remunerative. Moreover, the University Tests Act of 1871 has not entirely fulfilled the expectations of Nonconformists; and should the suggestion advanced in the Hertford College case by the Solicitor-General, who endeavoured to shew that the Act was of a merely “enabling” or permissive character, be accepted, as seems far from improbable, by the Court of Appeal, the necessity of a supplementary statute will be scarcely doubtful. In any case, so long as 235 out of 360 fellowships in the University are hampered, in one form or another, by the necessity of taking orders in the Church of England, few will be found to contend that the principle of religious equality has as yet received adequate recognition; and, as we shall attempt to shew, the matter is one with which the present Commission may be fairly expected to deal in no half-hearted manner. There are other points connected with the tenure of fellowships to which we shall again advert: we have already mentioned enough to shew that there is at the present day abundant scope for a measure of reform. The matter was not lost sight of by the late Ministry; and when on a disastrous day, more than four years ago, Mr. Gladstone appealed to the confidence of the nation, a University Bill was one of the projects enumerated in his now almost forgotten programme. But when it became known that the new Parliament would contain a Conservative majority, considerable and compact, the hopes of reformers dwindled; Nonconformists recognised the futility of expecting aid from a party to which “Church and State” forms a mystic shibboleth, without which no festive celebration would be complete; the lotos-eaters, if such there be, on the banks of Cam and Isis, heaved a sigh of indolent relief; the sleepy party turned once more their faces to the wall.

The sleepy party had unfortunately reckoned without their host. They had failed to recognise the guiding principle of

latter-day Conservatism. They forgot that a statesman who had educated his party into passing the most democratic measure in the history of our Constitution, was now Prime Minister. They were oblivious of his predecessor's naive declaration, that the triumph of Toryism was to "dish the Whigs." The phenomenon that every progressive measure advocated by the Liberal party was being furtively incorporated in the Conservative programme, had possibly escaped their notice. They were soon to be undeceived. It was unreasonable to expect that the great Conservative party would fall into the mistake of leaving University Reform as a possible rallying-cry to the shattered ranks of their antagonists. The Royal Speech on the opening of the session of 1876 intimated that a Bill had been prepared, of which the object was the amelioration of the University system and the advancement of the cause of higher education. The announcement, as might have been foretold, failed to please anybody. The Bill was anticipated by academical obstructives with indignant horror, and by academical reformers with avowed suspicion. *Et tu, Brute*, exclaimed the disgusted Tory; *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*, was the secret feeling of many a distrustful Liberal. The loyalty of the former party to its political leaders suffered a shock from which it will not rapidly recover; while the latter feared that the Conservative Bill would prove a sham Bill, and would only furnish an excuse for delaying real and organic reform for years to come.

The task of the Government—a Government, be it remembered, which piques itself on making things comfortable all round—was certainly a far from easy one. It was absolutely certain that whatever they proposed would offend and irritate a large number of people whose support they could not well afford to lose; it was extremely problematical whether they would be able to conciliate or satisfy a single class. The subject was one in which very few members of either House took any serious interest; while many decided Liberals in party politics shewed themselves extremely averse to any changes affecting the position of the Colleges of which they were for-

merly *alumni*. The gentlemen who write leading articles in the newspapers proved, on the whole, even more ill-informed as to the condition and requirements of the Universities than the Legislature itself; and the general feeling was such that it seemed probable that a colourless and inoffensive Bill would be introduced, which would meet with little opposition from any quarter. The preparation of the scheme was entrusted to Lord Salisbury, it being apparently presumed that the Chancellor of the University of Oxford would know all about the subject. Lord Salisbury is doubtless a man of great ability, though without academical distinction; but both in and out of Oxford he is best known as the most influential representative of a Toryism and—to adopt a convenient French expression—a “clericalism” which are nearly obsolete. If there be any faith in ritual and respect for rubrics, if there be any belief in tests and catechisms, if there be any pious horror of those who abjure the one and ignore the other, assuredly it is in Lord Salisbury’s bosom that these feelings and opinions are most warmly cherished. It is about as easy to conceive his Lordship in the guise of a radical reformer, as it would be to imagine Mr. Newdegate in a Cardinal’s hat, Sir Wilfred Lawson in a state of inebriety, or Mr. Bright with a loaded revolver in his pocket. Lord Salisbury, however, is a man of genius, and he determined to shew that he was equal to the job. There was one thing alone in which the Premier must pardon his servant; he had acquired a habit of bowing his knees in the house of the Church as by law established, and the habit was one which he could not altogether overcome. The Heads of Houses were mostly required by College statutes to be in holy orders, and so Headships must be expressly exempted from the operation of the Commission. A large number of fellowships were confined to the clergy of the Church of England, and that qualification must be scrupulously maintained. To make things quite safe, good old-fashioned High-church Conservatives, like Lord Redesdale and Dr. Burgon, were selected as Commissioners; and every care was taken that the Liberal element, which for the sake

of appearances was added, should be of a thoroughly orthodox type. What, then, remained to reform? Much every way. It had come to the ears of the Marquis of Salisbury that there were a number of young Fellows of Colleges, many of them residing in town, who took their share in College administration, who were mostly laymen, frequently Nonconformists, and who shewed themselves distinctly unfavourable to the reactionary tendencies of some of their seniors. Here was a grand opportunity for a clean sweep. His Lordship suggested that "idle Fellows" were a gross abuse; they were a pernicious fruit of the new-fangled system of open competition; the modest dividends which they drew would be much better employed if handed over to the University for the encouragement of "original research," and the creation of new Professorships, to be held by gentlemen of sound doctrinal views. These pernicious young men must be summarily deprived of all share in governing their Colleges, in which case it would be clearly seen that lay fellowships were useless sinecures of which an honest reformer must make short work. Lord Salisbury was distinctly in favour of making the "researcher" happy for life with a secure endowment; he was quite enthusiastic for establishing a Chair of Mongolian literature; but as for your idle Fellow, the Marquis could not away with him.

Such, read between the lines of Lord Salisbury's speech, was his idea of University Reform. The design was ingenious, and worthy of its subtle author; but the plan did not prove exactly popular. Objections were heard on all sides. It was asserted that a University Commission with no power to deal with the question of the Headships was an obvious absurdity; and before the Bill became law, the Heads were surrendered to the tender mercies of the Commission. It was hinted that a liberal endowment of research might lead to far greater abuses than those which it was proposed to abolish; and, after one or two discussions, Lord Salisbury's peculiar notions on this subject were quietly dropped. It was pointed out that by a clause of doubtful meaning it might be possible to get rid, by a side-wind, of some of the most valuable provisions of the Tests Act

of 1871 ; and, after a little argument, another clause was added by which the principles of that Act were re-affirmed. The Bill did not receive the Royal assent till the end of last session ; and long before that, Dr. Burgon's name was tacitly removed from the list of proposed Commissioners. It was, moreover, suggested that the influence of some young men of liberal views on the governing bodies of their respective Colleges often proved extremely useful ; and the clause which disfranchised them was never pressed to a division. As to the regiment of Professors with which we were at one time threatened, the scheme was soon shorn of all its imposing dimensions. Mr. Hardy, who carried the Bill through the House of Commons, remarked that he was far from advocating any extensive increase in the Professoriate ; and he dwelt with some emphasis on a clause which enabled the Commissioners to *consolidate*, if they thought it desirable, two or more Professorships. The Government, in fact, acted as the present Government always acts, and shewed itself thoroughly amenable to a little judicious pressure. Even the idle Fellow was alluded to by Mr. Hardy in a style which was really quite respectful. He was not, it appeared, idle at all—far from it ; he was a most industrious and meritorious member of society ; it was not the Fellow, but the fellowship, to which Lord Salisbury had intended to apply that disparaging epithet. Even that was not quite correct ; what the Marquis had really meant to call them was “prize fellowships ;” and a prize fellowship, everybody admitted, was a very useful institution. It was these rewards which mainly attracted young men of ability to the Universities ; without them it would be difficult to maintain the high standard of the honour examinations ; they gave those who won them a start in life, and supported them through the critical period of their career. It was pointed out that many of the most distinguished members of the House, including more than half of those who sat in Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, had once held prize fellowships. The tone of the liberal professions was distinctly benefited by them ; they contributed to no small extent to the diffusion of culture

and refinement of taste. Whatever the Commissioners did, whatever they left undone, they must certainly be extremely cautious in dealing with the class of which Lord Salisbury had spoken in his haste. Such was the general tone of the Ministry when their measure was subjected to Parliamentary criticism. In the sequel, the Commissioners were left to do pretty much what they thought best, abundant securities being at the same time provided for the full consideration of any "grievance" to which their proceedings might give rise. Even the clerical restrictions on academical emoluments, in the defence of which Lord Salisbury had employed so much strategy and skill, were only saved from summary condemnation by an assurance that the Commissioners would deal with them on their merits. The matter, Mr. Hardy urged, was doubtless one on which those gentlemen would exercise a wise discretion ; no attempt to defend such disabilities on principle, or in the abstract, was seriously made ; but notwithstanding the attitude of the Ministerial bench, and the sucking-dove accents of Lord Salisbury's roar, the majority which left those venerable restrictions to the wisdom of the Commissioners only consisted of fifteen in one House and nine in the other. Those who followed the progress of the University Bills of the last two sessions could scarcely fail to recognise the truth of the saying, that the Conservatives are occasionally in office, but the Liberals are always in power.

The Commission having thus been left with its hands entirely free, the prospects of satisfactory reform, in the right direction, practically depend on the constitution of that body. In this respect, Cambridge has on the whole every reason to be content. It might, indeed, be regarded as matter for regret that a Commission which is to reform and improve the University system should be entirely composed of University men. The infusion of an extraneous element, unaffected by academical training and traditions, untinged by the *genius loci* of the Cam, would have been in some respects a useful addition. The interests of science could not be better represented than by Lord Rayleigh ; but the nomination of some eminent *savant*

from the outside world, such as Professor Tyndall, and some liberal and cultured representative of the Nonconformists—such, for instance, as Dr. Allon—might have proved extremely valuable. It may also be questioned whether, in the interests of despatch—and nothing is more important than that the Commission should be as expeditious in its work as is consistent with care and caution, and should not keep the future position of the University in protracted suspense—it was advisable to nominate as Chairman the Lord Chief Justice, who is also Chairman of the Commission on Extradition, and who probably at his advanced age finds his heavy judicial duties a nearly sufficient occupation for all his energies. We confess, too, that we should ourselves have been glad to see some College Head among the Commissioners. The interests of the Heads, as representing the Colleges, and the Professors, as representatives of the University, are sometimes considered antagonistic; and the Commission includes two Professors, but no Head. It cannot be pretended that this circumstance arises through the impossibility of finding among the seventeen Heads a properly qualified person. Such an idea would be insulting to a very eminent body of men, and would have no foundation in fact. The appointment of the present Vice-Chancellor, a man of great powers of business and singularly moderate views, would have been approved by all parties. The name of the Master of St. John's was suggested by Lord Hartington but rejected by the Government, apparently for no other reason than that he had done excellent service on Mr. Gladstone's former Commission. Had he been nominated, the apparent inequality by which Trinity possesses four representatives on the Commission and St. John's—a College only second to Trinity in numbers, rank and influence—not one, would have been to some extent redressed. Lastly, no more admirable appointment could have been made than that of the new Master of Trinity Hall, Sir Henry Maine, whose name was suggested as an Oxford Commissioner in 1876, and dropped, for some inexplicable reason, in 1877. Sir Henry is one of the most distinguished scholars and quite the most distinguished jurist whom the University has in

recent years produced; he has filled many responsible positions, and filled them all with conspicuous success; he has indeed touched nothing which he has not adorned by his taste and illuminated by his acumen. Should any chance vacancy on the Commission occur, we strongly hope that Dr. Atkinson, Dr. Bateson or Sir Henry Maine may be chosen to make the Septemvirate complete.

It remains to indicate, as explicitly as our limited space permits, the nature of the problems which the Septemvirate will be required to solve. These problems may be conveniently divided into two classes—those which concern the relations of the Colleges to the University, which require or are supposed to require re-adjustment, and those which concern the internal economy of the Colleges themselves. The former subject may be said to bear somewhat the same relation to the latter that international law bears to municipal law. The corporations called Colleges may be compared to a number of semi-independent states, knit together for certain purposes into a kind of loose confederacy, which is called the University. It may no doubt be urged with truth that, from an historical point of view, the University is everything, and the Colleges, which gradually grouped themselves around it, of quite secondary importance; but the circumstance, in the light of contemporary experience, is not of great practical interest. At the present day, none will deny that the welfare of the University substantially depends on the prosperity of the several Colleges, and that any legislation which diminishes the resources or thwarts the progress of those societies must ultimately have a prejudicial effect on the Alma Mater to which they originally owed their being. It is sometimes said that the Colleges are teaching bodies, while the University is an examining body; and although this statement is not altogether accurate—for each College examines its own students, and the University teaches, theoretically at least, and no doubt to some extent practically, by means of its Professors—it is yet approximately correct, and conveys a distinction which it is useful to bear in mind. It would, however, be more exact to say that the Uni-

versity has the exclusive right of conferring degrees ; that in order to exercise this right in a proper manner, it reserves to itself the function of examining all students who are candidates for degrees ; and that it is one of the most important duties, though far from the only duty, of the individual Colleges to prepare their undergraduate members for the University degree examinations. With this end in view, each College maintains a competent staff of tutors and lecturers ; and the reputation of a College to a great extent depends on the measure of success which its students attain in the competition for University distinctions. An inter-collegiate system has, moreover, been formed, by means of which students of one College are permitted to attend the lectures given by distinguished graduates of another, and each lecturer is enabled, if he pleases, to confine his attention to a special branch of some particular art. The principle of the division of labour on the co-operative system has, in short, been recently applied, and applied with considerable success, to the scheme of collegiate instruction. It is, however, complained in some quarters that there are certain departments of learning and research which cannot be taught or studied satisfactorily except by the direct agency of the University, and by graduates who do not depend for their status on any particular College. We are further told that the University is unable to make appropriate provision for the encouragement of these studies through lack of adequate funds ; that the Colleges, or some of them, have more ample funds at their disposal than they can possibly require ; and that for these reasons "a modification of the pecuniary relations" between the University and the several Colleges is much to be desired.

The question, we fear, must be rather a dull one to non-academical readers, but we should not do justice to our subject if we failed to bestow on it a brief examination. It may be remarked, in the first place, that circumstances analogous to those described above are of far from rare occurrence. There are a large number of persons in the world who are deeply impressed with the conviction that their means are deplorably

insufficient for their legitimate requirements, while others, of no greater merit than themselves, have been favoured by an unwarrantable caprice of fortune with an extravagant proportion of this world's goods. That eminent philosopher, Mr. Orton, whose theory of exchange the present generation, misled by the mischievous maxims of political economists, has altogether failed to comprehend, notoriously entertained a similar view; and we believe that Mr. Whalley, encouraged by the precedent Lord Salisbury has supplied, is about to move for a Royal Commission, of which he suggests that Lord Coleridge, his brother Chief Justice being pre-engaged, might be appointed Chairman, to inquire into all the circumstances of his case. The sharp-set footpad, with a wife and family totally unprovided for, who garots a wealthy banker in a suburban lane, and relieves him of a plethoric purse, will doubtless in future be prepared to contend that "a modification of their pecuniary relations" was desirable for both parties; and should the Cambridge Commission adopt some of the projects which have been submitted to them, we scarcely see how the Lord Chief Justice could refuse to acknowledge the relevancy of his defence. A good time must surely be coming for the promulgators of communistic doctrines, to which the world has hitherto listened with indifference and incredulity, now that one who is at once an English Marquis and the most Conservative member of a Conservative Cabinet, has professed himself a half-brother of the guild.

Analogies, however, are proverbially deceptive; and to content ourselves with meeting the claims of the University by comparisons of this kind would be both inadequate and unfair. These claims substantially fall under three heads, and on each of these a few observations will not be out of place. Let us begin with the most important question, that of the Professoriate. We are told that the University wants a great many more Professors, and, according to some of the exponents of this view, the present staff of Professors ought to be enlarged to an extent so enormous that we may well wonder how the University has till now managed to get along

at all, with only thirty-four Professorial Chairs. In dealing with questions of this kind, it is as well to base our statements as far as possible on official sources of information. We will not therefore discuss or criticise an article on this subject which recently appeared in *Macmillan's Magazine*, from the pen of one of our Professors. It is indeed a remarkable fact, considering the scantiness of their numbers and the overwhelming labours with which they have to cope, that these gentlemen find leisure to grace the magazines with such numerous essays. The above-mentioned periodical, indeed, rarely presents its readers with a number which does not contain at least one Professorial disquisition; and the writer of the article in question—who demands four additional Professors in his own department, in order that he may strictly confine his own utterances to the exposition of its “theory”—ranks among the most versatile and copious contributors to weekly and monthly literature. We will merely mention that he expresses in the paper above referred to a strong opinion that the existing staff of Professors is lamentably inadequate, and hints that the additional teachers at present required are about seventy-nine in number. Let us now turn to the elaborate Report, which appeared last spring, of the Syndicate appointed to consider “the Requirements of the University in different Departments of Study.” Under the head of Mathematics, no addition to the present teaching power is suggested. In Classics, thirteen subjects—including Byzantine Greek, Late Latin, Palæography, Inscriptions, Romance, and Slavonic Languages—are mentioned in which “Professorships might with advantage be created.” Professorships of Assyrian, Egyptian, Aramæan and Chinese, and University Readerships in Armenian and Telugu, are demanded by the Board of Oriental Studies. Modern languages have not been forgotten, and “authorized teachers” of Dutch and Scandinavian are represented as much to be desired. History, Archæology and Fine Art, between them ask for twelve more Professors or Teachers. Theology is not behindhand in the race, and, although already provided with four well-endowed

Professorships, requires three "entirely new" ones, of which "Pastoral Theology" is one—the academical sheep being at present, we infer, without a shepherd—besides six Readerships in subjects like Comparative Doctrine and Church Law. Medicine and Moral Science have not failed to urge their respective claims; but the most formidable requisitions of all are those put forth on behalf of Natural Science. This subject, we find, cannot be satisfactorily studied without at least sixteen more teachers, in such departments as Embryology, Palæontology, Pathology, and, above all, Morphological and Cryptogamic Botany, which, we are told, is to be carefully distinguished from the systematic branch of the subject—for which sufficient provision was long since made—and therefore, we presume, may be fairly designated as "unsystematic."

There is one condition—a very simple condition, and we think a very fair condition—on which we are willing to entertain the question whether these subjects, or any large proportion of them, are of such practical importance or intrinsic dignity as to render the establishment of Chairs, devoted to their development and exposition, a *sine quâ non* of the University of the future. The new Professors, we understand, are wanted mainly in order to give *instruction* in these topics; and, that being so, it is surely not unreasonable to inquire what amount of success the present body of Professors has actually attained in *teaching* students those branches of learning to which their four-and-thirty Chairs are respectively appropriated. We are sometimes told that scores of undergraduates yearly pass away in dull despair and uncomplaining hunger from a cruel Mother who has refused them the intellectual sustenance for which they crave. They have asked for bread and received a stone; instead of the nutritious egg, their appetites have been mocked by the unpalatable scorpion. Their thirst for knowledge is still unslaked, and their desire for wisdom yet unsatisfied. The stupid prejudices of the academical system have proved to them a fatal stumbling-block, and our obsolete traditions a rock of irreparable offence. We have had perhaps among us some mute inglorious Milton, yearning for information as to

the folk-lore of the Cannibal Islands ; but he has yearned in vain. One who had in him the germs of another Cuvier has sighed for instruction in antediluvian entomology ; but his aspirations have been heard by the winds alone. He searched for a Professor, and found him not ; he entreated the modest boon of a Demonstrator, and was told that he was not there. The Colleges, administered by pedantic and uncongenial Dons, have confined their teaching to the exploded lore of bygone days ; such subjects as Classics and Mathematics, Law and History, Moral Science and Theology, can no longer be expected to attract or interest the young and inquiring mind. The ignoble herd, it is true, have come and read, and taken their miserable "honours," if the word can be so perverted, in these despicable and antiquarian subjects ; but the *élite* of the rising generation have found no scope for their mental energy in the narrow groove to which the Colleges, sunk in mediæval superstition, have confined their attention ; and melancholy instances could be produced of men who have been forced to take to boating or athletic sports, in order to supply that aching void which the trivial curriculum of the Senate-house could never fill.

And, in this appalling state of affairs, what, it may be asked, have our Professors done ? Our Professors, strong in the *mens conscia recti*, have for the most part followed Lord Melbourne's sage advice and decided to "do nothing." There is a well-known classification by which Professors are divided into two classes. The first are those who profess much and do little : the second category comprises those who profess little and do nothing. An epigrammatic dichotomy of this kind is of course very unjust to individuals. It is a caricature ; but a caricature is altogether pointless unless it has some sort of foundation in fact. There are some Professors of recondite and esoteric subjects who devote unsparing energy and pains to such pupils as come to them ; and their limited classes often include some of the best men in the University. There is more than one Professor at the present day who attracts a large audience by the profundity of his learning and the lucidity of his exposition ; but with some few exceptions, which may be almost

counted on the fingers of a single hand, the University Professors find it practically impossible to persuade the University students to attend their lectures. It may be that their disquisitions are too learned or too formal ; it is certain that they are frequently delivered to empty benches. We have at present two Classical Professors—one of Latin and one of Greek—and four Professors of Mathematics ; they are all men of European reputation ; and yet we believe that we shall be doing no injustice to these six gentlemen when we assert that on an average they do not get six pupils a term between them. On the other hand, a good College lecturer is sure to have his room crowded. A friend of our own, a member of the smallest College in Cambridge, recently announced a course of lectures on Personal Property—not a specially fascinating subject—and sixty students at once put down their names to attend. We have ourselves been present at lectures delivered by Professor Jebb, when a College lecturer at Trinity, to more than a hundred undergraduates ; and we believe that the gentleman who has succeeded him in the same position attracts at least as large an audience. Experience, indeed, seems to shew that undergraduates cannot be induced by any method short of absolute compulsion to attend Professors' lectures ; and the most successful of College teachers, if promoted to a Professorial Chair, finds that his pupils immediately desert him. We have no space at our command wherein to discuss the reason of this fact ; but when it is persistently asserted that the University requires more teaching power, it seems just as well to point out that the University has conspicuously failed to utilise the teaching power which it already possesses.

Before dismissing this topic, there is a final observation which we should like to make. We earnestly trust that the University Commission will make no attempt to re-model our institutions with a view to assimilating them to those of which the most familiar example is afforded by the German Universities. Cambridge has a type, or *ἦθος*, of its own, the result of the accumulated traditions and matured experience of many generations ; and it is one of which we could not regard the

disappearance otherwise than with grave regret. Our collegiate system does not content itself with providing intellectual education for those who come within its sphere; it supplies a moral discipline and social training which influence the whole subsequent career and tone of the average graduate. The cenobite life, with all that it implies, the community of interests and pursuits, the *rapprochement* of men of varying bent, the sumptuary code, liberal and elastic, but not merely nominal, and a supervision which is salutary but not vexatious, are among the benefits which a College confers on its *alumni*; and in many cases it is in this combination of influences, brought to bear on our "gentle youth" at that critical period when the character is most susceptible to impressions from without, that the principal value of a University education consists. We feel assured that any attempt to change our Universities into a servile imitation of those of Germany—which cost the State more than half a million a year—would end in hopeless failure; and we have a strong conviction that the British public would view with little satisfaction the transformation of our decent and gentlemanly undergraduates into swaggering *Burschen*, whose delight is in duels, who hate the respectable and scorn the *Philister*; or, still worse, into a bad imitation of the ingenuous *étudiant* of the Sorbonne, living in sweet harmony with the inevitable *grisette*.

The second of the three heads on which the demand of the University for "a modification of its pecuniary relations" with its members appears to be based, has received the sonorous designation of "the endowment of research." On this we shall be very brief. The same individuals, the same *savans*, the same Marquis, who, with a holy indignation at sinecures, advocate the suppression of "idle" fellowships, think that the University should be entrusted with a considerable fund, out of which stipends or annuities are to be paid to able graduates out of work who feel a vocation for original research. These able graduates are usually married; they have perhaps held fellowships and lost them; and every one is agreed that a married man cannot "research" at his ease, undisturbed by

sordid cares, on less than £1000 a year; a good house, generous wine, æsthetic surroundings, plenty of society, and a long holiday in the autumn, are absolutely essential if we are to keep our researcher up to the mark. Neither must these gentlemen be hurried in their labours. The University must not act like children who dig up the seeds in their gardens to see if they are sprouting; on the contrary, it must possess its soul—if a University has a soul—in patience, in quietness, and in confidence. A researcher must not be troubled by indelicate people with persistent inquiries as to how he is getting on. It must be remembered that he is *ex hypothesi* engaged in the investigation of subjects hitherto unexplored by man; he soars to altitudes which preceding footsteps never scaled; he plunges into mysterious depths of which the profundity has been gauged as yet by none. *E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen* must clearly require a good deal of time; and it would be unreasonable to worry the modern follower of Epicurus with any vulgar clamour for results. It will surely be enough to know that he is "stung with the cæstrum" of some great, if not "swift-working," conception; and we may console ourselves for hope indefinitely deferred with the anticipation that another generation, better qualified to appreciate them, will some day enter into his labours.

All this may be very true; we would only suggest that it is rarely advisable to abolish one institution and substitute another of precisely the same kind, in the expectation that it will produce entirely different results. If half of what is said of idle fellowships be true, there could surely be no better vehicle for the encouragement of research; the best men in the University are provided with a modest competence, and they are free to spend their lives, if they please, in acquiring and disseminating knowledge. If a man does not feel a vocation for such a life, to double or treble his income will scarcely inspire him with the requisite enthusiasm. If, on the other hand, it is objected, as it sometimes is, with a slight want of consistency, that the Fellow is incapacitated for research, not because he is idle, but because he is cumbered with much teaching,

we can only say that all experience belies this theory, and that the most valuable and original work in scholarship and science has been almost invariably produced by those busily engaged in educational pursuits. The reason of this is indeed sufficiently obvious. To teach intelligent pupils well requires considerable preparation and constant study; questions are suggested in the course of a lecture which, to be answered thoroughly, involve reference to original sources of information; and a good lecturer, who devotes himself to some special subject, after teaching it for a few years, generally finds himself in a position to contribute largely to its further elucidation. If his branch be scholarship, new interpretations of obscure points have doubtless occurred to him; he has perhaps discovered some ingenious emendation, or reconciled various readings which previous commentators had dismissed as hopelessly enigmatic. If such an one has been engaged in mathematical or physical science, the suggestions of the lecture-room and the experiments of the laboratory may have gradually prepared the way for some striking and valuable discovery. If, then, it is proposed to relieve the researchers of the future from the work of teaching, we regard the proposal as extremely mischievous; if all that is wanted is to give those Fellows who under the present system do not lecture a more complimentary epithet and a somewhat different *status*, it seems to us that such a change would be entirely nugatory. For, we may fairly ask, where are our researchers to come from? Are they to be drawn from the same class as the College Fellow? Then why call old things by new names? Or are they to be selected from the numerous gentlemen who, through dulness or indolence, have missed their fellowships, and may therefore be fairly presumed to have a special qualification for well-endowed research?

The last ground on which the University claims assistance from the Colleges, consists in the alleged want of new buildings, principally for scientific purposes. Many of the Colleges happen to be in a similar position; some of them urgently require more lecture-rooms, more accommodation in Hall,

more rooms for students ; they are hindered from carrying out these projects by want of funds ; but no enterprising College has ever hit on the happy idea of suggesting a modification of its pecuniary relations with the University, or with any other corporation. We can only say here that the wants of the men of science cannot be satisfactorily tested or criticised by others ; it is impossible for those ignorant of the exigencies of physical research to affirm that, where a dozen laboratories and museums are claimed, half-a-dozen would be amply sufficient ; while if those wants are to be satisfied *in toto* out of collegiate revenues, the Colleges had better go into the Bankruptcy Court at once, and ascertain how much in the pound this inexorable creditor is disposed to take. It is, moreover, important to observe that if it be once understood that, as the requirements of the University extend—and we do not for a moment question that, as time goes on, it is very natural that they should become more extensive—it will always be possible to meet them out of a mine of wealth in the University itself, of which the existence has been hitherto unsuspected, there will at once be an end of those noble cases of private generosity from which the University in the past has so greatly benefited. There is surely no better way in which a wealthy and philanthropic citizen can perpetuate his memory than by associating it with some academical institution which will retain his name through succeeding centuries ; but if the University were once allowed to annex for its own purposes the property of the Colleges, two reasons would at once present themselves which would effectually check the promptings of individual munificence for all future time. Every one who knows anything of the history of our Universities and Colleges is well aware that they owe almost everything they possess to private benefactors ; but if such a measure of confiscation were once permitted, no one would ever give anything to a University which had proved its capacity for helping itself from other sources ; and no one would ever give anything to Colleges, of which experience had shewn that the revenues were always liable to be diverted to purposes entirely different from those

for which they were originally intended. When we think of all the buildings which the University owes to special gifts or bequests from some of its most illustrious members—of institutions like the Fitzwilliam Museum, the Cavendish Laboratory and the Divinity Schools now in course of erection—we should be loth indeed, for the sake of any temporary acquisition, to see all chance of similar donations in the years to come completely barred.

In any case, nothing would be more unjust than to carry out a proposal which finds favour in some quarters, especially among the wealthier Colleges, and force the Colleges to contribute, if they contribute at all, to the University chest at a uniform rate. Equality is a specious word ; it is a word which in the course of history has been found a convenient cloak for a good deal of practical injustice ; and in this case equality would be the reverse of equity, and would indeed be tantamount to relative inequality. It might, for instance, be found on inquiry that at least one College in the University was in possession of an enormous and slowly accumulating fund, which, by the terms of the trust on which it was held, was necessarily applied to College buildings, and for which it was scarcely possible, with the best will in the world, to find satisfactory employment. With the consent of the College, a portion of such a fund might perhaps with propriety be devoted to the purpose of University buildings ; but to expect other Colleges—some of which possess no such thing as a “Domus” fund—to contribute a similar sum would be obviously absurd. It might be possible to shew that several of the Colleges at present enjoy a considerable surplus of income over expenditure ; others exhibit a balance-sheet similar to that once recommended by Mr. Micawber, and live, so to speak, from hand to mouth. Some of these corporations have a large *prospective* increase of revenue, from the falling-in of beneficial leases and copyholds for lives ; others, while their requirements multiply, have substantial reason to anticipate that, through the exhaustion of minerals on their estates and other causes, they will suffer an actual decrease in income in

the course of the next few years. Thus it appears from the Report of the Commission of 1872 that, during the fifteen years from 1875 to 1890, the estimated increase in the revenue of Trinity College amounts to about £18,500; in that of King's College, to more than £8200; while Christ's, Jesus and Queen's Colleges anticipate additions amounting respectively to £3000, £2000 and £1800. The other Colleges, with four exceptions of quite insignificant amount, expect no increase whatever. Under such circumstances, to tax all the Colleges on an equal footing would seem justifiable only on the principle of taking from him that hath nothing even that which he hath.

Our space is nearly exhausted, while an important section of our subject still remains untouched. The Commissioners will, it is to be hoped, give their most serious consideration to the question of what we have already designated as "municipal" reform. The changes required in the internal regulations of the Colleges, as distinct from the changes alleged to be required in the relations of the Colleges to the University, are really very considerable; but on the present occasion we can only indicate in the most concise and cursory manner the general character which, as we conceive, it is desirable that those changes should assume. For some time past, indeed, several of the most influential Colleges, and notably Trinity College, have been anxious to alter the statutes by which they are governed in various particulars; but the Queen in Council has been advised to withhold her sanction from such proposals on the ground that the matter would be shortly dealt with on general principles by the Legislature itself. The Legislature, as we have seen, has practically delegated the responsibility of such reforms to the University Commission; and we trust that the Commissioners will in this matter adopt a decided and consistent policy; that they will approve the suggestions of the more liberal among the Colleges; and that in other cases they will not hesitate to take the initiative themselves, and gently stimulate those of which the opinion is at present less advanced, to proceed in the same direction.

We cannot dismiss without some expression of opinion the question of the tenure of College Headships and College Fellowships. The Commissioners have been left free to deal with both points as they may think expedient, but it is difficult to imagine that they will be willing to accede to the proposition of certain academical republicans, and abolish the Headships altogether. It is doubtless true that the duties of the Master of a College are somewhat undefined, but they are none the less real, and they are often, when, as is usually the case, conscientiously discharged, extremely onerous. It must be remembered that a College is not merely an educational establishment, but almost invariably a corporation holding extensive and valuable real estate. Something is no doubt to be said for attaching more definite functions to the position of a Master ; but a great obstacle to any uniform rule in this respect consists in the circumstance that, while rules are rigid, the capacities and dispositions of individuals exhibit considerable diversity. Our College Heads have as a body shewn much judgment in devoting themselves to those departments of work which by habit and temperament they are respectively most competent to take in hand. Some of them make admirable Vice-Chancellors and excellent representatives of the University to the outside world ; another is distinguished not so much by aptitude for business as by the literary labours which the *otium cum dignitate* of the Master's Lodge has enabled him to pursue and perfect ; another is the most efficient member of the Council of the Senate and half-a-dozen Syndicates ; while others discharge with extreme skill and judgment the responsible work of administering and superintending College property. Thus

Unto each man his handiwork, unto each his crown,
The just Fate gives.

It is indeed generally admitted that, in order to carry on this administrative work in a satisfactory manner, every College ought to have a permanent President, distinguished from those of its senior members who are fully occupied in educational

work ; and we have been unable to discover in any of the schemes for substituting " quinquennial Presidents " or " Councils of Tutors " for the present Heads, any reason to suppose that such a change would be more efficient or much less expensive than the present system. The hope, moreover, of succeeding to one of the Headships, with the comparative leisure which it implies, often constitutes a valuable inducement to permanent residence on the part of graduates whom the University could not well afford to lose, and who are now content to spend the best years of their lives—years in which men of equal ability would have elsewhere made themselves an assured position—in the ungrudging service of their respective Colleges.

We think, therefore, that there is much to be said in defence of the Headships ; but we have nothing to urge in favour of the present rule, by which, in almost all cases, they are confined to members of the Church of England, and, in the great majority of cases, to members of the clerical profession. Such a limitation would appear to be totally inconsistent with the spirit of the Tests Act ; and it sometimes causes, and probably in the future, if not removed, will cause with far greater frequency, a serious difficulty in the way of electing the most suitable person. The Colleges which are permitted by their statutes to have a lay Head—Trinity Hall is one of the very few thus fortunately circumstanced—have constantly availed themselves of the privilege ; and we trust that, in this particular at all events, the Commissioners will not hesitate to place all the Colleges on the same footing.

The same remark applies with even greater force to the tenure of Fellowships. We have already mentioned that as nearly as possible two-thirds of the aggregate number of Fellowships in the University are to a greater or less extent hampered by the condition that their holder must assume the orders of the Church of England ; and the mere statement of such a condition of affairs should be sufficient to procure its summary condemnation. In Parliament, indeed, it was generally admitted that clerical Fellowships could only be defended in so far as they were necessary for maintaining religious

instruction in the several Colleges. We will not pause to inquire to what extent and in how many cases they really subserve this end; it is sufficient to answer, that a very small fraction of the total number ought to furnish abundant provision for such a purpose. If, however, it should be suggested that they are necessary for the encouragement of theological study, the suggestion, to those acquainted with the facts of the case, would seem almost ludicrous; and we may at all events reply, that a much more efficient instrument for securing that very desirable object is immediately available. There is now at Cambridge a Theological Tripos, and if it once were understood that the Colleges were prepared to give Fellowships for distinguished merit in that examination, as they already do for distinguished merit in Classics, Mathematics and Natural Science, there would be no lack of candidates of adequate distinction. Any College which might wish especially to recognise the faculty of Theology, in the same way as certain Colleges, by means of fellowships, studentships and scholarships, now stimulate the faculties of Law and Medicine, would only have to appropriate one or more of its fellowships and studentships to graduates in that school, and those so elected, whether clergymen or laymen, members of the Established Church or Nonconformists, would probably devote themselves to teaching and lecturing on theological subjects with an assiduity and success conspicuous only by their absence in the average clerical Fellow under the present *régime*. We fancy, indeed, that the only reason why the clerical restrictions have been tolerated so long lies in the circumstance that, in the majority of cases, the assumption of orders is not a condition of election, but the Fellowship is vacated unless they are assumed within a certain period. Thus in recent years, while the disinclination of the majority of College Fellows to enter the Church has become rapidly more marked, these disabilities have been regarded as a convenient method of procuring vacancies, and ensuring a steady "flow of promotion." It appears from the University Calendar, that at Trinity and St. John's all the Fellows—with a few

exceptions in favour of those holding some College office—are required to take orders within seven years of attaining the standing of a Master of Arts; the rule at Emmanuel is practically the same; at Corpus Christi, eight Fellows out of twelve are required to take orders within *three* years of election; at Christ's, ten out of fifteen within six years of M.A. standing; at Queen's and Caius, Fellowships are retained for life by those who enter the clerical profession; and at Jesus, six Fellows out of sixteen must always be in holy orders. The abuses which this system involves, and the enormous temptations to which men are exposed, so long as it continues in force, to profess a vocation which they do not feel, have been so frequently pointed out, that we need not dwell upon them here. Bishop Thirlwall's is probably not an isolated case of one gifted with that rare combination of qualities which makes the ideal judge, and who has nevertheless, after a few years' struggle at the bar, succumbed to the pressure of the Fellowship system, and embraced a calling not specially congenial to his mind and character. Lord Eldon, as is well known, was at one time on the point of doing the same thing. If the Commission should accomplish nothing else, it will still have done a good work if it renders such cases impossible for the future. There is indeed something peculiarly painful in the idea of a cultivated gentleman coming to the Bishop with those words on his lips which the Prayer-book prescribes, and which contain a solemn asseveration of a spiritual impulse and irresistible call to the most sacred of professions, while there remains in his heart the unuttered exclamation of entreaty, "Put me, I pray thee, into one of the priests' offices, that I may eat a piece of bread!"

We may perhaps be asked how, if the chance vacancies in Fellowships above alluded to are no longer to occur, it will be possible to prevent their tenure from becoming perpetual. The answer is extremely simple. If a Fellow devotes himself to College work as tutor, bursar, lecturer, or in any similar position, he ought to be allowed to retain his Fellowship as

long as he holds such office, and, in some cases of long-continued service, either for life or until he obtains other promotion. But, with these exceptions, the tenure of all Fellowships should be strictly limited to a certain number of years from election. It is unnecessary to here enter into detail as to the precise period to be fixed; but on the whole we should say that twelve years from election—the term now prescribed at Downing College—or ten years from M.A. standing, should be the extreme limit. A “prize fellowship” is, we believe, an institution of a very valuable kind; we have mentioned some of our reasons for that belief on a preceding page; but a prize fellowship, if allowed to develop into a sinecure for life, is, we do not doubt, a great abuse, and in many cases a boon—like that granted to the importunity of Midas—which exercises a most disastrous influence on its unfortunate possessor. We are glad to think that this point is one on which public opinion, both inside and outside the Universities, has already pronounced so distinct a verdict, that further argument on our part would be a superfluous and prodigal expenditure of time and space.

Fellowships being thus strictly limited in their duration, the condition of celibacy, which was so long characteristic of our University system, but which recent innovations have rendered no longer uniform, will necessarily cease, in those cases where it is still in force, to boast a *raison d'être*. It is notoriously a relic of the mediæval period when every Fellow was a monk; and of late years the only excuse for perpetuating it has been that, like the clerical restrictions, it afforded a chance of vacancies arising, which, when the reform indicated above is carried out, will occur no longer capriciously, but at regular intervals of time. Whether it is advisable for young men with limited incomes and uncertain prospects to undertake the responsibilities of matrimony, is not a point on which either we or the Commissioners, when engaged in remodelling College statutes, are called upon to express a personal opinion; the matter is obviously one which, in the case

of University graduates as in that of other members of society, must be left to the absolute discretion—or indiscretion—of the individual immediately concerned.

There still remain three points which, if of minor importance, yet possess considerable interest, and on each of which we should like to say a few words before concluding an article which has already, we fear, exceeded all reasonable limits. There seems to be a wide-spread impression that the question of College patronage of ecclesiastical benefices will be submitted to the consideration of the Commissioners. The number of advowsons at present in the gift of the various Colleges is very large; and it appears from the Report of the last Commission that their aggregate value is about £135,000. In former times, when almost all the Fellows took orders as a matter of course, there was some sort of assurance that the person presented would be one whom the patrons felt, from personal knowledge, to be properly qualified for the office. The guarantee, it is true, was a far from perfect one; for in many cases a man who was eminently successful as a College lecturer proved signally incompetent as a parish priest. But at the present day even this partial security is often no longer to be attained, since few Colleges find a sufficient number of clerical members among their governing body who are willing to fill the vacancies which from time to time occur. For livings of small value almost invariably, and for livings of considerable value very frequently, a nominee has to be sought for from without. The Colleges have seldom sufficient leisure at their command to institute a wide inquiry; persons are often appointed of whom little is known except that they were formerly scholars, or at all events members, of the College, and that they have since been engaged in clerical work in the country; and a patronage which has never been free from serious objections has now in many cases become an actual source of embarrassment to the patrons themselves. The whole question of the distribution of Church patronage will, it is to be hoped, shortly be deemed worthy of the earnest attention of the Legislature; but while a general measure of reform

must be reserved for the future, it is certainly open to question whether, by a transfer of a portion of the College patronage to other hands, a new source of revenue might not be made available for other purposes. As things stand at present, if a College living is sold, the proceeds are held in trust and suffered to accumulate with a view to the purchase of another; and thus, even if a College is desirous of doing so, it is unable, without some such intervention as the Commission might supply, to divest itself of this *dignus vindice nodus*, and get rid of any part of its ecclesiastical patronage which it may regard as superfluous for its wants.*

It is understood to have been suggested in some quarters that the period of residence at the University requisite to obtain a bachelor's degree might with advantage be somewhat curtailed. Some misapprehension appears to prevail on this point, it having been stated that a degree could not be procured except by residence extending over more than three years; at Cambridge, at all events, candidates for the *ordinary* degree may present themselves for examination after having kept nine terms—that is, in two years and nine months from the time at which they entered. For the *honour* examinations, the time allowed for preparation is rather over than under three years; at Oxford, we believe, it is considerably longer; and the course of reading for an honour degree is always so extensive, that we have never heard of any complaint at Cambridge that the time assigned for it was too long. We understand that the suggestion above referred to has been made partly with a view to the convenience of young men who intend to follow the profession of a solicitor; every effort should no doubt be made to extend to these gentlemen more frequently than is at present the case the advantage of an academical degree; but it is only fair to point out that even

* It is understood that one Cambridge College has for some years held a very large fund—of the amount of which we forbear, lest we should be charged with exaggeration, to state the most moderate estimate—in trust for the purchase and augmentation of benefices. The patronage of the College is believed to be amply sufficient for its wants.

now an articled clerk who has obtained from either University the right to call himself a bachelor of arts, is excused two years of his articles specially on that ground. Thus it appears that a solicitor can at present obtain a University education if he is willing to devote an additional nine months to preliminary training; and we cannot feel disposed to regard in a very serious light the complaint of those who do not think it worth their while to sacrifice a start of nine months in their profession for the sake of an education of which they would experience the intellectual and social advantages through the whole of their subsequent career. For the sake, however, of this class, and of young men intended for commercial pursuits, who wish to begin practical work in the office at the earliest possible date, there would probably be no difficulty in allowing candidates for a degree to present themselves one term earlier than under the existing rule, thus meeting the requirements of those who urge that two years and a half is the *maximum* of time which such persons can usually spare for this object. Our only fear is that, if this alteration were effected, the percentage of failures in the examination for the ordinary degree, already sufficiently and even discredibly large, would be enormously increased.

The only other topic to which we desire to direct public attention is that of "University Extension." We hope that the Cambridge Commission will do anything that may be in their power to develop and promote the very useful scheme by which lectures on history, political economy, political philosophy, English literature, mixed mathematics and natural science, have been in the last few years delivered by qualified graduates to large classes of working-men, ladies and others unable to come to the University for instruction, in some of our large centres of population. These lectureships, originally established in compliance with a pressing application from several large and important towns, have on the whole proved eminently successful. The liberal grants of public corporations and philanthropic individuals in the way of lecture-rooms, libraries, and other educational appliances, have done much

to facilitate their establishment ; but it would be unreasonable to expect that such an organization should be at once and everywhere self-supporting. Its benefits are in the highest sense reciprocal ; while the "populous places" included in its sphere gain the advantage of careful teaching by the best men, periodically tested by a judicious system of examinations, and while knowledge of useful and interesting subjects, accompanied by valuable suggestions for self-culture, is thus brought within the reach of classes to which such aids to intelligence have been hitherto inaccessible, it would at the same time be difficult to exaggerate the benefit indirectly reaped by the University from the extension of its influence to places and classes to which the higher education and the academical teaching had hitherto been but an empty name. We trust that the Commissioners will devise some plan for further developing a scheme which by its independent energy has proved itself deserving of their help, either by connecting with it any Fellowships which the Colleges, or some of them, may be willing and able to appropriate to the work, or by any other method which may commend itself to their judgment.

Our final word must be an earnest plea that the line be nowhere drawn too tight. A little elasticity, and a certain allowance for friction, is as necessary in managing men as in managing machines. After all, it is not so much on its institutions as on the men who administer them that the prosperity of the University must in the long run depend. An over-rigid scheme, or a blind pursuit of an unattainable uniformity, would only thwart and cramp that free play of individual character and intellectual independence to which Cambridge in the past has owed so much. One College differs from another College, not only in glory and reputation, but in its tone and its traditions ; and should a dead level ever be produced by legislative enactment, we may be assured that the level would be one of mediocrity and weakness.

PERCEVAL M. LAURENCE.

V.—CUDWORTH'S MSS. ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

ENGLISH Theology has no brighter period in its history than the close of the seventeenth century. There were giants on the earth in those days ; and "the Intellectual" Cudworth was not the least in stature amongst them. Bishop Burnet, in tracing the characters of the Latitudinarian divines of his age, says :

"Dr. Whichcot was much for liberty of conscience, and being disgusted with the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this, he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature. . . . Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius and a vast compass of learning. . . . So this set of men at Cambridge studied to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds and in a philosophical method."*

An interesting comparison might be drawn between Cudworth and his friend Locke. The Platonism of the one stands in strong contrast with the empirical philosophy of the other (a difference arising probably from the modes of thought induced by the studies of their respective professions). But in the love of truth, of freedom of opinion, and of practical—apart from ceremonial or dogmatic—religion, they were strikingly similar. The friendship between them was renewed in the second generation. It was in the house of Cudworth's learned daughter Damaris—the wife of Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in Essex—that Locke spent the closing years of his life, and to her his last words were addressed.

Cudworth's fame now rests upon the first part of his *Intellectual System*, which he published in 1678. He spent several years in composing parts of the second, but died, in 1688,

* Own Times, ed. Oxford, 1823, I. 321.

before he had finished his plan. He left his MSS. on that subject, consisting of several volumes in folio, together with a large Commentary on the Seventy Weeks of Daniel and other learned essays, to the care of his daughter, Lady Masham. For some time they quietly reposed in the library at Oates. But about the year 1762, when her grandson, the second Lord Masham, married his second wife, he thought proper to make room for books of polite amusement by disposing of his useless tomes of ancient learning. For this purpose he sold a very considerable number of the books and papers which Cudworth and Locke had bequeathed to his family, to a Mr. Robert Davies, a bookseller in Piccadilly. Mr. Davies concluded, or was told, that the MSS. were the productions of Locke, as some amongst them may have been. As he was one of the booksellers who had engaged Dr. Dodd to write a Commentary on the Bible, he furnished the Doctor with these MSS., which served to give an extraordinary éclat to that work,* and to the *Christian Magazine*, with which also Dr. Dodd was connected. The name of Locke answered the purpose of the proprietors, and the public were unacquainted with the truth of the fact. Some notes by Cudworth on the Seventy Weeks of Daniel appeared as Locke's in Dodd's Magazine, in June, 1763. They were probably notes of that elaborate Discourse which Principal Tulloch tells us "was read in the public schools of the University with great applause and admiration," but which Dr. Tulloch thought had never been published.

Mr. Davies, however, had no more regard for these learned volumes than the right honourable Goth who had expelled

* "The MSS. of Mr. Locke, which had long been confined to Lord Masham's library at Oates, were put into my hands; among these were two of Mr. Locke's Bibles, interleaved, containing several observations of his own, amidst a variety of collections from different commentators. The possession of these papers, which upon a cursory view I thought more considerable than they were afterwards found to be, induced me to propose the present work to the public. . . . However, I must be obliged to say, that high as my expectations were raised, either by Mr. Locke's or Dr. Beaumont's Bibles, those expectations were disappointed upon consulting the principal commentators, where I found the remarks of those learned men not only expressed with equal force, but greatly improved and enlarged."—Dodd's Commentary, Preface, p. i.

them from his library; and on receiving them back from Dr. Dodd, threw them into his garret, where they were exposed to the depredations of rats and maid-servants. He offered them to Bishop Law, who was preparing an edition of Locke's works; but Law convinced himself that they had been written by Cudworth, and declined the bargain. However, in 1777, a gentleman ("Mr. Bryant," says a MS. note in the British Museum) who had a veneration for the name of Locke, and was concerned to hear that any of his writings were in danger of being lost, went down to Davies' house at Barnes to see these MSS., and as he was positively assured by him that they were the real compositions of Locke, purchased them for forty guineas. Upon examination he soon perceived the deception, and returned them to the vendor. Having, however, come to the conclusion that they were the works of Cudworth, he recommended them to the curators of the British Museum, by whom they were purchased for ten guineas. There, after their perils, they now rest. They form ten volumes, which are thus described in Ayscough's Catalogue:*

"4978-82. Five volumes on Free Will.

4983. Thoughts, Memorandums, &c., relative to the Eternity of Torments, and Thoughts on Pleasure.

4984, 5. Commonplace-books of Motives to Moral Duties, 2 vols.

4986, 7. Commentary on Daniel, 2 vols.

Dugald Stewart, in his Dissertation on the History of Philosophy, declared his great regret that Cudworth's MSS. "should have been so long withheld from the public;" and the *Edinburgh Review* expressed its wonder "that these large manuscript works, preserved from destruction by accident, should be suffered to remain unpublished in the British Museum." But as the writer of the article *Cudworth* in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* prudently says,

"That these writings are valuable cannot be doubted. It is known indeed that they display great compass of sentiment and a vast

* *Gent. Mag.*, lviii. 1186 ("S. A."=Samuel Ayscough, lxvi. 1009), lix. 126; *Nichol's Literary Anecdotes*, ix. 276; Additional MSS., British Museum, No. 18,555, 16.

extent of learning. Nevertheless, from their bulk, the abstruseness of the subjects on which they treat, and the revolutions of literary taste and opinion, it is pretty certain that the publication of them would not be successful in the present age."

But this writer's caution is more apparent in commercial than in literary matters; for the catalogue which he gives us of these MSS. is very inaccurate, and was apparently framed at a guess, by copying a list which Dr. Birch had made of all Cudworth's unpublished writings. It even includes one work (the Latin treatise "On the Verity of the Christian Religion," against the Jews), of which Birch expressly says, that though Cudworth's letters shew that it once existed, "it is not yet found."

In 1838, the Rev. John Allen, M.A., of King's College, London, published the first volume of Cudworth's MS. on Free Will; but this appears to have been the only attempt yet made to bring any of these dissertations to the light. They have probably been almost as little disturbed by readers as by copyists. Even Principal Tulloch did not consult them when preparing his admirable accounts of the Cambridge Latitudinarians. But it is interesting to find Theodore Parker setting down the inspection of these MSS. as one of the duties to be despatched during his brief visit to England.

The MS. with which we are at present concerned was written, as we shall shortly see, after the publication of the first part of the *Intellectual System*, and consequently in the last ten years of Cudworth's life. It may have been one of those small volumes in which Bishop Chandler thinks he embodied the main points of his doctrine when he found life growing too short for the completion of his great book. It begins thus (I have modernized the spelling):

"Collection of confused thoughts, memorandums, relating to Eternity of Torments, collected out of my little book.

"The day of death is to be taken absolutely as eternal life, for St. Matthew declares there will be a final separation and an eternal allotment of misery or happiness; but if there are endless circuits of souls, and it's possible for celestial souls to lapse, then, as a man

may descend, so may one well ascend from the dark and miserable regions of hell to heaven ; the eternity of the one being taken away, there can be no proof of the other ; since they seem to ground it on the eternity of heaven. Eternal life and happiness is not to be so taken as if men were necessarily immutably fixt at their departure hence ; but only that whosoever lives well here and is removed to heaven, has all the probable means and the greatest advantages of remaining there and constant for ever ; so that (as we can prove by natural probabilities that the soul may survive the body, because not composed of those elements which are corruptible, but it cannot follow hence that it might *always* remain and continue in being, for God might annihilate it, yet because it seems to be capable of immortality we call it immortal) ; so everlasting life is only to be understood as that God will never destroy our being, but that we may enjoy eternal life, and that He will always continue those heavenly enjoyments which we shall there possess, if we maintain our station and the purity of our minds."

He continues the subject, and replies to objections which might be brought from Luke vii. 28 and 2 Tim. i. 10, as proving that future bliss is unchangeable.*

The MS. then breaks off, and we have a series of brief notes, such as these :

* He says: "But this, they will cry, is contrary to the Scripture's promise of eternal life. St. Paul to Timothy 2, i. 10, says, Christ has brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel ; that is, whereas others owned that our souls were immortal and eternal, yet they supposed that all souls would have a continual circuit and transmigration into different bodies, but our Saviour it was that discovered or brought to us a fixed and certain assurance of the permanency and duration of eternal happiness in the other world to those that lived well here. Thus Dr. Cudworth, p. 568." (The italics are ours). This is a reference to the *Intellectual System*, Book i. ch. iv. (p. 568 of the edition of 1678), where he gives a similar explanation of this text, and quotes Rev. iii. 12 as analogous: "The soul's immortality was believed before, not only by the Pharisaick Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too; but because these for the most part held their endless circuits and transigrations of souls, therefore was he the first who gave the world assurance . . . of a fixed and permanent state of happiness." If Cudworth were the author of our MS., it seems strange that he should thus cite himself in the third person. But he may have intended to publish these papers anonymously; and Universalism was still a heresy dangerous enough to make that precaution advisable. Thomas Burnet, a little later on, thought it prudent to protect himself by putting his book into Latin.

"That we may be as vicious as we have been before ; and since God permitted us once to fall, may still permit us."

"It's plain . . . by the scorching of the finger and dipping of the tongue, that his body was risen ; now how does this agree with the common theology that the body rises not till the day of judgment?"

He adds a list of books to be consulted :

"All Ecclesiastical Historians, antient and modern ; Fathers ; Standish, *Defence of Origen* ; Huet's *Origeniana* ; Halloix, *Origenis Defensus* ; Socinus ; Pearson on Creed ; Hammond, *A Set Discourse* ; Burthogge, *Of the Perpetuity of Hell Torments*."

He then abandons the subject ; and his next notes are a collection of questions apparently for future investigation. The first is, "To inquire whether the great spring of religious melancholy is not from idleness." He discusses at some length, "Whether unchastity is not the most difficult vice to subdue of any." He suggests many reflections on pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, and their influence on the character here and hereafter. He asks, "Whether or no it is not probable that the punishment of the wicked will not be in that very punishment which their soul abhors ? as, if a man is very proud, there will be no punishment so intolerable to him as the evil of contempt and negligence." He remarks : "There is no nobler proof of the Divinity of Jesus Christ than the unaffected humility with which he performed all things ; vain-glory . . . being visible in the most divine philosophers."

Incidentally he touches on the interpretation of various texts ; inquiring the difference between the baptisms of John and Christ, and why they co-existed ; how charity may be said to cover a multitude of sins (where he finds a parallel in Prov. x. 12) ; and what was meant by the prophecy that Christ should baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire. He quotes the declaration, that "he that looketh on a woman to lust hath committed adultery," and remarks that, though the interpreters think differently, it is evident from what precedes that this refers only to married women. He condemns polemics ; saying,

"With what affection and zeal do men dispute about election and grace, and justification by faith; how eagerly do they contend for it as for the faith that was once delivered to the saints; but the faith that was delivered to them was not notion but life; it was humility and charity, patience and neglect of the world."

He confesses that he feels compelled to go thus far with the theory of predestination—that men's natural temperament often determines their conduct, and all their reasonings are in vain against it. He censures the highflying writers who consider everything a duty or a sin, and make religion an *unreasonable* service, drawing "a religious pattern for monks in solitude, rather than for men that live on a theatre."

(Cudworth would have been somewhat startled if he could have looked forward to Dr. Whewell's "Principle of Moral Purpose," that no object should ever be desired except as a means to some Moral end !)

He resumes his original subject :

"There are two ways by which men may avoid the eternity of hell torments; by the cessations of their beings or of their torments. See Pearson on article of Life Everlasting. Now though the cessation of being is what I dislike more than the other, though entertained by Smalcus, yet I must confess that I cannot conceive how a man can endure pain of sense eternally with knowledge and consciousness of his fate, when any violent tortures so disorder our understanding, that we can't be called ourselves; and, since all pain of sense must arise from union of the soul with the body, and the material fire preys always on the body, how the body can naturally subsist. For if you have recourse to supernatural means or miracles for to conserve it, then I see no reason why God may not as well change the course of nature, and work a miracle for man's salvation as well as for his destruction."

After several blank pages, we next come to a dissertation clearly written out, as if copied from an earlier rough draught, entitled, "Beginning of the Discourse of the Eternity of Torments."

He commences by shewing that happiness is the great aim of life, and that we always act with a view to it; and hence

that it is important to inquire what prospects we have of happiness in another life.

“The general cry of all ages seems to agree in this, that our happiness and misery will be eternal and unalterable . . . and the revelation of Jesus Christ seems to confirm the universal belief and tradition of the world . . . But since the ways of God are reasonable, and all his designs are managed with infinite wisdom and goodness ; since He has given us reason for a light and guide to our minds, and by this we discern the wisdom, goodness, justice and perfection of God Almighty, since we judge of his existence by our reason and understanding ; and all the truth and certainty we have of the evidence and excellency of his laws, has its greatest force and influence from the satisfaction it gives our understanding faculties, and no man is thought to do ill who doubts and reasons of these things ; we cannot think it unreasonable to doubt or question whether the torments of the other world have an end or duration, whether the miserable damned beings will be ever miserable, or whether they may not have a relief or change of state. . . . For the actions of the most perfect Being are always just and reasonable ; they are not managed by arbitrary will and power, by unbounded lust and appetite, but by perfect wisdom and understanding. If God has designed that the torments of hell should be eternal, it is because it is best and fittest they should be so, and if it is not suitable to the wisdom, justice, goodness, and the designs of God, we have reason to conclude they are not eternal. . . . Let us therefore impartially think and consider on what foundation this universal opinion has been received. . . .

“We shall therefore show what authority this opinion has from Scripture, for what reasons it was generally received and understood in the literal sense, what has been the opinion of the ancients on those places, how advantageous it is to religion and virtue, and the equity and justice of God in this design ; and then show what inconveniences will arise from the removal of this belief, as also what inconveniences and also absurdities are like to flow from the contrary opinion and notion. And on the other side we shall give a just and reasonable interpretation of those places of Scripture which seem to favour this opinion, and show that there is no necessity to understand them in the literal sense. We shall show that several of the ancients have rejected it ; that it is inconsistent with the attributes of God, with his justice, wisdom and goodness ;

that the power of God, which they seem to elevate so much by this design, is in reality vilified, lessened and disparaged ; we shall prove its inconsistency with the plain and visible designs of God in the forming human nature ; we shall also make it manifest that the design of religion is not really promoted or advanced by this opinion, but that it is rather hindered and obstructed by it ; that it is not the best motive to virtue and morality ; and whereas it is pretended several inconveniences will arise from it, we shall show that there is no inconvenience or disadvantage in it, but that there is just and reasonable encouragement to virtue without it ; and leave it to every man's judgment and apprehension to conclude or determine whether he thinks it eternal or no."

He then discusses Tillotson's argument, that no lesser punishment would deter men from sin, as even this does not wholly deter them. Amongst other replies to this argument, he urges that "Eternal torments could not in equity or justice be indicted before the Christian law was divulged, and this penalty annexed to it ;" and that "no lawgiver has just right to enforce his laws beyond equity and justice."

His next heading is, "Against the Argument from Choice, which is Dr. Hammond's."

"That it is by a man's choice is false, because no man chooses eternal torments ; a man that is hanged for robbery on the highway can't be said to choose hanging, tho' he knows it is the consequence of robbing—not but that he is a great fool to do [so] when he knows the event of it. It follows not that a man deserves eternal punishment because it is prohibited under such a penalty, and therefore, knowing the penalty, he deserves it for venturing it ; for this all along takes the thing supposed for certain, and concludes—not the certainty of it from the reasonableness of the thing, but—the reasonableness of the thing from the certainty of it. If the thing is not decreed, and is not antecedent to this reasoning, it will not prove it ; and if it is decreed, and is antecedent, it does not prove the reasonableness of it."

After reverting briefly to Tillotson, he considers the "Argument from the Necessity of it to Religion."

"This implies that religion and virtue is only secured by eternal torments, that this is the only or at least the principal motive and

enforcement of virtue and righteousness, . . . that virtue has all its binding force, its authority and influence, from fear and terror. . . . We have plain experience that men may be virtuous without it; witness the Jews, all those who died before our Saviour Jesus Christ, and all that believe not the eternity of hell torments."

He remarks that "he loves neither God nor goodness that loves Him only out of dread and fear."

After this follow "Mix't Thoughts against Eternal Torments."

"They are to prove two things; 1st, that they are eternal; 2nd, that they are reasonable. Now to prove the reasonableness of it does not prove their existence; because God may have reason to do many things which He does not. God might have punished Nineveh, it was very reasonable; yet no man can conclude from thence He did. But if it is unreasonable, we can prove that they are not eternal, because God is obliged not to act unreasonably by the perfection of his nature."

We have afterwards several pages of detached notes of a few words each, many of them too brief to be intelligible, on moral and religious subjects, apparently passing reflections and studies. Some of the principal run thus:

"Keep your knowledge to yourself, lest ruined by your intelligence. Learn silence; words dropt casually are dangerous."

"Why inform others? They won't inform you or help you."

"Ten times more busy to run us down than to raise us. All undervaluing and despising us and our concerns. *Hæc crux nostra.*"

"Men are hurried often by other men's thoughts and opinions as well as their own."

The notes seem to shew that the writer's mind was in a harassed state, and occasional business memoranda, entered on the *backs* of the leaves of the MS., confirm this inference. Thus we read:

"16 March, vii. 1. to Green:—I am resolved to do all in my power to support the estate, to deliver myself from the false reproaches of others, and unjust notions that I had applied it to my use. So if it prevent future charges I shall be satisfied. She left it out of repair in all manner of ways."

And again :

"Stultia. uxor, mind your world."

Another note is, "Jas. i. 5 ; Rom. v. 3 ; Matt. v. 10 ; 1 Pet. iii. 14, iv. 13 ;" all which texts relate to the endurance of suffering.

There occurs one entry which conclusively settles that Locke was not the author of these notes : "July 7. Lent my sister C. a guinea." Now Locke had no sister ; he and the brother who died young were the only children of their parents' marriage. Lord King is indeed sometimes described as having been the son of a sister of Locke's ; but his mother was only Locke's cousin. Two further arguments which tend, though with less weight, to the same conclusion, may be drawn from internal evidence. The tendency of our author is to Universalism rather than to Destructionism ; but it was to the latter theory that Locke inclined, as appears both from his *Reasonableness of Christianity* and from a MS. of his which is printed in Lord King's Life of him. On matrimony, again, our author expresses himself with a bitterness of feeling that seems to speak of bitter experience. Cudworth was a married man ; Locke was not. One brief apostrophe to a wife we have already quoted ; in the same portion of the MS. we find the following fuller ones :

"Marriage. A proper body . . . as well as plenty of money required. Where it has been spoiled by melancholy, trouble, losses, it is utterly unfit. Will grow wise when despised, rejected, or reproached."

"Man a mere mechanism by the frame of his body ; nothing brings more changes than matrimony—weakens, disorders, and dissolves the body."

"An *uzor* is governed by her own appetites, passions, affections, humours, and her friends ; which are nearer and dearer than the tie of husband, which is now looked on as a metaphysical relation, as all moral things are treated as fancies ; this owing to Popery."

There is a Swift-like combination of the sad and the ludicrous in these traces of domestic jars darkening the life of the

great Cambridge philosopher ; and the picture reminds us of the trials amidst which the *Ecclesiastical Polity* was written. Cudworth had married in 1654 at the age of thirty-seven ; and "of his wife," as Principal Tulloch says, "we learn nothing." But a writer in the *Republic of Letters* thinks there is ground for conjecturing that she brought him a large fortune.

He resumes his original subject, and replies to the arguments to be drawn from the Scriptural declarations on the subject, as to which he urges "that the word *Eternal* is taken in Scripture often for a finite time, and not for duration without end, as Ex. xxi. 6, Deut. xv. 17, Gen. xiii. 15, 2 Kings xxi. 7, Gen. xvii. 13." He also presses that even if the word itself does necessarily import eternity, we are not bound to construe the texts in a literal and actual sense ; for to limit ourselves to such a mode of interpreting Scripture would compel us to admit the doctrines of Transubstantiation and Reprobation, "which are as plainly expressed as the eternity of torments." He rejoices in the prospect which the New Testament gives us of Christ's final victory over evil, when Sin and Death, i.e. absence of spiritual life, shall be no more, of which he has previously said : "There is one faith and one Lord Jesus, one God ; so there will be one soul, one spirit of love diffused through all beings, conspiring and agreeing in the same love of order and goodness." He goes on to state briefly twenty-one arguments for eternal torments—in which there is nothing specially worthy of quotation for novelty—and then five further arguments against them, the last of which is, "that defect of human salvation must be either from power or will in God : now we will demonstrate God both can save men, and that his will is to save men." But he unfortunately omits to supply this very important demonstration.

He then replies to the views of Norris (*Misc. p. 385*) and Curcellæus (*Opera*, p. 97).

Several pages are afterwards devoted to ethical dissertations on Pleasure and Natural Justice. The MS. concludes with various reflections on practical religion, its nature and its

supports. He recommends as the best safeguards, reflection on God's omnipresence and on Death; and would have us seek our rules of life in the Scriptures, and not in the writings of theologians, whose minute and oppressive requirements he considers most unwise. Jeremy Taylor, he says, "has done a great injury to religion, and run many men into despair. When there were fewer books of devotion, there were more Christians." He considers Tillotson to be the best writer on the subject, he having "no sour maxims, no superstitious freaks, nor impracticable rules."

This is a good specimen of the tone and character of his remarks:

"Devotion is a great duty of religion, but charity is a greater. He that loveth his brother, loveth God also. We can't be long in acts of devotion, but we may be often in acts of charity."

The tone of these reflections, and indeed of the entire MS., is such as we should expect from one who, like Cudworth, "placed Christianity too purely in the love of God and man to be considered as having much regard for those controversies about rites and opinions with which zealots disturb the world."*

Not that the said zealots forgave his indifference. Far from it: in his life, they, as is their wont towards those who are not of them, called him Arian, Socinian and Deist;† and in his death they, as also is their wont,‡ spread lying rumours as to his last hours. We are to believe that "a clergyman of great piety and worth (who expressed himself thereupon with the utmost concern and sorrow)," on visiting Cudworth "upon his death-bed, heard him declare *he believed not anything at all of Deism*," and—remembering doubtless that sage divines had pronounced the Intellectual System to be a disguised defence of Atheism—thence somewhat strangely "inferred that he died

* Sir Jas. Mackintosh: *Dissertation Second.*

† See Turner, *Of the Messias.* London, 1685.

‡ Witness the legends as to the deaths of Hume and Gibbon. Sam. Clarke, Channing and Lant Carpenter, Archbishop Murray and Athanasie Coquerel.

a very Infidel."* (Locke himself, as he tells us,† was, like Tillotson, accused of Atheism in his day.)

The literary history of Universalism has not yet been written. Until it is, judgment on the originality of the contents of our MS. must be reserved. Yet, whether or not it added anything to the reasonings of earlier writers, it may at least be regarded as an acute and logical refutation of the dogma of Eternal Punishment. Whether its attempts to establish the opposite dogma of Universal Restitution deserve equal praise, may be doubted. It is easy to deduce pleasant conclusions from an *a-priori* position that *Deus tenetur ad bonum*; but their value is questionable. It is not for us to bind the Infinite, even with a chain of gold. The doctrine of Reprobation is utterly extinct, but the Pelagian or Arminian theories which overthrew, seem likely to follow it; and visions of Free Will to be supplanted by a philosophical law of Determinism. Probably the history of our present controversy will be similar. Now again, as in Cudworth's Cambridge days, men are studying "to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds and in a philosophical method;" and they seem likely to settle this controversy much as he settled the Calvinistic one. They may refuse to believe that their future will know no change after death, and yet may doubt whether all its changes must necessarily have but one direction. From dogmatizers, whether predicting inevitable woe or inevitable weal, they will turn away, sighing, with the Hebrew sceptic, "All is vanity!"

COURTNEY KENNY.

* Present State of the Republic of Letters, xvii. 29. The writer naïvely comments: "But for my part I am apt to conclude just the contrary; supposing a mistake to arise from some inadvertency of this reverend gentleman, who might imperfectly hear Dr. C. professing his steadfast attachment to Christianity in opposition to *Deism* in the usually received sense. And this the rather because the Dr. could not but know that he had been suspected and calumniated on this score by several who impeached him as a Deist in masquerade."

† Vindication of Resurrection (Works, III. 103).

VI.—MIGUEL SERVETO-Y-REVÉS.—I.

Charakterbild Michael Servet's. Gezeichnet von Henri Tollin, Lic. Theol. Prediger zu Magdeburg. Berlin: Carl Habel. 1876.

Servetus and Calvin. A Study of an important Epoch in the early History of the Reformation. By R. Willis, M. D. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1877.

THE story runs that in the last generation the newly-elected Mayor of an ancient and famous city promised, on assuming the civic dignity, that in the discharge of the duties of his office he would be neither partial nor impartial. This, without a paradox, is precisely a representation of the attitude in which Dr. Willis indulges himself towards the strongly contrasted heroes of his tedious and trifling volume. For neither of them does he mean any disparagement, to neither of them does he render any justice. Scattered over his pages are plenty of phrases of compliment for both, phrases which construct no durable picture, and express no valuable judgment. His spirit is good, his helplessness is incurable. Never have we seen a more lamentable instance of great characters treacherously belittled by the incompetence of a would-be admirer. He has no reverence for his subject, even when his subject is the majestic personality of Calvin. That mighty and imperial mind not only created and crystallized a new theology; not only crushed the Papal argument, and compelled respect for the intellect of heresy; but moulded nations, took prisoners for God the most intractable elements in the civilization of his day, and permanently impressed upon the most thoughtful peoples of Europe their stern spirit of independence and their dauntless grip of truth. Dr. Willis knows nothing of this. In John of Geneva he sees only a distinguished Presbyterian preacher, of petty ambition, obsolete notions, stiff ways and sour demeanour. As little is he affected by the subtle and puissant genius, whose prophetic glance, with its rare penetration and its equally rare sincerity, was a *novum organum* to comparative

geography, to Biblical criticism, to physiological discovery, and to divine science. Miguel Serveto, to his modern biographer, is but a roving Spaniard with a clever turn for conjecture, who took to physic, dabbled in theology, fell a victim to a crotchet, and was burnt into fame.

We thought we had got beyond this. The great living authority on Serveto has marked three past stages in the abundant literature which his writings and his tragedy have called forth. There is the long reach of pre-historic gloom, beginning with the *Fidelis Expositio* of 1554, in which his adversary, at bay, thrusts upon Protestant Europe what is henceforth to be received as the "true story"* of the dead heretic. There is the period of reviving interest, opening with the *Restitutio* reprint of 1711. There is the better era which starts from the *Historia* of Allwoerden, 1727, embraces the invaluable researches of D'Artigny and Mosheim, and closes with Trechsel and Rilliet and Stähelin. Dr. Willis is simply a survival. He properly belongs to the second of these periods. He has undertaken no real research worth the name, and, considering his superior advantages, his book, as a whole, compares unfavourably with the old *Impartial History* of 1724, long the standard English work on the subject, and ascribed to Sir Benjamin Hodges. They tell of a certain Scotch student, too proud to go down to his neighbour's apartment, and too poor to have a candle of his own. In the floor of his garret, an accommodating crevice permitted him to borrow a slender ray which now and then illuminated his book. Through chinks and crannies in Dr. Willis's pages, an occasional gleam of Tollin, meagrely supplied, adds the bitterness of disappointed hope to the vexation of the customary twilight. We do not hesitate to affirm that in the brief compass of the vivid Character-Portrait by Tollin (which has been translated into English under the author's supervision by an accomplished lady, and published

* Cardinal Manning, who recently executed a similar *tour de force* on his own account, thus ingenuously describes the spirit in which it is done: "We have to fear but one school, the school of history."—*Contemp. Rev.*, March, 1878.

in a Unitarian newspaper*), there is more matter of value for the right understanding of Serveto than in the whole of Dr. Willis' volume of 541 unprofitable pages.

Miguel Serveto-y-Revés, to give him the full wealth of his ancestral name, was born at Tudela, in Navarre, of an honourable family from Vilanova,† in Aragon, with a hereditary aptitude for the profession of the law. Tollin, with a German love of analogy, has shewn by a collation of many examples that his name ought undoubtedly to have been Servet; for names in -eto are exceedingly rare in that part of the world. He hence concludes that it actually was Servet; and conjectures that it had been Italianized by the young traveller, following the lead of his distinguished kinsman, Andreas Serveto of Añinon, the Bologna jurist. Even assuming this to be the case, a man has surely some right to determine the spelling of his own name. No one would think of going back from Calvin to Cauvin, on the strength of a capitular register (still preserved) at Noyon. Nor, to come nearer home, would any one dream of disturbing Thomas Emlyn in his claim to be so called, though his father's proper surname was Emley. The force of Serveto's own invariable usage, as shewn, for example, with peculiar distinctness on his title-pages in 1531 and 1532 ("per Michaellem Serveto alias Reves"), and in his correspondence with Ecolampadius, overbears all arguments from analogy, and decides the point beyond appeal. Revés is added in conformity with a Spanish custom which appends the metronymic; and Tollin is probably right when he infers from this name that the mother of Serveto was of French family. We hesitate a little more about the birth-place, but on the whole are prepared, with D'Artigny and Tollin, to accept Serveto's own word at Vienne, to the effect that he was "natif de Tudelle au Royaulme de Navarre." We can discern no ground for a misstatement there; whereas at Geneva, the "de Villeneuve" of his examination on 15th August (strengthened into "de

* *Chr. Life*, Oct. 27, Nov. 3 and 24, Dec. 1, 1877. It has been translated also into Magyar, by Professor Domokes Simén.

† On the same page (81), Dr. Willis misspells this Villanueva and Villanova.

Villeneuve natif" on 23rd August), was obviously intended to bar any question as to his assumption of the name Villanovanus, or Villeneuve, throughout his career as a physician. Tollin's opportune extract from the manuscript annals of the Paris medical faculty (1538) completely tallies with the Vienne evidence: "Michael Villanovanus, natione Hispanus, aut ut dicebat Navarrus, sed Hispano patre progenitus."*

We have been at the more pains to present these points with some care, because in Dr. Willis' pages the impression is conveyed that the facts are in hopeless confusion. He thinks (p. 81) that Serveto was at no time "very particular as to his name and designation," an opinion in which those who have marked the precision of his title-pages, both before and after his assumption of the Villanovanus surname, will be slow to coincide. He argues (p. 4) against the Vienne evidence for the birth at Tudela, on the curious ground that Calvin "knew him well." Does he suppose, then, that theological antagonists are in the habit of exchanging confidences about their respective birth-places? For that matter, there is no one more likely in private converse to have heard Michel Villeneuve refer to the place of his origin, than his friend and patron, Archbishop Pierre Paulmier of Vienne. When Tollin finds leisure to complete the journey of exploration which took him in 1858-9 to all the likely spots for gathering up Serveto lore, except those in central Italy and in Spain, he may be able perhaps to substitute authority for inference, and lay our doubts to rest.

Jean Calvin and Miguel Serveto probably met for the first time at Paris. They were nearly of an age; for although the exact date of Serveto's birth has not been ascertained, and was perhaps unknown to himself, yet the leading facts point with some distinctness to 1511 as the year of his nativity. At Vienne, on the 5th April, 1553, he calls himself "about forty-two."† It is true that at Geneva, on the 28th August of the same year,

* *Servet's Kindheit u. Jugend.* 547.

† *Quest.* 8. Willis, who gets this right at first (p. 3), subsequently alters it to "forty-four" (p. 255).

he says forty-four; yet on an earlier day* of the trial, he had incidentally described himself as "about the age of twenty years" at the date of the publication of his first work (1531). Calvin evidently believed this to be the fact, for, as men may read at large in his *Institutio*, he dwells upon the circumstance that his foe "jam vicesimoprimo ætatis anno cœperat Prophetam se jactare."† The temptation to manufacture a historical coincidence by assigning the birth of these great antagonists to the same year of our Lord, has, however, led many biographers to prefer the less probable date, 1509.

We are equally unable to fix with unerring certainty the precise time when that personal intercourse between them, so fruitful and so fatal in its results, took its rise. If Beza is right in placing its beginning in the year 1534,‡ it might easily at this juncture have appeared to a superficial observer that there was much in common between the two men. Both had been destined for the law; but each had developed, though in very different directions, a genius for theology. Both were ardent disciples of the new movement, and as such bitterly hostile to the errors and abuses of Rome. But in each there was a dominant force of individual temperament little disposing either to rest satisfied with the Reformation theology, in the crude condition beyond which Luther's giant nature seemed powerless to advance it. Here the resemblance ends. And if, as we believe, the *ante annos sexdecim* of Calvin's own narrative§ may be construed strictly to denote 1536 as the year of their first encounter, their paths had already irrevocably diverged. In 1534, Serveto, the young writer of two small, thin volumes of theological tracts, was entirely without physical science; while Calvin had published nothing but an annotated edition of Seneca on Clemency, as a plea for toleration, and an anti-Lutheran treatise against the sleep of the soul. The year 1536 beheld Serveto fairly embarked in the

* 23rd Augt., Quest. 4.

† *Inst.* iv. 16. 29.

‡ *Vit. Calv. Epp. ejus præmissa*, a. 2, b.

§ *Fid. Ezpos.* (Tractatt. 1576, p. 817).

profession of a physician, and Calvin already crowned with immortality as the author of the *Institutio*.

By parentage and by nature Serveto was a true son of the princely Spanish race—proud and generous, the child of enthusiasm, deeply imbued with religious veneration, strong in his affections, rapid in thought and in resentment, powerful, and even impetuous, in speech and speed. He has sketched the Spanish characteristics with a pen dipped, as it were, in his own vitals. "Restless," saith he, "is the mind of that people, and vast in its endeavour; quick are they of genius, but impatient under discipline. Half-taught, they reckon themselves among the learned; and with showiness and wordiness parade a wisdom greater than they have. Too much are they in love with sophistry."* These were the mental perils of the young Serveto; they lay around and within him. How bravely he encountered, how nobly he overcame them, the story of his life must tell.

His first University was that of Saragossa, which he probably entered as a lad of twelve,† and the first great teacher under whose influence he came was Pietro Martire d'Anghiera (1455—1526).‡ That he had no inclination to forget his original Alma Mater, and no reason to be ashamed of his early course beneath her care, is proved by his subsequently entering himself at Paris (1536) and Montpellier (1540) as from Sara-

* From the Ptolemy, 1535; but the opening phrase is taken from Anghiera.

† Chalmers entered St. Andrew's University at the same early age.

‡ Dr. Willis has been unable (p. 8) to find "any evidence of Angleria's presence in Saragossa at any time, even as a casual resident." Tollin refers him in reply (*Lehrsystem M. Servet's*, ii. 14) to St. Hilaire's *Hist. d'Espagne*, vi. Picc. Justif., p. 503. In compensation for the loss of Anghiera's instructions, Dr. Willis has credited Serveto with a hitherto unsuspected admiration for a work which most people think they know pretty well through the medium of Montaigne's famous essay. This is the *Theologia Rationalis* of Raymund de Sabunde, "over which we spent some hours with much delight." Whether these were hours of study or hours of slumber he does not say; possibly the latter, inasmuch as the Museum copy which he employed is described by him (p. 13) as "one of the early editions, if it be not the first (Argentorati, 1496)," but quoted immediately after (p. 15) as "what we believe to be the second edition of Sabunde, fol. Argentorat. 1495." The true date of this copy is 1496, but according to Brunet there are at least three prior editions.

gossa. A few years spent in this Spanish University prepared him for attendance, in 1528, upon the study of the law, at the more distant and famous University of Toulouse. Dr. Willis, whose text is starved and sapless enough at this point, casts into a note (p. 12) his confession that the more accurate and observant Tollin "speaks as if he had been present with Servetus at Toulouse; accompanied him over the St. Michael's bridge that spanned the Garonne; beheld the iron cage suspended from its balk for ducking heretics until they died; looked on at the religious processions that filed incessantly through the streets," &c.

Valuable as was the legal training which he here received, and which has left influential traces on more than one page of his subsequent studies, it was not the richest boon of Serveto's student life at Toulouse. "*Là il prit connoissance avec quelques écoliers de lire à la S. Ecriture et évangile, ce qu'il n'avoit jamais fait auparavant.*"* Reading the holy book with the keen eye of a daring curiosity, fastening, with an instinct that never faltered, and with a love that never wavered, upon the person of our Lord as presented to his heart in the evangelical narrative, he at once began to think out for himself, from this centre, the serious and agitating problems of dogmatic truth and of Christian piety.

Already, from 1525,† the promising lad had become attached to the service of a patron of no mean powers of mind, and no small opportunities of effective promotion. This was Juan Quintana, an Aragonese by birth and family, a Franciscan by religious training, for a season promoted (1530), in consequence of his known leanings in the direction of religious conciliation, to the responsible office of Confessor to Charles V., and as such in closest attendance upon the Emperor's person. In this service, according to his own account, Serveto remained enrolled till the death of his patron in 1534. To reject this statement, as Dr. Willis does, is to misunderstand the nature of the link which bound the poor student-lad to his powerful

* Quest. 4. 23rd Aug.

† *Servet's Kindh.* u. Jug., p. 583.

countryman. But the period of active requisition by the Confessor's side in the household of the Emperor was necessarily much shorter. In 1529 he visited the north of Italy in the imperial train, and witnessed the brilliant pageant of the coronation at Bologna. Nothing impressed him more deeply than the spectacle of the adoration of the Pope, Clement VII. (Giulio de' Medici). "With these eyes have I seen him, borne in pomp upon the necks of princes, making with his hand the awful sign of the cross, and adored in the open streets by the whole populace on bended knees, to such a degree that those who could kiss his feet or his slippers esteemed themselves happier than the rest."* Northern Italy was full at this time of secret heresy, and the ardent soul of young Serveto could not have altogether escaped the intellectual impulse of the times. Transferred next year to Augsburg, still in Quintana's train, he would necessarily come into contact more or less direct with a healthier and robuster type of liberated thought; and if Tollin's fine imagination does not lead him to see too much between the lines of an ambiguous testimony, Serveto may have even gone out of his way to seek a personal interview at Coburg with the great Soul of the Reformation himself.† But his close and long association with the calm and tolerant mind of Quintana permanently indisposed him to localize the whole truth on either side of then existing party lines. Two years later he writes: "Ego [nec] cum istis nec cum illis in omnibus consentio, aut dissentio. Omnes mihi videntur habere partem veritatis, et partem erroris; et quilibet alterius errorem dispicit, et nemo suum videt."‡ With a fundamental difference of temperament, there was much throughout life in the positive attitude of Serveto as a conformist which reminds us of Erasmus. In the case of Serveto, this passive bearing was only rendered tolerable to himself by earnest spasms of theological plain-speaking, which the phlegmatic Hollander would have dis-

* *Rest.* p. 462.

† *Luther u. Servet.* Berlin, 1875.

‡ *Diall. de Trin.*, last page. Dr. Willis introduces, in his version (p. 25), the words "Catholic or Reformer," which do not occur in the text. "Lutheran or Catholic" would express the meaning; the point is the relation of good works to faith.

daigned as the suicidal expression of infelicitous imprudence. Father Quintana, when the tract of Serveto, from which we have just quoted, was laid before him by John Cochläus at Ratisbon, lamented that "one whom he knew by sight" should have put forth "*pestilentissimum illum librum*," and used efforts to suppress it. He could hardly have done less. But he does not seem to have cast off its author, though they never met again.

From Augsburg we trace young Serveto to Basle, where we find him in personal communication with Œcolampadius; from Basle to Strasburg, where he associates with Bucer* and Capito, the latter more disposed than the others to sympathize with his peculiar tone of thought. Yet they are all attracted by his genius, and even bitten in a degree by his new way of putting things; soon however to be repelled by his too daring heresies. Œcolampadius enters upon a correspondence of expostulation with him, of which very interesting portions are still preserved. Bucer, who had formerly written most affectionately to him, compiles, but does not print, a *Confutatio* of his errors.† From his pulpit at Strasburg, Bucer is commonly believed to have said that his once "beloved in the Lord" now richly "deserved to be disembowelled and torn limb from limb." But this report did not get out till Martin Bucer was "of holy memory;" and John Calvin is the reporter.‡ That there was something in it, we readily grant; that it can be taken *au pied de la lettre* we know Calvin's masterly style of *fidelis expositio* too well to believe. Never did any man set himself to outflank the "school of history" with less misgiving or with more effect than John Calvin. He stoops not basely to invent the circumstances on which he relies; he understands his business better; he dexterously barbs the innocent facts for his skilful purpose. Our English Cardinal is clever at this task; but Calvin went about the work in a deadly

* What evil genius drives Dr. Willis to print this name (p. 43) Bützer? Butzer, we know, is the corrupt Germanized form of Bucer (Kuhhorn); but Bützer?

† Tollin in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1875, p. 711.

‡ Letter to Sulzer, 8 Sep. 1553.

earnest, to which his Eminence with all his virtues is a stranger. Hence the marvellous superiority of the Genevan over the Vatican "true story." Its success is demonstrated by the fact that, to this day, every one of Calvin's *post-mortem* accusations—the "*vanus ille præco Judææ*"—the inability to read Justin Martyr—the outrageous pantheism—has made its distinct impression for evil upon the imagination of the friends as well as the foes of Serveto.

The little book which Bucer confuted, *De Trinitatis Erroribus, Libri Septem** (1531), taken in conjunction with its sequel, *Dialogorum de Trinitate, Libri Duo* (1532), with an Appendix in four chapters, *De Justitia Regni Christi ad Justitiam Legis collata, et De Charitate* (both volumes printed at Hagenau), constitute a very remarkable theological development to proceed from the pen of any young man between twenty-one and twenty-two years old. If we consider the age in which it saw the light, and remember the antecedents and the prospects of its author, we may even venture to claim for this sustained manifesto of theological independence, that it approaches, if it does not touch, the very first rank of excellence, both in point of speculative substance and of moral bravery. No wonder it attained a vogue which first agitated and then alarmed the Protestant divines. No wonder the good Melanchthon, who owned "*Servetum multum lego*," was somewhat staggered by it. Its sincerity is as transparent as its merit. The so-called retraction prefixed to the Dialogues—"retracto. Non quia falsa sint, sed quia imperfecta, et tanquam a parvulo parvulis scripta"—does not yield an inch of principle, but admits a thousand faults of execution. Boyish as it is in many of its more unguarded features, its kernel remains untouched under every successive revision, and is impregnable to assault. Serveto was the first modern exponent of Christianity to adopt

* It would seem to be both easy and advantageous to observe some consistent method of representing in English the title of this work. Dr. Willis, however, thinks otherwise. He entitles it (p. 37), "On Trinitarian Error;" (p. 41) "On Mistaken Conceptions of the Trinity;" (p. 49) "On Trinitarian Misconception;" (p. 70) "On 'Current Misconceptions of the Trinity.'"

the strictly historical method. He is clear of purpose at the very outset. "*Ab homine exordiendum*" is the initial word of his research. If we are to be Christians, it is of the first importance for us to be recalled to the question "*quis sit ille Christus*;" and from the Man, the real historical personage, our theology must take its rise. From this position he never recedes, and every subsequent opening and ramification of his doctrine is chiefly valuable in his eyes as lending clearness and consistency to the grand thought which is present with him all along.*

Theologians are for the most part accustomed to regard a Humanitarian Christology as the extreme, and even the *reductio ad absurdum*, of Protestantism. No doubt, if we confine our view to its more recent phases, and to its ecclesiastical connection, it may be contended with some justice that modern Unitarianism is but Calvinism in decay. But nearly all the conspicuous leaders in this line of thought at the era of the Reformation, the men who lighted the lamp of the movement, were Catholics rather than Protestants. This is true of the cold, reflective Fausto Sozzini, quite as much as it is true of the warm, impulsive Miguel Serveto. They left Rome not to join Luther. They brushed aside the Trinitarian dogma in their haste to get at Christ. They halted at no intermediate stage. That which they carried with them, that which in fact drove them out, was a principle of personal and religious loyalty, far more akin to the better spirit of Catholic piety than to the mutilated system, Augustinianism without its heart, which Calvin, made omnipotent by the exigencies of the time, soon framed anew with clamps of iron dogma. They too had their ideal of Christian stability and Christian churchliness. "*Judicabit ecclesia*," is the last word in that grand initial sentence of Serveto's theology, from which we have already cited the opening maxim. Their idea was to rally and re-inspirit the Christian mind by recalling

* Mr. M. D. Conway's really fine description of the theological Christ as a "passionless simulacrum" is anticipated in the first book of the *Restitutio*, with its heading, "*De Homine Iesu Christo, et simulachris falsis*."

the primary allegiance of the Christian heart. Let Christ be known in his true self, and neither the pure majesty of Christian truth, nor the sure bond of Catholic unity, could fail.

A little earlier in his narrative than the period at which we have arrived, Dr. Willis assures his readers (p. 6), "that by mental and moral endowment Servetus probably appeared to all about him a born churchman, with the crosier, and even the cardinal's hat in perspective." This fancy must be dismissed at once and for all, if we are to gain and to preserve any satisfactory insight into his career. There was absolutely nothing of the ecclesiastic about him. Not even the unfettered position of lay director of the churches, which fell to the lot of the statesmanlike Sozzini, would have possessed any charms for Serveto. He was a theologian, because he found it necessary to investigate the grounds of religion in his own heart; he was a theological pamphleteer, because, with his frankness of nature, he could not avoid communicating his most prized treasure to his friends. But his professional bent lay in quite another direction. He soon developed a strong appetite for natural science, and to this as a career he unsparingly dedicated himself. It is to this, and to no servile instinct of fear, that we attribute his change of surname. Doubtless he always thought it right to take care of himself when he could. There was no wilful fanaticism in his honest nature. But in the intellectual atmosphere of Basle and Strasburg his ideas of human culture and of human usefulness had been unexpectedly opened. He was far too sensible and too aspiring not to feel that, even if he could already teach something to his contemporaries in virtue of a certain native clearness of theological insight, he still had much, relatively speaking he had everything, to learn. "*Semidocti, jam se doctos putant*," must be accepted as an autobiographical verdict upon the defects of his earlier training. So he resolutely puts behind his back what we know him to have valued, the fame of a theological precocity, and becomes a working student again, as Michel Villeneuve. He studies philology

and physics, pursuing the diligent career of a travelling student. Dr. Willis, who brings him to Paris now for a considerable sojourn (1532-34), introduces him to Calvin, thus misled by the chronology of Beza. At any rate, we meet him soon at Lyons, supporting himself by his labours as a corrector of the press, in days when every printer was an artist, and every publisher a man of letters.

At Lyons, in 1535, he edits for the Trechsels a new issue of Bilibald Pirckheymer's Latin version of Ptolemy's Geography, adding Scholia of his own, the fruit in part of his own travels and personal observation. Thus he speaks, under the head of France, of having seen the king touch many persons for scrofula; "whether they were cured or not, I did not see."* This is the book on which Tollin, in an admirable paper, founds his claim to rank Serveto as a pioneer of comparative geography; Dr. Willis contents himself with presenting a few extracts descriptive of manners, poorly rendered. This, too, is one of the books to which reference was made on his trial. The condition of Palestine, as an unfertile land, is dispassionately described, and the statement is made that it has been over-praised, "*injuriâ aut jactantiâ purâ*." When accused of having in these words cast a reflection upon Moses, the reply of Serveto was complete. First, he said that the words were not his, but another's; next, that they were withdrawn in the second edition, which was not denied; lastly, he inquired whether Moses, forsooth, was the only writer on Palestine. His tone in this reply was evidently one of contempt, and Calvin did not forget or forgive it. In his *Fidelis Expositio* he reproduces the scene in court. Who, if not Moses, the prisoner had been asked, was *vanus ille præco Judææ*. We are ingeniously left to infer that these are the very words of the incriminated book. They are not. They are Calvin's

* "*An sanati fuerint non vidi.*" Dr. Willis, by a loose rendering, interprets this as a sarcasm: "but I did not see that they were cured." The passage was altered in the edition of 1541, "I have heard say that many were cured." It is rather remarkable that this change was made after Serveto had qualified and begun to practise as a physician.

own. He, and not Serveto, imagined this telling, this dramatic phrase. Full well he knew what might be trusted to pass current with posterity as a characteristic indiscretion of his fallen enemy. Dr. Willis has missed a very important piece of evidence bearing upon the truth of Serveto's statement that even the words of the book were not his. The incriminated passage thus concludes: "Quare promissam terram, pollicitam, et non vernacula lingua laudantem pronuncies." M. de Chapelle, who gives a French version of the remainder, pauses at these words, and owns that he cannot translate because he does not understand them. Dr. Willis is not so soon at fault. He too does not understand, nevertheless he does translate them, in this remarkable fashion: "Wherefore you may say that the land was *promised*, indeed, but is of *little promise* when spoken of in every-day terms." Schelhorn was the first to perceive that the "vernacula lingua" here referred to must be German, that "laudantem" is an error for *laudatam*, and that the passage contains a play upon the two senses of the phrase "das gelobte Land." Since this, Tollin has discovered the punning German in the person of Lorenz Friese, thus vindicating the entire good faith of Serveto's disclaimer.*

In sketching the character of Serveto, we have incidentally alluded already to the intensity of his personal affections. While acting at Lyons as corrector of the press, he was employed in this capacity upon some of the works of Dr. Symphorien Champier (1472—1539), of that city. Between this skilful and scientific herbalist, physician, Platonist and astrologer, and the poor scholar who was engaged in seeing his publications through the press, a warm friendship sprang up. The observant reader will not forget that Quintana, Serveto's original patron, died in 1534; the acquaintance with Champier, who may be regarded as his second foster-father, began in the following year. The result of the friendship with Champier was a determination on the part of Serveto,

* The passage is fully explained in such a common authority as James Yair's (1771) version of *Chauffpié* (1766), only that Yair writes *Shelborn*. Tollin's exhaustive article Dr. Willis refers to, but seemingly has not read.

now five-and-thirty years of age, to become a duly qualified medical practitioner. To Paris accordingly he resorts as a medical student, having already served, we may believe, some short apprenticeship in the healing art to Champier himself. Champier made him a Galenist. Under his Paris teachers, Johann Günther of Andernach, Jacques Dubois of Amiens, and Jean Fernel of Clermont, he became a finished anatomist. As assistant to the former, he succeeded the famous André Vesale,* and his master bears emphatic testimony both to his practical skill in dissection, and to his being "vix ulli secundus" in the knowledge of Galen's doctrine. In due time he acquired his degrees of M.A. and M.D., and attained the status of a professional physician.

During this period the two least known of all his many publications came from his pen. These were in vindication of Champier and Astrology, the patron of Serveto and his hobby having been jointly attacked by Dr. Leonhard Fuchs, of Heidelberg. Hence the appearance of the *Brevissima Apologia pro Campegio in Leonardum Fuchsium* (1536), and the *Apologetica Disceptatio pro Astrologia* (1538). Between the dates of these publications we find him lecturing at Paris on Geography and on Astrology, and this to distinguished audiences; among his hearers being "a young ecclesiastic, a scholar and man of talent, Pierre Paumier, who after employment in various offices of trust by his king, Francis the First, was transferred to a position of no less dignity and emolument than that of Archbishop of Vienne in Dauphiny."† In 1537 he also put forth his little work, *Syruporum Universa Ratio*, which ran through five editions in eleven years. Of this Dr. Willis gives a poor account, though he praises the author's merit, and rightly states that it arose out of controversy between the Galenists, of whom Serveto as disciple of Champier was one,‡

* Dr. Willis says (p. 105), "associated with no less distinguished an individual than Andrea Vesalius," but Günther's own words expressly say, "post hunc" (p. 107).

† Willis, p. 110.

‡ "Sacra est autoritas Galeni, passim docentia." *Syr. Univ. Rat.* p. 10, b.

and the Averrhoists. He oddly informs us (p. 112) that "these syrups appear to have been one of the bones of contention between the two parties." No one would guess from Dr. Willis' book that Serveto's treatise consists in fact of six medical lectures (*sermones*), and that it is not until the fifth of them (*De Syruporum compositione et vario usu*) that the practical use of diet-drinks is discussed. Of the Greek on Serveto's title-page, Dr. Willis makes a queer mess. But what would one have? When the Greek on a man's own title-page presents us with two false accents and an anomalous punctuation, it is not to be expected that he will succeed very well with the Greek on another man's title-page.

Serveto's lectures on Astrology drew down upon him, as the result of an action before the Parlement de Paris,* an inhibition (March 18, 1538) forbidding him to meddle with the judicial branch of that science, i.e. divination in individual cases from stellar influences. His lectures were considered libellous by the medical faculty, and his *Disceptatio* was called in. We may hope that the promised re-publication by Tollin of this *liber rarissimus*, may enable us to judge, with more certainty than we can from the records of the trial, what were the salient points of Serveto's astrological speculation.

In this same year 1538, Serveto, or Michel Villeneuve, M.D., leaves Paris, to exercise his profession in the provinces. He comes to Avignon, and thence returns to Charlieu, near Lyons. During his not very long residence here as a medical man, occurs, as is brought out on his Geneva trial, the only love-story that can be associated with his name. In a spirit of deeper interest than mere curiosity, one would like to know who the lady was whom Miguel Serveto would have married, had he been in a position to do so. At Charlieu, too, Dr. Willis fixes the scene of Serveto's re-baptism; calculating (erroneously, however, as we have seen) that he was 30 years of age in 1539, and that inasmuch as he reckons 30 to be the

* i.e. Supreme Court of Judicature, not "Parliament," as Dr. Willis prints and understands it.

proper age for baptism, in accordance with the pattern of our Lord, he must have submitted himself to the ordinance in that year. With the necessary correction to 1541, the conjecture is highly probable; but the place and the ministrant must remain involved in mystery.

The year 1541 sees Serveto a resident in Lyons once more. "Not overburdened with professional work at first, Villeneuve appears to have renewed, if he had not kept up, his connection with the publishers of Lyons."* His Ptolemy comes to a second edition in 1541, and he dedicates the amended issue to Archbishop Paulmier. This marks the beginning of the third patronage which Serveto enjoyed. Champier, it will be remembered, died in 1539. But his chief literary work during this second period of sojourn at Lyons is the edition of the Pagnino Bible in 1542.

Dr. Willis devotes to this edition a chapter (xv.), of which we have more reason to complain than of any other section of his book. It might have been thought that the vials of injurious suspicion had already been poured upon Serveto's head in sufficient copiousness, and by a master's hand, at the Geneva trial. Dr. Willis, however, has earned the right to be remembered as having added a drop to the bucket, and this from no sort of malice, but out of pure incapacity to deal with a matter involving a certain amount of scholarly care. His blunders begin at the outset of this chapter, where he tells us (p. 139) that Pagnino's original edition of 1528 "is said to be the first edition of the Bible that is divided into chapters." There never was a printed edition not so divided. He means that it is said to be the first edition of the Bible in which the principle of verses is adopted throughout. The verses are not divided, but are marked by a numeral to each verse in the margins of the chapters. Pagnino followed the Masoretic verses in the Old Testament; for the Apocrypha and the New Testament he constructed a versicular arrangement of his own. It did not come into favour, and in Serveto's

* Willis, p. 131.

edition is abandoned for the older plan of *letters* in the margin.

That Serveto bestowed great pains and unusual thought upon this edition must be evident to any one who has really studied it. It suited the purpose of Calvin to deny this. He tells us in his *Fidelis Expositio* (p. 836) that Serveto choused (*emunxit*) the printer of 500 livres for the work, and then "soiled it page by page, partly with a multitude of futile trifles, partly with impious ravings." This he did "*ne furatum esse quis diceret quod mercedis nomine sumpserat.*" Dr. Willis, who, as we shall see, has odd notions of Latin construction, translates this (p. 155), "'Who,' says Calvin, 'shall venture to say that it was not thievish in the editor when he took five hundred livres in payment, &c.?' To Dr. Willis this question seems unanswerable, and he takes upon himself to moralize accordingly. Moreover, he has made a discovery, on which he plumes himself not a little. The discovery is, that in 1541, the year before Serveto's edition, Pagnino's Bible was brought out by Melchior Novesianus at Cologne, and that Serveto has availed himself, without acknowledgment, of the editorial labours of Novesianus. He says (p. 142) that Serveto "would therefore lead us to believe that he had had the privilege of working from a copy corrected and annotated by Pagnini himself." That (p. 142) "we are forced on the conviction that Villanovanus followed no copy corrected and annotated by Pagnini, but the fine edition of Novesianus." Further (p. 143), "we are sorry, therefore, to find our editor taking credit to himself in directions where none was due." Again (p. 144), his procedure "is much to be regretted, and indeed is hardly to be understood." Yet (p. 145) he thinks it "illustrative of one element in the character of the subject of our study, and not to be passed over by us." In short, we are asked to believe that Serveto lent himself to a bookselling speculation, and gave his name, but not his labour, to a catch-penny reprint.

Now we own that, until we examined the facts, this view of the case seemed just possible. Serveto was never rich, and

probably at this time was very poor. The five hundred livres, if Calvin be right in the amount, was doubtless a considerable sum to him. And even without the provocation of dire necessity, we have known men do things in the way of literary piece-work which a stern morality would rightly condemn. Let us suppose a case. If, for example, we could imagine a couple of literary men issuing a prospectus for the reprint of an ancient and precious work of forgotten genius; if we could imagine them, as a specimen of their ability to act as its editors, printing a portion of the title-page, and allowing it to pass muster with no less than five errors of the press, one being of primary importance to the sense; if we could imagine that they knew the book so slightly as to misstate even the number of its pages; if we could imagine them, while owning they were themselves going to work from a reprint, enhancing the scarcity of that reprint by stating, quite erroneously, that it was but a little less rare than an original of which only two copies were in existence; if we could imagine them vouching for the copy they were about to follow as being line for line with the original, when the very table of errata was sufficient to convict them of egregious ignorance on the point,—then, no doubt, we should have a right to say frankly, here is a mere bookselling speculation, to which these men, if they had consulted their reputations, would never have lent their names; and we should decline to be *emuncti* to the extent of the subscription cost. But the case is very different with Serveto.

Prefixed to his edition of Pagnino's Bible are three prefaces. Dr. Willis has wholly ignored the second of these, which is from the pen of John Nicolas Victorius. Its evidence disposes first of all of the notion that there was any design of ignoring Novesianus. The translation of Pagnino had indeed been, says Victorius, "*non ita pridem Coloniae excusam*," not so long ago printed at Cologne. But that edition was pirated; this present one is the author's own, "*ipsius auspiciis prodeuntem*." The Cologne edition had been "*postliminio* (by way of reprisal) *ab ipso authore, nescio quid jam imminente fato suavius modulante, ita recognitam, ita annotationibus locupletam, ut nunc*

non tam restituta quam primum edita videri possit." Victorius implies clearly enough that old Pagnino, vexed with the Cologne publisher, who had probably given him no royalty on the book, had taken a copy of the pirated issue, and gone over it with his pen for a new edition by a Lyons publisher. And the fact is of historical moment as confirming the statement of Père Echard (on the testimony of his epitaph) that Santés Pagnino died, not in 1536 as is usually said, but on Aug. 24, 1541. Perhaps Victorius goes somewhat too far when he speaks of Serveto's Bible as "*annotationibus (Pagnini) locupletam.*" Indeed, in strictness, this flourish is contradicted by his own statement a little above, to the effect that Pagnino's annotations "*nunc apud hæredem conservantur,*" and that it would be well if some publisher would bring them out for the public good.

Let us now turn to the first preface, which is Serveto's own. In this he speaks, in full accordance with Victorius, of an "*exemplar ipsum locis innumeris propria manu (Pagnini) castigatum.*" It is evident that Dr. Willis has not studied the two books with sufficient closeness to judge whether these "*loci*" are "*innumeri*" or not. He admits that there are some, but decides that they are not "*of the slightest significance.*" For ourselves, writing at a distance from libraries, we can simply say that we have been unable to examine the Cologne Pagnino. With reference to the annotations, "*quæ ille nobis quamplurima reliquit,*" Serveto says that he had given a great deal of his own labour "*post omnia ejus annotamenta,*" i. e. not, as Willis renders it, "*to make available the author's annotations,*" but rather in spite of them.

This preface of Serveto is valuable as setting clearly forth his very definite and original view of prophetic Scripture. He holds that it is not in the merely verbal coincidences of prediction, but in the history, in the action, in the living drama which fills the prophetic canvas, that we discover what is really prefigurative of our Lord. The mystical or prophetic meaning is always given in the clothing of a historic, or rather a heroic, a poetic narrative. "Those who are igno-

rant of Hebrew events," he says, "lightly despise the historical and literal sense, which is the certain token (*monumentum*) of the event to come; whence also they hunt everywhere ridiculously and in vain for the mystical senses.*. . . For every one of the prophets, according to the letter, followed their own history, which both prefigured things to come, and in which, according to the spirit, mysteries of Christ were enclosed;† for 'all things happened to them in a figure,' as Paul says, and 'the testimony of Jesus Christ,' as John says, 'is the spirit of prophecy;' although, according to the letter, the then sense of the prophets was different, as the history of events bore. Now if any one deny that sense to be strictly literal, in that the force of the letter does not always strictly apply, I will readily allow it him. Yet this must be considered; that the whole Hebrew language is full of hyperbole, and other and greater mysteries are contained in it. It is further to be considered that if this sense be not called literal, still it was a kind of shadowing forth of coming truth. For example, in David the shadow (*in umbra Davidis*), there is reluctant a truth belonging to Christ alone. From David's history occasions are taken, in the Psalms, of making predictions concerning Christ; indeed, it is on this ground that he is said to have been a type of Christ. . . . Moreover, this Book is said to be written within and without; and is agreed that the face of Scripture is two-fold, like a sword cutting both ways. Fruitful is the power of Scripture; yea, under the oldness of the letter that killeth,‡ it so contains the newness of the spirit that

* "Unde et mysticos sensus frustra illi et ridicule passim venantur." Dr. Willis turns this: "they vainly and foolishly *expend themselves* in hunting after recondite and mystical meanings in the text *where nothing of the kind exists*." It will be seen that this last gloss is quite contrary to Serveto's meaning.

† "In qua Christi mysteria secundum spiritum concludebantur." Dr. Willis renders this: "*led as they were by inspiration to conclusions* having reference to the mystery of Christ." It must be "by inspiration" that some are led to "conclusions having reference to the mystery of" Latin syntax.

‡ "Sub vetustate occidentis literæ;" which Dr. Willis renders, "under a *waning* literal sense." The translator for the *Impartial History* has similarly mistaken *occidentis* for *occidentis*.

maketh alive, that when one sense is collected from it, it would be wrong to omit the other ; the more as the historical sense discloses the other of its own accord.* Whence also we have ever endeavoured in our scholia to bring out that literal, old, or historical sense, everywhere neglected ; so that in its mould (*ejus typo*) the mystic, which is the true sense, might be made known ; and that Him who is the scope of all, Jesus Christ, veiled under those shadows and figures, whom therefore the blind Jews behold not, we all with unveiled face may clearly behold as our God."†

Such is Serveto's theory of prophecy, a theory which he works out in detail in his scholia upon the prophetic books. Dr. Willis has evidently no grasp whatever of his author's thought. Hence, quite unwittingly as we believe, he falls perpetually into the error, which Serveto reprobates above, of collecting from these scholia the historical sense which they present, to the entire omission of the other which they present as its complement and consummation. There is thus not a single fair extract in his pages from Serveto's scholia on the prophets. He gives the impression that in Serveto's mind the prophets have a literal sense, which does not apply to Christ ; whereas the pith of his exposition lies in this, that it is precisely the literal sense which does so apply. The language in which the great drama of Hebrew history is represented, being too large for the occasion, drives the mind to the consideration of Him who was to come. This principle leaves him perfectly free to interpret Isaiah liii. as the threnody of Cyrus, and (in the *Restitutio*) Deut. xviii. as the annunciation of Joshua ; while in both he sees the reluctant image of One for whom alone the language is not overcharged. We believe this is true of Serveto's dealing with all those parts of Scripture commonly referred to our Lord, saving

* "Quia historicus ille alium ultro patefacit." Dr. Willis has : "seeing that the historical sense comes out ever the more clearly." Our readers will notice that something else "comes out ever the more clearly."

† "Revelatâ facie deum nostrum clare videamus." In Dr. Willis' version : "revealed to us in such wise that we seem to see the very face of our God." It may be captions to remark that a simple Scripture phrase such as this "revelatâ facie" always seems to present peculiar difficulties to Dr. Willis.

only the Book of Canticles, which Dr. Willis has not noticed. This Serveto leaves without a single heading or marginal note which would suggest a reference to Christ and his Church. We may observe also, that in addition to the historical insight of his scholia upon the Old Testament, there are indications of critical study, as also of his peculiar Christology, in the scholia to the New; which Dr. Willis does not seem to have opened. In particular, there is a discrimination between the writings of John the Apostle and John the Presbyter, in which Serveto follows out a well-known hint of St. Jerome.

Pursuing the track of Serveto's editorial labours at Lyons for Jean Frellon the publisher, Dr. Willis represents him (p. 157) as having turned into Spanish "the *Summa Theologiæ* of St. Thomas Aquinas, a work entitled *Desiderius peregrinus*, and another, the *Thesaurus animæ Christianæ*." The first piece of work here mentioned would be a huge undertaking indeed. As his authority, Dr. Willis cites only Christoph Sand; but Sand does not mention the Aquinas. It is D'Artigny who says that Serveto "corrigea plusieurs livres pour Jean Frellon, entr' autres une Somme Espagnole de S. Thomas, dont il fit les argumens"—a rather different story. Perhaps this may turn out to have been an edition of the Latin *Summa* for the Spanish market.* Then as to the *Desiderius* and the *Thesaurus*, which are one and the same little work, Sand does not say that Serveto was the translator into Spanish, but the actual author. The fact is that the *Tratado llamado el Desseoso: y por otro nōbre Espejo de religiosos* was originally composed in the Spanish language some time previous to 1542. Serveto, however, had nothing to do with the book or its authorship. Nor even was it he, but Arnold van der Meer, who (1554) rendered it into Latin from the original. It had already been Latinised from a German version by F. L. Surius.†

* *Nouv. Mém. d'Hist.*, Paris, 1749, ii. 68. D'Artigny adds, "Il traduisait encore de latin en espagnol divers traités de grammaire."

† We may be permitted to refer to *Notes and Queries* (1875, pp. 69, 191), where we have collected some further particulars of this book and its history. We have there remarked upon the significance of the fact, that of two treatises erro-

The occurrence of Frellon's name warns us that the tragedy of Serveto is not far off. It was through Frellon that the correspondence with Calvin was conducted which cost Serveto his life.

Some years before this, in 1536 if our calculation be correct, when Calvin was on a hurried and a final visit to France for the purpose of arranging his affairs, the future antagonists had met, and had endeavoured to influence each other. It was not easy work on either side. Calvin was then ready for a formal discussion, which, as we read his own language, he had himself proposed.* Serveto did not compear when expected. The full circumstances are nowhere furnished to us. Beza† makes Serveto the challenger, a thing so probable on the face of it, as to lead every reader to forget that, had it been true as well as probable, Calvin would infallibly have mentioned it. Beza further, following a venomous hint of his chief's angry word, a hint, however, which even Calvin did not dwell upon in his "true story," ascribes Serveto's non-appearance to conscious weakness, "illo ne Calvini conspectum ferente." This addition betrays the unskilful artist. It is going too far in absurdity, even when we recollect that it comes from Théodore Besze, the harlequin of the Reformation. No man was ever more sure of himself and of his opinions than Miguel Serveto; no man was more anxious to impress his views upon John Calvin, or more sure that, give him fair play, he would be able to do it. Serveto, however, only half understood his opponent. Feeling the power and the polish of his matchless dialectic; having some inkling, too, of that unrivalled supremacy over men which Calvin was afterwards to display; burning to deliver, somehow, to the world, a richer strain of Christian teaching than Calvinism could supply, Serveto believed that, in Saisset's

neously attributed to the pen of Serveto, one, the *Desiderius*, is a book of pietistic meditation; while the other, the fragment *De Tribus Impostoribus* (1598) is an ultra-rationalistic criticism of all historical religion.

* "Me ante annos sexdecim, non sine præsentis vitæ discrimine, obtulisse operam meum ad eum sanandum."—*Fid. Exp.* 817.

† *Vit. Calv.* ut sup.

pregnant phrase, "to carry Calvin with him would be in fact to carry Protestantism with him." With marvellous credence, he did not despair of converting the author of the *Institutio*. It was a strange failure of insight. The very qualities which he admired in Calvin, forbade the slightest chance of success. A species of fascination led Serveto into the clutches of that relentless will, which must either use him or crush him.

John Calvin was one of those men "whom," says Renan, "you see at a glance; who are cast in one piece. A single letter, a single act, is sufficient material for forming an accurate judgment of his character." Cold, patient, exact, inflexible, Calvin steadily rose to the topmost place among the leaders of the Protestant movement, without bating a jot of the preconceived purpose of his unbending will. At all points was he the opposite of Serveto. No distaste drove him from law to theology; neither the instinct of curiosity nor the appetite of culture led him out of theology to physics. Not innately speculative, but severely, blindly logical, he stayed within the confines of rigorously measured doctrine; and his theology is the deification of his jurisprudence. There is not a flaw in his elaboration. He has nothing to retract, nothing to remodel. His great work, given to the world before he was six-and-twenty, represents his final mind on all the paramount questions of theology. A tolerant expression here and there, which drops out in a later edition, is so obviously a mere excrescence on his argument, that to prune it off is but correcting, as it were, an error of the press. A polemical buttress here and there, accumulating as the years run on, adds no thought, and removes no difficulty. He had no doubts, no hesitations. His work was to mould men, in mind and action, to the shape he had constructed for himself. Follow him, and he allowed you to lean upon him. A tower of strength was he, in every day of battle, in every mood of uncertainty. Woe be to the man who crossed his path, who declined his dictum! Debate with an opponent Calvin never could; it was not his way; he simply smote him down. He has been called a cruel persecutor. Far is this from being true. Cruelty did not enter

into his thoughts ; but neither did compassion. Neither the fire of the hearth nor the flame of the stake warmed him through. From the choosing of a wife to the destruction of a heretic, nothing moved him. Scarcely did he feel that it was a man with whom he was dealing. He, Calvin, had got the Truth of God at his back, and in the way of his march there was something that must be put out of the way. If a rebuke would do it, he was satisfied to rebuke. If not, he struck a blow. Blow fell after blow, till the antagonist was subdued or annihilated. That was Calvin's method. Thus he triumphed amid the world's amaze. We are familiar with the stern similitude of his outer man. Glance at it once more ; not at the clear-cut features of his countenance, the aquiline profile, the long, lean face, the cold eye like a jasper-stone ; but see the close-fitting cap, whose fur lappets come down over the ears, as though designed to shut out any whisper of an appealing sound. There behold the picture of a man who centres in himself, whose eyes look right on, who listens to no remonstrance, and is haunted by no regrets.* As we gaze on this statue, the deeply pathetic prayer of Sterne rises to our hearts : "If I must fall, let it be by some passion which Thou hast planted in my nature, which shall not harden my heart, but leave me room at last to retreat, and come back to Thee !"

This was the man whom Serveto dreamed of converting. To have changed one of his opinions would have been to accomplish a hopeless task ; but to have enlisted him in the service of an enthusiasm would have simply been to alter his entire nature. Such a man we cannot love. It is impossible to hold him in our hearts as great, honest, human, unwieldy, intolerant Luther is held. The Augustine of Protestantism, he has not a spark of St. Augustine's passion, his vivid sympathy, his picturesque imagination ; the Loyola of the Reformation, he has not a trace of Loyola's brilliant fana-

* This observation belongs to Dr. Bellows, who introduces it somewhere in his *Old World with a New Face*. Dr. Willis' volume contains two very clever and spirited etchings of Serveto and Calvin, the best things in the book. The portraits seem, however, to have by some mischance exchanged eyes with each other.

ticism, or his almost feminine piety. Equally impossible is it not to admire him. We especially, who are his children, his intellectual offspring, can we, without emotion, an emotion which he perhaps would have despised, look unto the rock whence we are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence we are digged? "Calvinist von Geburt, und entschiedener Freund der Toleranz von Natur"—thus, in describing himself, Pastor Tollin describes the generation of a people who have fulfilled in history no contemptible career. The more completely we feel ourselves emancipated from his iron sway, the more frankly may we shew the full reverence that is due from us, in dealing with the mighty shade of John Calvin.

ALX. GORDON.

VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. GERMAN BOOKS.

Die Christliche Glaubenslehre nach Protestantischen Grundsätzen dargestellt. Von Dr. Alexander Schweizer. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig. 1877.

A YEAR ago* we were able to congratulate the friends of a free scientific theology on the appearance of a third great work on Dogmatic Theology, a work, by the way, of which a second edition is already demanded. Of these three treatises, the first, that of Alexander Schweizer, now lies before us in a second edition. That such books should reach second editions is certainly an encouraging fact in these days of scepticism on the one hand and Romanism on the other. It is one proof amongst more that men have not ceased to believe it at least possible to reconcile Christian faith and fearless science.

Alexander Schweizer is well known as Schleiermacher's most gifted disciple, and as the chief of modern Swiss theologians. He possesses the main qualifications which rendered his master the great leader of the modern continental schools of scientific theology, while he is free, perhaps because in some respects less gifted, from

* Theological Review, April, 1877, p. 28.

some of the defects of Schleiermacher. Dialectical capacity he certainly possesses, but he is not led astray by it as was his master. He has Schleiermacher's deep religious feeling, but the Swiss preserves a more rigid control than the German over his emotions when he is dealing with facts and arguments. Moreover, Schweizer's style is lucid and strong, while Schleiermacher's is obscure, prolix and heavy. To most English readers of German theology Schleiermacher's *Christliche Glaube* must remain an unread, probably a wholly sealed book. This need not be the case with Schweizer's *Christliche Glaubenslehre*. And indeed the disciple's book may in this instance very well be substituted for that of the master.

Schweizer's work falls into three main divisions. The first treats of the affirmations of the Christian consciousness as religion generally, as the Christian religion, and as Protestant Christianity. In this division, the question of the authority of the Bible is discussed. Schweizer teaches that its authority does not rest upon its supposed supernatural inspiration, but upon the value of its subject-matter and its authors. The second division examines the nature of elementary religion as it lies at the basis of the specifically Christian religion. It treats of the revelations of God in the natural and in the moral world. The third division, much the largest of the three, expounds at length the Christian faith, or the religion of Redemption, Schleiermacher's phrase being used. This division falls again into three sections—the economy of the Father, the economy of the Son, and the economy of the Holy Ghost. The headings of these sections will not frighten those who remember that the author belongs to the left wing of Schleiermacher's followers. He is no Trinitarian, his Son of God being simply the perfect representative of the true religious life; and his Holy Ghost is not a person, still less a person in the Trinity, but the grace of God applying the means of salvation.

In a brief notice, the entire edifice of a great work like this, with its whole expression and meaning, cannot be dealt with. We must content ourselves with a reference to two important particulars that distinguish the spirit and tendency of Schweizer as compared with other theologians of the modern school. The first difference between him and them is the import the historical Christ has in Christianity; the second is his attitude towards the Bible. Biedermann and Heinrich Lang separate Christ and Christianity, and do not greatly care what becomes of Christ if only his religion remains. In their *Christian Dogmatics*, they treat of Christianity

before they come to treat of Christ. Christ himself is only a means of spreading the absolute religion, just as Paul or Luther might be. Not so Schweizer. He insists much on the inseparableness of the person of Christ and the principles of his religion, and on his unique religious character and religious work. His attitude towards the Bible, more particularly the New Testament, with which he mainly deals, is not that of a cold hard critic who appears to find satisfaction in widening the gulf between ancient Biblical thought and modern modes of thinking. Though a disciple of Schleiermacher and not of Ewald, he reminds us of the latter in this respect. While it is the tendency of some critics to seek the perfection of their art in making the Biblical writers think and feel as no reasonable and sensitive man now thinks and feels, Schweizer inclines strongly to the pre-supposition that the reason and the religious feelings of those writers were the same as our own, though expressed in other forms of language. For instance, he does not admit that the fourth Gospel looks upon the Logos as a pre-existing person. Again, he sees in many of the Gospel miracles typical and allegorical narratives. We quote these instances, not as fully assenting to these particular applications of Schweizer's exegetical principles, but simply as illustrative of them. It is certainly worthy of careful consideration, that so unhesitating a rationalist, in the true sense of the term, enters his earnest protest against a handling of the Bible which reckons amongst the triumphs of scientific exegesis any fresh assignment of a passage to the category of solar mythology, Rabbinical fancy, Gnostic speculation and party "tendenz," rather than the vindication of it as an eternal word of God clothed in the language of men.—This brief notice of a book which ranks amongst the great theological works of the century, must be closed with an earnest recommendation of the careful study of it to all who desire to see how reasonable a thing true Christianity is, and also to those who may imagine that there is no great substratum of truth lying beneath the creeds of the Church.

Die Confessionen in ihrem Verhältnisse zu Christus. Andeutungen zu einer biblisch-theologischen Lösung der Confessionsfrage von Karl Lechler. Heilbronn. 1877.

A large-hearted, very suggestive, poetically written little book on the great question of a catholic union of the Protestant, Romish

and Greek Churches. We have read it with an interest none the less because its author writes from a standpoint very considerably nearer orthodox Protestantism than our own. In effect, the book aims at the promotion of a Christian union which shall expressly include the widest diversity of ecclesiastical organization and theological belief. It argues for this by shewing how ancient and fundamental this diversity is, going back to the churches of the Old and New Testaments, running through the whole course of ecclesiastical history, and being founded in the nature of man and of the Christian faith.

Herder, nach seinem Leben und seinem Werken dargestellt von R. Haym. Erster Band. Erste Hälfte. Berlin. 1877.

We have here the first instalment of the first life of Herder that can lay claim to exhaustiveness. Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, have found numerous biographers, but the man to whom at least Goethe owed much, and whose influence on German literature, philosophy and theology, was immense, has had to wait for the third generation to supply his biographer. The interesting and sympathetic sketch which the great man's widow put together from her recollections and some of her husband's correspondence, has hitherto been the only available substitute for a complete memoir. There have been various collections of materials for a complete work, but they have lain widely scattered and in a dry uninteresting shape. Herr Haym now lays his hand upon them, and with true German industry and patience has commenced the task of working them up into a minute and exhaustive history of the life and works of the man Herder. He appears to be an able and interesting writer, as well as an indefatigable student. This portion of the work is certainly well done, but as it brings us only to Herder's resignation of his first post at Riga, we are at present unable to say whether the author will succeed in giving the world a complete and worthy picture of a man who was in many respects a true hero. We wish him success in his undertaking. He is endeavouring to pay a debt which Germany has long owed to one of her greatest men. If the work as it goes on keeps up to the standard of excellence already attained, the student of theology especially will derive much instruction from the next volumes.

J. F. S.

2. SOME SWISS THEOLOGICAL WORKS.

The undisputed supremacy which Germany long enjoyed in every department of theological knowledge is now less readily acknowledged, and her laurels have to be shared with Holland on the one hand and Switzerland on the other. In English-speaking countries, the Dutch theologians have of late received a full share of recognition and praise, but the services of their Swiss fellow-workers have not been so fully appreciated; or perhaps it may be more correct to say that Germany has got the credit of nearly all that Switzerland has accomplished. Zürich has been regarded as a centre of German culture almost as much as Heidelberg or Leipzig. But a closer acquaintance with the writings of the Swiss Liberals shews that their recent contributions to theological science have special characteristics of their own, and something approaching to a distinct national type. With the University of Zürich as headquarters, and an enterprising and liberal-minded publisher as the medium between them and the public, they have within the last few years shewn themselves equal in richness of information and patient industry to their German or Dutch allies. We offer brief notices of a few of their recent publications, in the hope of shortly taking a closer survey of this interesting field.

Jahrbuch der Historischen Gesellschaft Züricher Theologen. Erster Band. Zürich: Cæsar Schmidt. 1877.

The Theological Society of Zürich was formed in 1873, under the presidency of Professor Volkmar, but its first "Year-book" was only issued about fourteen months ago. Its contents clearly indicate the standpoint of the members of the Society, and shew that in Zürich liberal theology has quite passed the struggle for existence which it has still to maintain in many quarters. Volkmar heads the list of contributors with a *resumé* of his lectures on "The Old and New Belief" of Strauss, and is followed by Albert Wild with an able and original analysis of John's Gospel. The other articles, with the exception of a critique on Böhlinger's "Athanasius and Arius" by Albert Waldburger, deal chiefly with the history, customs and present position of the Swiss Protestant Churches, one interesting essay on "Pietism in Zürich" deserving special mention. We hope this first volume will be succeeded by others, giving as

good proofs of precise information and a conscientious and reverent study of religious subjects.

Das Christenthum und seine Mission im Lichte der Weltgeschichte.

Von Prof. E. F. Langhans. Zürich : Cæsar Schmidt.

Those who find pleasure in reading "the perpetually continuous book of the world," will find here a portion of it deciphered by an able hand. Professor Langhans has embodied in this work the result of long and careful study, it having been prepared seven years before its actual publication, and almost entirely re-written in the light of the improved methods and more mature conclusions now adopted in Biblical criticism and historical research. It is divided into two sections ; the first dealing with Christianity as the religion of love ; the second, as the religion of fulfilment ; while a third part, not yet published, will be devoted to its social and political relations. The subject is one that has been often carefully treated, but Professor Langhans appears on the field as an independent explorer. He has collected and clearly arranged a vast mass of information on the Christianity of the New Testament, shewing the nature of the soil out of which it sprang, and its affinities with the earlier forms of religion. The plan of the book is such as to make it suitable for popular use, as well as for those familiar with theological investigations. Each section is followed by a series of *Beilagen*, so as to avoid superabundance of details and the interruption of the text by reference to authorities. In all respects this work sustains the high reputation of its author, and contrasts most favourably with not a few books on the same subject written with an evident bias and full of cloudy hypotheses.

Ein Neues Buch vom Wahren Christenthum. Von Otto Berchtold. Zürich : Cæsar Schmidt.

This devotional manual is the work of a true uncanonized saint, whose short life was devoted to the furtherance of the liberal faith in Switzerland. It has already found readers wherever the German language is understood, and it is to be hoped it will yet appear in an English translation. It contains one hundred and ninety-six meditations, prayers and hymns, bearing on all the chief phases of religious experience. The prose portions are all, or nearly all, original, while the poetry has been carefully selected. It is free alike from cant and dogmatism, and is a fresh, simple, earnest utterance of the truths and experiences of religion in the language of to-day.

Ein Gang durch's Alte Testament. Von A. Wysard. Zürich :
Cäsar Schmidt.

The author of this Old Testament course holds the position of teacher of religious history in the Gymnasium of Zürich. He is one of the poets of that city, and has turned his gifts to good account in the re-translation of the finest portions of the Hebrew literature. The compilation of this book has been a labour of love, and every part of it gives proof of fine taste and most scrupulous care. The first portion gives such information respecting the history and religion of the Hebrew people as is suitable for pupils in high schools or colleges, while the second part deals with the Old Testament books, giving a short introduction to each, and the portions best suited for reading or committing to memory. Wysard's re-translations of Job and of the Song of Solomon are singularly happy, and the same may be said of many of the Psalms and the Babylonian Isaiah.

A. C.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

Mr. Miller's work on Irvingism* fills up in a sufficiently ample way a blank place in contemporary religious history. The early annals of the movement are well known to all who take an interest in such matters, and have indeed been lately re-written in more than one religious biography. Mrs. Oliphant's *Life of Edward Irving*, that of Robert Story of *Roseneath* by his son, the recently published *Memoirs of Mr. McLeod Campbell*, and the *Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen*, have all done their part in bringing vividly before our minds that strange outbreak of "speaking with tongues," and alleged exercise of miraculous powers, which were manifested partly in a humble shipwright's home at Port Glasgow, partly in Irving's London congregation. But at this point the curtain has been suffered to fall. We have, indeed, had a hint of new personages who might be ready to appear on the scene, in the accounts of the conferences on prophecy held at Mr. Drummond's house at Albury, a Surrey parish of which Hugh McNeile, afterwards to win notoriety of a very different kind, was the rector. But the last we have seen of Irving himself is as he appears in Mrs. Oliphant's picturesque pages, deposed from the leadership of a move-

* The History and Doctrines of Irvingism, or of the so-called Catholic and Apostolic Church. By Edward Miller, M.A., Vicar of Butler's Marston. 2 vols. 8vo. London: C. K. Paul & Co. 1878.

ment which owed all its life to his genius and eloquence, struggling in vain with forces which he had called into existence, and going down to Scotland, with the chill of death already upon him, on a hopeless mission of evangelization. By what means was this outbreak of scriptural fanaticism in a quiet Scotch Presbyterian kirk converted into a Catholic and Apostolic Church, with a four-fold ministry, an elaborate ritual, a complete and minute liturgy, and world-wide pretensions? The promise of the fruit was by no means visible in the flower: by what strange perversion of the laws of nature was one developed out of the other?

This is the story which Mr. Miller undertakes to tell, and tells with great minuteness, and, as we think, with conspicuous candour. His first volume contains the history of the sect; the second, a lengthy examination and criticism of its doctrines. For ourselves, we should have thought the latter superfluous. At least, all that is of permanent value in it might very well have been compressed into a single chapter, which would not have materially increased the bulk of the first volume. But Mr. Miller looks at Irvingism with quite other eyes than ours. He is a strong High-churchman, and regards it as a kind of parody of the High-church movement of the century. We are not without a suspicion that he may himself for a moment have felt its fascinations. He says that his "work arose out of the acceptance of the opinions known as Irvingite by clergymen of the Church of England." We are not, therefore, disposed to find serious fault with him for a somewhat lengthy statement and refutation of doctrines which experience has shewn him to be not destitute of persuasive power. And under many difficulties, he has executed his task well. His style is clear; his judgments candid; his statements always moderate. He has had something to contend with in lack of materials; for the authorities of the Church which he was desirous of describing, characteristically enough shut up their archives against him, "on the ground that it was presumptuous in any outsider, not to say an opponent, to undertake such a work." On the whole, we feel abundantly justified in saying that Mr. Miller has made an important contribution to our knowledge of what we at least should call the morbid anatomy of religious belief.

We had noticed many curious facts for extract, but the briefest epitome of Mr. Miller's story would exceed our allotted space. He has brought out in very clear relief the theory, on which he lays great stress, and which we think is substantially true, that the

development of the Irvingite system is partly due to the same forces as have produced the High-church revival. But there is another matter which has forced itself upon our own minds almost as we read every page, yet of which he naturally enough says nothing. This rigid symbolism, this minute ecclesiasticism, this expectation of Christ's second coming, perpetually disappointed, yet never daunted, would all of them be impossible to men who had apprehended the indisputable literary facts which lie at the foundation of a scientific interpretation of Scripture. This was the element which Scotch Presbyterianism bequeathed to the Catholic and Apostolic Church. If prophets spoke with tongues at Corinth, why not in Regent Square? If twelve Apostles governed the primitive Church, why should not twelve more govern the Church that was to see the Second Advent? If 144,000 of the tribes were to be sealed before the day of tribulation, were it not well that the Apostles should at once set about the work? It is this appropriation of scriptural facts and types which makes Irvingism a little hard to deal with by men whose position in regard to Scripture is but slightly different; yet to others, takes it out of the category of serious religious phenomena, and makes it only a matter of curious historical investigation. At the same time, it is perhaps well that Mr. Miller looks upon the Catholic and Apostolic Church so much *au sérieux*—if he had not, he would hardly have written so interesting a book.

Major Osborn has issued, in his "Islam under the Khalifs of Baghdad,"* the second volume of his work on the history of Mohammedanism, of which "Islam under the Arabs" was the first. We have already spoken in appreciative terms of "Islam under the Arabs;" the present volume more than sustains its interest, and will proportionally raise the author's reputation. He holds his pen in a surer grasp than he did at first: his multifarious materials are better arranged and more clearly set forth: he traverses ground less well known and therefore affording a fresher interest. The peculiarity of Major Osborn's plan does not permit him to dwell very minutely on the secular affairs of the Mohammedan kingdoms whose vicissitudes he records; his only concern is with Islam as a form of faith, and with ordinary history so far as it is needful in illustration of this. Still, his volumes may be consulted with profit by those

* *Islam under the Khalifs of Baghdad.* By R. D. Osborn, Major Bengal Staff Corps. London: Seeley, Jackson and Halliday. 1878.

who wish to trace the course and to watch the effects of that great wave of conquest which, beginning from Mecca, spread itself westwards to Spain and eastwards to India. And, from the very fact that Major Osborn's pages were for the most part written before the Eastern question assumed its present phase, they may teach a lesson to those who cherish the belief that Islam is capable of being reconciled with a progressive civilization, and that the barbarous abuses of power in Bulgaria are to be exclusively put down to the inherent brutality of the Turkish nation. The story of the Khalifs of Baghdad, under whom Mohammedan rule reached its highest pitch of splendour—even of the "good" Haroun-al-Raschid, in whom history and legend alike make the glories of the race to culminate—is the sufficient confutation of this fancy. Islam has always been associated with a barbaric rule, though the eyes of critics may have been dazzled with the equally barbaric splendour with which it has sometimes been varnished. Such a poor pretence of civilization has had no root of stability, and has always passed away in a storm of unbridled passion and a torrent of human blood. No more frightful stories blot the history of mankind than are narrated in these pages.

The characteristic interest of Major Osborn's volumes is, however, religious. In a clear and vivid narrative, interspersed by many illustrative anecdotes (for which he offers a very needless apology), he tells the tale of the gradual development of Islam. Here he is in a region with which comparatively few readers are familiar. Most educated men are acquainted with the fundamental distinction between Sunni and Shiah; but it is possible without disgrace to admit ignorance of Malek ibn Anas and Abou Hanifa, of As Shafi and Ibn Hanbal. We cannot transfer any part of Major Osborn's interesting narrative to our pages, or even give a sketch of its scope and direction. But it is very curious to remark how, whatever be the original aliment given to them, the religious faculty of men acts upon it in the same way and works out the same result. Mysticism and rationalism, asceticism and antinomianism, traditionalism and bibliolatriy, have all sprung from the stock of Islam, however little adapted it might seem to bear such various fruit. It has often been remarked that Buddhism presents almost a parody of Roman Catholic Christianity, so close are the external resemblances between them: the reader of Major Osborn's volume will be able to note many curious analogies between the development of Islam and that of every other form of religion which has had a wide acceptance among men. In this sense it is a real contribution to the study of comparative

religion. We congratulate Major Osborn on having completed another instalment of a really valuable work, and shall await with eagerness the publication of "Islam in India."

To republish six volumes of Sermons,* the most recent of which is thirty-five years old, is a somewhat perilous venture. It does not take away from the peril that Dr. Arnold's were mostly school sermons, intended for the congregation of boys and young men which filled Rugby chapel, and written, as the present editor tells us, "in the midst of a busy life, almost invariably on a Sunday afternoon, in the couple of hours before he went into chapel." Four of these volumes were originally published in the preacher's lifetime; two others were edited by his widow. "For some years after his death," says Mrs. Forster, "the Sermons continued to pass rapidly through successive editions, and they have never ceased to have a certain circulation," a fact which will probably continue to be true of this new and cheaper issue. The chief merit of the Sermons, as judged from the standpoint of the day, is their admirable moral directness and earnestness. We can believe, as we read them, whatever we have been told of the strong ethical influence which Dr. Arnold exercised upon all with whom he was brought into contact. They are not very original nor often eloquent, but it is easy to see that they may well have been a fountain of religious life and impulse to those who listened to them. Perhaps, apart from the preacher's personality, and reduced to rely upon their unassisted intellectual merits, they are hardly likely to have much weight and force in the altered intellectual circumstances of our own time. Dr. Arnold lived at the beginning of a period of religious transition, of which he was himself a guiding force, and which, but for his early death, might also to some extent have moulded him. But it seems to carry us very far back, and almost into another world of thought and feeling, to recollect that when Dr. Arnold died, Dr. Newman had not yet seceded to Rome; that the whole development of Ritualism was still in the future; that eighteen years were still to elapse before "Essays and Reviews," and twenty before Dr. Colenso's first speculations on the Pentateuch, were published, and that about contemporary with these works was "The Origin of Species." The plain statement of these facts suffices to shew that these volumes lie altogether behind the controversies of the present moment. Perhaps

* Sermons by Thomas Arnold, D.D. A new Edition, revised by his Daughter, Mrs. W. E. Forster. 6 vols. London: Longmans. 1878.

it would be true, in any case, to describe Dr. Arnold as a personal and moral rather than an intellectual force. But from whatever he was as an intellectual force, thirty-five years, full of change, divide us.

Mr. Mark Evans, in the interesting little book before us,* endeavours to shew that the original and world-wide aspirations of humanity after "One better than the best we can conceive," represented in the sacred books of ancient religions, misrepresented by the subsequent application of imagination to the subject-matter of religion, and not fairly described or accounted for by modern theories which are perpetually contriving some arrangement by which the religious emotions may harmlessly expend themselves in a vacuum, are fully recognized and satisfied by Christianity alone, and meet their natural development and most helpful education in the sanctities of home life. As these aspirations lead man to the Source of all spiritual truth, they elicit, according to our author, answers to their questionings, in the form of a series of "revelations" either disclosed or verified in the deeper experiences of the common lot. Place yourself in the long line of those who have in all lands been feeling "after God, if haply they might find Him;" strive to enter into the "glory of sonship" by truly and reasonably accepting the manifestation of "the ideal and perfect Son;" and then the language of human piety, the yearning of the soul, the impulse of worship, are no longer things to be accounted for or explained away, but become the secret and ground of constancy, virtue and hope, amid the storms of circumstance and the mysteries of existence. We welcome every zealous and intelligent appeal for the *religious* treatment of man's religious nature, at a time when so many of our leading writers seem prepared only to tolerate it or to ignore it, are proposing the lowest terms for its "reasonable satisfaction," or painfully endeavouring to shew that its language is only that of another faculty or emotion in disguise, unconsciously claiming an independence which does not belong to it. There is a disposition to mark off a little space, like an Indian reserve, somewhere between intellect and æsthetic feeling, where religion is to be allowed to live if it can, or die if it must, with a tacit intimation that before long the fences may be thrown down and the ground appropriated without a protest. Though we take exception to many points in Mr. Evans's exposition of Christianity, our cordial sympathy follows him

* *The Gospel of Home Life.* By Mark Evans. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1877.

throughout; he is duly affected by the seriousness of his task, and the truly devout and liberal spirit which is necessary for its accomplishment is not wanting. In his criticisms, alike of unspiritual orthodoxy and of materialistic philosophy, Mr. Evans shews both insight and skill; indeed, we must confess that we have found the working out of the main idea of the book, as expressed in the title, less finished and less impressive than many of the incidental *adversaria*. The following sentences, however, which we take from the first essay, "The Gospel of Fatherhood," are striking and to the point, and may serve as a specimen of our author's treatment of his leading theme: "Nothing short of deliberate determination can prevent a man from getting glimpses of God's revelation from communion with his children. . . . They who neglect the living instruction of their children, who find them a trouble, who see them once and again, whose profession, or business, or pleasure, usurp the moments which are the children's by right, who would think it childish to join in their games, to whose ears their ringing laughter is a noise instead of music, are failing to learn in some sort the depth of God's infinite patience with themselves, are neglecting one of the truest sacraments of their salvation, are shutting their eyes to the glory of the eternal God, as it is reflected in the glory of earthly fatherhood" (pp. 32, 33).

A "Revised English Bible"* is, at the present time, not only somewhat of a surprise, but also, we should think, a venturesome undertaking for the gentleman who is understood to have incurred the very considerable expense of its publication. The two Companies engaged in the revision of the Scriptures may be expected before long to give the public the opportunity of judging to what purpose they have been at work now for nearly eight years past. Meantime, the volume before us offers itself as a kind of temporary substitute, and in a modest preface undertakes to supply what is necessary "to correct *indisputable* errors and inadequate renderings in our present Bible; and, in the New Testament, to give also the more important emendations of the text which have been adopted by the best editors of the Greek Testament."

The work is carefully done and handsomely printed. Its execution reflects much credit on the four revisers mentioned in the

* The Holy Bible according to the Authorized Version, compared with the Hebrew and Greek Texts, and carefully revised, &c. 1 vol. 8vo. London, 1877. Printed for the Editor by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 43, Fleet Street.

preface, namely, Professor Gotch, the late Rev. B. Davies, Dr. Jacob and Dr. Green, all well-known names. In particular, the revisers have not needlessly departed from the authorized version, or introduced too much stiff and unidiomatic English, for the sake of a close, literal rendering of the Greek. Other distinctive and useful features are these: (1) the new headings of the chapters, which, in most instances, correspond well to their actual contents; (2) the division of the text into paragraphs, which are generally far more in harmony with the subject matter than the chapter divisions of our authorized version. Thus, for example, Isaiah lii. is divided at ver. 12, and the concluding verses of that chapter are connected with chapter liii. The same kind of change occurs in numerous instances, but it is made without omitting the chapter and verse numerals, which of course are indispensable for reference. (3) The marginal references and various renderings, which will be acceptable to many readers, as will also the chronological summary of Bible history at the end of the volume, and the maps which accompany it, and which are "founded on the best geographical authorities." The editor does not reveal himself except by the initials "J. G." at the end of the preface.

It is to be hoped that people understand what "natural history" means, or they may be misled by the title of Professor Blackie's lively little volume,* which is full of interesting discursive talk about Atheism, but contains little or no historical information. The book deserves to be widely read, for it abounds in shrewd wisdom and caustic wit, and does not fail to furnish ample matter for serious reflection. But we fear it will not produce much effect upon those against whom it is directed, for the simple reason that its author has never thoroughly mastered their positions, and shews very plainly that he does not consider it worth his while to do so. You must have some intellectual sympathy with your opponent before you have any chance of convincing him. Professor Blackie says some very contemptuous things about Darwinism, but he never shews any appreciation of Darwin's evidence that nature can *select*, and thus gradually produce similar results to those attained by the human breeder who consciously carries out a pre-determined plan. This evidence *does* give a tremendous blow to the old argument from design; for science now asks for nothing but time to be able to

* The Natural History of Atheism. By John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek at the University of Edinburgh. London: Dalby, Isbister and Co. 1877.

account for all the adaptation of organic life without having to postulate a Mind as their conscious designer, and unlimited time is just what geology had already furnished. Surely it must be frankly admitted that Paley's argument can now be employed only to supplement and enrich a knowledge of divine verities springing from a deeper source. The chapters on Greek Polytheism and Buddhism, in both of which our author finds a kernel of true Theism, will be read with interest; but most attractive are the vigorous onslaughts in the last chapter on the extravagances of Scotch orthodoxy which have provoked an atheistic reaction. Here is indeed fine scope for the dashing knight-errantry of the Greek Professor; we wish him many a brilliant victory upon the same field.

"Is Theism Immoral?"* is the title of an ably written pamphlet, which seeks to defend Mansel's Bampton Lectures against the strictures of J. S. Mill. The author certainly succeeds in shewing that Mansel's views may be stated in a form in which they are not immoral; but whether the Dean would have accepted all that is here said on his behalf, is a point which we must leave to those who are better acquainted with his writings. The charge of wilful misrepresentation, rather freely brought against Mill, does not seem to us to be made out. Mansel is not an author whom it is specially easy to follow, and if it be the case that his views have had to wait till the appearance of this pamphlet for their effective justification, this very fact might have taught its author to be more cautious in ascribing disingenuousness to a former critic. But we readily admit that the publication of Mill's posthumous works puts his previous criticisms on religious matters in a somewhat awkward position. It is certainly unfortunate that in his controversy with Mansel he did not state, simply and directly, all that he really believed. The controversy would then have dealt with real mental facts and actual opinions, instead of hypothetical issues, and Mansel might have been saved from some of the unjust treatment he received at the hands of his own party. Mill's criticism has always seemed to us singularly effective, so far as it is founded on premises which he elsewhere repudiates. If our knowledge of morality is prior to our theology, if we have any intuitive certainty of right and wrong, it is impossible to let this knowledge be over-ridden by

* *Is Theism Immoral? an Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Argument against Mansel's View of Religion.* Swansea: E. E. Rowse. 1877.

any *à posteriori* revelation of the Divine attributes, and this is what Mill is really feeling when he declares he will go to hell rather than offer a lying worship to the Deity. This declaration is not "profane bluster," as our author calls it. If Mill had really believed in a hell, it would have been simply sublime; and as it is, the statement is a splendid testimony to the imperishable certainty of "the grand, simple landmarks of morality." God can be called good truthfully only if we believe his character conforms to this eternal morality. It is legitimate to reject the popular dogmas of the atonement and everlasting punishment on the ground that they are monstrously inconsistent with perfect justice and infinite love. No external revelation can annul the inner certainty. Had Mill been able to take this position consistently, he might have fairly overthrown his adversary; but it was unwise of him to enter into any theological discussion, with his views of the fundamental postulates of human knowledge. Our author, like many another writer, finds it an easy task to convict him of numerous logical absurdities; and to judge from the avoidance of theological criticism on the part of modern agnostics, they have learned to profit by the example of Mill's generally acknowledged failure.

Mr. Congreve's "Annual Address on the Festival of Humanity,"* delivered to his little congregation of Comtists, is a veritable "*vox clamantis in deserto*," yet a voice crying, for the most part, after a very earnest and kindly fashion. Perhaps, as being addressed to a prepared audience, it is not always very intelligible to the general reader. On the one hand, it is impossible not to recognize the presence of very serious and noble aims, which, in spite of all discouragement, are urged with great earnestness and a firm faith in their ultimate triumph. On the other, the attentive reader will not fail to notice that the *modus operandi* of the Comtist church is to establish an intellectual despotism, which would prove eventually of the most oppressive kind. The world is to be taught by its appointed teachers, and by no others; must open its mouth to take in what intellectual sustenance it can get, and be content. The following passage, which we cannot resist the temptation of quoting, is very characteristic. Religious students are to be satisfied with the dogmatic scraps of Comte's Catechism; the study of even the master's great works is to be regarded as dangerous.

* Religion of Humanity. The Annual Address, &c., on the Festival of Humanity, January 1st, 1878. By Richard Congreve. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1878.

"We have none of us perhaps, in this connection, sufficiently present to our minds the pregnant expression of our master when he spoke of the noxious habit of reading—so compressive of thought.

"We have incurred a certain danger in this respect by the translation of the *Politique Positive*, not I hope counterbalancing its advantages, but a real inconvenience. It is a work which requires a great amount of leisure and effort, and I may add of previous training, if it is to be duly mastered; and such conditions are not generally fulfilled. It is by its present form thrown open to all, and we may be sure that most will not study it, but pick out here and there bits which please them or which they dislike. But I am now thinking more of the serious religious inquirer, and of the desirability of his reading the work. To such I would strongly counsel abstention as a general rule, persistent abstention to most; the deliberate concentration of your energies on the work which contains the condensed expression of the larger one, so far as that is strictly a religious work; on the Catechism, which affords ample matter for meditation, full guidance for your religious thought, and most definite direction for the highest sphere of that thought, the worship of Humanity, in all its fulness. You will spare yourselves (I speak to the really religious student) much time and labour, for which you have need enough in other directions, most particularly in the study of the great poets or other religious books, and you will have gained a much truer mastery of that which is to be your life. If after that you are in a position to enter on the study of the great work in its entirety, you will not regret that you have laid such a foundation for your undertaking; and as you proceed, you will, if I mistake not, see the truth of some such judgment as that which I have been expressing, as there gradually becomes clear to you what a masterly, adequate condensation its author has provided, so far, I repeat, as the properly religious construction is concerned. In this reading age, however, I have no doubt that such advice as is here given will be generally set aside, and as little doubt that in very many cases the issue will be the abandonment of all interest or further inquiry."

We have received from Mr. R. D. Dickenson a neatly-bound and well-printed Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, by the Rev. C. Neil, M.A.* The plan of the work is well conceived, but not so well carried out. Both the analysis of the Epistle and the Notes are spoiled to a great extent by wordiness. The orthodoxy is of the most extreme character, and the spirit shewn towards less orthodox writers is little commendable. Great stress is laid in the preface upon a "simplified" manner; but such words and phrases

* The Expositor's Commentary. Illustrated Notes on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. By the Rev. C. Neil, M.A. London: R. D. Dickenson, Farringdon Street. 1877.

as "gratuitous," "avocation," "tantalizing circumlocution," "dispensational arrangements," &c. &c., hardly bear out the promise implied. "Bestowment" should, we think, be left to the wondrous contributors to "The Twentieth Century." We cannot accept the following sentence, "Justification is wholly gratuitous, and based on a purchased deliverance in Christ," as either a correct or simplified version of "being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (p. xxxiv). Nor do we think "we were received into the Divine favour," an honest version of "we were reconciled to God" (p. 179). Many other examples may be found at p. lxxvii. The illustrative extracts are sometimes useful and even striking, but are too long. Canon Liddon and Dean Alford seem to be the greatest names on the list. The extracts are not always in accord. On p. 243, e.g., we are told that the cry "Who shall deliver me," &c., is not that of a captive; whilst the very next extract informs us that it is, and that it is, moreover, the cry of one chained to a dead comrade.

The theology is highly "evangelical." The "Scheme of Redemption" is a constantly recurring phrase, and St. Paul's glowing sentences are frozen into a hard scholasticism. The Doxology, xi. 36, "For of Him," &c., is, we are informed, "an implicit reference to the three attributes of Jehovah respectively manifested to us by the three co-eternal Persons" (Alford), but Mr. Neil thinks that "this is not so clear as in the ascription of praise in Eph. iv. 6 (p. 377). Of course "the God-man" is a common term for Jesus, and we are also informed that "Lord" is equivalent to "Jehovah" (p. 328). "The Messiah who is God," is Mr. Neil's paraphrase of Rom. ix. 5, of which he retains the authorized version. If he had remembered what he wrote on p. 50, he would probably have modified his note on p. 296. The reading, by "faith in the blood," is also retained. Mr. Neil's idea of the Divine nature is, to say the least, curious. We are told that the Father, in surrendering Jesus to death, exercised a mysterious act of *self-sacrifice*, which yet involved neither pain nor loss (p. 285); also, that before our Father can hear or accept prayer from his children, the aid of two (other) divine persons is needed (p. 275). We are not, after this, surprised at being told (p. 276) that science and mental philosophy could not have guessed at these truths, and that both of them are "purely matters of revelation, as much so as that of the Trinity itself." Surely Mr. Neil lapses into "heresy" when he says (p. 260), that "the resurrection itself is God's (i.e., God the Father's) distinct

act." Can one of the "three attributes" of God act independently of the other two?

Apart from these real blemishes, the book, especially if compressed, will be found very useful to students who want a full "orthodox" version of St. Paul's Epistle, and care little for newer and brighter truth.

The Rev. T. Smith's little work on the First Epistle of Peter,* shews the same excellences and the same defects as the book just noticed. He is strongest in the practical parts of his exposition, where no "sceptic" excites his wrath and no heretic has to be denounced. His style is too diffuse, not to say "preachy," and he seldom rises above the deadest level of Evangelicism. He is more candid on some theological points than Mr. Neil; for though he too uses the phrase God-man, he admits (p. 12) that the God-man's "being was in some way, which we cannot comprehend, dependent on the Father whom he calls His God, even after His resurrection from the dead." The printing and general appearance of the volume are very creditable.

The appearance of a third edition, revised and enlarged, of Mr. White's "Life in Christ,"† affords proof of the widespread interest with which the question of the future state of mankind is now regarded, and of the intense desire of many, who in all other things are strictly orthodox, to find some way of escape, consistent with their view of the proper authority of the letter of Scripture, from belief in the hateful doctrine of unending torment. It is to worshippers of the letter that the theory of destructionism will chiefly commend itself, although those holding freer views will not fail to find in Mr. White's pages much material deserving their attention. We could wish that before another edition of the book is called for, its author would make himself better acquainted with the arguments, and especially with the moral spirit, of Universalism. At present he seems to know only the rudest travesties of that doctrine. Were such not the case, the statement that Universalism offers "consolations to impenitence," and the quotation in this connection of Ezek. xiii. 22, thus italicised, "*With lies ye have strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he should not return from his wickedness, by pro-*

* Expository Lectures on the First Epistle of St. Peter. By the Rev. Thornley Smith. London: R. D. Dickenson, Farringdon Street. 1878.

† Life in Christ: a Study of the Scripture Doctrine on the Nature of Man, the Object of the Divine Incarnation, and the Conditions of Human Immortality. By Edward White. London: Elliot Stock.

missing him life," would convict Mr. White of controversial unfairness which, we believe, is very foreign to his nature.

In a handsomely printed volume, "*The Bible Record of Creation*,"* Mr. Grant gives us another of the too numerous attempts to prove that the Hebrew stories of the Creation are in perfect harmony with "the really verified conclusions of science." The author quotes freely from Huxley, Tyndal, Darwin, Spencer and Herschel, but shews a very dim apprehension of the nature and strength of the objections with which a modern apologist for the Mosaic cosmogony is called on to grapple. He has read much and understood little. We can, however, honestly compliment him on the good temper displayed in all references to opinions from which he dissents.

Mr. Wale, minister of Bromley-Road Chapel, London, believes that "nearly every thought or doctrine developed in the subsequent Books of the Bible, from Exodus to Revelation, has its germ in the Book of Genesis." His "*Biblical Outlines*"† are intended to shew the existence of the Evangelical scheme of salvation in the Pentateuch. The fancies with which the book abounds are neither true nor new, and receive no adornment from the author's crass statement of them.

The expectation of the rapid decay of all church organization greatly delights the author of an essay‡ which has the merit of brevity.

E.

* *The Bible Record of Creation true for Every Age.* By P. W. Grant. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

† *Biblical Outlines; or the Distinctive Characteristics and Mutual Relations of the Books of the Bible.* By Burlington B. Wale, F.R.G.S. London: Elliot Stock, and Partridge and Co.

‡ *The Decay of Churches: a Spiritual Outlook.* London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co.

THE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. LXII.—JULY, 1878.

I.—BALAAM.

Bible Studies. By M. M. Kalisch. Part I. *The Prophecies of Balaam* (Numbers xxii. to xxiv.), or *the Hebrew and the Heathen*. London: Longmans. 1877.

THE value of Dr. Kalisch's Commentaries on the Old Testament has steadily increased as they advanced. It is needless, and perhaps impertinent, to inquire how far his original views on the date and mode of composition of the Biblical books have been modified during the course of study which has resulted in the production of the successive volumes on Exodus, Genesis and Leviticus, or whether any change of view, if such there be, has been brought about solely by the study itself, or in part by the influence of other writers who have been more active, and have attracted more general attention in this generation than their predecessors in any previous one could command. It may be that he has simply been emboldened to deliver his views on these questions more fully and lucidly as the public mind became more ready to hear them and capable of appreciating them. Certain it is that the historical criticism of the Pentateuch received a far more important contribution from his two volumes on Leviticus than from their forerunners on Exodus and Genesis. We had good ground for expecting not only sound work, but valuable and discriminating criticism, from his studies on Numbers and Deuteronomy. It is very sad to learn from the preface of the smaller work now issued that his health is so impaired as to

render it very doubtful whether he will ever complete even the Pentateuch, to say nothing of the other divisions of the Old Testament. But he has secured the publication of a commentary on one of the most curious and interesting episodes in the remaining part of the Pentateuch—the chapters which contain the story and prophecies of Balaam, the heathen prophet who testifies to the glory of Israel—and promises us another similar volume commenting on Jonah, the Hebrew prophet who went on a mission to the heathen Ninevites. Of these chapters he says very truly,

“This section, complete in itself, discloses a deep insight into the nature and course of prophetic influence; implies most instructive hints for the knowledge of Hebrew doctrine; and is one of the choicest master-pieces of universal literature. Love of such a subject could not fail to uphold even a wavering strength, and to revive an often drooping courage.”

The section containing the story of Balaam (from Num. xxii. 2 or 3 to the end of xxiv.) is, whatever criticism may ultimately decide concerning its relation to the chapters preceding and following it in our present Pentateuch, “complete in itself,” in the same sense in which the first account of the Creation (Gen. i. 1—ii. 4a), that of the Garden of Eden (Gen. ii. 4b—iv. 26), the history of Samson (Judges xiii. 2—xvi. 31), and many others, are distinct narratives, which have only a very loose connexion with the adjoining chapters, and look as if they were already existing narratives, which the compiler has inserted bodily into his work. Hence we are justified in treating this section on Balaam as a distinct work, and in extracting from it the notions it conveys of Balaam’s history and character, without allowing our judgment to be affected by other accounts of him. These must be considered separately, and with a view to discover how far they agree with and how far they diverge from this, the fullest account extant of that prophet. This is the course pursued with rigorous fidelity by Dr. Kalisch, and in this consists the chief merit of his book as a piece of historical and literary criticism.

The Book of Balaam—I adopt Dr. Kalisch’s designation for

convenience, without intending to prejudice the question of its complete distinctness from the adjoining chapters—commences with the assertion that the Moabites were terrified by the numbers of the Israelites who were passing through their territory in the last year of the exodus from Egypt, and were encamped in the “plains of Moab,” on the east side of the “Jordan of Jericho,” i.e. the part of the river near Jericho, just above its influx into the Dead Sea. The Moabites also felt a natural repugnance or loathing towards Israel.* They conferred with their southern and eastern neighbours, the Midianites, on the course of action to be adopted—if the text is free from interpolation here; and Balak the king of Moab then sent an embassy (v. 5), which appears directly afterwards (v. 7) to be a joint embassy from Moab and Midian, to the seer Balaam at Pethor on the Euphrates, taking presents and requesting him to return with them to curse Israel: “for I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed.” I must, however, draw attention to the incoherent way in which Midian is introduced in vv. 4 and 7, and forgotten throughout the rest of the Book of Balaam; which is best accounted for by regarding v. 4a and the words “the elders of Midian” in v. 7 as interpolated.†

* פֶּחַר v. 3. Fear of their numbers is the only motive assigned in vv. 3—6, 11, for Balak's action; and therefore v. 2, where fear of their power as conquerors, based on their treatment of the Amorites, is expressed, can hardly belong to this section. This is rendered more probable by the fact that Balak's name is mentioned as if for the first time in v. 4, and that this section apparently knows nothing of the Amorites, whose subjugation by Israel would be extremely welcome to the Moabites, crushed by them in earlier wars, xxi. 26. For these reasons I cannot agree with Kalisch, who proposes to take vv. 2 and 5 as genuine, vv. 3 and 4 as interpolated. If we do so, we have Balak introduced without any intimation who he is, and the wrong motive assigned in v. 2 for his action in v. 5.

† “Moab said to the elders of Midian.” *Moab said to Midian* would be intelligible; but how are we to understand that the Moabites in general spoke to the select elders of Midian, especially as the latter were not present among them? Moreover, Balak alone sent the messengers to Balaam, v. 5, who report the words of Balak, v. 7, and are princes of Moab, or sent by Balak, in v. 8, 10, 13, 14; only in v. 7 are they “elders of Moab and elders of Midian.” The context between vv. 3 and 4 is improved if 4a be removed: “And Moab felt a loathing of the children of Israel, Balak being king of Moab at that time. And he sent messengers,” &c.

Thus Balaam is introduced as an Aramean or Mesopotamian, whose fame as a prophet or magician had spread to the land of Midian, insomuch that his blessing or curse was there believed to be efficacious. Everything in the narrative exhibits Balak as an ordinary superstitious heathen, who placed faith in the ordinary arts of divination or sorcery as practised extensively throughout western Asia and Egypt in ancient times. To him Balaam could appear only as a common sorcerer, and as such he desires, and is willing to purchase, his aid. Yet to the Hebrew narrator, Balaam clearly appears in a very different light. He does not indeed in so many words call Balaam a "Prophet of Jahveh;" but the god whom Balaam serves is unhesitatingly called *Jahveh*; without his distinct permission, Balaam refuses to move; and when that permission is denied, he absolutely declines to have anything to do with the proposed mission. When a second more august embassy arrives to solicit him again, he holds the same language; and it is not he, but God, who changes his mind and allows him to go, but on condition that he shall say only the words which God puts into his mind. This condition Balaam faithfully repeats by way of warning to king Balak (xxii. 38, xxiii. 3); and observes in the oracles which he subsequently utters, and in further conversation with Balak (xxiii. 8, 12, 26, xxiv. 13, &c.). Not Nathan before David, nor Micaiah before Ahab, nor Elijah before Ahaziah, were more grandly fearless in their demeanour towards powerful and cruel monarchs, and their vindication of the character of Men of God, than Balaam in the presence of the Moabite king. Micaiah's language is indeed identical with Balaam's: "As Jahveh liveth, what Jahveh saith unto me, that will I speak" (1 Kings xxii. 14). One of the chief merits of Dr. Kalisch's Commentary is the vigour with which he insists on this point. He refuses to interpret the Balaam of our narrative by stories culled from other sources, which give a very different account of his character, and insists that to our author he is a genuine servant of Jahveh, knowing no other allegiance, and never tempted aside from the course of truth and honour by the gifts or

threats of the king whose bidding he is expected to do. Thus he says :

“The key to Balaam’s whole conduct lies in the words, ‘I cannot go against the command of the Lord to do either good or bad of my own mind.’ The same significant term ‘of my own mind’ is in the Pentateuch employed on another and no less remarkable occasion. When Moses announced the miraculous punishment to be inflicted upon Korah and his associates, he said : ‘Hereby you shall know that the Lord has sent me to do all these works, and that I have not done them of my own mind’ (Num. xvi. 28 ; comp. Jude 11). As Moses is the mouthpiece of God’s behests and his instrument, so is Balaam. The greatest of the Hebrew prophets and the heathen seer here introduced are equals in this cardinal point, that all they say and do is not ordinary human speech and deed, but the expression of the Divine will, which, renouncing their own volition, they are ready or compelled to obey. Can a stronger proof than this parallel be conceived of the high position and dignity which the author assigns to Balaam ? From this central view everything else is easily surveyed and illustrated. Never under any circumstances does Balaam forget that he is the servant of God, whose visions he beholds and whose spirit comes upon him, whose direction he seeks and whose revelations he utters.”

We are not at liberty to invent for our narrator an exclusiveness of which he himself knows nothing, and to say that as Jahveh was the God of the Hebrews only, none but a Hebrew could know him and expound his will. If the Biblical books are to teach us anything, we must allow them to speak to us, and must not make the mistake of teaching them instead. If we treat them fairly, we shall find many varying sentiments respecting the relations of God (or gods) and men. The author of the Book of Balaam speaks in a tone very different from that usual with many other writers, for example the Deuteronomist ; but his obvious meaning is not on that account to be distorted. And he does not stand alone. The Canaanite king Melchizedek is in one of the oldest chapters of Genesis (xiv. 18) stated to be “priest of the Most High God,” and in that capacity he bestows his blessing on Abraham. The Judge Othniel was a Kenizzite, yet the spirit of Jahveh came upon

him and gave him victory (Judges iii. 10). There was nothing to prevent Ruth the Moabitess from taking the God of the Hebrews to be her God. The later Isaiah constantly uses language which implies that the prescriptive right of Israel to the favour of Jahveh was being forfeited, and that he would create a new heavens and a new earth, or a new Jerusalem, to which the Gentiles would flock. And there are whole books which seem to know nothing of Jewish exclusiveness, as Job, and some chapters of Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes. There is thus a considerable body of writing, from early as well as late times, sufficient to prove the existence of sentiments differing widely from the current Levitical orthodoxy. With this we cannot hesitate to associate the story of Balaam as given in Numbers xxii.—xxiv. The systematizer and harmonizer cannot be at the same time the historian; for the former has to reject or discredit whatever makes against the unity and symmetry of the scheme, whereas the religious duty of the latter is to treasure the records of the past in all their multiplicity and evidence of the free and various action of the mind and will of man. However strange it may have seemed to Israelites of other times, when religious ideas were drilled into ideas of a school, the writer of the Book of Balaam clearly regarded Balaam both as a foreigner and as a prophet who had direct intercourse with Jahveh and never even in thought was unfaithful to his allegiance. Even the suggestion that he sold his oracles, his blessings and curses, for money or honour, like common heathen sorcerers, and put pressure upon Jahveh to be allowed to do Balak's bidding, finds not the slightest countenance, but rather its own refutation, in this narrative; although nearly every commentator has urged or allowed this more or less decidedly. Balak certainly treats him as amenable to this influence; but his answers and his action prove only his utter and perfect integrity. The elders undoubtedly went to him bearing "the rewards of divination" in their hand, and we are not told that he declined the present. But Dr. Kalisch well says,

"Supposing even that Balaam accepted them, he deserves no

censure. For, according to the notions of those times, no one ever consulted a seer without offering him a present, either in money or provisions, although the most trifling gift contented the simplicity of Hebrew prophets (comp. 1 Sam. ix. 7, 8; 1 K. xiii. 7, xiv. 3; 2 K. viii. 8, 9; see Mic. iii. 5), and the assertion (Josephus, Ant. VI. iv. 1; X. xi. 3) that the Men of God did not receive or take such presents is unfounded, though in some cases they may have had special reasons for refusing them (2 K. v. 15, 16, 26; comp. Gen. xiv. 22, 23)."

To the second embassy Balaam gives no more hope of success than to the first. He declares that no amount of treasure could bribe him to swerve an inch from the course prescribed by his God, and that he will see what Jahveh will again speak with him. Without any pressure from Balaam, Jahveh then comes and prescribes, otherwise than before, that if the men call upon him, he is to go, "and thou shalt do only the thing which I tell thee to do." Such a change in the mind of the Eternal is not unfamiliar to the Hebrews in their legends. A far stronger instance of it is found in the legend of the destruction of Sodom, where Lot is saved by the persistent expostulation of Abraham. And Dr. Kalisch's reading of the spirit of the story is well worth considering:

"Will now [on occasion of the second embassy] the command of God also be the same as before? Those familiar with the spirit of the Hebrew Scriptures will hardly expect it. As God revokes the decree of destruction announced against the people of Nineveh, because they abandon their evil ways; but as on the other hand he draws Pharaoh deeper and deeper into disaster and perdition, because that monarch in spite of all warnings hardens his heart and perseveres in the impious contest; so must Balak king of Moab bear the fatal consequences of his blindness and obduracy. Once he had received from God an unmistakable admonition, which ought to have induced him to earnest reflection. But instead of retreating, he sets his own resolution against that of Providence with even greater refractoriness, and he hastens into ruin. The Biblical doctrine of free will is with sufficient correctness expressed in the Talmudical adages, 'If a man is disposed to sin, the door is opened for him; if he is disposed to do right, he is assisted;' 'Everything

is a gift of God, except the fear of God, which must be man's own choice ;' and ' Man is conducted in the path on which he is desirous to walk.' . . . After his first repulse, Balak was free to withdraw from his rebellious design without injury and without chastisement. But he persisted in that design ; he himself—not God—hardened his heart ; and now God's inevitable retribution must take its inexorable course. It is *for this reason* that Balaam receives the permission, denied before, of repairing with the messengers to Moab. There can be no question of arbitrariness or fickleness on the part of God, nor of a reproachful [reproach-worthy ?] action on the part of Balaam. The chief actors in this solemn drama are not God and Balaam, but *God and Balak*."

And the change in the Divine command is after all more formal than real. Balaam may indeed now go ; but what he may or may not do remains the same as before. He therefore saddled his ass and went with the princes of Moab.

But then, we are told, God was angry because he went ! Here indeed is a violent contradiction between verses 20 and 22. In the former he was not only permitted but commanded to go, under prescriptions relating to his actions when he reached the scene of action. In the latter, at the very outset of his journey, and therefore before the time for observing the prescriptions had arrived, God is angry with him for doing the very thing which he had just ordered him to do. The absurdity of the attempts of commentators to bridge over the discrepancy by purely arbitrary assumptions, is the strongest proof of the reality of the discrepancy. It cannot be better exhibited than in Dr. Kalisch's words :

"A variety of vague surmises and fancies have been thrown out, of which no sound interpretation can approve. Balaam, it is said, asked God to be permitted to comply with Balak's wish, and God yielded to his 'hypocritical importunity' (*Origen* . . . and others). The words 'Rise and go with them' (v. 20) did not convey a command or charge, but merely consent and permission, since God, seeing Balaam insolently persist in his wicked scheme, did not desire to interfere with his liberty of action, and Balaam availed himself of that permission with a culpable eagerness, which he proved by rising early the next morning and saddling his ass with

his own hand : had he received the least intimation that he was to bless the Israelites in Moab, he would surely have refused to go ; wherefore he was left in uncertainty on that point ; and, guided by the secret wish of his heart, he assumed that God, in retracting the prohibition of the journey, retracted also the prohibition of the curse (so *Knobel* . . . and many others). . . . What is there in the Biblical text that can countenance any of these conceptions ? . . . Balaam has no personal desire whatever. There is not even a trace of an anxiety, perhaps legitimate on his part, to assist natives and friends against invaders. He puts to God no request ; he merely consults him ; and he is expressly commanded to go to Moab because he has been appointed as an instrument in the execution of that Divine judgment which had been called forth by Balak's conduct."

God's anger, first mentioned in verse 22, is the animating spirit of the whole story of Balaam's journey to Moab with the ass that speaks, i.e. verses 22—35. The angel of Jahveh stood in the way to bar Balaam's progress, with a drawn sword, while Balaam was riding and two servants were with him. Yet the angel was seen by the ass only, who turned aside from the road, and was struck by Balaam. The same thing happened again in a narrow lane, and Balaam's foot was grazed against the wall. On the third occasion, the place was so narrow that no escape sideways was possible, and the ass had to fall down, which so enraged Balaam that he smote her with a great stick. Then "Jahveh opened the mouth of the ass," and she remonstrated against such cruelty from a master whom she had always served faithfully. Balaam answered her without exhibiting any surprise at her being endowed with human speech ; and then at length "Jahveh opened Balaam's eyes, and he saw the angel of Jahveh standing in the way." The angel, who had hitherto opposed Balaam's progress in silence, now also found speech, and pointed out to Balaam that but for the refusal of his ass to proceed, he would have been slain by the sword. Balaam expressed due penitence, and offered to go back, as the journey appeared to be displeasing to Jahveh (the angel had said to Balaam, "I came out to withstand thee because thy conduct is pernicious in my eyes"). Yet Jahveh, through his angel, did not adopt this

solution, to which his opposition and his explicit declaration of the mischief of Balaam's action necessarily led, but changed his mind again, and reverted to the command and the very words which he had used in verse 20. This second change of Jahveh's mind fully justifies Balaam's conduct, renders the blame cast upon him uncalled-for, and the whole episode about the journey purposeless. Its circumstances and the influence it was supposed to have on Balaam's conduct are never again alluded to. If the whole episode, v. 22—35, be omitted, we have a consistent and sufficient narrative. Consistent, because then no change of purpose appears in Jahveh's dealings with his prophet, and the command given by Jahveh in verse 20 ("Go with them, and thou shalt do only the thing which I tell thee") is echoed by Balaam in his answer to Balak in verse 38, "The word that God putteth in my mouth, that shall I speak." Sufficient, because this journey needs to be described no more than the journeys of the messengers to Balaam's country and back, and again a second time to him, which are passed over in silence in verses 7, 14 and 16; verses 21 and 36 may stand quite naturally together without a trace of any omission: "And Balaam rose up in the morning and saddled his ass, and went with the princes of Moab. And Balak heard that Balaam was come, and went out to meet him to the city of Moab," &c. We are therefore prepared to consider it extremely probable, if not absolutely necessary to the consistency of the narrative, that the episode in question is interpolated, and inserted without any tampering with the original narrative, since its excision leaves the story complete and grammatical, not requiring the alteration of a single letter. Dr. Kalisch adds further considerations confirming this conclusion:

"The kernel of the whole section [ch. xxii.—xxiv.] is *Balak's* contention against God and his decrees; but in these verses that deliberate plan is abandoned, and altered into a struggle between God and *Balaam*. Every thoughtful reader must be struck by this remarkable shifting of the main interest. How was it that Balaam, who till then had lived in undisturbed tranquillity of mind and

perfect submission to God, and who in the whole of the subsequent narrative is seen in the same harmony of character, was suddenly and transitorily drawn into this grave conflict? Was it necessary that a seer, who again and again had declared his unconditional devotion to God, and had invariably obeyed God's gentlest hints, should be terrified and admonished by an angel appearing with drawn sword and threatening him with death? And lastly, how different is the spirit of the episode from that of the bulk of the composition! The latter includes *supernatural* elements—revelations by vision and dream and prophetic utterances—all of which involve the ideal truth of a close relation of the spirit of man in its highest moments of fervent transport, with the Divine spirit to which it is akin. But the episode includes the *unnatural* element of a distinctly articulating animal—of an ass which sees an angel of God, and in its fright turns away from him; which complains of unjust treatment in pathetic words, and with which its master, by no means surprised at the animal's address, enters into dialogue. And, to complete the marvel, Balaam himself, whom we have seen to enjoy a constant and familiar intercourse with God, does not for a considerable time behold a Divine apparition at once beheld by his beast."

We are dealing with an ancient legend, and have to seek the meaning which it bore to its narrators, not assuming its objective or historical truth, which it would be probably vain to attempt to prove. Marvels, therefore, may be expected to find place in it, and the supernatural elements of the story do not in themselves as such raise any presumption against its antiquity. The genuineness of the story as a whole must be judged not by these, but by the coherence of the parts. Yet it may also be said that there are *marvels and marvels*. Some are and some are not in the spirit of the ancient legends of the Hebrews. The angel of Jahveh with a drawn sword is seen also by Joshua (Josh. v. 13, 14), though not with the function of barring the way. The angel who holds the flaming sword to bar the entrance to the garden of Eden is the nearest parallel. But the speaking ass appears, as Dr. Kalisch says, not so much supernatural as unnatural, and is unparalleled in Hebrew legend. It is a great stumbling-block to commenta-

tors. Dr. Kalisch well says, "For such remarks as 'Surely an animal is often more intelligent and foreboding than a foolish man' (*Ewald, Knobel*), or 'The irrational beast has a finer instinctive presentiment of many natural phenomena than man with the five senses of his mind' (*Keil* and others); these and similar suggestions are hardly more than phrases devoid of definite meaning." The ass may indeed belong to a very different class of literature from that to which it is here unnaturally attached—the Fable. This is not entirely unrepresented in the Old Testament, but there are only two examples—that of the trees choosing a king (*Judges ix. 8—15*), and that of the thistle and the cedar (*2 Kings xiv. 9*)—and neither of them exhibits a speaking *animal*. Still the instance before us is evidently analogous to the literature of fable, which had an immense extent in the ancient world; coming to the Greeks confessedly from the East, as *Æsop* was called a Phrygian, and his fables can be recognized in a more primitive form in the Sanskrit collections; and native also to the Semitic nations of Arabia, &c. It is a distinct legend from the story of Balaam the Prophet; whether it was originally attached to the name of Balaam at all we cannot now determine, but may regard as probable, since there seem to have been many stories current of him, in which he figured as a heathen sage, generally of a malevolent disposition, so that the popular mind might take pleasure in fastening upon him the fable of the "cruel master and his ass," and in making the ass see more than the philosopher. This episode has many peculiarities of style which justify us in separating it from the rest of the narrative, and in regarding it as probably of a late origin.*

* The peculiar and apparently later words are עֲלֵי *adversary*, v. 22, 32, לִלְלָהּ *Hithpa. to mock*, v. 29, יָרָא *to be headlong or dangerous*, v. 32, none of which occur in the Pentateuch; and רִגְלִים (three) *times*, v. 28, 33, employed by the Elohist in *Ex. xxiv. 14*, for the more usual פְּעָמִים. In v. 33, אֲדֹלָי *perhaps* occurs where the sense *unless* is required; it is almost certainly an error, and easily corrected by the alteration of one letter, into לֹאֲדֹלָי. In general this episode uses the vocabulary of the Jahvist, which is also that of the rest of the Book of Balaam. It is worthy of notice that the article on Balaam in the "People's Dictionary of the

Having on purely critical grounds determined this, we may confess to a feeling of relief at being rid—so far as the main narrative is concerned—of a passage which the common sense of mankind has long insisted on treating as ludicrous, in defiance of the reverence felt for Scripture. If these chapters be read with the condemned episode omitted, we find them to be truly as “exquisite a production” as Dr. Kalisch styles them, and may agree with the same critic when he asserts “that the Hebrew author represents Balaam the heathen in every respect as a true and noble prophet of Jahveh, and thus makes him participate in the highest and holiest privileges of the elect of the elected people.”

Balaam is met on his approach to Moabite territory, at “the City of Moab,” on the river Arnon, which formed the northern boundary of Balak’s dominions (see xxi. 13), by king Balak, who had come out thus far to do him honour. They then went together northwards, in very nearly the same direction by which Balaam must have come from the highlands of Mesopotamia, to a town called Kirjath-huzoth, where Balak killed oxen and sheep, and made a feast therewith for Balaam and his companions. On the following day they went further to Bamoth-Baal (“High places or sanctuaries of Baal”), a place probably somewhat further northwards, on the northern side of Attarus, Kirjath-huzoth being on the southern; where a portion of the Hebrew hosts spread over the Arboth-Moab (or Plains of Moab), near the influx of the Jordan into the Dead Sea, would first become visible.* Here Balaam causes

Bible,” edited by Dr. Beard, while exhibiting extraordinary confusion of ideas—e.g. calling the prophet now a Magian and now a worshiper of Baal—sets forth with a true critical instinct the objections to the episode of the ass, and pronounces it an interpolation,—a judgment which is the more remarkable as it contravenes the opposite decision of Winer, whose *Realwörterbuch* is largely used by the English writer.

* The geography is not very clear, and it is remarkable that most of the places are mentioned nowhere else. This is the case with Pethor, Balaam’s residence, with the “City of Moab,” Kirjath-huzoth, Bamoth-Baal, the Field of Zophim, and the “Summit of the Peor.” Pethor is stated to be “by the River, in the land of the children of his (Balaam’s) people,” meaning undoubtedly the Euphrates, as Balaam himself states (xxiii. 7) that he has been brought from Aram and the

seven altars to be built for him, and performs on them the greatest and most solemn sacrifices known to the Hebrews—a bullock and a ram on each. Of course the rite is not in accordance with the Levitical code; Balaam was not a priest of the race of Aaron, nor even a Hebrew, and the altars were like the unauthorized high places which were condemned and destroyed by Hezekiah and Josiah. But similar sacrifices were offered not only by the Patriarchs and Judges, but by Samuel and David, and our narrative only furnishes another among the many proofs of the non-existence of the Levitical laws of sacrifice till a late period of the monarchy. Balaam retires, saying, "I will go; perhaps Jahveh will come to meet me; and the matter of what he will shew me I will tell thee." Jahveh appears to his prophets in solitude. So Elijah left his servant at Beer-sheba and went on alone a day's journey into the wilderness, where he sat down to die, and was visited by the angel of Jahveh. So Jahveh appeared to Abraham "after Lot had separated himself from him," and promised his future blessedness; and again came to announce the fate of Sodom after Abraham had left the tent in which Sarah was. Similarly "Jacob was left alone" when God came in the guise of a man and wrestled with him. In the same category we may put the very numerous instances in which Jahveh presents himself

mountains of the East; and the name and situation on the Euphrates has been identified in Assyrian. The "City of Moab" (עִיר מוֹאָב) is described as on the Arnon, so that it cannot be identical with the Moabite metropolis, Ar of Moab (though Ar עַר is probably another form of עִיר, used however always as a proper name, and therefore without the article), which was far south of the Arnon. Kirjath-huzoth, the "City of Huzoth" or of streets or squares, may be identical with Kirjathaim. Bamoth-Baal, the "heights or sanctuaries of Baal," the Field of Zophim or of Watchmen or Prophets, and the Summit of the Peor, are all elevated places from which the host of Israel in the Plains of Moab by the Jordan were visible. The second is described as being on the ridge of the Pisgah, and the third as overlooking the Jeshimon or the Wilderness, by which words the Pisgah itself is denoted in xxi. 20; so that all three may be treated as situated on the long ridge called "the Pisgah." It should further be noticed that the Field of Zophim (שָׂדֵה צִפִּים) may be the same as Mizpeh of Moab mentioned in 1 Sam. xxii. 3, Mizpeh מִצְפֶּה being from the same root as Zophim, and denoting a look-out place, as is ingeniously suggested by Mr. Grove in Smith's Dict. of the Bible.

in a dream to the Patriarchs and others. And in Gethsemane Jesus left his three best-loved disciples, saying, "Tarry ye here and watch with me; and he went a little further" and had his solitary intercourse of prayer with God: this incident is strikingly similar, in its external characteristics at least, to the present story of Balaam and that just mentioned of Elijah.

Balaam returns inspired by a word that Jahveh had "put in his mouth," and delivers his first oracle, or *parable*, as this and all his other speeches are called. Perhaps the words by which prophecies are distinctively denoted (נִבִּיָּה and נִבְיָא) are avoided by the writer* for the same reason which leads him to avoid applying the title *prophet* to Balaam, although he describes him by epithets which indicate sufficiently the prophetic function.† Yet Dr. Kalisch's note on the subject is valuable:

"No other prophecy in the Old Testament is called נִבְיָא, which word, properly 'simile,' is exclusively used of the metaphorical diction of poetry or of proverbial wisdom. Yet Balaam's speeches are none the less true prophecy because they are at the same time the finest poetry. Their difference in form from all other prophetic orations is sufficiently accounted for by the circumstance that no other prophet had to accomplish so peculiar a task as Balaam." "We have instances of prophets being consulted with regard to the issue of military expeditions, and we have many instances of pious men interceding for others by prayer, or pronouncing blessings and curses, the effects of which were considered infallible. But there is no other example of a prophet who, requested to pronounce a definite and prescribed speech, is forced, 'heav'n-controll'd,' to express the very opposite again and again."

The narrator has now brought us to the point at which he was aiming from the beginning. Balaam utters his first oracle

* Yet Balaam himself in his prophecies does use the word נִבִּיָּה xxiv. 3, 4, 15, 16. This word is elsewhere almost always used with a name of God (or the angel of God) following: "The oracle of God," i.e. *God said*,—and this in countless instances especially in the prophetic books. Here we have "The oracle of Balaam." The only other instances of this usage are 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, Ps. xxxvi. 2 [1], Proverbs xxx. 1.

† "He who heareth the words of God, he who seeth the sight of the Almighty, prostrate and with open eyes," xxiv. 4, cf. 3, 16.

in rhythmical form and choice poetical language. To exhibit its beauty and force as fully as is possible in another language, we must have it before us in lines which represent the couplets of the original—where the lines are of nearly equal length and have an appreciable rhythm.* As the verses are not so printed in ordinary Bibles, I deem it not superfluous to print them here in a translation of my own, adopting where possible the elegant language of Dr. Kalisch.†

From Aram hath Balak brought me, xxiii. 7.
the king of Moab from the mountains of the east :
"Come, curse me Jacob,
and come, execrate Israel !"
How shall I anathematize, whom God hath not anathematized, 8.
and how shall I execrate, whom Jahveh hath not execrated ?
For from the top of rocks I see him, 9.
and from hills I look down on him :
Here is a people that dwelleth apart,
and is not reckoned among the nations.
Who hath measured the dust of Jacob, 10.
and by number the fourth part of Israel ?
May my soul die the death of the Upright,
and my end be like them !

Balak expresses his vexation : "To anathematize my enemies I took (i.e. hired) thee, and here thou hast blessed them indeed." But it was evidently deemed essential that the prophet should have in sight those whom he is to bless or curse ; therefore Balak on the first occasion took Balaam to the elevation called Bamoth-Baal, "and from thence he saw one end of the people ;" and so now he fancies that the sight

* The lines in the first speech (xxiii. 7—10) have each from six to eight full syllables ; only once nine. In the other speeches (xxiii. 18—24, xxiv. 3—9, 15—17, 18—24) they are prevaillingly a little shorter, having generally from five to seven syllables, but occasionally four and eight. An iambic and anapestic rhythm may generally be traced, but subject to great irregularity.

† Another translation in the lines of the original, from the Dutch of Professor H. Oort, is given in "The Bible for Young People," Vol. III. pp. 264—269. Oort's views, which I frequently cite, are found also in his "Disputatio de pericope Num. xxii. 2—xxiv.," Leiden, 1860, and in a short notice of Kalisch's book in the *Theol. Tijdschrift* for Jan. 1878.

of a different portion of the camp of Israel may work a change in the mind of the seer, and therefore takes him to the Field of Zophim on the top of the Pisgah, whence he can see "only one end of Israel, not the whole." The ceremonies of sacrifice on seven altars are renewed here, and Jahveh again meets Balaam and puts a word in his mouth. This second oracle is as follows :

- | | |
|--|------------|
| <i>Arise, Balak, and hear ;</i> | xxiii. 18. |
| <i>give ear to me, son of Zippor !</i> | |
| <i>God is not a man, that he should lie,</i> | 19. |
| <i>nor the son of a mortal, that he should repent.</i> | |
| <i>Is He one that says a thing and then does it not,</i> | |
| <i>that speaks and performs it not ?</i> | |
| <i>Here have I undertaken to bless,</i> | 20. |
| <i>and bless I shall,* and not reverse it.</i> | |
| <i>No one hath beheld misery in Jacob,</i> | 21. |
| <i>nor seen mishap in Israel—†</i> | |

* The text has יְבָרֵךְ "and he (God) hath blessed ;" but it is Balaam who in this verse is bidden to bless, so that the introduction of God as the subject is infelicitous, though Kalisch defends the text by saying that "the blessing is throughout traced to God and not to Balaam." But many ancient versions (Sept., Samar., Onk., Targ. Jer., Syr., Vulg.) had the reading וּבִרְכָתִי, which has been pointed either יְבָרֵךְתִּי or יְבָרְכֵנִי; the former yields the sense, "and I shall bless, and not reverse it" (i.e. the words of blessing); the latter, "and my blessing—I shall not reverse it" (the pronoun referring back to the word *blessing*). The latter is adopted by Oort; but the ׀ and before the following verb, as well as the fact that the blessing spoken of has not yet been given, make strongly against it. The former is irreproachable and powerful in sense, and I adopt it; my only hesitation being grounded on the fact that the perfect with the ׀ conversive is not elsewhere found in these prophecies; v. 19 has וְיִפְרָא "and hath he spoken;" even in xxiv. 17, וְיָקֻם, &c., depend on יִקְרָא, and are future in sense independently of the *vav*. See on this subject Driver's *Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew*, especially chap. ix.

† "He beholdeth not :—" who is the subject ? Surely not God, since (as Oort says) his presence in Israel is stated in the following words to be the cause of the felicity, so that the latter cannot at the same time be given as the reason of God's support; besides, if I have been right in turning out the name of God from the previous verse, we have to go back to v. 19 for any mention of him, and that verse is separated by an obvious pause from vv. 20 and 21. Hence, with Oort and against Kalisch, I understand the subject to be indefinite: "one hath not beheld" = "no one hath beheld."

- Jahveh his God being with him,
and the trumpet-call of the King in his midst.**
For there is no omen in Jacob, 23.
nor divination in Israel :
in due time it is told to Jacob
and to Israel, what God doeth.†
Here is a people that rises as the lioness, 24.
and lifts itself as the lion,
that lies not down until it can eat prey
and drink the blood of the slain.

This oracle is pitched in a higher tone than the previous one. It asserts the utmost felicity of Israel, and attributes that to the constant presence of a protecting god. It compares Israel to the lion, and intimates that Israel will not be satisfied with a less complete annihilation of his enemies than the king

* In accordance with the synonymous parallelism that prevails in these poems, I take the second line of this verse to refer to the presence of Jahveh as King in the midst of Israel. Kalisch says, "The Hebrews are constantly reminded of the dominion of their God, and summoned to his worship by the solemn sound of the trumpet. . . . The introduction of the earthly king in a passage which treats exclusively of Israel's relations to God would impair its admirable consistency." Oort's arguments on the other side seem to me singularly weak.—After this verse the text has the following (v. 22) :

It is God that brought them out of Egypt;
 He hath endurance like the wild bull.

It is repeated in xxiv. 8, which fact itself renders it suspicious. The whole verse suits neither context well, and some wish it cancelled in the one place, some in the other. It is further to be observed that the two lines of the verse do not agree well together in sense (exhibiting no parallelism), nor even in grammar; for Israel is described in the first by the plural pronoun, and in the second by the singular. Further, the first line can scarcely be a complete sentence, but would naturally denote "God, who brought them out of Egypt." I cannot but think that we have here a corrupt text. The second line is appropriate in xxiv. 8, and is required for the parallelism of that verse, which as it stands is the only one in the prophecies on Moab which has an odd number of lines (except xxiv. 4, which I shall emend). The first line, with the sense, "God, who brought them out of Egypt," would bear being inserted at the end of v. 23, though a reference to the deliverance from Egypt is hardly appropriate there; but as it would destroy the symmetry of that verse, it is better to expel it altogether as spurious. Neither Kalisch nor Oort venture to expel it from either place.

† The heathen arts by which the will of the gods was ascertained have no existence in Israel, since they are not wanted, as God is present and reveals his will to them by direct communication.

of the beasts. Balak in despair tries to stop the flow of a speech which turns out so fatal for him, and asks Balaam to say no more either of curse or of blessing. But Balaam again refuses to be under Balak's orders, and declares himself bound to perform all Jahveh's commands. So Balak is obliged to resort again to the device of a change of place, and takes Balaam to the top of the ridge of Peor, which commands a fine view over the desert, i.e. the Plains of Moab, about the mouth of the Jordan, where the Israelites were chiefly encamped.* From this fact, and because it is not here stated that Balaam saw only a fraction of Israel, we may conclude that he was supposed now at length to have obtained a full view; which renders the oracle pronounced here a yet grander eulogy than its forerunners. The same sacrifices are offered here as at the other stations. "And Balaam saw that Jahveh wished to bless Israel; and he went not as at the other times to meet *omens* (?),† but set his face towards the desert." Here we encounter a difficulty. At the other times, viz. before Balaam received the two previous oracles, we were not told that he went to meet omens or means of divination; so that this verse, in expressly stating that then he had sought omens, introduces something new, which must infallibly have been mentioned if it were true. The suspicion roused by this incongruity is greatly heightened by the mode of expression.

* Jeshimon has the article, and is not a name but a word denoting *desert*, synonymous with מִדְבָּר which takes its place in xxiv. 1. From xxiv. 2 we see that the desert in question is the "Plains of Moab," where the Israelites were encamped, xxii. 1, and consequently that Balaam was looking westwards. Thus the description of this incident in the "People's Dictionary of the Bible:" "The priest of Baal (?) turns his face towards the east (?), where his sun-god is wont to make his daily rise, and where is his ethereal palace. With a hand outstretched (?), and eyes looking intently towards his own home and the home of Baal (?), the seer strains his faculties to find the wished-for imprecation (?)," is discovered to be perverse in every particular.

† מְחַשְׁבֵּי, the same word which occurs in xxiii. 23, parallel to and synonymous with קִינָה, "divination." These words, as Oort rightly says, "non significant *incantationem*, qua quis contra alium uti potest, sed *divinationem*, *auguriorum captationem*," for ascertaining the will of the gods; the Authorized Version and Kalisch are therefore wrong in rendering מְחַשְׁבֵּי *enchantment*.

The peculiarity was manifestly felt by the translators of the Authorized Version, who substitute "to seek" for "to meet." You can *seek* omens, but you can *go to meet* a person only.* And on the previous occasions it was a person that Balaam went to meet—i.e. Jahveh. So here I cannot but believe that the original text had, "he went not as at the other times to meet Jahveh." In other words, he did not retire in solitude to receive a communication from Jahveh, but remained with Balak by the altars, and simply turned to look on the Israelites' camp. The reason generally assigned conjecturally for his not seeking fresh inspiration is, that he was now so penetrated by the Spirit of Jahveh, as to understand fully that "Jahveh wished to bless Israel," and consequently to be able to go on with the blessing without fresh prompting. But it seems to me much simpler and less hazardous in conjecture, to notice that his last oracle had been suddenly interrupted by Balak (xxiii. 25), and that he had implied in his answer that he had more to say, of which he must deliver himself (v. 26); and to

* The word **לִקְרָא** is not quite accurately rendered "to meet." It has the force of a preposition, Latin *obviam*, Ger. *entgegen*. It is a very common word, yet this is the only passage in the whole Old Testament in which it does not govern a *person* (Joah. xi. 20 and Is. xiv. 9 being only nominally exceptions), except Gen. xv. 10, where it meets *opposite*. Of this grammatical difficulty, which to me is of the highest moment, neither Oort nor Kalisch take any notice. My previous argument is not clearly stated, if felt, by Kalisch, who comes to my conclusion that **יִדְוֶרָה** (or, as he says, **אֱלֹהִים**) should be read for the existing **יְהוָה**. But his reasons are of an *a priori* and sentimental nature, which I think are entirely out of place in the criticism of antiquity: "Did then Balaam the first and second time practise those contemptible frauds, the absence of which among the Israelites he praises as their particular glory, and describes as one of the chief causes of their power and greatness? . . . Not without the deepest regret and reluctance would we see the brightness of this noble work tarnished by rude and lying superstitions. . . . The author meant to delineate Balaam like a true prophet of his [the author's] own people; if he did not, the chief interest of the composition is destroyed." But our aim must be, not to save the "interest of the composition" for Dr. Kalisch, but to see what the writer said; and if this word must be expelled on that score, I wonder that Dr. Kalisch does not demand the excision of the passages describing the "rude and lying superstitions" of the sacrifices of bullocks and rams on the seven altars. Moreover, divination, e.g. by Urim and Thummim, is recognized by the Levitical law. Oort justly condemns Kalisch's criticism here; but fails to discover either of my reasons for doubting the received text.

regard the third speech (xxiv. 3—9) as a fulfilment of the unfinished portion of the second.

From his new point of view, Balaam surveys Israel "encamped according to his tribes," so that he must be understood to overlook the entire people; and the Spirit of God comes upon him and enables him to utter his third oracle:

- The oracle of Balaam, son of Beor,* xxiv. 3.
and the oracle of the man of unclosed eye,
the oracle of him who heareth the sayings of God, 4.
*[and knoweth the knowledge of the Most High],**
who seeth the sight of the Almighty,
prostrate and with eyes open:
How good are thy tents, Jacob! 5.
thy tabernacles, Israel!
like long-extended glens, 6.
like gardens by a river,
like aloe-trees which Jahveh hath planted,
like cedars beside water.
Water overflows out from his bucket,† 7.
and his seed-fields are full of much water.‡

* Verses 3 and 4 are repeated as the introduction to the next oracle, vv. 15 and 16: where, however, an additional line is found after the first of v. 4 (or 16). The rhythm manifestly requires this line, as all the verses are in complete (see note on xxiii. 22), and there is no conceivable reason why these passages, otherwise identical, should differ in the presence or absence of this line. I therefore correct the defective v. 4 by the fuller v. 16.

† I read the singular מִיָּדָי which is indicated by the letters, as safer than the intended dual מִיָּדָיִם which ought to have a second י.

‡ Verse 7 appears to declare the fertility of the land given by Jahveh to Israel, produced by abundance of water—the first line referring to streams and springs by which the buckets and troughs for supplying the wants of men and cattle are supplied (cf. Ex. ii. 16), and the second to the rain which makes the crops grow. מִיָּדָי "his seed" therefore denotes his corn-fields, as in 1 Sam. viii. 15; and מַיִם רַבִּים "much water," as when Moses strikes the rock and *much water* comes out (Numb. xx. 11), not "many (separate) waters," the plural adj. being used merely because the word *water* is a plural noun that has no singular. "His seed is in (or with) much water," is an expression identical with Ps. xxxiii. 4, "all his action is in faithfulness," and perhaps Ps. xxix. 4, "in power." There is a remarkably analogous passage in Is. xxiii. 3, "the seed-land of the Nile with much water is her (Tyre's) revenue." But our passage cannot denote "corn-fields by the river," as Ewald and Kalisch take it, for *by* would be בְּ, as in the preceding verse.

- And higher is his king than Agag,
and his kingdom exalted.
He hath like the endurance of the wild bull,* 8.
he devoureth nations his enemies,
and crusheth their bones,
and shattereth——.†
He hath couched, hath lain down like a lion; 9.
like a lioness, who would rouse him up?—*

Neither can "his seed" denote his posterity, for (1) that suits neither the context with the previous line nor the mention of "much water," and (2) Israel is treated throughout without limitation of time, and consequently includes all generations of his existence as a nation.

* Before this line the text has "God [is] his deliverer out of Egypt," of which I have spoken in a note on xxiii. 22.—The word *הַעֲצָמָה* is of somewhat doubtful signification; Oort says *robur*, Kalisch *fleetness*; the former, or rather *endurance*, appears best justified by the meaning of the root. *רָאָם* (A.V. unicorn) is the Assyrian *ramu*=urus, bos primogenius (see Houghton in Trans. of Soc. Bibl. Arch. V. 336); and this meaning is sufficiently obvious from Deut. xxxiii. 17, where Joseph is compared to this animal, whose two horns are manifestly Ephraim and Manasseh.

† The text is almost certainly corrupt here. The word I have left untranslated is *וְחִצָּיו* "and his arrowa." The verb means "to break in pieces," not to pierce (though so taken by Kalisch and many others), and therefore cannot be easily combined with *arrows*. Hence this noun is by Oort emended into *וְחִצָּיו* "and their loins [the seat of strength, parallel with *bones*] he shatters;" suggested by Deut. xxxiii. 11, *מִחַץ מִתְּנִיָּם הָמִיר* "shatter his insurgents in the loins," where, however, a different word is used for loins. But this very passage suggests to Knobel a different emendation, *וְחִצָּיו* for *וְחִצָּיו* (parallel to *וְחִצָּיו*) "shatter his insurgents." This is much better, because the singular pronoun "his (instead of *their*) loins" is an almost fatal objection to Oort's reading; only if we are at liberty to change the text so completely, many other changes equally plausible might be suggested. Ewald's suggestion involves the least possible alteration, and is at the same time strictly grammatical: *וְחִצָּיו* "and those that shatter him he will shatter." This is very ingenious, but introduces a notion of retaliation which is foreign and scarcely appropriate to the passage. But it is based upon the fact that two of the three radicals of the word *מִחַץ* are repeated in the line; now such a repetition of letters is very often a mere corruption of the text; what, then, if the word *וְחִצָּיו* is due solely to such corruption? Omit it, and you have "their bones he crushes, shatters," which must form one line. In this case, the first two lines of the verse must either both be retained or both be rejected, contrary to my note on xxiii. 22; and it is perhaps more satisfactory to condemn the line about the bull, because the figures in v. 8 are taken from a carnivorous wild beast, in evident anticipation of the lion of v. 9. The two verbs side by side and unconnected find an exact analogy in the following verse.

*Blest be those that bless thee,
and curst those that curse thee !*

This speech is even stronger than the last. It proclaims unbounded prosperity to Israel's agriculture, and easy supremacy over all neighbouring nations, which must fear to rouse his wrath, as he is as cruel in wars of extermination as he is exalted in power. The reference to this cruelty, which becomes very distinct in verse 8, is perhaps suggested by the name of Agag king of Amalek, mentioned in verse 7 as one far inferior to the king of Israel ; for in the early days of Saul's reign, Samuel "cut him to pieces before Jahveh at Gilgal" (1 Sam. xv. 33). But it is fully justified by other facts, such as the frightful tortures perpetrated by David against the Ammonites, according to 2 Sam. xii. 31 ; although, if there were not events like these to refer to, we might perhaps satisfy ourselves with the explanation that the terms used are mere figures referring to the ordinary extermination of enemies, but heightened in their mode of expression by the comparison with the lion which does crush the bones of his prey. No wonder that Balak can bear no more, but orders Balaam not merely to *go* but to *fly* from his presence back to his own country, adding the sarcastic remark, "I thought I was going to honour thee greatly ; but lo, Jahveh has kept thee back from honour"—the god of whom thou art always boasting has done thee a bad turn just now. Balaam answers the taunt with dignity, again shewing himself perfectly upright and consistent. He then says he is going ; but yet will not go till he has told Balak what this people will do to his people in future time. Thus is introduced a fourth oracle, which includes verses 15—19, and is followed by three smaller utterances, v. 20, 21—22, 23—24, on the Amalekites, Kenites and Assyrians respectively. But verses 18 and 19, which are not on Moab but on Edom, are rightly separated by Dr. Kalisch from what precedes : so that the fourth oracle is contained in vv. 15—17 only. It is as follows :

The oracle of Balaam, son of Beor, xxiv. 15.
and the oracle of the man of unclosed eye,

- the oracle of him who heareth the sayings of God,* 16.
and knoweth the knowledge of the Most High,
who seeth the sight of the Almighty,
prostrate and with eyes open :
I see him, but not now, 17.
I look upon him, but not near ;
There hath walked forth a star from Jacob,
and arisen a sceptre from Israel,
and shattered both sides of Moab,
*and the crown of the head of all the tumultuous ones !**

According to Dr. Kalisch, this is the conclusion of the original and genuine oracles of Balaam. Considering that

* In v. 17 the writer places himself in the assumed position of Balaam in the age of Moses, and makes Balaam see future events as in the distance—not now, nor near. The star and sceptre are figures denoting a king, who, it is said, will crush Moab; the most obvious reference is to David; see 2 Sam. viii. The star and the sceptre are not the epithets or insignia attached to the king, but denote the king himself, for he it is who will “rise up from Israel.” The “two sides” are שְׁנֵי צַדִּימָא, dual of צַדִּימָא; and as Moab is figured as a man, these are the sides of his head, or temples; the word is often so used. The next line reads in the original שָׁרַף וְהָרַס בְּכָל-בְּנֵי-תוֹמָא, in which the first word is a verb; it is generally translated, “and has demolished all the sons of tumult.” But the verb, which is found in only one other passage, denotes to *undermine* a wall, and is scarcely conceivable as a parallel to שָׁרַף to *shatter*, and with a person for its object. It is fortunate that we have in Jer. xlviii. 45, a passage treating of the Moabites which repeats these two lines with some difference of reading: “a fire שָׂרַף וְהָרַס בְּכָל-צַדִּימָא מוֹאָב וְהָרַס בְּכָל-בְּנֵי-תוֹמָא” devours the side of Moab and the crown of the head of the sons of tumult.” Here for the questionable verb we have a substantive which only substitutes שָׂרַף for שָׁרַף and yields an excellent sense, the crown being added to the sides of the head to indicate the total destruction. Among the ancient versions the Samaritan seems to be the only one that has this substantive here; but I cannot hesitate to adopt it, with Knobel and Oort, and consider that the old precept, to prefer the harder reading, is misapplied by Kalisch here, where it is really not so much harder as impossible. The word שָׂרַף *tumult*, also guides us to the correct interpretation of שָׂרַף; for “the sons of Seth” has no intelligible meaning; only one Seth, the son of Adam, is known, and nothing is told of him; the only signification which “sons of Seth” could bear is mankind generally; but this is impossible here, where we require a parallel to Moab, such as Edom or one of the other ancient foes of Israel would be; and besides, mankind is denoted by “sons of Adam.” Besides שָׂרַף the root שָׂרַף also forms the synonymous noun שָׂרַף, which occurs in Lam. iii. 47; and our word is manifestly the same, in the defective spelling. But Jeremiah need not be taken as infallible with regard to the text; and his singular “side” seems less correct than our dual “both sides.”

these oracles are delivered to Balak king of Moab in answer to his demand of a curse upon Israel, Dr. Kalisch holds that they ought to reveal nothing but what closely belongs to that subject—the future power of Israel, especially as exerted over Moab. Up to xxiv. 17 the oracles keep within these limits; but in verses 18—24 the seer turns his mental eye upon other nations, and proclaims very briefly the fates of Edom, Amalek, the Kenites and Assyria. These subjects would not concern the king of Moab at all, and therefore they must be regarded as a later accretion. Another argument tending in the same direction is, that the writer evidently considers it essential to the curse or blessing, that the prophet should *see* those whose fate he either determines or announces. Balaam had to be brought from Aram to the heights of the Pisgah, to see Israel; and once there, he was supposed by Balak to have his mind variously affected according as he beheld this or that part, more or less, of Israel.* But the four nations whose fate is announced in vv. 18—24 are too distant to be seen from the Pisgah; yet the writer keeps up the fiction of their being visible, in the case of Amalek and the Kenites (vv. 20, 21). It might however be said that the writer uses a poetical license in imagining the range of Pisgah to command a wider view than it really does; and possibly the view which the dying Moses has from that same mountain (Deut. xxxiv. 1—3) is similarly extended beyond the possibilities of nature. The argument about the necessity for the prophet to see the people is therefore not decisive against the authenticity of these verses. It may be admitted that there are other reasons for suspicion. Balaam's concern is with the fortunes of Israel alone; now Israel's deeds are mentioned in verses 18 and 19, on the destruction of Edom, but not in the succeeding verses, and it scarcely seems to be Balaam's function to tell of the Assyrian conquest of the Kenites, nor of troubles brought upon the Assyrians from the West. At the same time we must beware of prescribing for the prophet what he ought to say and what to

* xxii. 6, 41, xxiii. 9, 13, 27, 28, xxiv. 2.

omit. We may well understand how a prophet whose main subject is the glory of Israel, may be led by enthusiasm to say some things not strictly belonging thereto. And, after all, these additions do belong to the history of Israel; even the Assyrian power, which it is not pretended is to be annihilated by Israel, was of the highest moment to the welfare of Israel, and carried the larger part of the latter nation into captivity. I do not therefore think that there is sufficient ground for separating these later verses from the earlier ones, and I scarcely believe that Dr. Kalisch would have so judged, were it not that they contain evidence of a later date than he wishes to assign to Balaam's oracles. To this question I will recur after interpreting them.

And Edom hath become a possession, 18.

and Seir his enemy hath become a possession,

while Israel acquireth might ;

*and Jacob overcometh them** 19.

and destroyeth the remnant from the city.

And he saw Amalek, and uttered his parable and said : 20.

First of nations is Amalek ;

but his future is that he will perish.†

* The text reads, "[one] from Jacob conquers"—the verb having neither subject nor object; an indefinite "one" might possibly be assumed as subject, although the addition "from Jacob" makes it not really indefinite, and therefore removes the passage out of the category of predicates with an indefinite subject. But the verb appears in an abbreviated form יִירָדָהּ for יִירָדָהּ, which cannot be satisfactorily explained. Gaab (quoted by Knobel) proposed, by attaching the ם to the preceding instead of the following word, to remove both difficulties. We then have יִירָדָהּם יִעֲלֶקֶב, which I have translated. The only anomaly is the plural object *them*, which is not surprising in speaking of a nation. But the uneven number of lines makes me suspect an imperfect text.

† If the text can be maintained, we must read with some old versions עַד אֲמָלֵק, Amalek (not אֲמָלֵקִי) being its subject; עַד *until*, is used instead of "when" in speaking of what happens *at the end* of a period; cf. 1 Sam. i. 22, quoted by Gesenius, and עַד כִּמְצֹא v. 22. Or else we might point it (אֲמָלֵק) עַד אֲמָלֵק "his future will be up to destruction," i.e. will carry him on to the point when he himself will be destroyed; but this is incredibly harsh; and this word for "destruction" does not actually occur anywhere.

- And he saw the Kenite, and uttered his parable and said : 21.
Firm is thy dwelling-place,
*and placed on the rock thy nest [Ken];**
yet Kain will be devoted to extermination, 22.
when Asshur leudeth thee captive.†
 And he uttered his parable and said : 23.
Ah, but who shall live
longer than God appoints him ?‡
Ships from the direction of the Chittim 24.
will humble Asshur and humble Eber,
even him, until he perish.§

I approach with great diffidence the difficult question of the

* *אֵימ* as pass. part. for *אֵימ* seems established by Obad. 4, if not by 1 Sam. ix. 24; see Ewald, *Lehrb.* 7th ed. p. 387.—*קַן* *ken*, "nest," is a play on the name of the Kenites; *קַיִן* Kain, in the next line, is the name of their assumed progenitor, who has the same name, but need not be supposed to have been regarded as the same person, with the son of Adam.

† The same alternation between the second and the third person is observed here as in verses 5 and 7, 9.—*עַד־כֵּן* (with *כֵּן* for the relative *כֵּן* as in xxiii. 28) literally *until*, but used as *when*, of the *terminus in quo*; see note on v. 20.

‡ This translation, due to Kuenen's ingenuity, seems to be the only one that secures to *כֵּן* its real sense (*more than*), and that refers the suffix *י* to a word within the sentence, viz. *כֵּן*. All the others make the great mistake of referring it to Asshur in v. 22, with which, as this is a distinct prophecy, separated by the words of prose, "And he uttered his parable and said," it can have no grammatical connexion. Moreover, Kuenen's version alone gives a sense which serves to introduce the anticipated humiliation of Assyria: no one, alas! can live beyond his brief appointed period; and so even the mighty Asshur is destined to be brought low. These two lines are made by Oort out of one; a couplet is needed, and the obvious pause in the middle justifies the division.

§ The odd number of lines in v. 24 shows that the text is uncertain. Oort restores the even number by dividing the line, "will humble Asshur | and humble Eber;" but this very obvious device is not admissible here, where the two synonymous lines do not form a couplet together, but the first forms the second line of one, and the second the first line of another couplet; besides, the second is too short. Eber is Mesopotamia, from which the Hebrews (*עִבְרִיִּים*) were believed to have come, and to have derived their name; here it is synonymous with Asshur, as the land belonged to the Assyrian empire. The last line cannot form a distinct sentence, and *בְּמִדְבַּר* is satisfactorily understood as emphasizing Assyria—even that empire which in the writer's time was still dominant. The *י* before *בְּמִדְבַּר* should probably be cancelled, unless it be taken as indicating the loss of a line. The last words must be read *עַד יִאָּבֵד* as in v. 20.

probable date of these prophecies. If we are at liberty to reject the oracles on Edom, Amalek, &c., as later additions, we may perhaps follow Dr. Kalisch in assigning the rest to so early an age as that of David. He reaches this conclusion from the following five considerations:—1. All the tribes of Israel are described as inhabiting the land in security and prosperity (xxiii. 9, 24, xxiv. 2, 5). 2. The people are constituted as a monarchy (xxiv. 7, 17). 3. One king rules the country, and Jacob and Israel are identical (xxiv. 5, 7, 17). 4. The Moabites are mentioned as utterly vanquished and humbled (xxiv. 17). 5. This section breathes on the whole a warlike spirit (xxiii. 24, xxiv. 8, 9, 17); such descriptions do not harmonize with the peaceful times of king Solomon. But these arguments are not convincing. In the times of the double kingdom, the term Israel is often used in its old sense of the whole nation, as in Amos i. 1, iii. 1, v. 1; and the names Jacob and Israel are synonymous, denoting the whole nation; so in Is. ix. 7 [8], xiv. 1, xxix. 23, Micah i. 5, ii. 12, iii. 1. The single mention of “his king” in xxiv. 7 is scarcely precise enough to make us sure that there was *only* one; and that of the “sceptre” in xxiv. 17, though certainly referring to an individual, does not preclude the existence of a second king. Still, we must concede to Dr. Kalisch that the picture of internal welfare and national strength is most fully realized in periods free from internal dissension; but does this necessarily drive us to the time of David? The reign of Jeroboam II. of Israel, B.C. 825—784, according to the common chronology, is pointed to as a time of great prosperity, when the two kingdoms appear to have been again temporarily united through his predecessor’s victory over the king of Judah (obscurely mentioned in 2 Kings xiv. 12—15, 19), and raised again to power by his own brilliant successes (2 Kings xiv. 25, 28, xiii. 5); and this king might well be the Star and Sceptre of xxiv. 17, if not the king greater than Agag. We may infer from the contemporary prophecies of Amos (i. 13—15, ii. 1—3) that Jeroboam included Moab and Ammon among his conquests, which recovered to the kingdom its greatest extent,

from Hamath in Syria to the stream in the Arabah or desert valley to the south of the Dead Sea (Amos vi. 14, 2 Kings xiv. 25, 28). His power and popularity are sufficiently indicated by the fact, that the writer of the Book of Kings, violent as is his hatred to the kings of Israel of the race of the first "Jeroboam the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin," allows to Jeroboam II. the glorious title of a Saviour (2 Kings xiii. 5, xiv. 27); which he fully deserved if he delivered his people from all fear of the terrible power of the Syrians, which had always been menacing them from the reign of Ahab, nearly a century before, and which soon after his death began again to be troublesome. From the notices in the prophets whose age is known, we discover that Moab, which had been so effectually subdued by David that it is not heard of again as a power till nearly a century and a half later, was never afterwards so completely conquered, but gave trouble to several kings, notably Uzziah, Jotham and Ahaz. This fact seems to me to speak strongly in favour of a late date for Balaam's prophecy. It was not *after* the conquest of a hostile nation that it became the object of so much anxiety and interest as to call forth the words of prophets concerning it, but *before*—while Israel was not yet safe from anticipated danger. Then the prophet's words were welcome to nerve the people to perseverance in resistance; and on this ground Balaam's declarations to the Moabite leader seem to me far more suitable to the later times of Jeroboam II. or his successors than to the earlier age of David. The same remark applies to the prophecy on the Edomites, which could scarcely have been written soon after their complete subjection by David, when they were no longer dangerous. Far more likely is it that it has reference to the campaign of Amaziah king of Judah against them, shortly before the accession of Jeroboam II. of Israel. The later prophecies on the Kenites and Assyrians are so vague as to suggest the idea that they are really in anticipation of the events they proclaim. The Assyrians made the kingdom of Israel tributary in the reign of Menahem king of Israel, who followed Jeroboam II. after an interval of two short reigns

amounting to only seven months together. It may well be that even before this time the Assyrians had been engaged in the subjugation of outlying and exposed tribes like the Kenites. The idea that the Assyrians themselves were destined to be humiliated by a power coming from the West until they should ultimately be annihilated, looks like a genuine prediction, founded doubtless upon the Hebrew ethical principle of retaliation ; for nothing else in these oracles can be brought down to so late an age as that in which the Assyrians ceased to be aggressive, and were a manifestly declining power ; and the form of the oracle strongly favours this view.* Thus the most likely period for the publication of these oracles would seem to be the quarter of a century which may be roughly described as B.C. 800—775 : I cannot here enter into the very vexed question of the chronology of the kings of this period.

We are gradually feeling our way towards certainty on the dates of the chief writings of the Old Testament. It is not very long since respectable critics could accept without misgiving the Mosaic origin of at least a considerable part of the Pentateuch ; the age of Samuel was regarded as one teeming with literature, even Colenso suggesting Samuel as a likely author of the Elohistic parts of Genesis ; the reign of David was the most brilliant period for literature as for national glory, the king himself being its greatest ornament by virtue of his numerous psalms, written to celebrate any remarkable event of his reign. Finally, the reign of his successor Solomon was regarded as a time rather past the climax, when the resources of art had already been fully used, and a certain weariness born of satiety had set in ; a time of philosophic

* The preliminary ejaculation, "Who shall live longer than God appoints him?" seems given in order to indicate the principle on which the prophet relies for the truth of the words that follow. And the word Chittim, which denotes properly Cyprus (especially the Phenician colony of Kition), but appears to be used also in a more general sense of the western countries, and as some think especially of the Greeks, is so vague as to provoke the suspicion that the prophet is here not speaking of a past or present that he knows, but of an expected future—which indeed was not realized.

reflection on the morrow of the feast, when enjoyment is over and the aching head pronounces all to be vanity. It need hardly be said how utterly antiquated this conception of the history of Hebrew literature is. It could only be sketched out by one who systematically ignored the facts of history as exhibited by the only reliable interpreters whose dates are known—the Prophets. If their evidence be received, Hebrew thought and religion, so far from having reached its climax under David and being worn out under Solomon, was vigorous and still youthful under Hezekiah; and the characteristics formerly ascribed to Solomon are found to be scarcely yet present in Josiah's reign. Our old ideas were mainly due to an enormous exaggeration of the antiquity of the books of uncertain date, especially those attributed to Solomon and the Pentateuch. The error having been discovered, the present tendency is of course to reduce the antiquity of everything which has not positive proof of great age. If the times that produced the various portions of the Pentateuch were subsequent to David, then the aspect of his age is altogether changed. It now appears to us as a primitive time, when but little, if any, literature can have existed, and we are tempted still further to cut down the number of psalms which Ewald allowed to be by David or of his age; and in the case of a composition of utterly uncertain date, we feel a hesitation to admit it to so great an antiquity, which those who could look upon the time of David as the most brilliant age of literature could not understand. Hence, I think, comes the repugnance, which I confess I cannot overcome, to considering the age of David as a possible one for Balaam's prophecies. The presumption seems now to be the other way. At the same time, if we would keep our judgment clear and candid, we ought to realize to ourselves how far this is a matter of presumption only, and that a grain of positive evidence may at any time turn the scale. Criticism sways backwards and forwards many times before it settles in its final position. The present tendency towards lowering the antiquity of books may be excessive, even though we do not now feel it so.

The only positive evidence as to date, beyond the considerations of historical fitness, which occurs to me, is afforded by language and style; on which I can only say a few words. It is difficult, in the absence of undoubted writings of David's time, to say what the language was then. It is easy, however, to see that the language of the Book of Balaam has very few, if any, traces of antiquity, and on the other hand occasionally startles us by strikingly modern forms.* The language of its narrative is in its vocabulary and constructions indistinguishable from that of the Jahvist writer or writers of the Pentateuch, and decidedly different from that of the Elohist.† This fact, I may remark in passing, makes me hesitate as to the propriety of following Dr. Kalisch in calling ch. xxii.—xxiv. the "Book of Balaam," notwithstanding the fact that it does appear to be destitute of any close connexion with the preceding and following chapters, and to be at some points incompatible with them. Many of the Old Testament books—notably Judges and some of the Prophets—contain, or even consist entirely of, a number of separate pieces, which may be all by one author, but are evidently distinct publications only loosely connected together by subject, or else having no bond of union but that of a common authorship. Such a piece is the Book of Balaam; with equal propriety we may speak of a Book of Gideon, of Samson, of Micah and the Levite. But if it be allowed that such designations have their usefulness, let not that usefulness be impaired by an exaggerated idea of the independence of the short pieces under consideration. It

* Among the comparatively recent forms, which seem to me to tell strongly against any date earlier than the time of Jeroboam II., and rather to argue for a somewhat later age, are the words *תוֹעֲפֹת*, *שָׁת*, *מְלֻכֹּת*, *רָאם*, *שָׁפִי*, *יִשְׁקָה*, *יִשְׁקָה* (even if pointed *יִשְׁקָה*), *מָח* as a relative (xxiii. 3, 23, xxiv. 22), and the verbal roots *נָקַב* and *קָבַב*, *גָּרַם* *Pi*, *שָׁרַם*. Where any of these occur in the Pentateuch, they are found only in the portions which are now admitted to have been written at a late period of the monarchy, if not after the Captivity.

† What forms the basis of Dr. Kalisch's estimate of style I fail to discover; surely not the vocabulary or favourite constructions of the writer, which I have examined. Therefore I can only quote in surprise his assertion (p. 145) that the narrative of xxii. 1—21 "has nothing in common with the Jahvistic style."

is perhaps impossible to predicate anything definite of the personality of the Jahvist. We can recognize his tone of thought and his favourite words and expressions, and we can form some idea of his age; but we cannot tell whether he is one or many. In saying that the narrative of our chapters is to be attributed to him, therefore, we do not commit ourselves to the assertion that it is by the same individual as ch. xxi. This indeed it cannot be; for in ch. xxi. Israel has already advanced much further than the Arnon, which was the northern boundary of Moab—to Dibon, Heshbon, Medebah, the Jabbok, Bashan—and conquers Sihon king of the Amorites and Og king of Bashan. Thus the time of danger for Moab is already past at the end of ch. xxi.; moreover, the conqueror of the conquerors of Moab, the Amorites, would be received rather as a deliverer than as a new enemy. Chapters xxi. and xxii., therefore, cannot be by the same writer, although they may be due to the same age and school.

Several expressions occur which are either identical or strikingly similar to phrases in other books. When such expressions are so idiomatic as to make it impossible that they could have been produced independently by two writers, they may yield some evidence as to the age of our book. "His seed-fields are full of much water" (xxiv. 7 *b*), appears to be quoted or adapted by Isaiah in the longer sentence on Tyre, "With much water the seed-land of Sihor (= the Nile), the harvest of the Nile, is her revenue" (Is. xxiii. 3). And so also our verse xxiv. 17 *c-f*, "There hath walked forth a star from Jacob, and arisen a sceptre from Israel, and shattered both sides of Moab, and the crown of the head of all the sons of tumult," seems to be the foundation on which Jeremiah raised the verse which forms the climax of his description of the destruction of Moab: Heshbon, he says, is no longer safe, "for a fire goes forth from Heshbon, and flame from the midst of Sihon, and devours the side of Moab and the crown of the head of the sons of tumult" (Jer. xlviii. 45).* The other

* All the points of difference are in favour of the originality of Balaam's words. ~~1117~~ especially is a later and more intelligible form substituted for the obscure

notable phrases bear less clear evidence of originality. Balaam says (xxiii. 9), "Here is a people that dwelleth apart;" and in the Blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxiii. 28) we find, in the same words, "Israel dwelleth in security apart." Balaam says (xxiii. 19), "God is not a man, that he should lie, nor the son of a mortal, that he should repent;" which sentiment is expressed in nearly the same words by Samuel, "The Reliance of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a mortal, so as to repent." In this passage Samuel's words seem just to miss the rhythm which would make them poetry, and sound like misquoted poetry; and the neatness of expression which is wanting there is conspicuous in Balaam's words. In Balaam's oracle, moreover, they occur in a very natural context; while in Samuel they are dragged in rather too violently to be original there; they might very well be a quotation. There is however one consideration on the other side.* The other passages are identical, or nearly so, in the two places. In xxiv. 14 we have the phrase "in later days," of the time to which Balaam's prophecy relates; it is used of the time pointed to by Jacob's prophecy in Gen. xlix. 1. Balaam says of Israel, "He hath couched, hath lain down like a lion; like a lioness, who would rouse him up" (xxiv. 9 *a b*); Jacob says the same of Judah, Gen. xlix. 9. Balaam blesses Israel in the words, "Blest be those that bless thee, and curst those that curse thee" (xxiv. 9 *c d*), the same in which Isaac blesses Esau, in a Jahvistic passage, Gen. xxvii. 29. The most definite result

תש, which even if written תש is less clear. The dual תש is far better than the singular תש, and yet likely to be original, since the latter might be produced through negligence or misunderstanding. The word כל "all the sons" is certainly original, especially if the meaning is, "not Moab only, but *all* tumultuous people in whatsoever quarter." And the general idea of Balaam's verse, that a power fatal to Moab comes out of Israel is far more likely to be the primary sense of these words, than the vaguer and more trivial notion that when Moab is being destroyed (we are not even told by whom) the city of Heshbon can no longer serve as a refuge, but will rather prove a danger, as "a fire shall issue from it," &c.

* Samuel uses the verb שקר, Balaam כזב for "to lie;" and the former is perhaps the older word. This is however not certain, as the latter is used by Amos, Micah and Isaiah.

yielded by these passages is, that Balaam's oracles are earlier than Isaiah and Jeremiah. It appears probable that they are also earlier than the composition of the Book of Samuel; and they reflect the style and phrases of the Jahvistic writers of the Pentateuch so decidedly, that they must belong to the same age. These considerations would confirm our previous conclusion, and suggest a date somewhat later than 800 B.C.

One very important branch of the subject I have left to the last, and must despatch in a few words—the legend of Balaam as found elsewhere. The adequate study of this question may perhaps yield an answer to the question, What was the original legend? that contained in our Book of Balaam, or some other, of which ours is a later modification? First let us notice that the only passage which appears to take the same view of Balaam's history and character as our chapters is Micah vi. 5: "My people, remember what Balak king of Moab schemed, and what Balaam son of Beor answered him [from Shittim to Gilgal], because he understood the righteousness of Jahveh." Balaam here is seen not to have entered into Balak's views, but to have understood Jahveh's mind, which was opposed to them; he therefore uttered no curse; moreover, Balaam is put into connection with Moab, not with Midian. It is important to notice that Micah wrote in the reigns of Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, so that these words may have been written less than forty years after Balaam's prophecies. According to these accounts it is evident that Balak was supposed to have been frightened by Balaam's words into giving up his idea of fighting with Israel. The same is distinctly stated in Judges xi. 25: "Art thou [Ammon] really better [i.e. stronger] than Balak son of Zippor king of Moab? Did he dispute with Israel, or fight with them?" A somewhat different conception of the action of Balaam is presented in Deut. xxiii. 4—6 [3—5]: "An Ammonite and a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of Jahveh . . . because he [the Moabite] hired against thee Balaam son of Beor from Pethor in Mesopotamia to curse thee; but Jahveh thy God was not willing to hearken to Balaam, and Jahveh thy God turned for thee

the curse into a blessing; for Jahveh thy God loved thee." The correctness of this passage is guaranteed by Neh. xiii. 1, where it is quoted from the "Book of Moses." Here it is implied that Balaam did pronounce a curse, for Jahveh turned *the curse* into a blessing; otherwise the legend is the same as before; Balaam is still associated with the king of Moab. The time of the Deuteronomist, it is well known, is the reign of Josiah, about 624 B.C. In Joshua xxiv. 9, 10, we hear that "Balak son of Zippor king of Moab arose and fought with Israel; and he sent and called Balaam son of Beor to curse you; and I was not willing to hearken to Balaam, and so he blessed you greatly; and I delivered you from his hand." This passage reproduces the very words of Deuteronomy,* and is probably by the same writer; for although the omission of any mention of the utterance of a curse makes it appear more closely related to the Book of Balaam and Micah, the distinct statement that Balak did fight with Israel renders this impossible. In Num. xxxi. 8 we have a very different account: "They slew the kings of Midian among their slain: Evi and Rekem and Zur and Hur and Reba—five kings of Midian; and Balaam son of Beor they slew with the sword." After the details of the massacre and plunder, we read (v. 15): "And Moses said to them, Have ye kept all the women alive? Why, these were to the sons of Israel, through the word of Balaam, [the cause] of making defection against Jahveh in the affair of Peor, and the plague came into the congregation of Jahveh." This last verse refers clearly to the plague† described in Num. xxv. 6—18, which is however only said at the end (v. 18) to have anything to do with "the affair of Peor," and in which Balaam's name is not mentioned. The account in Num. xxxi. brings Balaam into connection with Midian instead

* לָלַךְ to curse, instead of אָרַךְ, קָבַךְ, נָקַךְ and זָעַם; וְאֵלֶיךָ to be willing; שָׁמַע to hearken. The expression, "I delivered you from his hand," shows that, if he did not curse, he would have done, and that the curse would have had force.

† מַגֵּפָה; the same word is used in Num. xxv. 8, 18, and xxxi. 16. —Num. xxv. 1—5 is a distinct narrative from xxv. 6—18, and by a different writer, and inconsistent with the latter, especially in knowing nothing of this "plague."

of Moab, and apparently treats him as a Midianite ; at least it does not say that he had been brought from Mesopotamia, which would presumably have been mentioned had the writer known it. The words "through the word of Balaam" can only be explained by a hypothesis—that Balaam was regarded as somehow the leading spirit in the scandalous occurrence described in xxv. 6—18, although he is not alluded to in that account. These chapters of Numbers might, on the evidence afforded by the mode in which they have misrepresented everything relating to Balaam, be pronounced to belong to the very latest portion of the Pentateuch and to be written after the Captivity, if this result were not reached independently by other arguments. The only other passage in which Balaam is mentioned is Josh. xiii. 21, 22, where the list of places forming the boundary of the tribe of Reuben is closed by "all the cities of the plain, and all the kingdom of Sihon king of the Amorites, who reigned in Heshbon ;" to this our present text adds the words, "whom Moses smote, and [he smote] the princes of Midian—Evi and Rekem and Zur and Hur and Reba, vassals of Sihon, inhabitants of the land ; and Balaam son of Beor, the diviner, the sons of Israel slew with the sword among their slain." These words are a manifest interpolation, and are merely copied with very slight alteration from Num. xxxi. 8. It is an alteration for the worse that here the Amorites and Midianites are confounded together. Balaam receives a new epithet, "the diviner," which in the age when this was written was certainly not complimentary.* He has now begun to be regarded as a common deceiver, and as inspired by feelings of especial bitterness of hatred towards Israel. This idea is worked out by the Talmudists and the Jewish doctors generally with a marvellous ingenuity of invention. Dr. Kalisch says,

"Balaam accordingly is not only 'the wicked' par excellence, but he is stamped as the permanent type both of human depravity and

* רִקְיָאִים. The "rewards of divination" (רִקְמִים, from the same root), in Num. xxii. 7, were in their day, as I have said, not signs of an illicit or deceitful art.

of the enmity of the impious against Israel as a nation. . . . Balaam himself was identified with Laban, whom old Jewish writers credit with every vice of cunning and fraud. He was detestable like Cain and Doeg, Ahitophel, Gehazi, and Haman. He was among those counsellors of Pharaoh who advised the murder of every new-born male child of the Hebrews," &c.

Much very curious matter of this sort, which it was well worth while to collect, will be found in Dr. Kalisch's book. It forms a valuable commentary on the allusions to Balaam in the New Testament, which prove how largely the writers of the Christian Scriptures drew from late Jewish tradition, and how little able they were to distinguish idle and baseless stories from the original legend. I need not, after what has been said, do more than refer to the only passages in the New Testament in which Balaam is mentioned: 2 Peter ii. 14—16, Jude 11, and Rev. ii. 14, 15.* For a discussion on the interesting and intricate question whether the ancient Arabian

* "The doctrine of the Nicolaitans" in Rev. ii. 15 is mentioned with "the doctrine of Balaam" in v. 14. The name Balaam, which is generally assumed to denote "Devourer" or "Destroyer of the people," appears to have been translated into Nicolaus, "Conqueror of the people," and thus the Nicolaitans are those that follow Balaam; they are also mentioned in v. 6. Those that took the later view of Balaam as hostile to the people, and especially as having procured the destruction of 24,000 by the plague in Num. xxv. 9, naturally interpreted the name thus. Whether this was its original meaning is another question, which I am inclined to answer in the negative; the name of the first king of Edom, as given in Genesis xxxvi. 32, was "Bela son of Beor" (בֶּלְעָם בֶּן-בְּעוֹר), and the coincidence can hardly be accidental; but it will scarcely be maintained that a man would be named "Destruction" pure and simple, even by tradition. Of course if my arguments for the originally upright character of Balaam in tradition are cogent, his name *cannot* have a meaning which harmonizes only with another view of his character. Either the name must have some other meaning or it must have been changed. Our prophet's name is in the Massoretic punctuation בִּלְעָם Bileam; but the first syllable may have originally had the vowel *a*, which the LXX. and Vulg. preserve. The meaning "Destruction of the people" rests on the assumed form בִּלְעָם; but the single *ע* makes this very questionable. Other explanations which retain the single *ע* are, (1) *Bil'-am* "Destroyer" (Kalisch), in which the termination is not the word עָם "people," but an affix denoting the agent; (2) בִּלְעָם "Not the people" (Gesenius), i.e. not one of the sons of Israel, but a *Foreigner*; (3) בִּלְעָם "Lord of the people," from בָּל Aramean for the Hebrew בָּעַל, which last alone seems to me perfectly satisfactory.

sage Lokman is in any sense identical with the Hebrew Balaam, I have no room, and gladly refer the reader to Dr. Kalisch's pages. Both are personages belonging to tradition which may have no historical basis at all—that is, in the latter case, to mythology; many characteristics are common to them; and the assumed meaning of both names is identical, so that whichever is the more recent might be a literal translation of the other. But although the Arabs in recent times have added to the stories of Lokman features intended to connect him with Balaam, and one or two Jewish writers have stated that the latter is called by the Arabs Lokman, it appears certain that the Arabs originally knew of Balaam as distinct from Lokman,* and that their primitive conception of Lokman was far from identical with any of the various characters attributed to Balaam. The identity of meaning of the two names, also, is more than doubtful.† Moreover, much of what the Arabs assert of primeval times is either the pure invention of a recent age or a distorted picture of something gathered from the history or mythology of their neighbours.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

* See Korán, sur. vii. v. 174, 175, with Sale's note; D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Orientale*, s. v. Balaam; and the Hamburg *Orient* for 1846 in its *Literaturblatt*, No. 29, p. 451, which contains an important letter from Prof. F. (i.e. Fleischer).

† I have shown that it is exceedingly doubtful whether *Balaam* means the "Destroyer;" it is equally so whether *Lokman* denotes the "Voracious;" and even if it does, the conceptions of *destroying* and *swallowing* are by no means identical.

II.—THE LEICESTER CONFERENCE ON FREE COMMUNION.

The Congregational Year Book, 1878. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

The People called Independents, with relation to their Doctrinal History and Beliefs. By John Kennedy, M.A., D.D. London: Snow. 1878.

The English Independent, May 10 and 17, 1878.

IN October, 1877, the Congregational Union of England and Wales, which was then holding its autumnal session at Leicester, was startled from its propriety by the announcement that at Wycliffe chapel in that town, and during the week of its own meeting, would take place "a public Conference open to all who value spiritual religion, and who are in sympathy with the principle that religious communion is not dependent on agreement in theological, critical or historical opinion." The proposal to hold this Conference had grown out of "a private and informal gathering" which had been held in London at the time of the Union's spring session, the men whose names were appended to the summons being Independent ministers and laymen of more or less eminence, but nearly all held in esteem or suspicion for the liberality of their religious opinions. The announcement of the Conference was followed, somewhat needlessly, by another, signed by the Secretary of the Congregational Union, repudiating on the part of that body a connection which had never been claimed by the leaders of the new movement, who, it was obvious, so long as they kept their own personality and purpose distinct, had a perfect right to avail themselves of the concourse of ministers and laymen produced by the meeting of the Union. The Conference was duly held and largely attended. The Rev. Mark Wilks, of Holloway, occupied the chair, and papers were read by Mr. Picton, of Hackney, "On some Relations of Theology to Religion," and by Mr. Gasquoine, of

Oswestry, "On Freedom in Theological Thought and the Spiritual Life." It was soon manifest, however, that the majority of those present were not in accord with the objects of the meeting, and the discussion at first seemed likely to take what may mildly be described as a contentious turn. Peace, however, was preserved, in great part owing to a vigorous remonstrance addressed to the dissentients by Dr. Simon, who, though himself but little in agreement with the spirit of the Conference, felt and said that the questions which it raised were such as could not be silenced by clamour, but must be faced by argument.

Although the number of those who openly gave their adherence to the principles of the Leicester Conference was but small, the disturbance it produced in the Independent body was out of all proportion to its visible importance. We need not more particularly allude to long and sharp controversies which were carried on in the columns of *The English Independent* and *The Christian World*: these were but the outward signs of a more serious inward commotion. As the time approached for the meeting of the Congregational Union in 1878, the rumour grew that something decisive was to be done, which would certainly prove that the Independent body was soundly orthodox at heart, and perhaps have the result of purging it of its peccant humours. At last it was announced that the Committee, not without much searching of heart and many divisions both in opinion and in vote, had prepared the following resolution, which was to be proposed to the Union for its adoption:

"That in view of the uneasiness produced in the churches of the Congregational Order by the proceedings of the recent Conference at Leicester on the terms of Religious Communion, the Assembly feels called upon to re-affirm, that the primary object of the Congregational Union is, according to the terms of its own constitution, to uphold and extend Evangelical Religion.

"That the Assembly appeals to the history of the Congregational Churches generally, as evidence that Congregationalists have always regarded the acceptance of the Facts and Doctrines of the Evan-

gelical Faith revealed in the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as an essential condition of Religious Communion in Congregational Churches ; and that among these have always been included the Incarnation, the Atoning Sacrifice of the Lord Jesus Christ, His Resurrection, His Ascension and Mediatorial Reign, and the work of the Holy Spirit in the renewal of men.

"That the Congregational Union was established on the basis of these Facts and Doctrines is, in the judgment of the Assembly, made evident by the Declaration of Faith and Order adopted at the Annual Meeting in 1833 ; and the Assembly believes that the Churches represented in the Union hold these Facts and Doctrines in their integrity to this day."

Next, the situation was still further complicated by an announcement made by Dr. Parker, of the City Temple, that he would move the following amendment to the Committee's resolution :

"That whilst this Assembly views hopefully every honourable effort to extend the terms of personal religious communion, it is of opinion that theological and co-operative fellowship, as between churches and any of their organized forms, can be made complete and useful only by the acceptance of a common doctrinal basis, and therefore the Assembly solemnly re-affirms its adhesion to those Evangelical doctrines which the Congregational Union has maintained throughout the whole period of its existence."

Other amendments were also announced : one proposing to fall back on the Declaration of Faith and Order of 1833, to be alluded to hereafter ; another, aiming to supply some of the manifest *lacunæ* in the Committee's confession of faith ; a third, "disallowing the authority of creeds and articles of religion as a bond of union," while declaring it to be the essential object of the Union "to uphold and sustain Evangelical religion." But as none of these amendments, with the exception of Dr. Parker's, formed the subject of debate, we may pass them by without further remark.

A new element of excitement was added to the meeting by the fact that the Chairman of the year was the Rev. J. Baldwin Brown. Mr. Brown's honourable position as the leader of liberal Independency is well known to our readers ; his

courage and his honesty are as much beyond dispute as his intellectual ability: what would be his attitude in the chair? He had passed through some at least of the heretic's experience himself: not many years ago he would not have been called with the same unanimity as now to the honourable post in which his brethren have placed him. Would he avail himself of the Chairman's privilege of neutrality, and turn his opening address away from the question of the hour? Or would it not be a thing abhorrent to his nature, that the year of his Chairmanship should be marked by measures of a repressive and exclusive kind, against which he had lifted up no voice of protest? When the time came, there was no ambiguity in Mr. Baldwin Brown's answer to these questions. He felt that he could not to himself be true unless he pleaded for freedom with all the powers that God had given him. That, in spite of the effect which such an address must have produced, almost the whole vast assembly rejected Dr. Parker's amendment and adopted the Committee's resolution, shews how strong, even in a comparatively free church, are yet the forces of theological fear and prejudice. The debate was on the whole creditably conducted on both sides. To say that there were absolutely no ebullitions of bad taste and bad temper would not be true; but the men of the Leicester Conference were, if not conclusively answered, at least fairly heard; while the fact that the remaining amendments were withdrawn, only shews that so great an assemblage, brought together for so short a time, is fitter for declaration than deliberation. In the interval between the two debates of the Union, the friends of Free Communion met twice; once at the Cannon-Street Hotel, when papers were read, followed by discussion; a second time, for prayer and religious fellowship, at St. Thomas's-Square chapel, Hackney. Here short addresses were delivered by a Baptist, a Unitarian, and a Free-Church minister respectively; the devotional part of the service was conducted by three Independent ministers: a clergyman presided over all: and the general confession was, that the occasion was one of genuine spiritual inspiration and uplifting.

While the Congregational Union was fulminating its decree against the possibility of religious communion between men who differed in theological opinion, men who differed in theological opinion widely enough met and communed.

The simplest aspect of this matter is its relation to the Congregational Union. At the first glance it may not be easy to see what that is. The Congregational Union is not the Independent body; and even if it were, the very theory of Congregationalism would, it might be thought, preserve it from responsibility for what a few members of it chose to do at Leicester, and that with express statement of their own individual position. What is Congregationalism good for, if whenever two or three men agree to take a course distasteful to the majority, the majority, unless they make a special disclaimer, are held to be implicated in it? However, we must accept the facts as we find them. Dr. Mellor declared that the Leicester Conference had excited deep and wide-spread uneasiness among Independents, and the Congregational Union, by its vote, endorsed his statement. If, then, the Conference had inflicted a stain upon the fair Evangelical fame of Congregationalism, how was it to be wiped out? The method actually adopted was that of a Declaration of Faith, of how loose and futile a kind we shall presently see: the only sensible method appears to us to have been that recommended by the Chairman in his opening address: "As to the question whether the Independents are an Evangelical body, it seems to me that there is but one mode of solving it—by being Evangelical." Declarations certainly will not do it. Declarations will not even expel Mr. Picton and Mr. Wilks, who voted against this one in particular. They will not inform the public mind of the extent, great or small, to which rationalism may have undermined the faith of Independents. They will not restore Mr. Edward White to the ranks of ordinary believers, or explain away startling doctrinal utterances from the lips of Mr. R. W. Dale. More than this, so loosely drawn a Declaration as that which was actually adopted, suggests the idea that it was intended rather to conceal the existence of

heresy than to prove its non-existence. It looks as if it were meant much more for the doubters than the sturdy in faith, and to unite the greatest possible number of suffrages without any special regard to their Evangelical soundness. At all events, it is passed; and who is the better for it? What reason for uneasiness that existed before has ceased to exist? The Independent body is exactly where it was, with the same internal and external forces at work upon it, with its centre of gravity unchanged, and without a single heretic reconciled or purged away.

Before we say anything more of this Declaration, it may be well to state clearly what we conceive to be the true attitude of Independents to creeds or declarations of faith in general. They are a people who are apt to make much boast of their freedom: in what precisely does it consist? This question is answered for us quite clearly and succinctly by Dr. Kennedy, in a pamphlet which he has lately published expressly as a contribution to this controversy; and, for reasons which will be obvious, we prefer his words to our own: "In Congregational ordinations, these two things have gone together—and indeed they have run *pari passu* through the whole history of Congregationalism—non-subscription to a formulated creed, and at the same time a common agreement as to the substance of Christian doctrine."* This sentence no doubt accurately expresses the general state of the case; but it may be well to penetrate to concrete facts, and to see how the system works. Undoubtedly the Independents have no creed which stands to them in the same relation as the Prayer-book and Articles do to the Church of England, and as the Westminster Confession to the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland. Each congregation is an individual entity, entitled to be mistress of its own doctrine and discipline. But, at the same time, is not the property, in the great majority of cases, held on trust-deeds which contain doctrinal clauses of a sufficiently rigid and minute kind? Is not the minister bound, if not by express promise, yet by honourable engagement, to square his preaching by

* The People called Independents, p. 20.

these clauses? Is it not usual—we do not say universal—that the admission of laymen to the church, and consequently to the Lord's table, is made dependent upon a personal confession of belief and experience satisfactory to the minister and those who act with him? Then Dr. Kennedy explains at some length how the rite of ordination is made to enforce "the common agreement as to the substance of Christian doctrine." A church may elect what minister it will, but it cannot be admitted to the comity of neighbouring churches unless the new teacher has been formally recognized and received by the ministers round about,—a recognition and reception which are accorded only on the making of a satisfactory confession. Next, with the assistance of the *Congregational Year Book*, we may go a step further. There are county Congregational Unions or Associations, an intermediate stage in that organization of the body which is crowned by the Congregational Union of England and Wales. Into these, ministers and churches must be admitted by vote. We take the rules of the first two or three as they stand in alphabetical order in the *Year Book*. Bedfordshire :—ministers must produce testimonials to character satisfactory to the general committee; churches admitted by votes of three-fourths of members present. Berkshire :—three-fourths vote; ministers from other Associations received by transfer or at the recommendation of five ministers. Bucks, North :—ministers to send a letter of recommendation from some other Association, or from two or more accredited Congregational ministers, with a statement of doctrinal sentiments. These are fair specimens of the rest. Only in two cases is any theological qualification for membership expressly provided for. But we have surely said enough to shew that, without recourse to "subscription," there is ample machinery here for the exclusion of unsound churches and ministers.

We go a step further when we come to the Congregational Union itself. The only doctrinal statement to be found in its rules is the following definition of its first "Object," namely, "to uphold and extend Evangelical religion, primarily in



connection with churches of the Congregational order." And without entering into minute details, unnecessary in this place, we may say that it accepts as members delegates from "any Congregational church connected with the Congregational Association of the county in which it meets, or recommended by such Association;" or from "any church situate in London, the pastor of which is a member of the Board of Congregational Ministers, or which is recommended by that Board." Whatever doctrinal safeguards, then, attend admission to the county Unions, attend in the same way admission to the Congregational Union itself. But the Congregational Union has a confession of faith—if indeed, in view of recent events, we may not more truly say that it has two. In an Appendix to the Year Book, and therefore by no means in a place of dignity proportioned to the importance of the document, we find a "Declaration of the Faith, Church Order and Discipline, of the Congregational or Independent Dissenters, adopted at the annual meeting of the Congregational Union, May, 1833." It is preceded by the following preamble, which, in justice to the peculiarity of the position which the Union takes up, we extract unabridged :

"THE CONGREGATIONAL Churches in England and Wales, frequently called INDEPENDENT, hold the following doctrines, as of Divine authority, and as the foundation of Christian faith and practice. They are also formed and governed according to the principles hereinafter stated.

"PRELIMINARY NOTES.

"1. It is not designed, in the following summary, to do more than to state the leading doctrines of faith and order maintained by Congregational Churches in general.

"2. It is not proposed to offer any proofs, reasons, or arguments, in support of the doctrines herein stated, but simply to declare what the Denomination believes to be taught by the pen of inspiration.

"3. It is not intended to present a scholastic or critical confession of faith, but merely such a statement as any intelligent member of the body might offer, as containing its leading principles.

"4. It is not intended that the following statement should be

put forth with any authority, or as a standard to which assent should be required.

"5. Disallowing the utility of creeds and articles of religion as a bond of union, and protesting against subscription to any human formularies as a term of communion, Congregationalists are yet willing to declare, for general information, what is commonly believed among them, reserving to every one the most perfect liberty of conscience.

"6. Upon some minor points of doctrine and practice, they, differing among themselves, allow to each other the right to form an unbiassed judgment of the Word of God.

"7. They wish it to be observed, that, notwithstanding their jealousy of subscription to creeds and articles, and their disapproval of the imposition of any human standard, whether of faith or discipline, they are far more agreed in their doctrines and practices than any church which enjoins subscription and enforces a human standard of orthodoxy; and they believe that there is no minister and no church among them that would deny the substance of any one of the following doctrines of religion, though each might prefer to state his sentiments in his own way."

The "Principles of Religion" which follow, condensed into twenty articles, it is not necessary to set forth in detail. It is enough to say that they are an ample statement of what in May, 1833, would be considered the essentials of Evangelical belief.

We have been thus precise in our estimate of the relation of the Independent churches to creeds and confessions of faith, rather for historical than for controversial purposes. The facts fully bear out Dr. Kennedy's declaration of principle. There is no common creed, but only a doctrinal understanding, with many and careful guarantees for its practical enforcement. Whether it is better to have a creed openly recited in every service, or one hidden away in musty parchments in some lawyer's office, to be produced and applied when wanted, is a question which admits of difference of opinion. We can even understand a man's preference for an historical document like the Thirty-nine Articles, to be interpreted by competent magistrates in a court of law, over a loose doctrinal under-

standing or vague appreciation of Evangelical orthodoxy, applied by the members of a county Association. But what is of more importance, is the conception of religious freedom which these arrangements seem to produce and foster. It is a liberty to associate on fixed terms, and to refuse association to those who do not like the terms. It is liberty to build a wall of demarcation round any part of the fold you choose, and for those who are outside, full permission to stay there. This could not be much more clearly expressed than it was by Dr. Mellor in the debate of the 7th of May :

“Now, let it be distinctly understood that we have not met here this morning for the purpose of imposing any restrictions upon freedom of thought or freedom of expression. That has been plentifully alleged ; it has been untruthfully alleged. There is not a single member of this Congregational Union who entertains such a foolish, preposterous, and abortive notion. It is not a question of freedom of individual thought and utterance at all ; it does not touch by many leagues the question of individual freedom ; it touches the question of association and fellowship, which is quite a different thing.”

Practically he says to Mr. Picton, “Go, think your thoughts and make known your conclusions where you will, so it be outside this Congregational Union. Once apart from us, if we cannot bless, at least we will not interfere with you, except, indeed, in the way of refusing you all Christian fellowship.” And when Mr. Picton, in his manly and pathetic speech, responded to this virtual invitation to take himself off, with a declaration that Congregationalism was his spiritual home, and that he could not willingly face the thought of leaving it, the groans and laughter which greeted his declaration shewed how completely the meeting endorsed Dr. Mellor’s idea of Christian liberty. Presently, perhaps, even Dr. Mellor and the Congregational Union will come to see that they have approached the subject at the wrong end, and that the responsibility of religious communion lies with the soul that asks for it, not with the Church that gives it. Christ has set none of us at the gate of his fold to keep intruders out : when the

time comes, he will know his own without, sometimes perhaps in spite of, our help. If any man comes to us and asks for religious communion in any sense in which that phrase is used—common worship, individual or corporate sympathy, fellowship at the Lord's table—we hold that we have no right to put any questions to him, but only to go in and out with him in love, till time tries his sincerity. Even then, if he be insincere, he will soon tire of godly companionship, and, betaking himself to more attractive fields, the separation will come from his side, not from ours. And we emphatically differ from Dr. Mellor in thinking it a real offence against a brother's liberty to declare that, however much he may want our religious sympathy, however highly he may value association with us in the work of Christ, he shall not have them except on terms to which he cannot assent.

That Dr. Mellor and the Congregational Union agree with us more than they are willing to admit, is plain from the fact that they hesitate to push their doctrine home. They have only voted a Declaration of Faith which they hope will make Mr. Picton and Mr. Wilks uncomfortable. They have not proposed it for individual adoption. As yet, they have done nothing in the way of personal exclusion. They cannot understand why these gentlemen do not go, as they think honest men should; but beyond making insinuations as to their honesty, they have taken no steps even to procure their resignation. As for the Declaration itself, in adopting which the Union has been quite faithful to its traditions, it is a contemptible piece of theological tailoring, a thing of shreds and patches. This is how the Chairman of the Union himself speaks of it:

“There is another point on which it seems right to say a word. I am but a poor dogmatic theologian, and my opinion may not be worth much, but it strikes me that I have rarely read such a helpless theological document as this resolution. It might do very well as a popular compendium of Evangelical doctrine for a pulpit or a platform, where slipshod utterances are kindly excused; but that a body which has able theologians and teachers of world-wide repu-

tation among its members should promulgate such a document is amazing indeed. Remember, this will be scanned keenly by practised eyes, and it will be scanned quite as closely for what it does not say as well as for what it does say. We may call it what we like, but it will be looked upon as our creed, and our theological reputation is at stake. If the able scholars whom I see around me are content to put forth that document as the best summary which we can construct of the things which are most surely believed among us, be it so. *Liberavi animam meam.*"

The resolution is really not worth theological criticism ; but there are one or two questions in regard to it which it is impossible not to ask. Why are the doctrines which it enumerates, and they alone, selected from the ample and comprehensive schedule of 1833? We have been told that it is because they are the doctrines chiefly impugned at the present moment. Will the criterion work? We hardly think so. These peccant members of the Union are told to find their natural home with the Unitarians: why, then, is there not a precise statement of the doctrine of the Trinity? The Incarnation is included, a doctrine which, in one form or another, all Christians are willing to accept; while nothing is said of the Inspiration of Scripture, a matter which is at the base of all present theological difficulties. What is become of "everlasting punishment," explicitly enough set forth in the Declaration of 1833, and a matter in regard to which, if report speaks truly, the Congregational Union contains far more heretics than those who conspired at Leicester? Even "the life everlasting" is conspicuous by its absence. Is this because a well-known member of the Union, who signalized himself by bitterness against heretics in the press, if not in the pulpit, is the prophet of "conditional immortality," a heresy with which other members, still better known than himself, are supposed to be not untainted? At all events, the Congregational Union must not complain if a rule of interpretation which has been applied in the courts of law to successive Prayer-books of Edward VI. and Elizabeth and Charles II., is brought to bear also upon their Declarations of 1833 and

1878, and the omissions of the latter are considered as at least as significant as its statements.

We may, then, sum up the relations of the Congregational Union to the Leicester Conference in very few words. The Declaration which the Union has just passed is precisely analogous to that of 1833, and so far constitutes no departure from genuine Independent tradition. From their point of view; it is no new offence against freedom; the only just inference to be drawn from it is, that the Independents are not, and never have been, as free as they claim to be. Their liberty is limited by a doctrinal understanding which remains in the muniment-box of a chapel, or in the Appendix of the Year Book, till it is wanted for the more or less direct suppression of heretics. They parade "their jealousy of subscription to creeds and articles, and their disapproval of the imposition of any human standard, whether of faith and discipline," and at the same time their "common agreement as to the substance of Christian doctrine;" but when the occasion arises, it is manifest that their reliance for the purity of the faith is not upon the individual liberty which is secured by non-subscription, but upon the extent to which public Declarations and private Trust-deeds may be made to answer the purpose of creeds and church-courts to enforce them. We venture to predict that this state of things will not last long. The Congregational churches are feeling more and more the modifying and disintegrating influence of modern thought. It is not merely that, like all other churches, they have a left wing, but that the whole host is slowly and half-unconsciously taking up a new position. Even by leading men, whose orthodoxy is above suspicion, the old Calvinistic theology is not preached in the old uncompromising way. We suspect that the authors of the Declaration of 1833 would be very far from satisfied with the sense in which their sons and successors accept and expound it. If this process goes on—and we need not say that it depends upon forces over which not even Dr. Mellor and Mr. Rogers have any control—one of two things must happen: either a creed must be enacted and enforced, or the

"common agreement as to the substance of Christian doctrine" must be gradually modified. Of course this modification will go on too fast for contented orthodoxy, and not fast enough for impatient heresy; but we sincerely hope that the other alternative of a creed will never be chosen. As for "Declarations," they are in every way delusive. They do not expel a single heretic, while they cheer sound believers with the idea that all is right. Over opinions they have still less power than over men. They are chiefly comfortable to those who believe that the real way to treat a rent in the wall is to daub it over with untempered mortar and pretend that it does not exist.

But what is the principle of Free Communion as advanced by the Leicester Conference, and what are its present prospects? As stated by the conveners, it is, that "religious communion is not dependent on agreement in theological, critical or historical opinion." We confess that we cannot help having some sympathy with at least the intellectual position of the gentlemen who at Wycliffe chapel asked for definitions, although it is possible that their demand might easily have been more gently and courteously made; and we think that the time has come at which it is desirable that some of the leaders of the movement should explain, more precisely than they have yet done, what they mean, and within what limitations their principle is to be applied. For ourselves, we have no pretension to undertake this task, and must be understood to utter only an individual and unauthoritative opinion. But we are certainly inclined to doubt whether the principle, as laid down in the words quoted above, is susceptible of full logical defence.

First, however, some possible distinctions in the use of the words "religious communion" may be fitly noted. We understand it to mean, in this connection, the union for praise, prayer, and mutual instruction and encouragement, of men and women under the influence of religious feeling. Every one acknowledges that there is something—we will not pause to define what—in public or common, which is wanting in private or solitary worship; the question is, whether that something can be attained under conditions of theological

difference among the worshipers? And in trying to answer it, we should be disposed to draw a distinction between habitual and occasional worship. As to the latter, no man who looks facts in the face can for a moment doubt. *Solvitur ambulando*. No one, we should suppose, is so rigidly and senselessly sectarian as never to worship out of the fold which is his doctrinal home. Such an one could not wander even into other churches of his own sect without experiencing the necessity of an intellectual give and take. There is some slight change of religious climate involved in passing from Mr. Baldwin Brown to Mr. Dale, and from Mr. White to Mr. Rogers. The variations which exist within the borders of the Church of England are a subject of contemptuous scoff to most Independent critics, and of pious gratitude to others, whose ideal of the true Church is a little wider and more many-sided. To ourselves, we must confess, nothing is more uplifting and soul-stirring than to escape for a little while from ecclesiastical associations, which, however wide in theory, are contracted in fact, and to feel, in any fortuitous relation of worship adopted for an hour, and after the hour has passed, dissolved, that it is impossible to escape from the communion of saints and the brotherhood of the children of God. The lesson is forced upon the mind with delightful iteration, that all who are truly seeking after the better life are of one family. All subjects of the kingdom of heaven bear plain marks of the divine citizenship. Nor is it easy to say what are the limits beyond which this communion becomes first forced and then impossible. Certainly they do not lie within the borders of Christendom: some of our deepest religious impressions are due to the worship of the Roman Catholic Church. We know that we could freely and healthfully breathe the air of the Brahmo Somaj; we think that we could put off our shoes in the Mosque of Omar, and feel that we stood on holy ground; and we could imagine a certain community of feeling with worshipers in some idol temple, who, bowing down before the work of their own hands, were yet "feeling after" the unknown and invisible God, "if haply they might find Him." Even here we are

not inclined to interpose with a rigid "Thus far and no farther." The line between religion and that which is not religion is very difficult to draw, and each man must be left to place it where he will. Theism, Pantheism, Agnosticism, fade into each other through dim border-lands of thought where awe and reverence are always possible. Was it a religious feeling with which Dr. Strauss regarded his "Universum"? We do not know; but we too have a deep and genuine fellow-feeling with all recognition of the Natural Mystery and Wonder, and can bend the knee before that shrine also.

The encouragement and increase of such religious communion as this, we take to be the practical end of the "Leicester Conference" movement, nor can any be nobler or more necessary. Half the prejudices, jealousies, enmities, which divide Christian people, come of mutual ignorance. Each Church is shut up within its own doctrinal or ritual forms. Each Church reads only its own literature. Each Church knows no other religious interests than its own. It would be a genuine surprise to the majority of earnest Christians to find how like they are to their neighbours of other churches, if only they knew it, and how much they have in common. They would perhaps discover that some articles of belief had assumed a disproportionate importance to them, only because of their proximity to their special ecclesiastical position. They might even in time learn the lesson that religious affections and a godly life are strangely independent of theological convictions, and that men who are like Christ cannot be very far from Christ, whatever their apparent heresies about him. But all this, it will be observed, hardly touches the grounds on which a man selects his habitual religious home. His object there is not to ascertain the minimum of theological agreement with which worship is compatible, but the conditions, whatever they are, on which the maximum of religious communion can be attained. And among those conditions, a substantial intellectual agreement between the individual worshiper and the form of worship is undeniably one. The fewer shocks and jars there are in worship the better. It throws a man, so to speak, off the

lines, to have to close his lips at a particular article of a creed, or to join in some formula of worship with a conscious mental reservation. Something of this kind is perhaps always inevitable; all public worship is more or less a compromise; but the least is best. We hold that it is undesirable for Unitarians to join habitually in worship which is addressed to Christ, or which is based on the theory of human depravity, or which assumes a Real Presence in the Eucharist. The result must be, either a gradual acquiescence in the theology thus insinuated into the mind, or a loose theory as to the relations of the intellect to the religious emotions, or such a perpetual attitude of protest as must be fatal to the unconsciousness of awe and the self-surrender of reverence. And, *mutatis mutandis*, the same thing applies to other believers.

From this it follows, what we are persuaded the promoters of the Leicester Conference would admit, that there are practical limits to religious communion between persons of different theological beliefs. What those limits are must be determined by circumstances; and in all probability, under the pressure of forces now actively at work, they will be found to widen as the years pass. An Independent and a Unitarian minister may exchange pulpits, without its being desirable or possible that either should assume the permanent charge of the other's congregation. Protestant Dissenters of all kinds, who look upon the Lord's Supper as only a memorial service, might unite in its celebration, possibly with great spiritual profit; but they could hardly join with an Anglican or a Roman Catholic, who believed in the Real Presence. The great thing is to break down the narrow walls of severance, which are daily felt to be more irksome, and which answer not to spiritual facts of to-day, but to theological prejudices of a bygone time. And it is only when we come to the very broad statement of principle made by the promoters of the Leicester Conference that we begin to feel any difficulty. Is not "religious communion" at least dependent upon agreement in the fundamental belief in the existence of God? And is not this a "theological opinion"? We know of course that the word God is

used in a much looser sense than it once was, nor are we anxious to limit it. Any ideas which the word calls up in our minds are of necessity so inadequate to the Divine Reality, as to make us recoil from dogmatic definition of the excess or defect of the conceptions of others. We know, too, that John Stuart Mill, following in the steps of Auguste Comte, has decided that religion, and therefore, we suppose, religious communion, is possible without God. But we allude to this only to say, with what emphasis we can, that no philosophical end is to be gained, but much the reverse, by using old words in new and strange meanings, and that only confusion can be the result of hiding radically different conceptions behind the mask of the same phrase. Give the word God what extension we will, there can be no religious communion between those who believe that He is, and those who believe that He is not. Nor do we get out of the difficulty by formulating the undeniable truth that religious communion is based, not upon identity of theological conviction, but upon similarity of spiritual affection. For spiritual affections presuppose their object; and we hold it to be of vital importance whether the Grand Être be God or only humanity.

Nor again, in another and perhaps a more important sense, is it true to say that "religious communion is not dependent on agreement in theological, critical or historical opinion." What the authors of this phrase meant to say, we take it, was, that "religious communion may be independent of agreement in opinion," though even this, as we have tried to shew above, is somewhat too bold a statement. But take the words in their literal sense, and they are unhappily contradicted by the patent facts of the Christian world. To speak broadly, all the religious communion that actually exists is based upon a real or presumed theological agreement, and, in the strict mathematical sense, may be said to be "dependent" on it, inasmuch as, for the most part, the closeness of one varies with the extent of the other. And it is an obvious argument, not altogether without the character of a reproach, that has been and will be directed against the promoters of the Leicester Confer-

ence—You are finding it possible to commune with Unitarians and other heretical persons, because you are beginning to agree with them. Had you kept the fine fervour of orthodox faith, it would have been your effectual safeguard against such unhallowed alliances. And therefore had you not better, in the interests of honesty as well as of denominational distinctions which all plain men understand, drop this vague talk of general communion, and, instead of blurring our boundaries, go to your own place?

Leaving these gentlemen to defend their own theological and ecclesiastical position, as they are well able to do, we may admit that a certain change of intellectual has probably preceded their change of spiritual attitude. This change is, we should suppose, different in kind and extent in each individual case: some souls are more prompt than others to recognize spiritual affinities, some hearts to make the proffer of brotherly love across intervening barriers of doctrinal difference. But we should not describe this intellectual change as a movement towards Unitarianism or Rationalism, or any other ism which just now excites the fear or scorn of orthodox people. It is a much more important and significant thing than that could be. It is the altered attitude of a few thoughtful men, not towards any special scheme of Christian doctrine, but towards doctrine altogether. It involves the recognition of two great truths, both of which religious people are slow to acknowledge, but which they are being forced to acknowledge more and more every day: first, that the essence of religion lies in its simplest statements; and next, that we know much less than we think we do of divine and supersensual realities.

These two ideas are practically so interwoven and interdependent that it is difficult to select either for prior illustration. And perhaps it is sufficient to state them. The first is emphatically a matter of religious perspective, to which the mind that has arrived at the right point of view will yield prompt assent, though another, less advanced, must wait for conviction till many intellectual forces have had their slow and certain operation. And it is partly dependent upon the second. Take

the instance of the Athanasian Creed. What it offends the true modern thinker by, is less its theory of the Divine Nature, than the hard and mechanical precision with which it states it. There may be a sense in which the threefold conception of the Divine Unity is true. There may be minds to which it is more satisfying than the simple monotheistic affirmation. But the whole subject is beyond us. We are using words as if they accurately represented ideas, and ideas as if they were exact picture of realities, and yet a moment's thought ought to convince us that it is not so. Whatever is true, the hard, dogmatic outlines of the Creed are not true. Better bow in the silent confession of ignorance, than sin against fact and reverence in foolish presumption. So, again, with the doctrine of the Atonement. Years ago theories of the Atonement were rife in Evangelical circles, precise, symmetrical, supported by some warrant of Scripture: the counsels of the Most High from eternity to eternity were declared in every pulpit, and men talked of God, what He had resolved and what He was going to do, "as if He were a man in the next street." This has to a great extent passed away, and passed away most completely with the best educated men. A distinction is drawn, which we do not pretend to understand, but which seems to satisfy those who draw it, between the theory and the fact of the Atonement; and men are told to be satisfied with knowing that God, through Christ, is willing to save them, and not to trouble themselves with the precise how or why. This process is gradually extending itself, among men whose minds are affected by the modern spirit, over the whole area of theology. Thoughtful believers are becoming chary of large and minute affirmations. They find that what they are surest of, and what forms the basis of their agreement with others, are the simplest things. And they find too, often to their singular surprise, that their gradual surrender to the region of indefiniteness and uncertainty of beliefs on which they once set the highest store, has not touched the springs of their spiritual life; but that these rise from far deeper and more primitive strata of their being than they had before

suspected. A belief in God as the one Source of all physical and spiritual life, a devout recognition of every manifestation of His spirit in humanity, a hearty allegiance to the kingdom of heaven and to the Prophet on whose lips it first took shape—these things, once fully apprehended by faith and made the soul's daily bread, are more than enough for love, gratitude, impulse, hope, consolation, communion. And we cannot wonder that men who have once recognized this truth, and discovered into what a wide and noble brotherhood they are thus admitted, should long for emancipation from the narrowness and isolation of sects which do not even pretend to be the outward presentment of the "one flock" under the "one Shepherd."

It is, then, from a new way of looking at religion, which is no new way after all, but as old as Christ, that we are to expect a true and lasting widening of the terms of religious communion. This gradual growth of doctrine during the three first centuries, the subtleties of Greek speculation which ended in the definitions of the Seven Councils, the ignorant systematizing of the Fathers, the slow development of Roman Catholic doctrine, the results of the new vigour of speculation at and after the Reformation—these we have to get behind, and to return, if we can, to the simplicity of the Gospels. The intellectual constituents of Christ's belief were surely few and simple; yet if they fed his faith, are they not more than enough for ours? We look out on a wider, a more complex, a more marvellous world than he did, and some sad and stern lessons Nature in these last years may have taught us, though as yet perhaps we have not learned their full compass and deepest significance. So, in one mood of mind, we bow in silent awe before the shrine of the "Unknown and Unknowable," confessing that the All-quickening Life is too many-sided and too great for our mental grasp, and altogether past our finding out; and again, the word of Jesus wakes the echoes in the depths of our own spirit, and we draw nigh with childlike love and reliance to the footstool of his Father and our Father, of his God and our God. While throughout the

whole, one thing is abundantly clear to us, that what is called the Christian life, but which by common confession is independent of all disputed points in theology, is the natural, the manly, the strong, the peaceful, the happy life; and that whoso lives with God, in the spirit of Jesus Christ, is, whatever the defect or excess of his creed, on a rock that cannot be moved. Such an one has no doubts but those that spring from his own irresoluteness and faithlessness; nor, if we may accept his own witness, is his life without divine helps and leadings.

Whether this movement has a future before it, it is yet too soon to predict. Much will depend upon its success in keeping whatever organization it may assume loose and plastic. No one can say what work may lie before it, or by what methods it may most effectually be done. A premature stiffening of structure, a too early selection of activities, might only end in the establishment of another society, or the formation of a fresh sect, things which the world most emphatically does not need. What is really wanted is, that men who care for wider religious communion than any single Church can give them, should have a centre round which to group themselves, and opportunity of translating their desires into words and facts. At the same time, it is impossible to doubt that some movement of this kind holds the secret of future church organization in England. The spirit of the age is with it; the very stars in their courses fight for it. Religion is neither dead nor dying; but all existing sects and churches have the germ of decay at the core. Nothing is stranger at the present moment than the way in which the passage of men from sect to sect is interrupted, and all progressive spirits wait where they are for the manifestation of some better thing. No doubt there will always be dogmatic men and dogmatic churches; but all dogmatism tends Romeward at last, and over against the Church of the Bond will be developed the one Church of the Free. Certainly no other Church will ever reconcile with religion the disciples of the new knowledge, who now, in some perplexity, know not whether they may trust the yearnings of

their own hearts, and believe in a God whom Nature will not reveal to them. Some speakers at the Congregational Union thought that the Declaration ought to be adopted, for fear of what Mr. Samuel Morley, M.P., might say or do if it were not : might it not be alleged on the other side that even the approbation of Mr. Samuel Morley, M.P., would be a poor compensation for breaking with the advancing thought and sure knowledge of the age? One thing is certain, that the reformation of religion which ensued upon the revival of classical learning, needs to be followed by another, the motive forces of which will be supplied by the philological and critical and physical discoveries of the last hundred years, and that by the wave of its secular progress, which already day by day slowly rises higher, the churches built upon the older foundations will be submerged. Whether presently, when the first danger is overpassed, there will still be left a religious home in which men's souls may dwell and be at peace, will depend upon the fidelity of theologians neither to old creeds nor new declarations, but to simple faiths and wide sympathies, and the duties which are the pillars of the law.

CHARLES BEARD.

III.—THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY COMMISSION.

THE Universities—in England and in Utopia—cannot complain at present of popular indifference or neglected importance. Among the few achievements of the last Parliamentary session, a Universities' Act counts as one of the most serious ; and popular magazines and newspapers have for months deluged us with discussions relative to the proper sphere and functions of Universities, the desirability of multiplying them, and other kindred topics. To those engaged in academical work, this publicity must on many sides be agreeable and reassuring. Yet many acquainted with the actual state and requirements of Oxford and Cambridge, must frequently have deplored the ignorance of the smaller facts of the case, and of the more

pressing local needs, betrayed by the external friends and patrons of University reform in higher or humbler station. A brief review and summary of some of the principal difficulties and anomalies in the present working of the educational machine in Oxford, which constitute the *raison d'être* of the Oxford University Commission, so far as any is to be found, may not be a useless addition to the recent mass of speculation and high criticism.

A Commission with extraordinary powers for the reform of University and Collegiate institutions and statutes in Oxford is now sitting. It is too late, therefore, to ask whether such a Commission was really a necessity; whether it was not constituted to satisfy claims which are now well-nigh exploded—the claims of the “original researchers;” whether the truly desirable reforms of the methods and mechanism of education in Oxford were not gradually being realized and perfected by the normal agencies of the place, almost as quickly as was serviceable; whether a Commission appointed by a Tory Government was likely to give satisfaction or security in reforms to an educational corporation, or group of corporations, the resident and laborious members of which were mainly of “another persuasion.” It is better now to admit that there are many anomalies, many superfluities, many extravagances, many hurtful or useless features and elements in our University and College arrangements, the correction or removal of which may be accelerated by our *Deus ex machina*; and that after the cesser of the commissioned intervention, Oxford may be found better adapted to present-day requirements than before.

Those who have left the University ten or twenty years or so, not seldom ignore the changes which have taken place in the mean time, and betray an ignorance of the Oxford of to-day almost as great as, and much more misleading than, the speech of those who have never been here at all. Yet we are still far from a state of things which could be regarded by any one acquainted with the details of our present system as even approximately final or durable. If some benevolent and

intelligent despot could be commissioned to legislate for us, he might make a *tabula rasa* of our present system, and re-institute a purely rational and consistent one in its place. But rational legislation of that sort is not in our English way ; nor does it appear likely that the Commission intends to do more than invite and encourage the development of the more obvious and natural tendencies already at work in the University. In the careful and voluminous statement recently communicated by them to the Vice-Chancellor (*Oxford University Gazette*, April 26, 1878), it is evident that they are not prepared to make any sweeping change, or initiate any fresh departure, in the methods of teaching now current, nor even to pronounce decidedly in favour of any, to the exclusion of another.

In the Oxford which is already almost antiquated to those who matriculated twelve years ago, the official unit of teaching, so to speak, was the College. There was a considerable body of Professors, the number of which had recently been augmented ; but if a man reading for "honours" looked beyond the walls of his own college for assistance, it was rarely to professorial, much less to other college lectures that he betook himself ; he put himself in the hands of a "private tutor" or "coach," and supplemented thereby what was lacking in the college instruction. "Coaching" and "cramming" are more or less synonymous terms ; the successful college tutor has always something at least of the "crammer" in his method ; and the strength of "cram" is the examination system. For reasons which need not here be specified, the coaching system has never, it is said, attained at Oxford the magnitude and importance which it enjoys at Cambridge ; but with the increase of "Schools" or subjects of examination, a system of inter-collegiate lectures and instruction has come into existence, standing midway between the collegiate and the professorial methods, and helping to check the excess of coaching. A good deal of evil is said of the coaching system, and not without justice ; but something may be said in its favour. It represents and realizes to some extent an element of freedom sadly lacking in our

collegiate instruction. Pupil and "coach" find each other out by a natural affinity and selection, and the best coach will have most and best pupils. It is, moreover, the part of a good coach to consult the idiosyncrasy of his pupil to an even greater extent than the ideal college tutor himself can generally afford to do. The evil in the coaching system arises, not from its freedom, but from its bondage to the examination-papers. Any educational advantage which the college tutoriate possesses over its Bohemian rival is due to the fact, that the tutor with a guaranteed stipend can, if he has the will and ability, afford to range a little more freely round the natural lines of a subject: albeit should he largely avail himself of such a privilege, he would feel that he was sacrificing the success of his pupils to his own educational ideals. But the college as the unit of instruction has broken down under the accumulation of subjects now admitted in the Schools, and the increased preparation necessitated by a rising standard in the examinations. There is hardly a college in Oxford not more or less interested in some scheme for the division of labour and the combined attendance of its undergraduate members at common lectures. Yet these college combinations are still in a very rudimentary phase, and their lists of lectures present comical anomalies. Several lectures are still given on one and the same subject, and three men will be lecturing on the same work of Aristotle, and three different men on one and the same work of Plato, so that it still takes six men to do the work of two. The lists of combined college lectures in the honour schools of Mathematics, Modern History, and Theology, do not present the same anomalies, and the teaching of natural science, so far as at present developed, is of a more strictly professorial type, and eminently promising. These latter Schools are comparatively recent creations, and the individual colleges have never professed to afford proper instruction for these subjects. But though the college no longer professes to find sufficient lectures for its members within its own walls, the tutorial system is still its glory and boast. The idea of the tutoriate, so far as instruction is concerned, is that each student or pupil should

not only attend lectures and listen passively while he fills a note-book, but also receive some more individual attention, and have opportunities of discussing his own difficulties with a maturer mind. Excellent as this idea may be, the actual scheme in working is open to some obvious objections. The pupil does not select his tutor, but is generally assigned to him: moreover, the sense of disciplinary relations overshadows the free exchange of words and ideas; and further, if the two are congenial souls, and if the compulsory and magisterial element in their relation is forgotten, still there is the examination to remind them that they are not free to follow the true bearings of a subject, or the bent of their own genius, but must stick to the artificial prescriptions of a Board of Studies.

Thus coaches and college lecturers and tutors are all tied in some bond of unfreedom, mercenary, disciplinary, examinatorial. What wonder that the present illustrious Rector of the University of Berlin, Professor Helmholtz, in his recent inaugural Address,* should have contrasted the academical freedom of the normal German University with our English system, not to our favour. Can it be well that the higher studies and the higher instruction of the land should be thus cumbered with serving? Might it not be well that, at the University at least, knowledge should be freely pursued for its own sake, and the student be initiated into a method and an instruction essentially better than those he has left behind at school?

And have we not already the means provided for that higher initiation? Does not the University, as a teaching power, just differentiate itself from the college by supplying the means required? Or what, then, are our professors for? The professors are raised above the economical necessities of the "coaches," and above the disciplinary impediments of the tutoriate, and can ignore the examination-papers as not even your most popular college lecturer dare ignore them. So our University teaching might all be in the grand style—if only

* Transl. in *Nature*, Nos. 445, 456.

there were any students in the grand style to hear it! But at present the professoriate is, speaking broadly, a rudimentary organ, though whether its function is exploded or not yet revealed among us may be disputed. The professors must, at any rate, feel that at present they do not constitute the true educational power in the place: the real work of instruction is done by the classes of teachers above mentioned. And as the professors do not largely replenish the ranks of examiners, they are really very like a "fifth wheel on the carriage," revolving at times with great rapidity, but not essential to stability or progress.

Yet the existence of this ineffective professoriate is a useful protest in favour of a more liberal style of education than at present prevails; it is a protest in favour of a freer choice between teacher and learner, of a freer course of study, than the scholastic auspices of the tutoriate can sanction. The friends of the latter are always extolling the personal relations into which it brings pupil and teacher; they ignore the fact that the professor is not necessarily an *ex cathedra* lecturer and no more. A professor may always gather round him a smaller class of more earnest and able pupils to work under his immediate supervision; and the work thus done will be superior to anything produced in answer to tutorial discipline. What is likely to be the spirit of a man's literary efforts, who is "gated" for not bringing his tutor the college essay for the week? This confusion of study and discipline may be partially beneficial to the second-rate men, who after all constitute the general mass; it is injurious, if not cruel, to the better intellects.

A competitive examination system is, as above said, the strength of a cramming system; add the difference between pass-men and class-men, with all that it implies, to the examination, and you have the secret of a great part of the unfreedom and restriction of Oxford education. It is the pass-man, with his amiable weaknesses, extravagances and deficiencies, who makes more than half college discipline necessary; it is upon the pass-men that the slight burden of university or proctorial discipline mainly presses. It is obvious

that the co-existence of two widely different intellectual standards for a degree is an anomaly, the gravity of which increases as the merely social prestige of a degree wanes with a cheapened standard of living at the University. Until recently, an Oxford degree meant almost surely that a man was either of a certain social status or of a certain intellectual calibre. It no longer has this sure alternative meaning. Certain colleges have simplified matters for themselves by refusing to receive pass-men. But if this refusal were made a rule for the whole University, the immediate effect would be to sever a large part of Oxford's connexion with the nation. The pass-man binds us to the highest and to the lower social strata; intermediate lie, speaking broadly, the sources of the honour-men. The pass-men recruit largely the ranks of the clergy; it is the pass-men, probably, who return our two Tory burgesses. A proposal has frequently been mooted to confine the higher degree of M.A. to honour-men. It would be within the powers of the University of itself to make such a change; that it will do anything of the kind, with the present system of examinations still in vogue, is not likely. If at any future period the examinations for a degree were so re-arranged that the ordinary B.A. degree were to be attained by passing a general examination, at the end, let us say, of two years of residence,* the degree of M.A. might then be reserved for those who remained to study for some further school of special honour subjects, whether classical, historical, theological or scientific. The degrees of B.A. and M.A. would then each have its definite connotation, and this would be the least of the benefits conferred by such a reform. But the reform of the examination system does not apparently fall within the programme of the University Commission. Were the Commissioners, however, to express a strong opinion in favour of conferring degrees after two years' residence, in answer to a demand which has been heard in Parliament, the University

* For which general B.A. examination might not a modicum of natural science advantageously be made a *sine qua non*?

might be moved in the direction of beneficial change above indicated.

It is possible that by such a re-arrangement of the examinations something might be found for the professor to do. The conception of special study, and the necessity for differentiation of teaching, would receive further development; and any development in that direction will favour the professorial type of instruction, and the quasi-professorial form of inter-collegiate teaching. At present, half-a-dozen professorial chairs in Oxford might be vacant, and, so far as the teaching of the place goes, their occupants would never be missed. It must always be remembered, when partial critics point triumphantly to the impotence of the professoriate as an educational organ, that the professoriate with us has never had a fair chance. On the one hand, the ground is pre-occupied, and moreover the competitive examination is as fatal to the proper style of professorial teaching as the pass examination is indifferent or derogatory to it.* On the other hand, you do not want professors to teach school-boys. Your average Oxford undergraduate may in malice be a child, but is scarcely in understanding a man. He is probably a blooming, thoughtless, athletic prodigy. To returning eyes, long sated with the common crowd of ungainly, bespectacled, wan, boosy German students, what sight so enchanting as the bright, graceful, active, joyous presences of Oxonian youth! But it is open to adverse criticism, is this flowery Academe. The Germans, among whom the professorial system has borne its fairest fruits, sometimes call our University, not without scorn, a school. Aye, there's the rub! We find our "men," for the most part, boys; and we keep them boys for two or three years at least. This is what our collegiate discipline, and our University discipline, and our examinations upon examinations, and our tutorial direction and initiative, and last, not

* There is only one Oxford professor (so far as I am aware) who combines pass and class teaching in one course. Whether he does so by elevating the pass, or degrading the class, standard, or by soaring far above both in the native professorial empyrean, those who have heard must be left to determine.

least, the absence of any direct relation, for the most part, between the studies, or so-called studies, of the University and practical life and men's after careers, have largely to answer for. The only post or career for which a University education and degree, as such, qualifies a man is that of schoolmaster: the one thing which the University can achieve of itself is to take a boy, to keep him a boy, and to send him back to spend his life among boys. With this function may be classed the simple reproduction and qualification of teachers to conduct the work of Oxford itself, who are equipped by their education and degree for University and Collegiate appointments. With the non-scholastic world, the University enjoys only a secondary and more or less arbitrary relation, which it might before this have forfeited but for the social advantages with which it atoned for its intellectual and practical shortcomings. The Church, as might be expected, fares best: the lectures of the Theological faculty have some direct relation to the future wants and practical life of their hearers; certificates of attendance at two courses of theological lectures are generally required from candidates for ordination by the Bishops. But any one who has attended such courses knows in how perfunctory a manner the majority of hearers listen, or rather listen not, to even the most brilliant and profound lectures, such, for example, as those of the late Regius Professor of Divinity, Dr. Mozley. An evil spirit pervades the whole body of teaching; a *testamur* or certificate is wanted:

Rem, bene si possis, si non, quocunque modo, rem.

So as bare attendance, without attention, or even—unless some candidates have been greatly maligned—the untrue assertion of attendance, was enough to obtain the certificate, while the professor lectured, his hearers—composed themselves. Again: still further to detach their University life and associations from their future life and work, and that life from all lay reminiscences, too many of our candidates for orders cannot content themselves with the prolific advantages offered to them at the University, without making themselves two-fold

more children of an ecclesiastical party, by going from the University to a clerical training college. Their conduct is a poor compliment to our Theological faculty. The other faculties, of Law and Medicine, do not even profess, nor is it competent to them, to turn out their students equipped for their careers. A man is not a man even when a Bachelor of Arts : he has still all his technical education and business in life to learn.

You cannot change a system of education and discipline with a stroke of the pen. The age at which men come to the University has had a tendency to rise : men took their degrees once on a time at fourteen or sixteen ; they seldom leave school for the University now before eighteen or nineteen. It is expected by many that the Commissioners will do something to correct the present and apparently growing tendency, which keeps men of twenty and upwards still in leading-strings, by enacting an earlier and uniform age for the tenure of scholarships. But that a single measure of this kind will make a very great ultimate difference in the age at which men will take their degrees, is not to be supposed. It might be a better policy to relax a little the leading-strings of discipline and instruction. It cannot, at any rate, be a sound essay in the higher education to create new institutions for expanding manhood, where the rigour of school regulations is revived or maintained with, in some respects perhaps, even more than its native intensity and exactness, without many of the compensations and valuable features (for example, the monitorial system) attached to it at school, and accentuated by contrast with a freer society all around. Of the economical or financial success of the Keble College experiment, there can be no doubt ; and if economy were the end-all of existence, the elder colleges of Oxford could not do better than take a whole chapter out of the Keble book. While other friends of the institution are quarrelling over the ideal causes of its success, it may still be permitted to suggest that what many parents have best understood in its programme has been the *argumentum ad crumenam*. But economy and discipline are only

means to an end; and a growing amount of freedom is a grand element in education. The Keble College experiment is still undecided. The education is cheap: but what sort of men will it turn out? The prizes of the larger life, success in the greater struggles, demand free and fertile individuals, not creatures all of one model. The young Spartans at Keble College may win incorruptible crowns on the river; but they have not yet greatly distinguished themselves in the Schools. When this glory, too, is added to their fame, the question will still be asked, What becomes of the Keble men in after life? *Nous verrons.*

The colleges have ceased to be separate units of instruction, as we have seen; but each is still a centre of social life and an organ of discipline. For the discharge of the latter function they are well adapted; and there is little ground for reasonable complaint. The Germans may smile at rules for attendance at chapel services and fixed hours for locking gates; but these things are hardly felt by the mass of students as hardships, and cost very little sacrifice of personal liberty. An undergraduate at Oxford is not merely as free, or nearly as free—leaving disciplinary instruction out of the question—as he wishes to be, or as it would be wise for “happy children just let loose from school” to be—but also enjoys far more of the positive elements of freedom than his German *confrère*. For the grounds of that advantage we may have to look beyond the University. What are the whips of collegiate or university discipline compared to the scorpions of compulsory military service? And where have the German students a voluntary association for mutual improvement and education to compare with the Union Society? Moreover, be it remembered, there is no German University without its *carcer*. The one cloud in our undergraduate’s “great heaven of blue” is the inevitable examination. The tutorial and proctorial offices have few terrors for men who in general society, or elsewhere than in Oxford, meet their tutors and much maligned persecutors on a footing of ease and equality. There is no memory from college days to compare with the permanent awe with which

a man looks back upon his schoolmasters, and which revives in after encounters, even long after his reason and experience have assured him that they were very like ordinary mortals. The quiet working of University discipline rests in the main upon the simple hypothesis—rarely belied—of the honour and truth-speaking of Englishmen. A more real blot upon the elder colleges is their expensiveness. This does not arise from the extremely low figure at which the tutorial fees are placed, but from indirect causes, one of the principal of which has been servants' perquisites. Now much has been done, and is being done, to minimize the sources of extravagance, without depriving the undergraduates of all power of choice and self-control in these matters. If a collegian at Oxford brings a crushing bill to his parents now, they are probably themselves most to blame in the matter. For those really too poor to discharge the necessary college expenses, and unable to obtain a scholarship, the University has provided a means of approach in the arrangements made for "unattached students." The name is not a happy one, but the thing has been a steady and growing success, until in this year the unattached outnumber any single college. It may be expected that the Commissioners will not omit to make some increased provision, if possible, for these free University students.

Leaving "the action of examinations" out of account, it is not upon the freedom of the undergraduates that the University and the colleges (as a rule) set undue restrictions; it is upon the thought and life of their teachers. Omitting the Theological chairs—appointment to the most important of which is vested in the Crown—the University does not professedly exact a clerical test from any of its Professors or Readers; but we all know how practically from the constitution of the body which in many cases elects Professors—being that same body which returns Parliamentary burgesses—professorial elections are clerical and political questions determined by a party whip. Even the Crown appointments, which should be like Cæsar's wife, are not always above the suspicion of being dictated by other than purely scientific considerations.

A dogmatic theologian may still be illustrious in his own line; the late Regius Professor of Divinity was a conspicuous example; but it is not every appointment for which so good a reason can be assigned. So long as the University enjoys the privilege of returning two Members to Parliament, and of being converted from time to time into an arena where places are won by wire-pulling, it would not be desirable to transfer any more patronage to the Government. In the case of recently-founded chairs, there has been a tendency to vest the appointment in small select Boards; the more limited and enlightened the electoral power and responsibility, the greater the security against its abuse. It is to be hoped that the Commissioners will stereotype this tendency in the case of any new chairs now to be created.

That the Commissioners should invite or encourage the foundation of any chairs in the Theological faculty unfettered by the clerical restriction, was too much to expect; the need for such instruction is scarcely as yet perceived in Oxford. But the case of Fellowships is different. The clerical restriction upon general literary and scientific education is, we may hope, in Oxford doomed. Had a Liberal Government been in office when the University Bill became law, the total abolition of the restriction would have formed, we may be sure, a part of the Act itself. Even as things were, the Government won a "Cadmæan victory," on an understanding that the Commissioners should take the question into serious deliberation. The real teaching staff in the University has pronounced emphatically against the maintenance of the restriction: there is hardly one college where the governing body is in favour of the present state of things. From a paper just issued by order of the Commission to members of governing bodies, it is evident that the Commissioners are prepared honourably to redeem the understanding above alluded to. They will secure "proper and effectual provision for religious instruction and religious services in the different colleges;" and that done, they will not improbably sanction the liberation of all further fellowships from a clerical test. There are colleges in which the

governing bodies are debating whether they shall retain even a single clerical fellowship or not: there are colleges in which an obstinate and powerful minority would maintain the *status quo* if it could. *Quem Deus vult perdere!* It would be wiser for such clerical conservatives to agree with their adversary quickly while they are in the way with him. The Commissioners have now the opportunity of making something like a permanent equation and peace between the contending parties; they may not improbably insist on the clerical duties of the college being discharged by a member, or members, of the governing body, and decline to relegate those functions to an outsider, without position, a chaplain or lecturer: this much provided, they may free the remainder from all clerical restrictions. If there are to be clerical Fellows still, it seems on the whole desirable that they should be elected to discharge certain definite duties, and that they should be already in orders when so elected. But these provisions may turn out hereafter to be not all pure gain. The scandal of men taking orders to keep fellowships will be rolled away; but how very much more clerical our clerical Fellows will be! If the liberal clergyman, the salt of the place, should become extinct! It must always, however, be remembered that to secure a minority in orders, is not to prohibit the majority from ordination. If the Church should one day re-adjust its formulæ and subscriptions, or if they are really at present reconcilable with common sense and science, then, when our little phase of scepticism is overpast, we shall have men enough willing to enter what might be the noblest profession. Meanwhile it is not proposed to confiscate college livings; these pensions are still left to induce men to take orders. The number of actual clerical Fellows is likely to be for some time to come in excess of the statutable minimum.

A more striking anachronism and anomaly than ever the clerical fellowship is the celibate restriction upon Fellows in general. If to offer a man a bribe to take orders is an offence against morality, what is to be said of bribing a man to remain a bachelor, *sans reproche*, or otherwise? What would be the

effect in society at large of a legal penalty upon marriage? *Horresco referens*. Practically, however, the restriction has not worked so vilely as might be expected by an intelligent foreigner. So long as the majority of Fellows were clergymen, they had the prospect of college livings to fall back upon, or other Church preferment, where the restriction would no longer oppress them. The layman meanwhile left Oxford, or only stayed to teach a short time within his college walls. But with the great increase of lay Fellows and teachers permanently resident in Oxford, the shoe has pinched tighter and tighter. A man was offered six or seven hundred a-year, or more, luxurious surroundings, and nearly half-a-year's holidays, on condition of remaining a bachelor. The majority, to their credit, declined the tempting bait, and passed quickly away into social life and struggle, and the colleges secured a rapid succession of juvenile Fellows, while the government remained in the hands of a few old bachelors at the top of the tree. And what was the result upon the teaching and education of the place? And what was the type of "Don's" character thus developed? Character was stunted and stereotyped, in too many cases, into selfish isolation, by the denial of the commonest human ties and sympathies, while too much of the teaching was done either as mere matter of routine, or merely as a paragon *en passant* to the bar or some other career. The young Fellow, fresh from the Schools, was set to teach men all but his contemporaries, giving place in a year or two to a successor no better prepared, and with as little intention of making a profession of his Oxford work. It is not so very long since a well-known professor published a pamphlet, in which he estimated the average age of the Oxford teacher at twenty-five!* The average age of the German professor is more than double that figure. What solidity, what self-respect, could such unripe tuition possess? what zeal or enthusiasm could it inspire?

* On reference to Professor Bonamy Price's pamphlet, *Oxford Reform*, 1875, I find that he does not specify the exact average age of the "young tutor," of whom he says so much good and evil; but his criticism would be pointless if the average were estimated at a much higher figure than the one given in the text.

And those were the teachers set or chosen to enlighten us on all things in heaven and earth—morals, politics, history, textbooks, philosophy! They did the work in a fashion; it was a marvel how they did it; and they were not to blame for having it to do. But those who have watched the progress of the last few years, generally agree that the standard of college teaching has risen considerably. The principal causes of this rise are not far to seek; they are the college combination already described, and the increasing relaxation of the celibate restriction. It is notorious that much of the best teaching in the place is done by married men; in many cases by men still young. It is not an accident that just those colleges which are most conspicuously successful in the "Schools," are also the colleges which have gone furthest towards the total abolition of the great anomaly. Nor need that total abolition necessarily entail the collapse of the college system; it is only necessary that certain details of residence and tenure should be modified, in order that the best elements in the college system should be preserved. What may safely be predicted is this, that those colleges which most expeditiously re-adapt their arrangements to altered circumstances, destined sooner or later to tell upon all, will most certainly conserve the solidarity of collegiate life, and will get a certain advantage in the future over their more cumbrous compeers. What may be looked for from the Commissioners is, that in this, as in other matters of college reform, they may proceed in particular cases upon some general principles derived from the best sources, and, without destroying the individuality which may fairly be claimed by each corporation, may set a limit to opposition which is mainly a survival from a state of things practically and morally condemned already.*

A number of secondary reforms will follow upon the removal of the celibate restriction. The celibate Fellow, whose interest it is to be as little as possible in Oxford, and when there to

* Of our opinion in this matter it may be said, *οὐκ ἀδίκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν*. But when have considerations of abstract justice alone effected a reform? Thrice happy the man whose interest also seals him to the side of improvement!

have as little as possible to do, will never be persuaded to curtail his enormous vacations. It is from men who are devoting their lives and energies to teaching, as their profession, that certain wise reforms in the nature and conduct of the University examinations is to be expected. But these and other similar changes will probably be the work of the University itself at no distant period. The method of appointing college teachers and Fellows, falls directly under the cognizance of the Commissioners. At present, fellowships have long been prizes for competitive examination, and teachers have as a rule been appointed practically by such examination. But the proper distinction between the prize fellowship and the teaching or tutorial fellowship has now become apparent even to those who would fain see existing restrictions maintained in full vigour upon teachers, while consenting to relax them in favour of prize fellowships. The rapid succession of Fellows which has hitherto been secured by the clumsy expedient of the celibate restriction, can be fully provided for in the case of the prize fellowships, where it is desirable, by limiting tenure to a period of years. In the case of tutorial fellowships, that same rapid succession has been one of the greatest evils in the existing system, as above indicated; and the Commissioners may be expected rather to make provision against it, as well as to free the appointment to such fellowships, under proper safeguards against abuse and jobbery, from the preliminary of an examination.

There are other points of college reform, more especially in connection with the value and tenure of scholarships, upon which the Commissioners, to judge from the questions addressed by them to members of governing bodies, appear to contemplate some general plan of reform, applicable to all colleges alike. On these points there is hardly so large and homogeneous a body of opinion already formed in Oxford as upon the question of the tenure of fellowships. On two preliminary points, however, there is something like a general, though not by any means a unanimous, judgment. The intense rivalry and competition between colleges for the pick

of the scholars is thought to be unduly stimulating to the candidates, and not beneficial to the colleges: again, the monetary value of scholarships is thought to be fixed in general too high. Beside the *status quo* which will hardly be left intact, three alternative proposals will probably be brought to the notice of the Commissioners. There are those, it is said, who would suggest that the whole resources of the colleges at present devoted to the support of scholars should be thrown into a common fund, out of which scholarships should be granted tenable at any college according to the successful candidate's pleasure. This proposal might indeed, if carried out, destroy the rivalry between colleges, but it might be by the plethoric aggrandizement of one or two, which happen at the moment, justly enough, to be in favour on intellectual or economical grounds. It would be no gain to the majority of students, it would be a questionable gain to the college itself, to have the young intellectual aristocracy of the University all concentrated within its four walls. Still there is a show of liberality in the proposal which might commend it to many reformers. A second alternative would be to abolish scholarships altogether, and to apply the money thus set free to reducing the general tutorial and lecturing fees, so as to offer, as far as might be, a perfectly free education, or at least instruction, at the University. But a perfectly free University instruction implies as a condition of its efficiency either a much greater love of study for its own sake, or a more intimate relation between study and the prizes of after life, than exists at present in our country: moreover, the alternative now under consideration would benefit the rich as much as the poor; and, until Oxford is very much more a poor man's University than at present, would be an untimely birth. Add the fact that your average Englishman hardly thanks you for what costs him nothing, and that there would be very great difficulty in instituting or maintaining at present so sweeping a reform, for which there is so little preparation in the present system, and we need hardly speculate whether any such suggestion would receive the sanction of our Commissioners. Thirdly, it may be pro-

posed uniformly to modify the existing regulations, by reducing the value and multiplying the number of scholarships, and perhaps in some cases re-introducing a poverty qualification. One college might still have more scholars, as more Fellows, than another ; but the more objectionable features of the present system would be removed, and the honour and emoluments of a scholarship extended to a larger number of deserving students.*

There are many important points—for example, the claims and position of the natural sciences in our University—under consideration by the Commissioners, which have not been expressly touched on here, and this article has already perhaps exceeded its due limits. It is time briefly to recapitulate the main points on which stress has been laid, and to conclude with what may appear, for want of space to argue the questions, an arbitrary hint or two upon certain topics germane to the matter in hand.

This paper will not have been written in vain if it helps any readers to understand that the best work of the existing University Commission will be to give an impulse to certain reforms which are already in process, and have been originated in the colleges ; that the professorial teaching, if true to its style, can never be a success in relation to an examination system more or less competitive ; that it is in the power of the University of its own accord gradually to modify and improve that system ; that the highest efficient teaching in the University, namely, the inter-collegiate, has a tendency to approximate to the professorial type. That teaching in Oxford has been subjected to two more or less arbitrary checks, over and above the examination system, which affects mainly the professoriate ; namely, the clerical and celibate restrictions upon fellowships. The action of these restrictions has been

* Among many serious objections to the plan of complete uniformity pointed out to me by a friend, one in especial may here be appended as worthy of consideration. Would it be wise, by establishing a low uniform limit of age for the candidates for scholarships, to preclude colleges from offering assistance to a large and deserving class of students, those, namely, who from various causes have started late ?

briefly sketched. What is urgently needed is more freedom all round: for the undergraduate, not so much a freer discipline as a clearer separation between the spheres of discipline as such and study as such, more encouragement to study for its own sake, more liberty and responsibility of choice, less dictation and initiative from above, a humaner conception of the scholar's vocation. For the teaching power, that it should be liberated from the two anomalous restrictions which have generated not a little of the unscientific frivolity, whether shewn in viewiness or in dogmatism, of latter-day Oxford. These illiberalities were being removed from within; the Commission may accelerate and unify the good process. Young workers in Oxford grow more and more hopeful and loyal to the place and their work, trusting that Oxford may yet one day be no longer merely the "home of lost causes and impossible ideals."

To conclude with another brave hint. It is not surprising that the Commission is slow to multiply professorships under existing circumstances. But colleges are encouraged to offer funds to the University, especially to improve its "plant," in buildings, libraries, lecture-rooms, laboratories, museums. These appliances will benefit science and the scientific spirit, whether applied in natural studies or in letters, and will pour fresh confusion upon dogmatism. And is Oxford always to be averse from a liberal study of theology? Shall never any encouragement be given to the freer pursuit of knowledge in that sphere which with us lags furthest behind?

The Lord is my light, has long been the proud motto of our University: if for awhile she might abate her boasting and be content to pray, *Stablish me with thy free spirit!*

REGINALD W. MACAN.

IV.—MIGUEL SERVETO-Y-REVÉS.—II.*

Charakterbild Michael Servet's. Gezeichnet von Henri Tollin, Lic. Theol. Prediger zu Magdeburg. Berlin: Carl Habel. 1876.

Servetus and Calvin. A Study of an important Epoch in the early History of the Reformation. By R. Willis, M. D. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1877.

THE most prosperous episode in the chequered life of Miguel Serveto is his residence at Vienne (1542-53), in a position of comfort and even dignity, as physician to the successful ecclesiastic who had been a hearer of his mathematical prelections at Paris, Archbishop Paulmier. Established here beneath the wing of a liberal-minded prelate, his professional skill, his scientific acquirements, and his natural sweetness of disposition, might seem to have ensured him the certainty of a happy life in respected ease and tranquil privacy. Such a life had no charms for him. To what extent he found or made at Vienne intellectual friendships in which he could open his heart, we do not perfectly know. Père Jacques Charmier, of that city, who got into trouble† owing to his connection with Serveto's affairs in the memorable year 1553, was evidently something more than an acquaintance. The Arch-

* *Corrigenda* in Part I., April, 1878. P. 283, *note*, for "Domokos" read Domokos. P. 288, l. 25, for "Ego [nec]" read Nec; the *ego* being a mere erratum which has crept into some copies. P. 290, l. 15, for "twenty-one" read twenty. P. 297, l. 27, for "is divided" read is found divided. P. 299, l. 39, p. 300, l. 10, for "locupletam" read locupletatam. P. 300, l. 13, for "conservantur" read asseruantur. P. 304, *note*, for "meum" read meam. P. 306, *note*, the reference is to Bellows' *Old World in its New Face*, I. 289.

† He was condemned to three years' imprisonment by the ecclesiastical authorities at Vienne. Their sentence against Serveto was not passed till Saturday, December 23, 1553, nearly two months after Serveto had been reduced to ashes by the more expeditious hostility of the Inquisitor-General of Protestantism. Dr. Willis interpolates into this posthumous judgment the words, "his body to be burned" (p. 276), but the astute ecclesiastics of Vienne did not thus slay the slain. What they did was to hunt up and destroy all the works of Serveto they could find. Hence the extreme scarcity of the 1541 Ptolemy. A copy now in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, seems to have owed its preservation to the fact of the date having been carefully altered by hand (in two places) to M.D.XLIII.

bishop himself, who had listened to Serveto in days when both men were likely to have been less guarded, in all probability lent a sympathetic ear to his physician in private intercourse; though in the riper stages of the Vienne prosecution he fulfilled his office among the judges, at the call of the Church. Serveto's friends at Vienne could rely upon his good faith to keep their secrets. The generosity which subsequently refused to furnish a list of those who owed him money for his professional services, was equal to the strain of withholding also the names of any to whom he had communicated ideas.

Serveto lived as a conformist at Vienne, contenting himself with the precedent of St. Paul in the temple; but with One higher than St. Paul, One whom he loved and fain would serve, the cry of his spirit rose and grew: "How am I straitened!" Hence he re-opened the fatal intercourse with Calvin. Hence he offered even to throw up his prospects and come to Geneva, if only he might have liberty and opportunity there. He seems to have thought that, in personal access, his living enthusiasm might gain even upon his inflexible correspondent. By this time, however, Calvin had discovered the true meaning of the correspondence. In short, he was expected to learn, not simply called in to convince. The moment he had made this discovery, Serveto, in Calvin's eyes, became a mere obstacle to his intellectual supremacy, and one that must be summarily got rid of.

Serveto's account of the correspondence is, that it began well, but that at length both writers lost their tempers, and fell to calling each other names. Calling terrible names was in those days a mere relief of the tongue, like the hard swearing of our great-grandfathers. "Why don't you swear a bit, my dear," said Fuseli to his choleric Methodist wife, "and keep yourself cool?" We firmly believe that Serveto might have called Calvin all the ill names he could imagine without provoking to desperation his antagonist's ire, provided only he had never attempted to teach him.* The sting of Serveto's obnoxious

* "*Hoc tantum in presentia testatum volo, me non ita capitaliter fuisse infestum, quin licitum fuerit vel sola modestia, nisi mente privatus foret, vitam redi-*

epithets, few in quantity as compared with Calvin's own, lay just in this, that they were by no means mere expletives, like the fierce and frequent execrations of his foe, but carried always with them an intellectual verdict, *de haut en bas*.* When at length, late in 1545, or very early in 1546, Serveto sent to Geneva the manuscript of a revised and enlarged issue of his theological tracts, giving it the title of *Christianismi Restitutio*, with an allusion that could not be mistaken to the *Christianæ Religionis Institutio*† of ten years before, he may be said to have invited the issue of his own death-warrant.

Calvin was not slow to issue that warrant. If the Ides of March involved the destiny of Cæsar, the Ides of February were big in 1546 with the fate of Calvin no less than of his victim. Would that some Spurinna had been present, as the great Reformer sat by his writing-table in Geneva, to render an effectual warning: "Cave Idus Februarias!" On that eventful day Calvin wrote four letters, sealing the doom of Serveto. Two of these are preserved, of one we know the contents, the fourth is lost. This last was to Serveto himself. To Frelon, through whom he sent it enclosed for Serveto, he declares that its tone was harsher than his wont (*plus durement que ma coutume ne porte*), and plainly intimates that he does not wish to proceed further with the correspondence. To William Farel, the faithful Farel, who had brought

mere. *Fid. Expos.* 827. Of all Calvin's utterances on the subject of Serveto, this is perhaps the most cold-blooded.

* Even the "*Mentiris!*" which Serveto in his dungeon scribbled so plentifully on the margins of his adversary's sheets, conveyed no moral charge, but was the scoff of conscious mental superiority. Like the "*Impostor!*" and the "*Quæ omnia tu ignoras!*" it simply meant, "That true! Not a word of it!" Some of Serveto's expressions in his Epistles to Calvin are so travestied by Dr. Willis as to add unnecessarily to the appearance of insult. Thus where Serveto writes (*Rest.* 611), "*Tu vero, Judaico quodam zelo, scandalizaris,*" &c., Dr. Willis actually puts into type (p. 177) the astonishing blunder, "But you, true Jew—*tu vero Judaico*—would shame me by a show of zeal." See the page following for a similar case.

† Since penning this suggestion, we observe a similar remark in Tollin's new volume (*Lehrsystr.* M. S. II. 7). Dr. Willis invariably misquotes the title of Calvin's great work, giving *Institutiones* instead of *Institutio*. The title runs *Inst. Chr. Rel.* in Calvin's own issues after 1553; perhaps the transposition was to abate the resemblance above noted. Posthumous editions recur to the original order.

him to Geneva at first, and was constant to him throughout with an unwavering admiration,—to Farel he lays bare his very heartstrings. In the National Library at Paris we may touch the actual paper, and trace the fading lines of that tremendous document. “Servetus nuper ad me scripsit ac literis* adiunxit longum volumen suorum deliriorum cum thrasonica iactantia,† me stupenda et hactenus inaudita visurum. Si mihi placeat, huc se venturum recipit.‡ Sed nolo fidem meam interponere. Nam si venerit, modo valeat mea autoritas, vivum exire nunquam patiar.” To Pierre Viret he makes precisely the same declaration. Henceforth he was on the watch for his opportunity, and this Serveto knew. The undated letter from Serveto to Abel Pouppin (written in or about 1547, and embodying portions of the twentieth Epistle to Calvin afterwards printed in the *Restitutio*), produced at the Geneva trial as evidence of Serveto’s defamation of Calvin, speaks of his failure to get back from Calvin the manuscript he had submitted to him. It contains also the remarkable prophecy: “Mihi ob eam rem moriendum esse certo scio.” Serveto adds: “sed non propterea animo deficior, ut fiam discipulus similis præceptori.” He concludes with the quotation from Habakkuk: “Super custodiam meam stabo, contemplabor, et videbo quid sit dicturus. Nam veniet, certe veniet, et non tardabit.”§

The draft from which this *longum volumen* of 1546 had been prepared was again re-cast. Further lengthened by the Calvin correspondence and other matters, the volume was now finally ready to appear in type; but there was some more delay owing to the difficulty in finding a printer. A Basle publisher, Marrin, courteously declined (9th April, 1552) to undertake it. Eventually an edition of 1000 copies was printed in Vienne itself, at a press owned by Balthasar Arnoullet, but kept secret, and managed in a house distinct from his public establishment. On Michaelmas-day, 1552, the printers set to work upon it; the

* Dr. Willis prints “literas.”

† Dr. Willis inserts *dicens*, though he professes to follow the certified copy published by Paul Emil Henry in 1844.

‡ Dr. Willis prints “recepit.”

§ Allw. p. 47.

3rd January, 1553, saw their task completed. The bulk of the impression, packed in bales, was secretly despatched to Lyons and Frankfort. It was intended that the fame of the volume should break forth, with sudden effect, at the Easter fair in the latter city. But Calvin was beforehand with its author. The man of the *Institutio* was one of the first to receive a copy of the *Restitutio*. Well did he know what use to make of it. His first letter dictated to Guillaume Trie was despatched on the 26th February. Before Easter, Serveto was a prisoner, having been arrested at Vienne on the 4th April. The Lyons consignment of five bales of the *Restitutio* was discovered and confiscated on the 3rd May. Respecting the Frankfort bales, Calvin wrote to the pastors of that city on the 27th August, and procured their destruction, though the Geneva trial was still pending. No wonder that few original copies, perhaps but three, are extant, though it seems certain that the book got into private circulation, especially in Italy, more freely than some writers are willing to allow.*

The literary treasure at whose nativity so much concealment was practised, does not, strictly speaking, belong to the class of absolutely anonymous books.† Though there be no name set out upon the title-page, and only initials appear in the colophon, yet the allusions to Michael, in the Hebrew and Greek texts of the title, must have told their own tale to a theological eye; and at the opening of the first Dialogue‡ (p. 199) the name Seruetus§ is fully disclosed.

* In addition to the well-known copies at Vienna and Paris, a third original, imperfect at the beginning, has been unearthed in the Edinburgh University Library, since our April issue, by the inquiries of Prof. Turner. A collation of one or two passages in the text of this volume, which we owe to the kindness of a friend, leaves no doubt of its authenticity.

† A passage in which the distinct personality of the writer peeps out occurs on p. 430: "Cœlibem vitam non improbo, quam ipse mihi elegi."

‡ Dr. Willis says (p. 194) that the interlocutors in this Dialogue are the same as in the *Dialogues* of 1532. Such is not the case. The second interlocutor in 1532 is Petrucius, in 1553 Petrus, the very name of Serveto's patron. Lovers of coincidence may like to be reminded that the name of the London printer who executed the 1711 reprint of the *Restitutio* was Peter Palmer. Wallace, I. 460.

§ This is the Latinised equivalent of Serveto. So far as our knowledge goes,

We are not about to criticise here the main argument of the *Restitutio*, or to expound the various aspects of its theology. At present we content ourselves on this head by deliberately warning our readers to take on trust no exposition by Dr. Willis which they have not verified, and to accept no translation of his which they have not tested. We have carefully gone over every page of his work ; in no single instance have we found his rendering of Serveto's thought entirely accurate ; rarely is it approximately adequate ; and in many cases he makes his author speak in terms which express a sense the very opposite of his real meaning. On the completion of Tollin's *Lehrsystem Michael Servet's*, of which the third and concluding volume is anxiously expected by all lovers of Serveto, the ideas of this great and original thinker will at length be properly presented to the world. From a dogmatic standpoint it might with some justice be urged that the aim of Serveto's work was to effect a restitution of Christism rather than of Christianity. From this point of view Serveto might perhaps be reckoned among those who have anticipated a favourite position of modern liberals, by seeking to sever Christ from Christianity. There is much in the *Restitutio* which, taken by itself, would seem to countenance such a separation. His earlier works, occupying in their re-written form nearly one-half (pp. 1—354) of the *Restitutio*, tend chiefly in this direction. For the dogmata of the Churches, whether Reformed or Unreformed, he retains little reverence, even scornfully contrasting them with the actual dicta of the historical Christ, and with the recorded spirit of his immediate following. With characteristic pathos he declares (p. 199) : " Video Christum a Christianis ignorari. Video Christianos dici, qui nesciant in quo Christianismi fides consistat. Et videns ingemisco. Si Christus, hodie veniens, iterum prædicaret se esse filium Dei, iterum eum sophistæ nostri crucifigerent."

Serveto, even when writing French, invariably, as we have intimated above (Part I. p. 283), avoids the Gallicised form *Servet*, employed by his contemporaries in French records and correspondence. Michel Seruetus was his signature to French documents when he laid aside the professional Michel Villeneuve.

Serveto's system, however, possesses the double merit of presenting not merely a recovered Christism as the bequest of the past, but also an ideal Christianity as the inheritance of the future. His outline of a Christian Utopia is delineated with great pains, great insight, and great freedom from party bias, in the later and less known portions of his *magnum opus*. His sagacious proposals for a union of Episcopal government with congregational liberty (pp. 657, 726); his religious care for a daily celebration of the Eucharist (pp. 513, 711); his recommendation of an *impositio manuum* for infants (p. 723), and a baptism for adults (p. 372), whatever we may think of his particular suggestions, are proofs of a consideration for the spiritual wants of the Christian community, as well as for the intellectual requirements of the individual thinker. All his schemes for a revived and purified life of the Church are frankly submitted to the test of the living spirit of the Church's Head and Lord: "Nisi ipse Christus ecclesiam suam nobis restituat, et spiritu suo dirigat, rationes humanæ nihil prodesse possunt" (p. 716). So mighty Luther bravely said: "I tell our Lord God plainly that if He will have His Church He must keep it Himself, for we cannot keep it; and if we could, we should be the proudest asses under heaven."

In our own judgment, the finest section of the *Restitutio* is the masterly *Apologia*, addressed to Philip Melancthon, with which it concludes. This is easily read, and to it we commend the scholar who desires to find in short compass a compendium of the purest Servetism. But the whole volume is the exhibition of a noble and stimulating order of thought. Obsolete as it is in some parts, and mystical in others, we venture to say that no one could engage in its study to-day, from whatever quarter of the theological world he might approach it, without feeling sensible of its power, and being the better for its influence. The style is truly admirable, and wonderfully modern in its literary complexion. Its brief and lucid sentences form the very antipodes to the grave, noble, closely-knitted periods in which Calvin's massive trea-

tises are composed. If we may compare Serveto's manner with the workmanship of more recent transcendentalists, we may freely own that here and there are crudities, acceptable perhaps to "the ears of the groundlings," but always best forgotten wherever found. In the main, however, the genius of Serveto signally anticipates the clear and pithy diction of Emerson; exhibiting more of "the burning core below" than Emerson usually permits us to see, and wielding a native force of epigram with an ease and polish such as to excel Emerson where he is strongest. There are sentences which compress into few words an energy of annihilating sarcasm which eats into the memory like a strong acid. Such is the withering remark, "ad scortandum a Papa consecrantur" (p. 447), in which Serveto sums the rationale and the result of clerical celibacy, as he saw it in his day. There are sayings, again, in which the author's characteristic Christism is condensed with all the tact and delivered with all the pungency of a proverb. Such are the "Christus ipse est idearum pelagus æternum" (p. 278); the "Christus est mihi vnicus euangelista" (p. 290); the "omnis Christi actio sit nostra instructio" (p. 526); the "nemo Christianus, nisi discipulus" (p. 566).*

It is interesting to observe that, on various points, Serveto's medical knowledge framed his conception of theological ideas and his interpretation of spiritual processes. The phenomena of demoniacal possession, for example, he claimed to be still existent in the forms of disease. "Contraction of the nerves is called by Christ (Luke xiii.) the chain of Satan; just as Paul calls his own [bodily] infirmity a messenger of Satan."† With subtle wisdom Serveto further applies the teaching of his medical experience in the elucidation of a question much

* So in the *De Trin. Err.* (p. 5 a), "Christi sermones sunt fundamenta ecclesie." The reader can form no idea of the compact beauty of Serveto's style from the renderings of Dr. Willis, who sometimes, on the other hand, adds a perfume to the violets of his author. Thus (p. 181) he represents Serveto as asking, "Do you not believe that the angels will prevail?" which is a very pretty sentiment, and worthy of Lothair. What Serveto wrote (*Rest.* p. 628) was, "Do you not believe that its own angels preside over the Papacy?"

† *Rest.* p. 392.

agitated in the religious world of our time. The diseases we experience here, he tells us, are shadows of the punishments which will afflict us hereafter. For Serveto, in his treatment of the problem of the supersensible world, shews himself no believer in a universal enjoyment of Heaven; as little does he plead for a separate Hell. The same Spirit of God is the light of the blessed and the fire of the damned. The glorious countenance of God, which is the joy of the good, will torture and rack the souls of the bad. Had Origen understood this, he observes, never would he have said that the devils will be saved, merely because they are to be brought back to God. Brought back they will certainly be; and in this will be their doom. "*Ipsemet spiritus sanctus, quem accepisti, erit tibi tormentum si eum male serves.*" God himself is the consuming fire that will destroy the wicked.

"That fire with which the wicked are to be punished after the resurrection is not in Scripture called infernal, though by a metaphor (*mystice*) it may be so termed. It is the fire of the eternal empyrean, and hence is called, in archetype, 'prepared from eternity.' This fire will torture demons and souls and bodies, bringing to them the foulest odour, with horrible sights, sounds, tastes and sensations. *As is usually the case with those whose senses are depraved* [by illness], sweet things they deem bitter, and fragrant things fetid. On the other hand, the condition of the blessed will be exactly contrary to this. All their senses will be filled with the sweetness of [God's] glory; their minds with new enlightenment; and of those things which were seen before as in a glass, darkly, clear knowledge will be given, by the true illumination of the divine spirit (*deitatis*) of Christ, who brings us all things."*

We cannot avoid entering here upon a topic closely connected with Serveto's medical knowledge, which has come up anew for discussion, and to which reference has lately been made by more than one physiologist of repute. To Prof. Huxley,† who has of course been at the pains to peruse the *Restitutio*, that work appears "essentially a farrago of scatterbrained theological speculations" (p. 176). The phrase smacks rather of

* *Rest.* p. 246.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1878, art. William Harvey.

those good old times for which Prof. Huxley sighs, at the end of his remarkable article, than of either the "silence" or the "mildness" which he commends in William Harvey. Still it may pass. Serveto at any rate mixed that "farrago" of his "with brains, sir;" and this perhaps at a lavish rate. "Characteristic of the man," we are further told, was a "tendency to headlong speculation" (p. 177); and to this happy-go-lucky freakishness of fancy, not to any sound observation or just experiment, Prof. Huxley asks us to attribute the so-called "discovery" of the pulmonary circulation. That we may be in a better condition to judge how the matter really stands, we here introduce the greater part of the passage in which the discovery in question is recorded.*

We must premise that Serveto in this passage is not professing to write a physiological treatise. The physiological demonstration comes incidentally to the front, as he is developing his ideas of human psychology. The Book in which the passage occurs is "On the Holy Spirit." Serveto's object is to exhibit the manner in which the Divine acts upon the human nature in man. He begins by reminding us (p. 169) that the old terminology, as given e.g. in Alexander Aphrodisæus (A.D. 200) had counted three "spirits" in man, each derived from one of the superior elements, water, air, fire.† It is

* *Rest.* pp. 169—178. Dr. W. B. Richardson says (*Gent. Mag.* April, 1878) the passage is hackneyed, which is true enough of one or two sentences in it. Through the kindness of Rev. S. A. Steinthal, we have been enabled to collate with the printed text his transcript of the Paris MS. formerly the property of Cæl. Hor. Curio, which bears every mark of being a copy (not an autograph) of the 1546 recension of the *Restitutio*. This recension is not only important as setting back the date of the formulation of Serveto's discovery by at least seven years, but it possesses, in spite of many obvious errors of transcription, a very high critical value. It contains what answers to pp. 92—247 of the printed text. Of this portion it presents evidently no mere draft, but a copy of the prepared text, that would have been printed had Calvin returned the manuscript. Some passages which occur only in this recension are in the author's best manner. The Circulation-section exhibits fewer various readings than any other part; shewing that it was fully matured in the original draft from which the recensions of 1546, and that printed in 1553, were successively prepared. We will note the various readings as we go on, omitting only such as merely give different spellings of the words.

† Here Tollin nods, giving us *Erde, Feuer, Luft*, as the three. *Ent. d. Bluth.* 1.

important for us to remember that of these three "spirits," one, the physical (*naturalis*) had been described as residing in the veins; another, the vital, in the arteries; a third or psychical (*animalis*), in the nerves. Serveto rejects this threefold classification. In doing so he does but follow the teaching of Champier ("cui ut discipulus multa debeo" *), who had already maintained that "there are in truth but two kinds of spirit, the vital and the animal."† Serveto in like manner identifies the "physical" and "vital" spirits,‡ i.e. he proclaims that the fluid contents of the veins and of the arteries are of the same nature. He does not, however, make a clean sweep of the old-fashioned terminology, but corrects and makes the best of it, as he thus proceeds.

"The spirit (fluid) which is communicated through anastomoses from the arteries to the veins, and in them called *physical*, is in fact *vital*.§ This first spirit (fluid) then is venous blood,|| with its seat in the liver and the veins of the body. The second spirit (fluid) is the vital (arterial blood), with its seat in the heart and arteries of the body. The third spirit (fluid) is the psychical (nerve force), as it were a ray of light, whose seat is in the brain and nerves of the body. In all these there is the energy of the one Spirit and Light of God."

Serveto next adduces facts to prove that the physical spirit (fluid), i.e. the blood, "is communicated to the liver from the heart,"¶ which is thus the distributor of blood, a point which Dr. Willis (p. 211) seems to have missed. One of his proofs is, that "an artery and a vein are always in conjunction;" but by this he probably means only that they open into each

* Dedication of the *Brevissima Apologia* (1586) to Carol. a Stagno. Quoted by Tollin, *Archiv f. pathol. Anat.* lxi. 3, 378.

† Willis, p. 102.

‡ "Vere non sunt tres sed duo spiritus distincti." The 1790 reprint has *sed deno*; the MS. reads, "Vere autem non sunt spiritus distincti."

§ "Vitalis est spiritus, qui per anastomoses ab arteriis communicatur venis." MS. "Vitalis est *vere* spiritus;" the margin, in place of *venis*, proposes the manifestly false reading *nervis*.

|| "Primus ergo est sanguis." MS. (margin), *primus ergo spiritus est sanguis*.

¶ "Quod a corde communicatur hepati." MS. "Quod autem a corde."

other, as Galen taught, not that they circulate their contents. He proceeds to speak thus of the aeration of the blood :

"Into the heart the *anima* was inbreathed by God to Adam, before it got into the liver, and from the heart communicated to the liver. Through inbreathing by the mouth and nostrils the *anima* is really inhaled ; and this inbreathing tends towards the heart,* the *primum vivens*, the fount of heat in the midst of the body. From the liver it receives the *liquor vitæ* (blood) as it were a raw material, and this in its turn it vivifies. . . . Of the blood of the liver through a wonderful elaboration, as you shall now hear, is the raw material on which the *anima* operates. . . . To arrive at this, it is necessary first to understand the substantial generation of the vital spirit (fluid, i.e. arterial blood), which is compounded of and nourished by the inbreathed air and the most subtle blood. The vital spirit (fluid) has its origin in the left ventricle of the heart, the lungs chiefly (*maxime*) aiding in its generation. It is a fine spirit (fluid), elaborated by the force of heat, of a bright (*flavo*) colour, of a fiery potency, so as to be as it were a lucid vapour from the purer blood, containing in itself the substance of water, air, and fire.† It is generated out of a mixture, made in the lungs, of the inbreathed air with the elaborated subtle blood, which the right ventricle of the heart communicates to the left. *But this communication takes place, not through the mid-wall of the heart, as is popularly believed ; but with consummate art (magno artificio)‡ the subtle blood from the right ventricle of the heart is set in motion in its long passage through the lungs ; by the lungs it is prepared, it is made bright ; and from the 'vena arteriosa' (pulmonary artery) it is transfused into the 'arteria venosa' (pulmonary vein). Then, in that very arteria venosa it is mixed with inbreathed air, it is repurged from fume by expiration.§ And so at length the whole mixture is drawn from the left ventricle of the heart by means of its diastole,|| being now fit stuff to become vital spirit (fluid, i.e. arterial blood).*

"That the communication and the preparation takes place thus

* "Ad cor tendit." MS. "in cor tendit."

† "Et ignia." MS. omits *et*.

‡ It is impossible to forget the professional naiveté with which Serveto elsewhere declares (*Rest.* p. 221) : "Multo excellentius est artificium in compositione hominis quam angeli."

§ "Expiratione a fuligine repurgatur." MS. *et expiratione*.

|| "Per diastolem. MS. *per diastolen*.

through the lungs is taught by the multiplied (*varia*) conjunction and communication of the *vena arteriosa* with the *arteria venosa* in the lungs.* It is confirmed by the remarkable magnitude of the *vena arteriosa*, which would not be such as it is in structure or in size, nor emit so great a force of the purest blood from the heart itself into the lungs, if it were for the sole purpose of their nourishment. . . . Further, it is not simple air, but air mixed with blood, which is sent† from the lungs to the heart through the *arteria venosa*; so that the mixing takes place in the lungs. That bright colour is given to the spirituous (arterial) blood‡ by the lungs, not by the heart.§ In the left ventricle of the heart there is no space capacious enough for so large and so affluent (*copiosæ*) a mixing, nor is there that elaboration which will suffice to produce (*sufficiens ad*) the bright tint. *Lastly, that mid-wall* [of the heart], *inasmuch as it is without vessels and without appliances (facultatum), is not in a condition to perform (aptus ad) that communication and elaboration, even granting something may resude.* By the same art with which, in the liver, transfusion takes place from the *vena porta* to the *vena cava* in respect of the (venous) blood, there takes place also, in the lung, transfusion from the *vena arteriosa* to the *arteria venosa* in respect of the spirit (arterial blood). Let any one compare these statements with those penned by Galen in Books vi. and vii. *De Usu Partium*, and he will be thoroughly master of a truth which Galen himself had not perceived.

"This vital spirit (fluid, i.e. arterial blood) then, from the left ventricle of the heart, is in succession transfused into the arteries of the whole body, in such sort that the finer portion seeks the higher regions, where it is elaborated still more; especially in the retiform plexus, situated at the base|| of the brain, wherein from vital (fluid, i.e. arterial blood) it begins to be psychical (fluid, i.e. nerve force), attaining the proper seat of the rational *anima*."

* "Quod ita per pulmones fiat communicatio, et preparatio, docet coniunctio varia, et communicatio venæ arteriosæ cum arteria venosa in pulmonibus." MS. reads, *Quod autem*; and omits *et preparatio, docet coniunctio varia, et communicatio*, by an evident lapse of the transcriber.

† "Sed mixtus sanguine mittitur." MS. mittitur, sed mixtus sanguine.

‡ "Datur sanguini spirituosus." MS. sanguini datur spirituosus.

§ "Non a corde. In sinistro cordis ventriculo." MS. non a corde a quo niger magis daretur. In sinistro item cordis ventriculo. Here is the only real addition to the text which the MS. gives in the part we are quoting.

|| "Basi." MS. vase.

We need not pursue the history of this "finer portion" of the arterial blood into the regions where physiology and psychology meet; though it is interesting to notice that Serveto illustrates one of his theories by the observation (p. 172) that "in the transfusion from the veins into the arteries there is a new kind of vessels in the lung, formed out of vein and artery." The following is what he says about the remainder of the aerated blood:

"So much concerning that portion of the spirit (arterial blood) which is drawn into the cerebrum; concerning the organs of the brain; and concerning its powers. Now for that other and greater portion.* The inbreathed air is led through the *trachea arteria* to the lungs, that after elaboration† by them it may pass through to the *arteria venosa* (pulmonary vein), wherein it is mixed with the bright and subtle blood, and is elaborated more. Thereafter the whole mixture is drawn by diastole from the left ventricle of the heart, wherein by the very powerful and quickening virtue of the fire there contained, it is brought to its normal perfection (*ad suam formam perficitur*) and becomes vital spirit (arterial blood), many fuliginous dregs being breathed off in this elaboration."

In this account we do not see, as some have done, any indication of the systemic circulation; nor anything inconsistent with it, as others have maintained. With regard to the pulmonary circulation, Serveto's description is express and clear; though he evidently does not suppose that the aeration of the blood is finished in the lungs, but holds that it goes on in the pulmonary vein, and is completed in the heart itself.‡ So far as it goes, his induction seems to us perfectly scientific.

* "Hæc de spiritali in cerebrum ducta portione, cerebri organia, atque potentiis. Parte illa maiore." MS. Hæc de *inspirati aeris* in cerebrum portione, et cerebri organia. Parte *alia* maiore.

† "Elaboratus." MS. elaboratus.

‡ There is a passage (p. 195) bearing on this point, not, we think, previously noted, and worth quoting as summing up, in a very few words, the pith of Serveto's doctrine of the transition from physiology to psychology. "The very air which we breathe, is made substantially one with our *anima*, after it has been essentially united (*adiunctus*) to our vital spirit (arterial blood), *intus in corde*." These last words, as well as the *essentialiter* which precedes them, are missing in the MS.

Not to speak of his reasoning from the magnitude of the pulmonary artery, he makes two great points against the popular view. First, the blood does not pass through the septum of the heart; second, if it did, that would be of no use. Prof. Huxley reminds us that the difference between Serveto and Galen is "merely one of degree." It would be strange if it were otherwise. In one sense, the difference between Galen and Harvey is only of degree. Serveto and Harvey both worked on Galen's lines, and left them only by more fully applying Galen's own methods. In the successive steps which men took when they were feeling their way towards that which was irrefragably demonstrated in Harvey's immortal work, the step which Serveto took in 1553 must not be disallowed; any more than the step which Cesalpino took in 1569, when he introduced the quickening phrase *circulatio sanguinis*; or the step which Fabricio de Acquapendente took in 1574, when he described the valves of the veins.

Prof. Huxley, however, adduces two considerations to diminish the length of stride which separates Serveto from Galen. First, he holds that Galen, like Serveto, not only takes blood to the lungs by the pulmonary artery, but brings it round through the lungs to the heart again. He gives no references, and therefore we cannot test the passages on which he relies. But the point has lately been in controversy between Ceradini, with his seconder Bizzozero, on the one hand, and Tollin, with his editor Dr. W. Preyer, on the other;* and unless Prof. Huxley has hit upon some important passage in Galen which they have missed, it may be assumed that the evidence is all in court. Galen then, as we understand him, speaks (*De Usu Partium*, vi. 10), not of a circulating current, carrying blood from the pulmonary artery onward through the lungs and through the pulmonary vein; but of cross currents, in virtue of which the pulmonary vein, at the extremity where it issues from the lung, gives back some of its "spirit," and receives in exchange a little of the blood from the pulmonary

* Tollin's pamphlet is *Die Entdeckung des Blutkreislaufs durch Michael Servet*, 1876, not "der kreislaufs."

artery. This is an exchange which, according to Galen, takes place throughout the whole body, at the anastomoses of the arteries and veins.* The pulmonary vein, at its other extremity, discharges its "spirit" into the heart, and brings away in exchange certain fuliginous matters. Does it introduce to the heart, along with the "spirit," some of the blood which it has taken in through the lungs? Dr. Preyer denies that Galen anywhere says so. Even, however, if he somewhere does, the degree is considerable which separates the description of a casual escape from the doctrine of a functional procession.

Prof. Huxley's second consideration is founded on Serveto's "licet aliquid residare possit" (*Rest.* p. 171), which he takes as admitting that after all "some of the blood of the right ventricle may transude through the septum." Serveto makes no such concession. He simply argues against the popular conclusion from the popular premises. What he says is: Even if anything can ooze off this way (a gratuitous hypothesis, in his view), still the septum of the heart can never give passage to the vast flood that wants to come, and cannot do anything in the way of elaborating it into arterial blood. Surely a fair point to urge against the traditional view, at the close of his own lucid exposition. On the whole, then, we think that, in the instance of the pulmonary circulation, Serveto makes good his promise (*Rest.* p. 125): "rerumque principia in lucem proferemus, summis philosophis hactenus incognita."

Calvin's prompt measures of reprisal on the appearance of the *Restitutio*, his disingenuous intrigue with the Romish authorities by a series of letters addressed through Guillaume Trie to Antoine Arneys at Lyons, and the consequent examination and trial at Vienne, are graphically drawn out by Dr. Willis, in three chapters (Bk. I. xix.—xxi.), which form the redeeming feature of his volume. This part of the ground had

* "In toto corpore mutua est anastomosis atque oscillorum apertio arteriis simul et venis, transumuntque ex sese pariter sanguinem et spiritum per invisibiles quasdam atque angustas plane vias." *De Usu Partt.* vi. 10. Venice edn. (Lat. only) 1541-45. The original text we have had no opportunity of consulting.

been well trodden by previous writers ; and though even here we can easily point to inconsistencies and flaws of detail, attributable to an inaccuracy which seems constitutional with Dr. Willis, yet he could not, and does not, go far astray. His "Mathias Ory" (p. 266 *bis*) should of course be Mathieu ; his "Archbishop of Maurice" (p. 256) is Monseigneur Jehan Paulmier, Prieur de St. Maurice ; his "two first leaves" (p. 238) and "four printed leaves" (p. 242) will not harmonize ; his "fifteen or sixteen years old" (p. 255) cannot be got out of "quatorze ou quinze ans." These, however, are slight slips. Unluckily, his loose workmanship once more, as in the instance of the Pagnino Bible, casts a very gratuitous slur on Serveto's good faith. For he actually makes Serveto affirm (p. 257), in the course of his first examination at Vienne: "It was very long, indeed, since he had written anything." That would have been an unpardonable falsehood. But mark the language of the original record: "*nous disant que de prime face il ne peult pas cognoistre si c'est sa lettre ou non, pour la longueur du temps qu'elle est escripte.*"

We wish we could speak favourably of Dr. Willis' narrative of the second and much more important trial, that at Geneva. The reader cannot complain that the space allotted to it is insufficient, for it is spread over eighteen chapters of the second book, occupying more than one-third of the entire volume. The facts of this *cause célèbre* have long been before the world ; it is only in the arrangement and the interpretation of them that there is room for the exercise of skill and of discernment, and for the employment of that higher faculty which distinguishes the historian from the annalist. We do not propose here to recapitulate the trial, even in its main features ; but we wish to point out one or two prominent instances in which Dr. Willis seems to us to have misconceived the facts, and drawn aside their significance.

According to every scrap of contemporary evidence, Serveto was arrested in Geneva on the very day of his arrival. He escaped from the prison at Vienne on the morning of the 7th April. For four months we lose sight of him entirely. On

Saturday, the 12th August, he rides up to the village of Louyset, a few miles from Geneva on the French side. Here he sells his horse, and passes the night. In the early morning of Sunday, 13th August, he walks into Geneva, puts up in a private apartment at the Auberge de la Rose, keeps himself close, and asks the landlord and landlady for a boat to take him up the Lake on the way to Zürich. His intention was to get off as quickly as possible, and ultimately to make his way to Naples, where there was a Spanish colony, not without a traditional repute as a home of liberal thinkers. But for the circumstance of the sacred day, the chances are that he would have been able at once to procure the boat, and pass through Geneva undetected. But for the circumstance of the sacred day, he would have had no temptation to shew himself beyond the four walls of his room at the Rose. We know not whether it was that the singularity of avoiding public worship would have excited suspicion, or whether the temptation to see Calvin in the pulpit proved too strong for his prudence. Certain it is, that he went to hear the afternoon sermon, and was recognized as soon as he took his place in church. Calvin was at once told of the stranger who sat there.* He instantly obtained an order for his arrest, which he could do, although it was Sunday, inasmuch as it was on a capital charge. By the next morning, instead of taking his journey towards Zürich, Serveto was listening to the thirty-eight articles of impeachment preferred against him in the name of Nicolas de la Fontaine, Calvin's most obedient humble servant.

If Dr. Willis had rejected altogether the account in the *Historia Mortis Serveti*, 1554,† we could have better under-

* "Recoغنن par quelques frères." *Registre de la Comp. des Pasteurs* (Billiet, p. 134). "Agnitus est a quibusdam, qui id continuo Calvino nunciatum iverunt." *Hist. Mort. Serv.* Mij a.

† Thus, since Allwoerden, it has been customary to describe the unentitled document, probably by Lelio Sozzini, printed in 1612 as an appendix to the *Contra Libellum Calvini in quo ostendere conatur Hæreticos jure gladij coercendos esse*, 1554. A copy, which has been kindly lent to us, once belonged to the Catholic controversialist Roger Widdrington. The *Contra* is often referred to as *Dialogi* or *Dialogus inter Vaticanum et Calvinum*, and till one examines it, it looks like a

stood his scepticism as to the immediateness of the arrest. But he quotes and accepts that account (p. 285) as good evidence, even on a remarkable point which some think tests severely the authority of this document, the appearance at church.* Dr. Willis makes little of Serveto's own word; we will therefore not dwell upon his personal testimony. Must not, however, the highest respect be paid in this matter to the express statement of Calvin himself? Let it be remembered that the only ground for imagining that Serveto lay hid in Geneva for several weeks before his arrest, is to supply room for working the theory that Serveto was in some kind of treaty with Calvin's anti-theocratic foes. Now we may give Calvin credit for being perfectly aware that any fact of this nature would score a valuable point in his own favour. Yet he absolutely excludes the possibility of it, telling Sulzer that "for almost four months,"† after getting away from Vienne, Serveto was wandering about in Italy. Since Jacques Spon,‡ who we believe was the first to drag this red-herring of a long concealment across the path, the apologists of Calvin have deemed it their duty to know more of what was secretly going on in Geneva during July 1553 than was suspected by Calvin himself. Dr. Willis is not an apologist of Calvin, but he is a victim of the apologists.

There are many ways of representing the entirely mythical

Dialogue; in fact, it consists simply of extracts from the *Fidelis Expositio*, followed by most damaging comments. Dr. Willis has extracted (p. 524) a patchwork passage compounded of a piece from the work itself (Aij b) and a piece from the Preface to the Dutch edition (· · iij a). In trying to give the title, he prints "Calvini quo ostenders conetur." This is only a specimen of his way of citing title-pages. Just afterwards (p. 525) he professes to give the title of Mino Celao's *De Hæreticis capitali supplicio non afficiendis; adjunctæ sunt, &c.*; but prints "supplicio afficientibus; adjunctæ sunt."

* There is of course no real conflict between this statement (found also in the *Contra*) and the evidence of Serveto, which was never disputed in his lifetime, "quil se tenoit cache en ceste ville tant quil pouvoit," and "quil na communique a personne." Quest. 28 and 29 of 23rd Aug.

† "Fere quatuor menses." *Ep. ad Sulc.* 8 Sep. 1553. Calvin said *Italy*, because he had heard of his opinions from that quarter. Though Serveto had not been there, the *Restitutio* had.

‡ *Histoire de Genève*, iii. 256.

tale of Serveto's relations with the Libertine party. Dr. Willis has invented a fresh hypothesis, which we like no better than the old ones. Serveto, it seems, according to this new reading, was not an instigator of the Libertine party, but its dupe. They nailed up the windows of his inn (pp. 284, 381) to make sure of him. We presume, of course, that this remarkable inn had no doors. Seriously (for we have a notion that Dr. Willis is poking fun at us about these windows), the whole account which he gives of the interference of Berthelier, with a view to turn the criminal process against Serveto into a political struggle, is sheer romance. As he justly observes of one of his imaginary episodes (p. 320), "the Records of the Criminal Court are significantly silent on the subject." Indeed, we may quote against his fanciful conduct of the story, his own more sensible remark toward the close (p. 462), that "to remove the prosecution from the sphere of theology to that of policy, were to take from it its chief interest and significance." Saving the attempt of Perrin, in the last days of the trial, to have the case remitted to the Council of the Two Hundred, we have no real evidence of interference, on the part of the anti-theocratic section in Geneva, to shield Serveto. There is no evidence at all of a disposition to employ him. The interposition to which Serveto made appeal, and which Calvin thought he might have to combat was that of the public opinion of the Swiss churches. "Il demandoit qu'on s'en rapportast au iugement des autres Eglises."* Calvin adds that he "willingly conceded this reference to the churches;" yet how much he really dreaded it is clear from the letters, public and private, which he industriously circulated among them. Moreover, with all his industry, and with all the immense weight of his personal influence, he failed to secure, from any one of the Swiss churches or civic councils, a positive utterance in favour of the capital sentence on which he was bent. The strongest moral support which he got came from the Pastors of Zürich, whose message, however, went no further than this: "Quomodo amplitudo vestra coer-

* *Decl. pour maint. la vraie foy*, p. 98.

ceat hunc hominem . . . vestræ prudentiæ æstimandum relinquimus."

The successive sets of articles of accusation produced against Serveto are feebly paraphrased by Dr. Willis; without precision enough for the theologian, and without condensation enough for the general reader. Though four times changed, they were still thirty-eight in number, excepting in the case of the second set, furnished by the Procureur-Général, Claude Rigot, when the number stopped at thirty. The articles in this second set, dealing chiefly with personal character, Dr. Willis thinks (p. 353), "have no look of being dictated by Calvin." He forgets that in the next set of thirty-eight, transcribed by the hand of Calvin's own amanuensis, the worst insinuations of the thirty are resumed, pressed further, and amplified in detail.*

In what may be called the by-play of the trial, there are two scenes, well worked up in Calvin's "true story," which have fulfilled a most successful part in injuring, the one the literary reputation, the other the religious character, of Serveto. The first is the well-known episode about Justin Martyr, which Dr. Willis narrates (p. 347), but has not investigated. With inimitable skill, Calvin leaves on the mind of every one who happens to be ignorant of Serveto's real qualifications and character, the irresistible impression that he could not read a word of Greek, and had falsely pretended to be in a position to quote Justin Martyr. Each fact employed for this purpose is perfectly true in itself. Serveto never had read, never had seen, a copy of Justin Martyr. In his earliest theological publication (p. 52b) he expresses a strong regret that he had not yet been able to consult ("utinam uidissem") the

* Serveto's reply to one of these questions gives Dr. Willis, who has already shown us how he can translate Latin, an opportunity of allowing us to judge with what effect he can write it (p. 376 n.). "Herniosus ab utero" is in express contradiction of Serveto's own evidence, who dated his double malady (incorrectly diagnosed by Dr. Willis) "de son aage peult-estre de cinq ans." It is odd to find "ad levandam infirmitatem" instead of *levandam*. "Impollens" is not a Latin word at all. But Dr. Willis can produce Latin words at pleasure; for example (p. 405), he gives us *Tritheiti*.

writings of all those who had written before the Arian schism. He had then seen only a "citatum testimonium" or two. Afterwards he made acquaintance, at first hand, with many of the ante-Nicene fathers. In particular, Tertullian and Irenæus became and remained his cherished authorities. Of Justin Martyr, the first edition was not printed till 1551. The *Restitutio*, as we have reason to think, was at that time waiting for the press.* But in Irenæus (Adv. Hær. iv. 6) there is a short extract from Justin; and (iv. 27, 31, 32) there are extracts of considerable length from a certain unnamed Presbyter, respecting whose identity many guesses have been made. Serveto believed him to have been Justin, and in this belief he quotes him, more than once, in the *Restitutio*. Once, indeed (p. 622), he speaks generally of this authority, quoting him among "presbyters, preceptors of Irenæus, disciples of the apostles, as he cites." But (p. 687) he is afterwards singled out as "Justin, or some other presbyter (*senior*), a disciple of the apostles;" and (p. 692) as "Justin or that presbyter, a disciple of the apostles, cited by Irenæus." This was perfectly fair and legitimate as opinion, even though, as a critical surmise, our knowledge of Justin compels us to pronounce it most certainly mistaken. When the tenor of these citations was quoted in Court as Justin's, Calvin ordered "codicem statim afferri,"† that is, as we understand the passage, he called for a *manuscript* of the actual Justin, and shewed Serveto sundry places. It is not every one who can read a Greek codex at sight. Calvin won an easy triumph when Serveto "nihilò magis legere quam puer alphabetarius potuit." He won a triumph

* With what avidity Serveto pursued his studies of early Christian authors is curiously shewn on p. 140 of the *Restitutio*. Nearly half of that page is of later date than the 1546 recension, and consists of extracts from Clement of Alexandria, whose works, according to Brunet, were first printed in 1550, and then only in the Greek. A Latin version did not appear till 1551. Serveto's criticisms on the original texts of Galen and Plato shew him to have been a fully competent classic. He was also a very fair Hebraist.

† *Fid. Expos.* p. 836. The *Decl. p. maint. la vraye foy* (p. 94) has simply "ie fei apporter le liure." It must not be forgotten that this French version of the *Fid. Expos.* is later than the Latin original. See the critical edition of Calvin's Works by Baum, Cunitz and Reuss, Vol. VIII. (1870).

still greater when Serveto, with no misgivings, called for the Latin version; and this, not because he was no Grecian, but simply because the book of Irenæus from which he had drawn his quotation is extant only in the Latin. "What's this?" exclaimed Calvin. "The book has not been translated into Latin; you cannot read the Greek; yet you pretend to be familiarly versed in the reading of Justin. Whence then did you get those citations which you so liberally indulge yourself in quoting?" It marks the proud confidence with which Serveto felt himself to be on a level of intellectual dignity far above the malignant attacks of an unscrupulous adversary, that he never deigned to utter a word in reply to this coarse taunt. It marks also the degree to which Calvin felt himself hard pressed in his endeavour to annihilate his adversary's reputation, that he condescended to retail the story as "*jocosum et risu dignum specimen*" of that adversary's powers.

Still more telling in its mischievous effect has been Calvin's famous picture of the memorable encounter, of which we have no record apart from Calvin's own story. Pushing to an extreme his reading of Serveto's doctrine of the Divine substance, Calvin stamped upon the pavement with well calculated indignation, and exclaimed, "Wretch, will you let it be said that I tread upon your God?" Serveto replied, "I doubt not that this bench, and whatever else you can point to, is divine substance." "Soho then, the devil himself will substantially be God?" The meaning chuckle (*cachinnum*) with which Serveto rejoined, "Can *you* doubt that?" was not lost upon his foe. Here, we believe, lies the real motive of this graphic scene; a scene which has seized upon the imagination of most modern writers, and made an indelible impression, as indeed Calvin designed that it should. Calvin, however, intended a moral rather than an intellectual inference to be deduced from this encounter. He wished to hold up Serveto to posterity in a character which he never ventured to present in any article of indictment on the trial, namely, as a crass blasphemer, not as a subtle pantheist. This is not the place

to enter on a discussion of Serveto's so-called pantheism. "God," he tells us (*Rest.* p. 125), "is not like a mathematical point; he is a boundless ocean of substance, essentiating all things, causing all things to be, and sustaining the essences of all things." But, as if to bar the very misconstruction which Calvin's skilful use of casual and distorted phrases seeks to palm upon us, he asks (p. 698), "Is not that divinity (*deitas*) which is implanted in stone or tree, distinct from the Holy Spirit, which is in man?" Dr. Willis, who has persuaded himself (p. 78) that "deep thinkers in general" hold "pantheistic principles," naturally credits Serveto with the same distinguished proclivity. Whenever, which is often enough, he runs up against anything which he does not understand in Serveto, he lugs in a pantheistic interpretation. Possibly he would not suffer any distressing qualms if he even felt himself obliged to admit the full charge of "impietas" which Calvin preferred against Serveto; for he tells us that, in his own judgment (p. 401), "religion has in fact at no time been the civilizer of mankind." He might, however, have been a little more careful about some of the extracts on which he grounds his impression of Serveto's pantheism. One specimen will suffice, though there are many examples. Thus (p. 174) he quotes, as from Serveto: "Without beginning and without end, God is always becoming—*Semper est Deus in fieri.*" The reference is to the *Restitutio*, p. 594, and any one who will take the trouble to look up the passage will see (1) that the phrase italicised by Dr. Willis nowhere appears in it; (2) that the passage deals with a particular view of the generation of the Son; the context, which twice occurs on the same page, being, "Generatio quæ nec principium nec finem habet, semper est in fieri;" (3) that the view expressed, far from being Serveto's own, is by him put into the mouth of an orthodox critic, whom he introduces as combating a "peculiar heresy" assigned to Calvin. This is on a par with the strange passage (p. 456) where, according to Dr. Willis, Calvin thus describes Serveto's pantheism: "He did not hesitate to say the Devil was in the Deity—*Diabolus inesse divinitatem.*"

What Calvin wrote was, "diabolis inesse divinitatem," viz. "that there is a divinity in devils." Such energy of misconstruction is surpassed only by the eagerness in manufacturing mistakes which credits Serveto (p. 92) with a description of the Scotch as "not a particularly religious people;" and this on the strength of his passing reference to their *dress*, in the words, "decenti forma, sed cultu negligētiori" (of comely make, but toilet rather unkempt).

But enough, and more than enough, of Dr. Willis. Evidently he did not estimate the magnitude or the delicacy of his task. That there are still in England minds willing to study Serveto, and souls that love him, he never guessed. That the dead Spaniard, as he esteemed him, is yet a living spring of thought and spirit of piety, how should he know? It is his misfortune that he has spoiled a great opportunity. His excuse is that he has honestly done his best. As we have tracked his course, through pages after pages which were to him, in more senses than one, "the accents of an unknown tongue," we have not been without a kindly feeling for a fellow-labourer. He tells us, with just pride in his profession, that a physician is (p. 13) "one of the guild whose destiny it is to lead the van of progress;" and in an admirable spirit he adds (p. 17), that "it is indeed among the privileges of the physician that his education never ends." Such a conviction bespeaks an open and an industrious mind. "Mais que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?"

History has in one respect had its revenge on the author of Serveto's prosecution in a striking manner. There can be no doubt, on the one hand, that what smites the popular imagination with a force which no special-pleadings have been able to soften, is the actual mode of Serveto's execution. That slow fire at Champel has burnt Calvin's reputation to a cinder. There can be no doubt, on the other hand, that Calvin never meant to burn Serveto, but distinctly meant to do something else with him. In the first letter dictated to Guillaume Trie, the distinction is plainly drawn between the cruel Romish flame and the simple Protestant sword. Moreover, the stake

was as sly as well as a cruel slaughter. The Church, in handing over its victim to the secular arm, exhorted the magistrate to shed no blood. Calvin, to do him justice, was perfectly straightforward in his principle, though wily enough in the conduct of his particular case. He thought it a right thing to shed a blasphemer's blood; he believed in the *jus gladii in hæreticos*. Though he was not going to let his prize slip out of his hands by any punctiliousness at the last, his hope that he would be allowed to shew Rome how to cut off a heretic's head *en plein jour* was genuine and sincere. The magistracy of Geneva would not aid him in establishing a new precedent; they fell back on the good old way.

Accordingly, on the 26th October, judgment was delivered. The capital charge is thus defined: "Thou, Servet, hast long put forth a doctrine false and fully heretical, and slighting all remonstrances and corrections hast, with a malicious and perverse obstinacy, persistently disseminated, and divulged it, so far as to print and publish books against God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit—in short, against the true foundations of the Christian religion, thereby endeavouring to cause schism and disturbance in the Church of God, whereby many souls may have been ruined and lost." The actual sentence runs thus: "Thee, Michael Servet, we condemn to be bound and carried to the spot of Champel, and there to be fastened to a stake and burnt alive, with thy book, both written by thine own hand and printed, till thy body be reduced to ashes; and thus shalt thou end thy days, to give an example to others who would do the like."

No wonder that when a document of such dread import was solemnly read over to him next day, the unhappy Serveto, wasted with a long imprisonment, of whose negligent severity the most touching and shameful evidence is preserved, lost for some moments his self-command, forgot his haughty bearing, forgot where he stood and whom he addressed, sighed, raved, and when the fit was exhausted, piteously cried at length in his native Spanish, "Misericordia! misericordia!" He was asking mercy where mercy was unknown. Calvin, who was

present and records the scene, saw nothing in the demeanour of his victim but the signs of a "beluina stupiditas."* But the phrase recoils, and suggests rather the infatuation which hunted to the death this guileless servant of the Lord.

On Friday, 27th October, 1553, the sentence was carried out. Two hours before the execution, Calvin came with two members of the Council, at the request of Serveto, to take leave of him in the prison. Even here unmoved, the Great Reformer kept his unbending face. Serveto begged his forgiveness. Calvin altogether disclaimed any private feeling of revenge, and laid stress upon his friendly endeavours for the conversion of the heretic now prostrated before him. "But," says he, "I besought him to think rather of asking pardon of the Eternal God . . . for having attempted to blot out three hypostases from his essence."† The Genevan divine veiled the pity of an iceberg in the phrases of a saint. Our English Queen, who had not so cold a manner, spake flatly to her foe: "God may forgive you, but I will never!"

At the stake, William Farel plied Serveto with solicitations to recant. Neither threats nor enticements could make him waver in the presence of a dreadful death. He had not the look of a man who would renounce his opinions to save his life. The portrait of him, engraved in 1607, represents him as he appeared in the last stage of his inwardly steadfast, outwardly changing career. The brow is high, open and massive; the eyes are large and deeply set, the eyes of observation and language;‡ the mouth speaks firmness and sarcasm; the whole aspect is one of deep thought mingled with deep anxiety; it is a powerful and impressive, but withal a painful face.§ He continued to invoke the name of God, and to ask of Heaven that compassion which men had denied to him. His torments

* *Fid. Expos.* 836.

† *Ibid.* 817.

‡ "Oculatissimus Michaël Villanouanus," writes his contemporary Seb. Münster.

§ The rigours of his Geneva prison, following close upon his wandering life after escaping from Vienne, had probably aged him not a little in appearance when this likeness was taken. F. Sozzini, whose information respecting the execution was derived from eye-witnesses, writes: "Certissimum enim est Servetum, cum supplicio affectus est, jam senem fuisse, et Calvino multo grandiore natu."—Opp. ii. 537 a.

were cruelly prolonged, and the spectators were stricken with horror at his sufferings, and at that fearful wail which rang out from the midst of the pile: "Jesus! Son of God Eternal! have pity on me!"

Calvin could afterwards comment upon the scene without an emotion of regret, and with a theological scoff at the heresy of this dying groan.* The Genevan *malleus hæreticorum* was proud of his work. It was a master-effort of that "prudential" to which the Zürich Pastors were content to entrust the fate of Serveto. The Vienne authorities had demanded (26th August) the extradition of the Church's prisoner, who had escaped beyond their jurisdiction. But no; "prudential" forbade. Though on Genevan soil no offence was even alleged to have been committed, on Genevan soil an example was made, which was deliberately intended at once to put to shame Romish inertness and delay, and to quell latitudinarianism for ever. Vain are the schemes of man. In stifling the voice of Serveto, his antagonist imagined that he had killed the opposition of independent thought. He had only secured its indestructible hostility. Guarding his church with a sword of fire that turned every way, he dwarfed the intellectual proportions and restrained the moral influence of the Protestant movement, by the evil victory of a new ecclesiasticism.

Here, and not in the peculiarities of his theology, valuable as these will be found for their own sake, lies the permanent interest of the persecution of Serveto in the history of modern religion. To treat the suppression of this rich and original mind as the mere *coup de grâce* of a Unitarian martyr, is to lower his position, as well as to be guilty of a sort of theological anachronism. The real Unitarian martyrs, of that and the next age, were men of genuine earnestness and of sharp intelligence; at the same time, as a rule, they were men of little theological genius. Heroes of conscience they undoubtedly were; and of heroism of conscience it may be truly said that it possesses a higher moral value than any other human

* *Fid. Expos.* 837.

quality. We gratefully own the stimulus of their noble example, but we hesitate to affirm that they have greatly enriched the compass, or deepened the influence, of Christian ideas. They were good critics, but not inspiring thinkers.

Acute criticism rather than profound thought is indeed the note of that whole school, which, by its memorable sacrifices, repeated from one generation to another of a distinguished history, has gained the chief right to use the Unitarian name. Morally as well as historically, the *Doctor Subtilis*, with his *quidditates* and his *hæceitates*, is the rightful ancestor, as of the drier type of scholasticism on the one hand, so on the other of the leading type of modern Unitarianism. That type starts from Ochino, one of the profoundest analyzers of theological thought which his age produced; and though we dare not call Ochino a Unitarian, we are entitled to say that he both cleared the ground for Unitarianism and indicated the path it must pursue. Through Ochino the Scotist, the originator of what is known as the Socinian view of the Atonement, the Sozzini derived the influence of that delicate and dry idealism which was the parent of their system. Socinism is the development of Scotism; and when its idealism evaporated, though the fineness of touch remained, the dryness was unrelieved. Between the genius of Serveto and of Fausto Sozzini there is all the unlikeness that separates the inspiration of Dante from that of Milton. Few now read the lucid expositions of Sozzini, which have so great a charm for those who wish to "skip the nonsense" of Christian theology, while retaining its intellectual beauty and its subtle hold upon the imagination. But the *Paradise Lost* of the Unitarian poet is in all hands, and here the anti-trinitarian theology has already lost its idealism, and expresses itself in the stately rhythm of gloomy and prosaic dialogue.

Calvin, with his unsparing sagacity, did not fail to note the irrelevance of the plea by which anti-trinitarians, of incompatible types, united in seizing upon Serveto as a great name to conjure with. "*Quosdam scio*," he snarls out, at the beginning of his *Fidelis Expositio*, "*ex diametro inter se dissidere, qui*

se tamen Serveti discipulos esse profitentur." How Serveto would himself have estimated the teachings of men who have honestly believed themselves to be carrying on his work, may be easily gathered from his careful references to Arius, Macedonius and Eunomius, in the *Restitutio*. Honouring and applauding their clear witness to the Unity of God, he considered that, as regards the further exposition of theology, they were simply without gifts for the task.

To class Serveto among Unitarians is accordingly misleading; except in so far as we completely rescue that term from sectarian use, and frankly treat Serveto as the head of a distinct and separate school of Unitarian theology, which, however, has enjoyed as yet few successors, and has rarely emerged in the history of anti-trinitarian thought. We may effect this rescue with the more reason, inasmuch as the word *Unitarius*, of uncertain origin, was refused by the school of Sozzini at its outset,* was assigned to that school by its adversaries, and was only gradually appropriated in the usage of its English adherents. Serveto himself was the first, so far as we know, to employ in controversial theology the term *Trinitarius*; and it is remarkable that his opponents were as unwilling to take it to themselves as he was anxious to fasten it upon them. So that neither the one nor the other of these correlative terms received a hearty welcome at the hands of those whose theological position it was intended to describe. The "*Trinitarios omnes quos vocabat (Servetus),*" in editions of the *Institutio* (I. xiii. 22) since 1559, runs curiously parallel with the "*quos Unitarios vocant*" on the title-page to the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum* (1666?). Calvin urged at the Geneva Trial that "*jamaïs homme . . . ne usa de ce mot Trinitaires.*"† And it

* F. Sozzini, though he employs the term *Trinitarius*, never, we believe, makes use of its correlative. The earliest express acceptance of the term by a Socinian, on which we can at present lay our hands, is in the phrase, "*oratoria Christianorum Unitariorum,*" in a posthumous tract by John Stoienski (1591—1654), written after 1627, perhaps much later. Even as late as 1665, Stanislaus Lubieniski the younger prefers the phrase, "*ecclesiæ Christianorum Catholicorum.*"

† 21 Aug. As the name of a benevolent Order, the term *Trinitarius* had been in use since the thirteenth century. In this connection it had, though indirectly,

may be recollected that in the final judgment one of the grounds of Serveto's condemnation was, that "il appelle ceux qui croyent en la Trinité, *trinitaires*." * This may explain the curious confusion in virtue of which Lamy, the Catholic historian of Socinianism, asserts† that the term *Trinitaire* was a name originally given to that class of Socinians of which Serveto was the chief. He had indeed introduced the term; not, however, as a designation for himself, but to describe those whose reading of the doctrine he repudiated as a "triceps illusio." The modern stereodox believer, who admits himself a Trinitarian without any sort of misgiving, may be startled to learn that he wears this now popular name at the bidding of an arch-heretic whose imperious insistence on its use contributed appreciably to his destruction.

To the true doctrine of the Divine Trinity, as distinct from the illusions of the schoolmen (*sophistæ*), Serveto always proclaimed his adhesion.‡ Yet he early perceived the danger of authorizing the use of the term.§ "Hæc est uera trinitas. Sed

a certain theological connotation; for S. John de Matha's *Fratres domus Sanctæ Trinitatis*, established 1199, were especially to occupy themselves in ransoming Christians held for their faith in Saracen bondage.

* He called them also *Tritoitæ*, a word which we take to be of his own coining, suggested probably by the *Unionitæ* found in the heading to one of the sections of the *Apotheosis* of Prudentius, and there used to describe Sabellians. Tollin (*Lekrs.* i. 26) treats it as a misprint in the *De Trin. Err. for Trithitæ*; but it recurs again and again in the *Restitutio* (pp. 30, 108, 394, 406, &c.), where we also find the adjective *tritoitici* (p. 100). Calvin gives *Tritoites* in the *Decl. p. maint. la vraye foy*, p. 99.

† *Hist. du Socinianisme*, 1723, p. 6.

‡ So Emlyn wrote (1708) to Lealie: "I who am a true scriptural Trinitarian, am far from rejecting, as a contradiction, any doctrine that bears the genuine stamp of revelation, merely because it has some difficulties attending it which I cannot solve, or because I cannot frame an adequate notion of it; nay, I firmly believe there is no contradiction in the Scripture account of the holy Trinity, to the divine Unity." (Works, II. 3.) Dr. S. Clarke's epoch-making exposition of this view did not appear till 1712. Clarke, like Whiston, was chaplain to Bishop Moore, whose copy of the *Restitutio* will be noticed further on.

§ So did Calvin. See, *inter alia*, the useful quotation in Willis, p. 493; taking care, however, to avoid his rendering of *docebimus* by "we have instructed," which completely destroys the significance of the passage. See also *Instit.* I. xiii. 21: "adhibita etiam multa cautione, ne aut cogitatio aut lingua ultra procedat, quam verbi dei fines se pretendunt."

uoce scripturis extranea uti nollem, ne forte in futurum sit philosophis occasio errandi; & cum antiquioribus, quia ea uoce sanè usi sunt, nihil mihi quæstionis est, modo hæc trium rerum in uno Deo blasphema & philosophica distinctio a mentibus hominum eradicetur.* Serveto held, with Sabelius, that the Word and the Spirit are effluences or manifestations of the one Personality of the Father. God reveals himself to men by and in Christ as the Word; he communicates himself to the souls of disciples by the Spirit. The celebrated accretion upon the Canon of Scripture in the First Epistle of St. John, "There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one," exactly expresses his belief. In his edition of the *Biblia Pagnini* he draws attention to it in the chapter-heading as "assertio trinitatis."

The peculiar genius of Serveto's Christology may be brought out by a comparison of his doctrine with that of other schools which may be considered Unitarian, in the widest sense of that word. He was not an Arian; for he refused to allow, with Arius, that the Son of God was a creation; though he admitted, with Arius, that "there was (a time) when he was not," except in the Divine idea. He was not a Socinian; for though, with Sozzini, he worshiped Christ, and called him God, this was not on account of any delegated power or purely representative function given to him by the Father, but because Christ had in him Deity, the fulness of Godhead, bodily. "The body of Christ is so agglutinated (*adglutinatum*) to God, as to be substantially one with him."† In the soul, spirit and flesh of Christ, "God substantially exists."‡ God is known, and is "spiritually adored, in the living Christ alone."§ He was not a Humanitarian of the familiar matter-of-fact type,|| because, while he owned that Christ's Sonship to God is identical in species with the sonship of Christians, of which

* *De Trin. Err.* p. 64 b.

† *Rest.* p. 188.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 231.

§ *Ibid.* p. 323.

|| Thus Priestley unreservedly declares that Christ is "a man, who is as much a creature of God as a piece of bread." *Appeal*, 1770 (conclusion).

it is the archetype, he held that such relationship, though *naturalis* in derivation, is not a normal fact, but in all cases is the outflow of a special divine energy.* In his discussions respecting the Trinity, Serveto had used much offensive language, *triceps cerberus* (*Rest.* p. 406), and the like, and had, by praising the Monotheism of the Kurân in comparison with the Tritheism of some Christians, given rise to the suspicion that he was at heart a follower of Muhammad.† But the very doctrine which Muhammad founded his religion to repudiate, the doctrine that God has a Son, was accepted by Serveto in its most literal form, and made the keystone of his system. Christ is "truly generated from the substance of God;"‡ hence, though he has his origin in time, he is "not a creature, not a being of finite power, but is verily to be adored, and is very God" (*verumque Deum*).§

If any modern sect is to be allowed to enrol Serveto as a predecessor, the liberal branch of the Baptist body may perhaps put forth a reasonable claim in this respect. We have no sympathy with Serveto's opposition to pædobaptism, but it must be admitted that he states his case with great power and great thoroughness. In contending for a rite of laying on of hands as the proper mode of admitting infants to the Christian Church, he is consistently true to his principle of taking an exact *imitatio Christi* as the standing rule for all the details of Christian observance. It is worth noting that for the first trace of an English knowledge of Serveto's doctrine we have to turn to a Baptist quarter. It occurs in a scarce pamphlet (1691)|| by Thomas Grantham, then of Norwich, author of the

* In the language of Catholic theology, it belongs to the *Supernatural Order*; but Serveto, so far as our recollection serves, avoids this ambiguous term, substituting *superelementaris* for some of its uses.

† F. Sossini has well defended him from this charge. Opp. ii. 535 b.

‡ *Rest.* p. 577.

§ *Ibid.* p. 4.

|| The date of the *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning*, by William Wotton, is 1694. Here the famous circulation passage is printed from an excerpt made by Abraham Hill, F.R.S., and given to Wotton by Charles Bernard, F.R.C.S. Wotton, however, in the postscript (xxv—xxxiii) to his second edition, 1697, quotes the passage from the MS. belonging to "My Lord Bishop of Norwich, whose incomparable Library contains everything that is rare and excellent."

well-known *Christianus Primitivus*, and of the still unpublished *Christianitas Restaurata*. We have discussed elsewhere the theology of Grantham,* and have there reprinted the artless lines which form the earliest tribute in our language to the religious virtues and the theological merits of Serveto. Apostrophising Calvin, with rugged indignation at the malice which would slay Serveto, "slander him, and then his books to ashes burn," Grantham intimates that he was acquainted with Serveto's masterpiece :

"But some did 'scape thy furious Flames, and he by them does speak
More Truth than thou his Enemy."†

John Moore, who was elevated from a prebend at Norwich to the throne of that see in 1691, had a transcript of the *Restitutio* in his remarkable collection. This transcript, which is not a particularly good one,‡ subsequently went to Cambridge with the rest of the Bishop's library, as part of that royal gift by the Hanoverian King which at once provoked the eager wit of the Jacobite epigram, and gave room for the overwhelming retort thereunto, by a loyal subject of the "wee wee German lairdie." It is by no means unlikely that the Baptist preacher, a man of learning and of literary curiosity, living, as we know, on the most affectionate terms with one at least of the Norwich clergy,§ had access to this very copy in the Norwich close.

We ought to add, as we have permitted Serveto to be classed among Baptists, that his doctrine of baptismal regeneration is essentially Catholic in principle, though he allows that "non omnes, qui baptizantur, vere regenerantur."|| Catholic also is his doctrine that Baptism is indispensable as a condition

* *Chr. Life*, Aug. 12, 1876, p. 164, and Aug. 18, p. 178.

† *A Dialogue between the Baptist and the Presbyterian*, 1691, *ad fin.*

‡ Wotton tells us it was made from the Hesse Cassel copy. It presents such errors as "Baptisticam" for *Papisticam*; and leaves blank spaces in the room of most of the Hebrew and Greek words. The MS., in three thick vols. small 4to, has been assigned to 1690 as its probable date.

§ John Connould, vicar of St. Stephens, in whose church Grantham was buried, and who gave directions, ten years later, that his own remains should be laid in the same grave.

|| *Rest.* p. 517.

precedent of the Eucharist ; "sine baptismo nulla est cæna."* Rejecting transubstantiation, which he calls *transelementatio*, or annihilation of the bread and wine, he rejects also the merely symbolical view of the rite of Communion ; "corpus Christi est multis in cæna communicabile."† At the same time Serveto distinctly cuts away the very ground of Sacerdotalism, by denying that the specialty which determines the sacred character and seals the efficacy of the rite (in technical language, the *form* of the Sacrament), is to be sought in the words of the consecrator. These alone are simply powerless.‡ It is the act of the assembled Church, commemorating Christ's love by presenting, breaking and distributing the bread and wine, with thanks and prayer, which constitutes the Sacrament.

One final word on "the school of history." The great spiritual use and moral good of the historical method of investigation, in matters pertaining to theology, is this. Such investigation, if conducted with competent knowledge and with reasonable fairness, cannot fail to bring us into familiar and even friendly relations with the character and work of sterling and religious minds arrayed against each other in contending schools of doctrine. Only through a patient and sympathetic study of the spirit and the difficulties of influential leaders on different sides in great controversies, can our theological judgment attain its ripeness or preserve its catholicity. There are writers who have deemed it their duty to disparage Serveto and ignore his claims, purely out of love for Calvin's creed. How completely the mere champion of Calvin may sink beneath the true level of his task, is painfully exemplified in the article *Calvin*, from the pen of a Scotch Dissenting divine, which has gained admission to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. There are other writers who have taken up the cause of Serveto out of sheer hatred to the doctrines of Calvin. How little, as a rule, they have contributed to the elucidation of Serveto's thought, or the advancement of his reputation, is instructive. Were it a reasonable subject for present-day

* *Rest.* p. 510.

† *Ibid.* p. 281.

‡ "Mentitur sacrificulus, dicens, hoc est corpus meum," p. 511.

polemics, we should have no hesitation in saying which of these sixteenth-century Reformers, the autocrat of Geneva or the physician of Vienne, we reckon to be, in doctrine and in spirit, the more truly evangelical. The really important matter is, that we should discover and acknowledge that both were men of splendid powers and unconquerable earnestness; men who never shrank from doing their best, whether for the cause of God or for the sake of man's highest weal. The frigid adamant of Calvin, the subtle enthusiasm of Serveto, never understood each other. How should they? Providence placed them in a grave antagonism, which was mutually blinding. Max Müller, in his sixth Hibbert Lecture, says that "in the eyes of his Swiss judges, Servetus was an atheist." It is tempting to put the matter in that way. Yet to render the statement strictly historical, it would be necessary to read instead: "in the eyes of Serveto, his Swiss judges were atheists." He had proclaimed (*Rest.* p. 30) that all Trinitarians are atheists, inasmuch as they worship a tripartite and connotative, not the absolute God. This assertion formed the burden of the first of those articles on which he was finally condemned; nor did he ever recede from the fatal paradox. The lapse of time, that gracious boon of God's mellowing art, ripens for us the cataract of mental vision, so that the baffling envelope on the eyes of partisans may at length be peeled away. If it is a joy to find that Archbishop Laud and Oliver the Protector, those great sons of England, both were men of whom the land that reared them may be proud; if in the career of John Wesley the hand of God's energy can be seen, while in William Law's retirement the secret of God's patience is felt; if, to come nearer home, the Christian witness and the child-like piety of Joseph Priestley may be held in deepest reverence, and justice yet be done to the merits of Thomas Paine, that strange offshoot from the Quaker stock; if these broad judgments be not only practicable, but demanded of us alike by Truth and by Charity, then it must be both possible and right to offer in the same breath an appreciative homage to the contrasted excellences of Jehan Calvin and Miguel Serveto-y-Revés.

ALX. GORDON.

V.—RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN SCOTLAND.

WE are often told by those who defend, not merely the theory of Establishments, but the Churches actually established, that true liberty of thought can exist only where the civil law defines and administers the creed of the Church. In England, for instance, Lord Penzance issues judgments which from their learning and impartiality carry a weight which the anathemas of a Presbytery could never acquire, at least in the eyes of reasonable men. And, no doubt, if you have accepted as an inevitable evil that the spiritual teachers of the nation must be bound over to the defence and propagation of a particular system of opinions, the advantages of a lay Judge, who has received a professional training in neutrality, are great and obvious. You may, in the first place, expect a reasonable amount of certainty and consistency in the exposition of the law. It will be based on historical evidence and the principles of justice, not on the shifting sands of theological speculation and the angry tides of ecclesiastical controversy. You may also expect that judgments so delivered will be expressed in language intelligible to the general mass of people interested in them, and not in that metaphysical jargon and unctuous slang which, it is to be hoped, will always remain the exclusive property of an excited Church Court. Again, a perfectly fair trial will secure the clergy in their legal rights against those reactionary impulses of superstition which from time to time appear in every considerable Church. In fact, a lay tribunal is an admirable arrangement for firmly maintaining the *status quo*. But its fatal defects begin to appear when it is considered that a Church, however faithfully she may have delivered herself in her original creed, is always in a state of change, sometimes of dissolution, more often of growth. She thinks, feels, and acts; she often has the highest thought, the intensest feeling, the noblest action of the time. Hence the exposition of the Creed by a lay Judge is of necessity imperfect and inadequate. It may prevent backsliding, but it must hinder progress. The advance of thought may find full expres-

sion in the definitions of a Church Court, but it can find no favour with a Judge whose duty is to ascertain the meaning of historical documents by well-known principles of interpretation. There remains the power of civil legislation. It may be said : Parliament once made a Church ; Parliament may reform, as well as destroy, its own creation. But this brings us face to face with the inherent weakness of Established Churches at the present day. In England and Scotland they are in an absolute minority of the population ; and you cannot get Parliament to take a sufficiently strong interest in the affairs of a minority. It is one thing to establish a Church, of which an undivided nation, or an overwhelming majority of the nation, are the members ; it is another to measure the religious progress of an important sect, and to give a legislative recognition to one among many contending theologies.

In Scotland, the peculiarities of the situation are, (1) that the administration of the law of doctrine rests entirely with the Courts of the Church ; (2) that in certain matters, though certainly not in the supreme question of the Creed, the Church herself claims a power of legislation. The Scotch Church, therefore, has none of the advantages which belong to a consistent and neutral exposition of the Creed in judicial cases. But, to the limit of her prerogative, she has, or claims, a power to adapt her constitution to the changes of religious thought and feeling. In both these respects she very much resembles her two great voluntary rivals, the Free and the United Presbyterian Churches, who have closely copied even the details of organization in the Mother Church. But the Dissenters have one great advantage. They can themselves effect almost any change upon their creed or discipline, subject to the rights of protesting minorities, where the change is what a court of law would call fundamental. But whatever disputes there may be about the legislative powers of the Mother Church, whether or not she is entitled to repeal the Acts of her own Assembly when these have become venerable by a long course of practice, this at least cannot be disputed, that she can repeal nothing which is contained in an Act of Parliament, and there-

fore she cannot change her creed in a single chapter of it. These differences are forcibly illustrated in the recent proceedings of the three Scotch Churches. In each of the great Dissenting communities there has been an important case of heresy which has profoundly agitated the Church. In the Establishment, on the other hand, they boast that there has not been a prosecution for heresy since the Disruption of 1843.* But they have had no more important question to consider than in what precise terms the elders of the Church should signify their acceptance of the creed. This question was decided on the side of freedom seven years ago, but a change of policy seems to have taken place, and the liberal party have now been thoroughly beaten in a pitched battle.

The formula now used for elders is in these terms: "I, A. B., do sincerely own and declare the above Confession of Faith, approved by former General Assemblies of this Church, and ratified by law in the year 1690, to be the confession of my faith; and that I own the doctrine therein contained to be the true doctrine, which I will constantly adhere to; as likewise that I own and acknowledge the Presbyterian Church government of this Church," &c. This formula was framed by an Assembly in the year 1694. It has no statutory warrant whatever. It was indeed framed for the purpose of evading the obnoxious Act of 1693, "for settling the peace and quiet of the Church," which William Carstares, by one of the boldest acts of diplomacy recorded in history, had prevented King William from carrying into execution. The Act of 1693 imposed upon ministers and preachers the oaths of allegiance and assurance, as well as the subscription of the Confession. It was clearly intended to bring the hesitating Episcopalian

* One of the last acts of the Evangelical party before leaving the Church was to depose the gentle and refined Thomas Wright, of Borthwick, for heresies which he warmly repudiated. Wright was the author of the "True Plan of a Living Temple," and "Morning and Evening Sacrifice," and other books, which the religious world had been reading with great pleasure for many years. The prosecution was got up by the late Dr. Candlish and a few other theological busybodies. Wright was expelled from a parish which he tenderly loved. He sank into great poverty, and died almost uncared for in Edinburgh.

ministers to a point. But the Presbyterian clergy would have nothing to do with the oaths of allegiance and assurance, and they therefore constructed in 1694 a Test Act of their own for the "late conforming clergy," especially those "on the north side of the Tay." This did not apply to "elders," who had previously, under a Resolution of Assembly in 1690, made law by the Act 1693, merely subscribed in a general way their approbation of the Confession. It was not till 1700 that the General Assembly, perceiving this defect, ordered all ruling elders to sign the formula of 1694. Such proceedings obviously give rise to a great number of difficult constitutional questions. It cannot be said that the State, having furnished the Church with a Creed, leaves to the Church the duty of saying whether or not, and in what terms, this Creed should be subscribed. The State has undertaken to settle this matter for all classes of office-bearers; and so far as the Acts of the Church are inconsistent with the Acts of Parliament, the former are not of the slightest validity. Even had the State said nothing upon the subject, it is by no means clear that the Acts of the Church could receive any effect, unless confirmed by Parliament. Upon what is the prerogative of the Church to settle such matters based? Her prior history, no doubt, discloses a persistent claim to spiritual independence, but it does not support the right to exact a detailed confession of personal faith from either ministers or elders. In the Preface to the Scots Confession of 1560 it is said: "*Denunciamus igitur omnesque adeo rogamus, si quis aut caput aliquod, aut etiam sententiam, cum sancto Dei verbo pugnantem hic animadverterit, ut pro sua humanitate proque eo amore, quo Christum Christique gregem prosequitur, nos per literas admoneat: Id qui fecerit, sancte ei promittimus, nos eidem, aut ex ore Dei, hoc est Sacrae Scripturae oraculo satisfacturos, aut quod secus a nobis dictum, demonstraverit, emendaturos.*" At the time of the second Reformation it was the opinion of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, who, by the bye, declined to subscribe the Confession themselves, "that the person to be ordained be asked of his faith in Jesus Christ, of

his persuasion of the truth of the Reformed Religion according to the Scriptures, and of his zeal for the truth of the Gospel and unity of the Church against error and schism." The Confession itself lays down the important principle that the judgments of Church Councils "are not to be made the rule of faith and practice, but to be used as an help in both." The Preface to the Directory of Public Worship says: "Our meaning therein being only that the general heads, the sense and scope of the prayers, and other parts of public worship, being known to all, there may be a consent of all the Churches in those things which contain the service and worship of God; and the ministers may be hereby directed in their administrations to keep like soundness in doctrine and prayer," &c. The General Assembly of 1647, which approved of the Confession "as to the truth of the matter," did not construct any formula or exact any subscription.* Indeed, they did not accept the whole Confession. They objected to the doctrine of Zwingli on the authority of civil government in religious matters, and they substituted for it the doctrine of Calvin. No change occurred during the reign of Charles II., and when the Confession was finally ratified by the Act of 1690, it was described as "containing the sum and substance of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches." There is no doubt that King William was extremely anxious, for the simplest of political reasons, to widen the gates of the Church. He wished to separate the Episcopal element from the Jacobite faction. He wrote letters on the question of Subscription, urging that it should be in general and impersonal terms, admitting the Confession as a public document, but not as true. The history of clerical subscription is very like that of subscription by elders. The formula of 1711, and the questions by which it is accompanied, were enacted not only without statutory warrant, but in direct violation of the Barrier Act of 1697. This Act requires all

* According to Wodrow, *Correspondence*, iii. 84, intrants generally signed the National Covenant and afterwards the Solemn League, as a protest against Popery and Prelacy. He also hints that a verbal assent to doctrines was asked at ordination. (Quoted in Taylor Innes' *Law of Creeds*, p. 66.)

general constitutions of the Church to be considered by the Presbyteries before being finally passed, so that the mature opinion of the Church may be obtained. The practical conclusion of this digression is, that what the Church has done she may undo. No doubt, a mistake, which has not been corrected for 150 years looks venerable enough.

The chief change on the formula of 1694, which Dr. Story, of Roseneath, has for some time been unsuccessfully proposing, is, that the elder, instead of declaring the Confession to be the confession of his faith, and its doctrine to be true doctrine to which he will constantly adhere, shall profess his approbation of the Confession as the public and avowed Confession of the Church, and as containing the sum and substance of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches to which he adheres. No alteration is proposed on the introductory acknowledgment that the Scriptures are the Word of God. The arguments used in support of the change are various. The present subscription is said to be illegal, but, unless convinced on other grounds, the Assembly are not likely to admit the blunder of their predecessors. Then it is said that cultivated laymen are to be found, especially in the large cities, who refuse eldership because they cannot conscientiously sign the formula. It is added, that the great majority of elders sign without having read, certainly without having studied, the Confession. No one seriously disputes the truth of these statements. The mind of Scotland does not now take so keen a delight in the bewildering subtleties of the Calvinistic scheme of redemption. How could it be otherwise? The human mind is of limited capacity, and in the present century almost every new year opens up some fresh pasture for the intellect or the imagination. And the truth of these statements entirely disposes of one answer made to Dr. Story's proposal, viz., that it would admit as judges of heresy men not qualified by learning, intelligence and orthodoxy, for the office. That is distinctly the result of the present system. The evil of course is partly due to the inherent absurdity of the Presbyterian principle, which converts into both prosecutors and judges a number of men who have re-

ceived no special training in the constitutional law or procedure of their Church, and who have all either personal interests or strong sympathies in their decision. But the evil would be lessened, by removing what has been found to be a difficulty by a class of thoughtful and educated laymen. A good deal of criticism has been wasted on the terms of the proposed subscription. It is said to be ambiguous, and to imply an acquaintance with the theology of the Reformed Churches. This is entirely to mistake its character. It is not a declaration of personal belief at all. The words are taken from the Acts of Parliament and Assembly, which really regulate the matter. They amount to a consent that the Confession shall remain as the general statement authorized by law of what the Church believes and teaches.* The value of this consent may be great or small; that will depend on the view taken of the functions of a creed. Many of these functions, though possibly not the most important, are quite independent of the practice of subscription. On the other hand, there is a party in the Church who say, that without subscription the elders by the assumption of office would tacitly acknowledge the Confession; and that it is the duty of the minister to exclude from the sacraments every one who does not accept the whole Confession. Dr. Story's theory is at least intelligible; it is

* It will be remembered that in 1839 Professor Blackie, after subscribing the Confession and Formula of 1694, on his presentation to the Humanity Chair at Mareschal College, Aberdeen, made the following statement to the Presbytery: "I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I have subscribed the Confession, not as my private confession of faith, nor as a churchman learned in theology, but in my public professional capacity, and in reference to University offices and duties merely." It required some courage to say so fifteen years before the lay Scotch Professors were relieved from the test. The plain answer is, that the law assumed a confession of private faith to be necessary for the safe discharge of University duties. The Act of 1693 laid this burden on the colleges, expressly "for the security of the Protestant religion." No doubt, in the case of a Humanity Professor, the *object* could only be that he should not attack the Confession, but the *security* asked was that of personal belief. Indeed, although subscription is now abolished, the Professors must still declare that they will teach nothing inconsistent with the Confession. Professor Blackie's case went into a court of law, where it was held that the Presbytery were bound to grant a certificate of the mere physical act of subscription.

certainly the theory of the Revolution settlement. But the true and fatal objection to the change lies in this, that its advocates profess to go no further. They are anxious to have it believed that they personally accept the Confession, and that the question of clerical subscription is not involved. It would be much better to admit that they are fighting, not for the consciences of elders simply, but for a broad and liberal theology in the Church. There is no doubt a difference in the ecclesiastical position of elders and ministers, and this the present Formula recognizes ; but, if the clergy do not believe the Confession, they have a much more crying case for reform, because their obligations, both express and implied, are far more stringent. Dr. Story himself has just published, in his volume on "Creed and Conduct," a brilliant and incisive attack on all the most cherished ideas of the Calvinistic Church. The "intelligent elder" is therefore a mere stalking-horse.

The legal establishment of a creed, however valuable as a safeguard against ecclesiastical tyranny, leaves the Church immovable and helpless as regards her own constitution. The advantage of the voluntary system is seen in the recent movement of the United Presbyterian Church for the revision of doctrinal standards. This movement is largely due to the persistent agitation of Mr. Macrae, of Gourrock, and probably also to the exigencies of the Ferguson heresy case, which was *sub judice* while the Revision Committee were carrying on their work. The Synod have now adopted a "Declaratory Statement anent the Subordinate Standards," which, although a weak and temporizing production, nevertheless contains some important admissions in favour of freedom. It recites that the Confession and Catechisms, being human compositions, are necessarily imperfect ; that the Church has already taken exception to their teaching on one important subject ; and that there are other subjects on which it is desirable to set forth more fully and clearly the view taken by the Church of the teaching of Scripture. There may be some doubt whether the Church has succeeded in setting forth her views with any degree of clearness ; but one thing at least is clear, that this

document solemnly records a departure from the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.* The first Declaration is intended to give special prominence to the universal love of God, the universal propitiation of Christ, and the universal offer of salvation. It is amusing to notice that, while pressing this legislation on the Church, the Committee violently disclaim the idea that they are contradicting or adding to the Confession. They are merely bringing out the full beauties of its meaning. Dr. Cairns, a great master of vagueness in language, observed: "What was proposed was rather a statement which might check or counterbalance something that might be regarded as going too far in a direction which was in itself right, as putting in something that might be a counterpoise to what might otherwise be looked upon as too strong or extreme." He admitted that the Declaration was inconsistent with the doctrine of redemption taught in the Confession, but he denied that he was bound to reconcile them. The Synod of Dort had gone just as far in saying (Canon ii. sec. 6), "that no one should perish through the defect or insufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ offered upon the cross, but solely and alone through his own fault." This is a terrible breach in the walls of Calvinism, but the destructive Declaration was passed with practical unanimity. The only point raised was whether the Declaration is, as it describes itself to be, consistent with the Confession. Dr. Cairns had already admitted that it is not, but the Assembly have decided that it is. It would have been very important for the reformers to hold the Synod to Dr. Cairns' admission, as this would have fatally discredited the Confession in a cardinal dogma. But the Synod do not seem, like Dr. Cairns, to take a positive religious joy in contradiction. Principal Harper made the astounding statement, that it had always been a distinguishing feature of his Church to hold a double theory of salvation, both particular and general. After this, one cannot feel surprise at any logical feats of the United Presbyterian Synod. The second Declaration says that the Confessional doctrine of election is to be held in connection and harmony

with the truth, that "God will have all men to be saved, and has provided a salvation sufficient to all;" and also with the responsibility of every man for his dealing with the free and unrestricted offer of eternal life. Here again there is a flat contradiction, the very familiar logical contradiction of "some" and "all." The mental harmony at which members of the Church are for the future to aim, resembles the ecstasy of the Alexandrian philosophy, in which the conditions of human thought are set aside. And the Church has laid down a most dangerous principle, copied from the Roman Catholic "sacrifice of the intellect," that contradictions of her most important standard may be believed. For the present, indeed, she calls them "harmonies," but the phrase cannot last for many years. If certain contradictions are formally sanctioned, it will soon be difficult to object to any heretical proposition whatever on the ground that it contradicts the Confession. The third Declaration affirms, that the doctrine of total "depravity" does not exclude responsibility under the law of God and gospel of Christ. It seems that a man "totally depraved," may feel the strivings and restraining influences of the Spirit of God, and may perform good actions, which, however, as they do not spring from a renewed heart, are not spiritually good, or such as accompany salvation. As the Augsburg Confession of 1530 says, "Man was still capable, fallen though he was, of actions outwardly honourable, and of making decisions in harmony with reason," though he "could not do anything that was well-pleasing to God." This will, no doubt, be a great consolation to depraved persons. But why are they not to get credit for their good actions? This question leads us back to the hopeless contradictions involved in the first and second Declarations. Orthodox authorities are scarcely wise, in thus struggling to maintain a distinction between the goodness which is applauded by the human conscience, and the goodness which is to serve as a passport to the joys of heaven. If all the natural virtues are left outside the definition of holiness, holiness itself will come to be regarded as a mere badge of Church-membership. The fourth Declaration raised more

discussion. It recited the necessity of Divine grace to salvation, and the duty of the Church to send the gospel to the heathen, "who are sunk in a state of sin and misery, and perishing for lack of knowledge." It then proceeded to explain that the Church does not require her members to believe that any who die in infancy are lost, or to believe in any particular judgment concerning the final destiny of the heathen. As Dr. Cairns said, "they were permitted to cherish the hope that none who died in infancy were lost." This is, no doubt, very amiable, but what becomes of the doctrine of election? There were two difficulties about the salvation of infants. The first was, that their want of understanding did not permit the ordinary process of salvation to be accomplished; and they were therefore necessarily lost. If this difficulty be surmounted by a theory of special salvation adapted to persons without understanding, infants are then merely placed under the ordinary law of election; and it is unreasonable to suggest that none of these "depraved" infants are to be lost. Fortunately, the sacred affections of the family have proved too strong for this particular phase of a miserable and brutal superstition. The poor heathen did not fare so well in the Synod. It was pointed out by several grave doctors in divinity, that if the heathen might be saved, although the gospel did not reach him in this life, there must be then an intermediate state in which the process of salvation may be accomplished. The reasoning is not conclusive, but the mere idea of an "intermediate state," of anybody getting "another chance," seems to send a thrill of horror through the Synod. What would become of their missionary schemes if the heathen is to be excused on account of extenuating circumstances, of invincible superstition or necessary ignorance? What do they care for the heathen if he is not perishing in the theological sense? What interest have they in the majestic march of civilization, if they cannot place so many "saved souls" to the credit of their Church? The argument is humiliating to a Christian Church, but it appears in this case to have triumphed. The Committee recommended a Declaration that the "final destiny"

would be determined by the righteous Judge according to light which the heathen possessed. For this the Synod substituted a finding that "the Church does not bind those who accept the standards to hold that God never in any case saves without the use of the ordinary means." If the matter were not so serious, there would be something infinitely ridiculous in the complacency with which this little assembly of infallibles discuss and almost decide what is possible to God in the salvation of the greater part of the human race. "A heathen or two may be saved here and there, but it will be a difficult job, unless our mission gets hold of them!" That is the spirit of the finding. Let us hope that those who took part in the debate were more intent on the "form of sound words" than on the awful realities which they treated in so unworthy a manner.

The fifth Declaration is in itself of minor importance, but it exhibits some of the favourite subtleties of the Scotch ecclesiastical mind. It declares that the Lord Jesus is the only King and Head of the Church, and "Head over all things to the Church which is his Body," and renews the protest of the Church against compulsory persecuting and intolerant principles. Three parties immediately appear upon the field. There are a few members who, loyal to the ancient principles of the Secession, and possibly looking forward to a speedy union with the Free Church, wish to keep open the question of an Establishment. There are those who, true to the principles elaborated during the voluntary controversy, wish to protest against all taxation for religious purposes. This party is headed by a venerable Father who refused to pay his school-rates because the collector could not inform him whether any portion of it would be applied towards payment for religious instruction. Both these minorities have a certain historical justification. The original Act and Testimony of the Secession Church declared the duty of the civil magistrate to maintain a National Church. In the beginning of this century, however, the burgher and the anti-burgher Churches began to relax their views on this subject. The Narrative and Testimony of 1804 led to the Union of Seceders in 1820, who contributed all that was valu-

able or new in the Voluntary controversy which followed. But in 1847, when the Secession and Relief Communion, the descendants of Erskine and of Gillespie, became the United Presbyterian Church, their Basis of Union declared that they "regard as still valid the reasons on which they have hitherto maintained their state of separation and secession from the Judicatories of the Established Church, as expressed in the authorized documents of the respective bodies, and in maintaining the lawfulness and obligation of separation from ecclesiastical bodies in which dangerous error is tolerated, or the discipline of the Church or the rights of her ministers or members are disregarded." This certainly does not suggest that an union of Church and State was, according to Scripture, sinful, one of the most popular phases of Voluntaryism. But the third party in the Synod, and the great majority of the present generation of United Presbyterians, occupy a position inconsistent with both their traditions and their professions of to-day. Politically committed to Disestablishment, they utter but a feeble echo of the grand old Covenanting doctrine of the Headship of Christ; and professing conscientious scruples about compulsion in religion, they elect School Boards all over the country, with power to levy large sums by rates for the teaching of a particular system of theology in schools.

One more article of this Declaration is worthy of attentive consideration. "In accordance with the practice hitherto observed in this Church, liberty of opinion is allowed on such points in the standards, *not entering into the substance of the faith*, as the interpretation of the six days in the Mosaic account of the creation; the Church guarding against the abuse of this liberty to the injury of its unity and peace." In spite of the rather ominous reservation or dispensing power which seems to say that this law shall not be pleaded by anybody who, the Synod may think, is injuring their peace and unity, this article contains great promise of liberty. There is no definition of the substance of the faith; and Church leaders know very well how dangerous it would be to ask for one. It is simply because orthodox people seldom think or

talk with complete freedom on religious matters that their profound differences of opinion remain concealed. In each communion, too, there is a vein of conscious heterodoxy. Then, if the substance of the faith be fixed, it will always be a fair question whether a given opinion enters into it. The particular matters on which the Church has already expressed some misgiving may not be of great importance. The precise duration of the Mosaic creation, the marriage with a deceased wife's sister, the suggestion that Leo XIII. is not Antichrist, may be disposed of without affecting the scheme of redemption. They are blunders of the Confession which may be plausibly explained as mistranslations of Scripture. But if you appeal from a subordinate to an ultimate standard, from the Confession to Scripture, on one point, why not on another? This was precisely the position taken up by those enlightened liberals of the Church of Scotland who, towards the end of last century, so strongly urged on Principal Robertson the propriety of abolishing subscription, that the great Moderate leader abruptly resigned his post.* They insisted that, for constitutional reasons and on grounds of common sense, clerical subscription implied an assent to the Confession only in so far as it agreed with Scripture, and that a person charged with heresy against the Confession might defend himself by an appeal to Scripture. If he undertakes to shew they differ, why should the Church prefer a fallible to an infallible standard?

In the Ferguson heresy case, however, we have a useful practical illustration of the amount of divergence from the strict line of the Confession which the United Presbyterian

* These were Messrs. M'Gill and Dalrymple of Ayr, Wodrow of Stevenston, Ross of Inch, Fergusson of Kilwinning, Oughterson of Kilbride, &c. Several of them are mentioned by Burns in the "Twa Herds." M'Gill wrote the *Practical Essay on the Death of Christ*, which is said to be frankly Socinian, and which the Rev. John Newton said alarmed him more than "all the volumes of Priestley." Mr. Mackenzie, of Portpatrick, wrote a very clever and lively book called "*The Religious Establishment in Scotland Examined on Protestant Principles*" (London, 1771, pp. 360), in which he exclaimed, "Tell me, ye zealous for the Lord, do you think when Mr. Fergusson appeared in heaven, his Creator asked him whether he was a Socinian or a Calvinist?"—P. 56.

Church is willing to tolerate. The field of battle was one which has been frequently occupied by this Church. Mr. Ferguson, a man of amiable character and subtle mind, had a peculiar theory of the Atonement. He taught that the requirement of Divine Justice, which the death of Christ satisfied, was an absolute surrender of the human will to the Divine ; and that this perfect surrender freed all mankind from the ultimate penalty of sin, which consists in annihilation, and would also ultimately free all mankind from that death to the body and darkness to the soul which are involved in separation from God. Then upon the lofty matters of justification and sanctification he was a rank Arminian, rejecting the idea of that imputed righteousness which, according to the Calvinistic scheme, comes before the completed harmony of the spirit with God, which is properly sanctification. The future condition of the condemned, he said, did not imply the infliction of suffering directly from the hand of God. The loss of Sonship to God, and the alienation of the soul from God, might cause inconceivable anguish. But of this some modification was possible, and of no man could it be truly said that it were better for him that he had not been born. Besides these peculiarities of doctrine, Mr. Ferguson, being a man of literary power and warm imagination, was guilty of uttering various phrases which, though perhaps not charged with any very definite meaning, had nevertheless the effect of irritating the orthodox intelligence. "Be true to thyself, and thou art true to God," sounds a very simple and honest maxim to live and die by. But to a good United Presbyterian it causes "surprise and pain." There was indeed a strong feeling of indignation against this coiner of novelties in thought. Most of the accusations against him were found by the Synod to be proved, although a minority of 120 in a house of 450 declared that he was not essentially at variance with the faith of the Church. Having secured their victim, the Synod are suddenly struck with compassion, and appoint a committee of ten to "deal" with the erring brother. What this sickening process consists of is not clearly revealed. The object of it is

said by Church lawyers to be, "to bring him to a confession whereby he may most glorify God." The Report of the Committee, however, contains one suggestive document: "We certify that the Rev. Fergus Ferguson suffered so much from exhaustion after the committee meeting last night, that, although considerably better this morning, he still remains in such a state of health that we regard it as absolutely necessary that his attendance to-day should not exceed four hours." [Signed by two eminent physicians.] Ultimately they succeed in getting from the sick man an acknowledgment that Christ's satisfaction to Divine Justice consisted in the endurance of the holy indignation of God against sin, and that the ground of the sinner's acceptance with God is the objective merit of Christ, the sacrifice completed on the Cross. Proceeding on this acknowledgment, which certainly seems inconsistent with the other facts in the case, and which does not apply to some of the heresies charged, the Synod, by a majority of 142 to 90, proceed to restore Mr. Ferguson to his ministerial functions, with a "solemn and affectionate admonition" not to think for himself on the subject of the Atonement. This decision, pronounced amid a whirlwind of ladies' pocket-handkerchiefs, was partly due to the personal popularity of the accused. But it shews in an interesting way how impossible it has now become strictly to administer the old creeds. The subject of the Atonement, for instance, is one on which it is increasingly difficult for even the ecclesiastical mind to "mumble the dry bones" of supernatural religion. In no other country than Scotland could so much lively interest be taken in such dim abstractions. But even there the movement of thought which has triumphed in the United Presbyterian Synod is towards the recognition in theology of the indestructible emotions and intuitions of the human heart, and against those grossly materialistic conceptions of the Divine order which have so long been permitted to overshadow the life of faith.

We have seen that the Established Church of Scotland refuses to grant any measure of freedom to her elders, while the United Presbyterian Church, by both precept and example,

has been making serious inroads on the purity of her Confessional doctrine. We must now turn to a much greater and more exciting controversy, which will render the year 1878 memorable in the history of the Free Church. The charge of heresy against Mr. William Robertson Smith, Professor of Oriental Languages and Exegesis of the Old Testament at Aberdeen, has already to a large extent been decided in favour of the rational, as against the traditional, interpretation of the Scriptures. Some charges still hang over the Professor's head, and one serious accusation the Assembly have found proved against him. But whatever may be proved against him, he is evidently safe from harm. The recent proceedings in Glasgow have shewn that the party of which he is the most prominent scientific member, carry with them the sympathies of the younger and more vigorous portion of the Church, of the students and professors in the Divinity Halls, and of the more cultivated laymen. The heretic was publicly received with an enthusiasm which bodes ill for the Confession of Faith. While he is engaged in discussing whether the Levitico-Elohistic document is earlier or later than Deuteronomy, a young lady presents him with a magnificent bouquet of flowers; most of the orthodox speakers are treated with marked disfavour and impatience; and the announcement of a favourable vote is drowned in general cheering. Indeed, heresy will soon be in fashion, for at the present moment Professor Smith bids fair to become the most popular man in the Free Church. An exception must be made of the North-Western Highland parishes, where he is openly spoken of "as a child of the devil," "an enemy of all righteousness, and a mass of unsanctified learning." It would be impossible here even to indicate the various points which have arisen in this ecclesiastical *cause célèbre*. But what have been called the Tendency question and the Deuteronomy question may be selected for notice.

Although Scotland is said to be the most orthodox country in the world, the literature of its Churches does not seem to contain any satisfactory definition of heresy. Indeed, the great canonists and publicists themselves do not succeed much better.

The heretic is the man who chooses for himself a doctrine foreign to the sense of the Church, and defends it pertinaciously. He is a contemner of unity. The First Book of Discipline, which belongs to the year 1560, says: "By heresy we mean pernicious doctrine plainly taught and openly defended against the foundations and principles of our faith." The Form of Process, which was settled in 1707, is more distinct: "Nothing ought to be admitted by any Church Judicature as the ground of a process for censure, but what hath been declared censurable by the Word of God, or some Act or universal custom of this National Church agreeable thereto." Again: "If the errors be not gross and striking at the vitals of religion, or if they be not pertinaciously stuck to or industriously spread with a visible design to corrupt, and that the errors are not spreading among the people, then lenitives, admonitions, instructions and frequent conferences, are to be tried to reclaim, without cutting off." And it was the opinion of Dr. Hill, an eminent Church lawyer, that "heresy, when considered as a legitimate object of Church censure, must respect some fundamental and pernicious error." There have not been very many prosecutions for heresy in the Church of Scotland, and it is therefore scarcely possible to derive any inference as to the understanding of the Church from the common style of the indictments or libels which it is the business of a Presbytery to prepare and to try in such cases. This style certainly suggests that some contradiction of the Confession of Faith, of the Creed which the office-bearers of the Church subscribe, is essential to the crime of heresy. The Creed is supposed to deal with all fundamental matters, with everything which is required for salvation. And on matters not requisite to salvation, the Creed is still the interpretation of Scripture which has been authorized by the Church, and which she is ready to enforce. It may then plausibly be said by a person accused of heresy: "I have steered clear of the Confession. Beyond that, according to the contract between us, there is perfect liberty." On the other hand, the Confession is merely the work of the Church, done at a particular time, in view of

particular controversies and of the then visible future of the Church. The supreme standard of faith is the Word of God. If, then, the Church should find a man teaching serious error against the true meaning of the Word of God, is her right to censure gone because she has omitted in her Confession to provide against this particular error, which may now be rising for the first time into view?* It may be said that the remedy for such a state of matters is legislation by the Church. In the absence of a written law upon the subject, the supposed heretic had no means of knowing what was the sense of the Church, and he cannot be fairly charged with striking against her sacred unity. To new legislation he must of course submit; but he ought to have an opportunity of submitting. If he will not confess himself wrong, if he will not accept the *canonica purgatio*, then his guilt amounts to that *pervicacia*, that obstinate revolt against the mind of the Church, which is rightly punished with the greater excommunication.† The right of a Church, which has not defined heresy, to declare the orthodox doctrine in a judicial proceeding against an individual member, and not by way of legislation, must depend, if it exists, upon a long course of practice. If so dangerous a power has notoriously been claimed and exercised in the history of the Church, those who join her communion know the risk they run. Whether the Free Church of Scotland has such a power, is one of the questions involved in the case of Professor Smith. He was charged by the Presbytery of Aberdeen, not merely with the promulgation of opinions which contradict and are opposed to the Scriptures and the Confession of Faith on certain points, but also with the promulgation of opinions which are in themselves of a dangerous and unsettling tendency, and also in their bearing on certain specified doctrines of the

* Stuart of Pardovan, an industrious collector and critic of Church styles, says that "a libel is a law syllogism consisting of the proposition or relevancy which is founded on the laws of God or on some ecclesiastical constitution agreeable thereto" (iv. 3, 1).

† The Church always assumed that "vana gloria" was the real object of the heretic.

Confession. It was pointed out that this second class of opinions were, on the assumption of the prosecution, not logically inconsistent with the Confession, and that the only opinions which a Professor comes under a special obligation not to hold are those "contrary to or inconsistent with" the Confession. So skilfully was this distinction pressed, that many seem almost to have thought that there is a natural presumption in favour of the truth of what is not inconsistent with the Confession. But, of course, no modern Church, even in Scotland, would propose to suppress an opinion which was admitted to be true. On the other hand, the Free Church would treat as false every opinion which was inconsistent with her own interpretation of Scripture, though not contradicting any Confessional doctrine. And for the mass of believers, whom the Church is bound to protect, logical consistency has very little to do with belief. What if for them the beliefs necessary to salvation rested on a substratum of prejudice? "Dangerous and unsettling tendency," is certainly one of the vaguest allegations ever submitted to a Court of Justice, but perhaps not more vague than some definitions in the English law of blasphemous or seditious libel. What is the danger, and who has been unsettled? Is a great scholar to be punished because weak vessels cannot comprehend him? Is there to be no strong meat, because it is not fit for babes? As Professor Smith has observed in his Answer to the libel, "To argue that an opinion is false because a real difficulty of belief is connected with its acceptance, is only possible to a rationalist who goes on the assumption that supernatural revelation must contain nothing which our limited reason is unable fully to comprehend." He therefore asks that the principle of accepting difficulties, which has been admitted in such matters as election and responsibility, should be extended to questions arising in the historical and literary criticism of the Bible. If this is not done, he prophesies that the "pious opinions" of the Catholic Church will begin to appear in his communion. Others may think there is a considerable crop already. There must always be, in a Church which strains at

an impossible orthodoxy. Whether there are "pious opinions" in the Free Church or not, there are certainly many cases in which their ancestors have restrained unruly members by admonitions. For instance, in 1723, Gabriel Wilson was warned against expressing himself in such terms as might have a bad influence on Christian practice, or anyways tend to weaken the life and power of godliness. And in 1736, Archibald Campbell (the critic of Hutcheson and of Tindal) was comprehensively directed not to use propositions which may be construed in an erroneous sense. But it is true that Professor Smith's accusers had to go back to the year 1729 and the famous trial of Professor John Simson in order to find even a doubtful precedent for their libel. Those who have read Dr. Cunningham's History of the Church of Scotland will remember the graphic summary which he gives of this monster case. The contemporary records of the procedure are very full and entertaining. The accusation was partly rested on an Act of Assembly of 1710, which forbids all persons to vent opinions contrary to any Head or Article of the Confession, "or to use any expressions in relation to the Articles of Faith not agreeable to the form of sound words expressed in the Word of God and the Confession and Catechisms;" and partly on what may be called a private Act of Assembly of 1717, forbidding Mr. Simson "to use such expressions that do bear and are used by adversaries in an unsound sense, even though he should disown that unsound sense, or to vent opinions, &c., not necessary to be taught in divinity, and which give more occasion to strife than to promote edification." The document is loose and peculiar, but the unhappy Simson was found guilty of having expressed himself in terms subversive of certain blessed truths, and which tended to shake the belief of them, and to inject needless and ill-grounded doubts and scruples into the minds of men, and to render them dark and uncertain as to what they should believe. One cannot leave Simson without a sigh of compassion. No amount of recantation could save the man who had said, "*Christus est æternus, sed non ens neces-*

sarium ;" and who afterwards had the audacity to add that this was a metaphysical question which good Christians need not determine, and that he should feel obliged if the Presbytery of Glasgow would define "self-existence." After a severe fight, the charge of "dangerous and unsettling tendency" has been dismissed from the Aberdeen case. But the Assembly have sanctioned two charges of equal oddity : (1) the promulgation of writings concerning the books of Scripture, which by their *ill-considered and unguarded* setting forth of speculations of a critical kind tend to awaken doubt, *especially in the case of students*, of the divine truth, inspiration, and authority of these books, and of the doctrine of angels as set forth in the Scriptures and Confession : (2) the promulgation of writings which by their *neutrality of attitude* and *rashness of statement* in regard to the critical construction of the Scriptures tend to disparage the divine authority and inspired character of Scripture as set forth in the Scriptures and Confession : and upon these two charges the case has still to be decided. The world has many reasons to feel grateful to the Encyclopædia Britannica ; among others, that it has created two new ecclesiastical offences. The language reminds one of Lord Cranworth's definition of gross negligence—that it was negligence with a vituperative epithet. It is clear that many good people in the Free Church are very angry. But what can be more rash or ill-considered for a Church in these days of restless inquiry and all-pervading scepticism, than to establish a "Secret of Abydos," an inner circle of mysterious doctrine, to be held by the priests, but carefully shrouded from the vulgar gaze, "especially from students" ?

A still more powerful interest was felt in the discussion of Professor Smith's published opinions directly affecting the inspiration and authority of Scripture. Of these only two came before the Assembly. He was charged with writing that "the Book of Deuteronomy, which is professedly an historical record, does not possess that character, but was made to assume it by a writer of a much later age, who therein, in the name of God, presented, in dramatic form, instructions

and laws as proceeding from the mouth of Moses, though these never were and never could have been uttered by him." The Professor's reasoning is founded on such matters as the style of composition, and the late recognition, in other parts of the Bible, of the "law of the kingdom," and the "law of high places," and the spiritual conception of law generally, which belongs to the prophetic period. The absence of the usual prophetic form and the presence of the historical do not imply, he says, as Kuenen supposes, a pious fraud. "Ancient writers are not accustomed to distinguish historical data from historical deductions." "The written record of the revelation of God's will which is necessary to salvation makes use of certain forms of literary presentation, which have always been thought legitimate in ordinary composition, but which were not always understood to be used in the Bible." There are here, obviously, two questions: (a) whether the form of literary presentation is a usual one recognized by critics; (b) whether, upon the assumption that it is, this necessarily conflicts with the Confessional doctrine of inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the book. If the Word of God consists partly of poetry, for instance, its infallible truth must mean something different from the truth of an historical book. But the great difficulty lies in explaining such a categorical statement, as in Deut. xxxi. 9, that Moses wrote the law and gave it to the priests. There was an older law which was the work of Moses. Did the writer wish his audience to understand that the later portion of the law was really delivered in a speech by Moses in the land of Moab? If he did, this was not true, and he knew it. If he did not, why did he say so, instead of selecting the prophetic form which is admitted to have been usual at the time at which he wrote? Is there any other example of this particular form of literary presentation of a code of law? The object must have been to give authority to the law. But this authority could not depend on mere literary form apart from the fact which that form was intended to suggest. That the writer felt no pang of conscience is not of the slightest conse-

quence. The result would still be, that, according to the critic's theory, the historical statements of an infallibly true book were habitually made in a reckless and inaccurate manner. It is not therefore surprising that, although Principal Rainy gallantly insisted that the Confession of Faith does not assert the historical character of Deuteronomy, the Assembly, by a majority of 301 to 278, found this part of the accusation proved. But the decision is so intimately connected with the theory of inspiration accepted by the Church, that its effect is almost destroyed by another decision arrived at later on the same day. Professor Smith had been further charged with lowering the character of the inspired writings by ignoring their divine authorship, by representing the sacred writers as taking freedoms and committing errors, and writing under the influence of party spirit and for party purposes. To all this, and much more of the same kind, the Professor had made one most important general answer. As regards inspiration, *θεοπνευστία*, he argued, founding on the old French and Dutch Calvinistic Confessions, that it is affirmed, not of the writers, but of the Bible. Infallible truth and divine authority, which are proved by the witness of the Spirit, belong to the Bible only in so far as it is a record of spiritual truth, of God's revelation of Himself and of His will. The Word of God is *contained* in the Scriptures. The two things are not co-extensive; and the Bible is not infallible or authoritative on matters which are not of faith. Its historical accuracy, and all the literary and critical questions about its form, are to be decided by the ordinary methods of evidence. In acquitting Professor Smith on this charge by a majority of 283 to 140, the Assembly has perhaps not fully adopted the sweeping theory which he advanced in his defence. But it was referred to in the discussion, and must have influenced the voting. The speakers of the majority insisted that the Confession had no theory of inspiration and infallible truth. This, however, would not prevent the Church from construing these words which are found in the Confession. They must have some meaning. And the Confession makes clear enough that these

marks of a divine origin, whatever they mean, belong to the whole Canon of Scripture, and are not confined to parts of it.

Here, however, we must leave this interesting case. Its lengthened debates, and even the formal documents, have been read by hundreds of thousands. All over Scotland it is felt that a new impulse has been given to liberal ideas. The opportunity is a great one for the Free Church ; for, when this controversy is settled in favour of liberty, she will appeal strongly to the really cultivated classes, and the character of her clergy will be permanently raised. Professor Smith is entitled to the thanks of his country. Outsiders may not find his position altogether consistent or intelligible: they may think that his principles must carry him much further, and indeed outside the Free Church altogether. But his personal courage, his refreshing lucidity of thought, the manly self-respect and public spirit of his defence, have made a deep impression, which is not limited to his own communion. As a scholar of high rank, he is well entitled to teach his Church. But his brave example will teach all the Churches the "nobility of freedom."

In the eloquent address in favour of comprehension with which Principal Tulloch lately closed the Assembly of the Established Church, he points out that there have always been, in the Church of Scotland at least two parties, "the one more ideal in thought and moderate in policy, the other more traditional in doctrine and enthusiastic in zeal. . . . It was the failure of the *moderate* party to do justice to those who have been called the *Evangelicals* in last century that led in the main to the unhappy secessions which then took place ; it was the excess of zeal of the Evangelical party which drove the Church on the rocks on which it split thirty-five years ago." The learned Moderator explains that he has no desire to plead for a Latitudinarianism which transcends the historical basis of the Church, but he insists that the differences which he has described are "the mere expression of the differing tendencies of human nature, and of the manner in which Christian thought and life and aspiration work in different

minds." These differences he traces so far back as the quarrel of Resolutioners and Protesters in the seventeenth century ; and he claims them as part of the inheritance of the Church. The Westminster Confession of Faith does not contain any narrow or sectarian theology. It represents the common theology of the Reformed Churches, and was accepted by the Scotch Presbyterians in this large historical sense. Its great lines of doctrine are those "which run through all the Christian ages," and re-appear in the theology of all branches of the Catholic Church.

There is something very attractive in this imaginative sympathy which seeks to trace out in the present and the past the broad resemblances of human thought. And it would be discreditable to the Scottish people if such imaginings did not stir, however faintly, some chord of national feeling in the breast even of the most stubborn and heretical Dissenter. But, when it is applied to the construction of a definite political programme, the principle of comprehension fails. It ignores differences which are really vital. The questions which have broken the peace of the Church may never rise again. There are still spiritual descendants of Guthrie and Rutherford, but they will never again, as at Perth in 1651, be asked whether Malignants ought to be admitted to the army. There are still Cameronians, but they have forgotten to protest against the Treaty of Union. The spirit of Gillespie and the Erskines is not dead, but Papal hierarchies are established and patronage is abolished without provoking any judicial testimony. The Free Church still preserves her Claim of Right in a charter chest, but she has declared for Disestablishment. The political occasions of dissent have been removed, but the differences of religious temperament remain. And by what title does the Mother Church call on her disinherited children to come back ? Has she set them an example in religious sincerity, in pastoral work, in theological learning, or in political independence ? Has she seriously addressed herself to the settlement of any of the great speculative problems or social evils by which men's minds are at the present time oppressed ? Has she not lived

upon a low sectarian level, preferring the husks of Tradition to the truth of God, and fighting her paltry battles of ecclesiastical rivalry and territorial aggrandizement? She has many pious and intelligent preachers in her parishes, and once in a generation comes a man like Lee, Macleod or Tulloch. As much may be said of all the Scottish Churches. Parliament is now being asked to inquire into their condition. We have endeavoured to describe the degree of doctrinal freedom which each of them has reached.

WILL. C. SMITH.

VI.—SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS.

To begin our ecclesiastical chronicle in the highest quarters, we must record the death of Pope Pius IX. on the 7th of February last, and the election, after a very short and undisturbed Conclave, of his successor, Leo XIII. The new Pontiff, formerly Cardinal Pecci and Archbishop of Perugia, was called to the Papal Court not very long before the death of Pius, and thence appointed to the office of Camerlengo, which has commonly been supposed to be a bar to the occupancy of the highest dignity of all. As yet, the new Pope has given the world no decisive taste of his quality. The impression produced upon the outside critic is that of a man of firm will and liberal tendencies, who wishes to withdraw from the irreconcilable position held by his predecessor, and to initiate new principles of administration, but who is restrained by influences which are yet too strong for him. His interviews with Padre Curci, his reported desire to leave the Vatican and spend the summer at Castel Gandolfo or elsewhere, are indications on the one side, while on the other it must be confessed that he has not actually said or done anything in declared opposition to the policy of his predecessor. The latest rumour is, that the struggle which is going on is telling upon his health, and that he is threatening abdication. But such stories must be taken with all reserve: truth is always hard to get at, but never so hard as at the Vatican.

The English Episcopate has sustained a severe loss in the death of Bishop Selwyn of Lichfield. George Selwyn, one of three brothers who all distinguished themselves at Cambridge (one afterwards

becoming Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and the other a Lord Justice), volunteered for colonial service at a time when his prospects of promotion at home were unusually good, and became Bishop of New Zealand. Here his career was one of unexampled success, and his successor is now a Metropolitan with five or six suffragan Bishops. Bishop Selwyn's administration of Lichfield, to which he was translated somewhat late in life, was hardly so fortunate; but he has, nevertheless, left behind him the reputation of an energetic and devoted Prelate and a noble man. His successor is the Rev. W. D. Maclagan, vicar of Kensington, a very successful parish priest, whose High-church opinions are modified by some Broad-church tendencies. In memory of Bishop Selwyn, it is proposed to found a new College at Cambridge, which, to the economical peculiarities of Keble College at Oxford, shall unite as far as possible a dedication of its students to missionary service. The scheme is as yet only in its infancy, and it is impossible to say how far it may meet with public support.

Another death may be mentioned, that of Dr. Mozley, the Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, if only for the purpose of calling attention to the way in which the resulting vacancy has been filled up. The office, in itself a dignified and important one, carries with it the further dignity of a Canonry of Christ Church, and is in the gift of the Crown. It has been conferred upon the Rev. W. Ince, of Exeter College, a man absolutely unknown in the theological world, and known at Oxford only as a respectable College tutor who has in his time rendered services to the Conservative party. It is impossible to imagine an analogous appointment at Leiden or Berlin. Such things are done only in England, and there, unfortunately, done almost without remark or protest.

Some of our readers may recollect that Ritualists, looking for an excuse for disobedience to recent decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, have found it in the fact that the Judges were not unanimous, and the declaration that the dissentient Judges were those most remarkable for ability and impartiality. And, in particular, they may be able to call to mind a somewhat sharp correspondence between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Baron, arising out of certain confidences as to the Ridsdale Judgment made by the latter to the Vicar of Llanfairfechan, who straightway published them to the world. At that time, although Lord Cairns

roundly rebuked Sir Fitzroy Kelly for infringement of his duty as a Privy Councillor, it was by no means certain whether absolute silence as to any possible division of opinion in the Court was included in it. Since that time, however, an Order in Council has been published requiring such silence; nor, as the Order seems to be based on precedents derived from the worst period of English history, when the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission were in full and baneful activity, has it met with much approval from constitutional critics, who, for the rest, are quite indifferent as to its effect upon ecclesiastical cases. Although, by what may probably be best described as a legal fiction, the decisions of the Judicial Committee take the form of advice offered to the Queen, who is supposed to pronounce between the litigants, there does not seem to be any valid reason why the publicity which obtains in every other English Court of Law should not obtain here also.

The progress made in suppressing Ritualism, either by Episcopal influence or the operation of the Public Worship Regulation Act, is very slow. The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol has incurred the vituperation of all the High-church newspapers, by putting down with decided hand the Ritualistic freaks of Mr. Ward, of St. Raphael's, Clifton, who, true to the obstinacy of his class, refuses, if he cannot celebrate the Eucharist precisely as he likes, to celebrate it at all. The Bishops of Rochester and Salisbury have been more fortunate with clergymen of their respective dioceses, against whom complaints were lodged by aggrieved parishioners. In these cases their fatherly admonitions were attended to, and compromises were arrived at which prevented the necessity of an appeal to the law. On the other hand, it cannot be said that Lord Penzance has hitherto been very fortunate in his judicial action. In some cases, at least, the Ritualistic clergymen brought before him have had recourse, before trying the *ultima ratio* of blank contumacy, to various legal devices, which, either because of the superior astuteness of their advocates, or because the practice of the Court has not yet been clearly settled, have so far been very successful. In the first place, we may note that the Archbishop of Canterbury has, by letters patent, appointed Lord Penzance Dean of the Arches, a proceeding which seems to admit the invalidity of the judgments which he has hitherto performed in that character. In the next, there is a legal hitch, the precise character of which we will not trust ourselves to

describe, in the case of Mr. Edwards, of Prestbury, who has taken none but defiant notice of Lord Penzance's monition, and at the moment at which we write it is uncertain whether all proceedings against him will not have to be dropped. Lastly, Lord Penzance has suspended Mr. Mackonochie, as an old and hardened offender, for three years, *ab officio et beneficio*. But now it is questioned whether he has any right to pronounce such a sentence, and it is contended that his only method of dealing with a contumacious clergyman is the invidious one of imprisonment for contempt of court. The result of these things is, that the Public Worship Regulation Act is not only ineffectual, but rapidly becoming a laughing-stock; and the comparatively few men who care about the matter are asking themselves whether it is not a polite fiction to designate the Church of England as established and governed by law.

The Burials' question remains where it was. The Government shews no sign of wishing to move in the matter. Church opinion, as expressed in declarations, petitions and clerical debates, has changed very little, if at all, its tone of "no surrender." On the other hand, Mr. Osborne Morgan's resolution, expressed this year in more general terms than usual,—“That, in the opinion of this House, the time has arrived when the long-pending controversy as to interments in parish churchyards ought to be closed, by permitting such interments either without any burial service or with the services preferred by the relatives or friends of the deceased, and conducted by persons chosen by them,”—was lost, in the present reactionary House of Commons, by the slender majority of 15, the votes being 227 to 242. This, in conjunction with the opinion of the House of Lords, expressed last year in Lord Harrowby's amendment, we may take as an indication that the difficulty is approaching an equitable solution.—In March last, the Archbishop of York obtained a Royal Commission “to inquire into the law and existing practice as to the admission to, and the sale, exchange and resignation of, ecclesiastical benefices, and to recommend remedies for abuses if any are found to exist.” The Commission has just been nominated. It consists of the Duke of Cleveland, the Bishops of Peterborough and Ely, Lord Justice James, Viscount Midleton, Lord George Cavendish, M.P., Sir W. H. Stephenson, Mr. G. Cubitt, M.P., and the Rev. George Venables, vicar of Great Yarmouth. Mr. Edward Stanley Hope is their Secretary.—A Bill is being passed through Parliament—though

whether in this most unfruitful of all sessions it will ever reach enactment is very doubtful—for the creation of four new Bishoprics, always under the condition, that is, that endowments for them are provided by the faithful. These are, first, Liverpool, to be carved out of the diocese of Chester, and to consist of the hundred of West Derby; second, Newcastle, for the county of Northumberland; thirdly, Southwell, for the counties of Derby and Nottingham; and fourthly, Wakefield, which takes in the part of the diocese of Ripon about Wakefield and Halifax. All these are to be in the northern province, except Southwell, which, as ecclesiastical antiquaries well know, had formerly a peculiarly close connection with the Archbishops of York. The maximum annual income of each Prelate is to be £4200, and the number of Bishops in the House of Lords is not to be augmented. We shall chronicle the establishment of these Bishoprics as they are called into existence by private liberality, as we assume that sooner or later Parliament will certainly assent to the present Bill, or one of a similar character. In the mean time we may notice that the new Bishop of Truro is making a spirited attempt to build a fit cathedral for his new Cornish diocese.

All the intellectual and religious activity of the Church of England seems to be among the High-churchmen. On the other side we hear only passionate appeals to the law, which is put in motion with what lack of result we have stated above, and loud tirades against Popery, which may alarm, but which neither conciliate nor convince. The Evangelical party produces so few men of learning and capacity, that even under the rule of Lord Beaconsfield, who has no ecclesiastical sympathies, and Lord Cairns, whose sympathies are notoriously with the Low Church, it succeeds in securing only the lesser prizes of patronage. The absurd helplessness of the party could hardly be better illustrated than by a quarrel which Lord Shaftesbury has had with the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge, and which, after a strange and amusing correspondence, has ended in his withdrawal from its ranks. The details are not worth permanent record; it is enough to state that Mr. Brownlow Maitland in a book on Prophecy, and Mr. T. G. Bonney in one on Geology, both published by the Society, made statements which every man of moderate enlightenment would admit to be incontrovertibly true, but which were not to the liking of the Evangelical lay Pope, who interposed with an authoritative condemnation, as peremptory and as unreasonable as

ever proceeded from the Vatican. The calm self-confidence with which Lord Shaftesbury sets himself against modern learning and science is very instructive. It shews that the Evangelicals, like the Bourbons, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and therefore not unnaturally find themselves out of place in a changed time.

For information as to the recent debates in the Congregational Union, and an account of religious affairs in Scotland, our readers are referred to articles which they will find in the body of the Review.

A case of much importance, as bearing upon the interpretation of the Universities' Tests Act, has recently been tried. Oxford once possessed a Hertford College, which was dissolved by Act of Parliament in 1805, and its property conveyed to the University in trust for Magdalen Hall. In 1871, the Universities' Tests Act was passed. In 1874, by another Act of Parliament, Magdalen Hall was dissolved and Hertford College re-constituted. In 1875, Mr. Baring gave a sum of money to the institution for the endowment of a Fellowship or Fellowships, tenable only by members of the Church of England. Although the Hertford College Act had contained a proviso that nothing in it should be held to repeal the Tests Act, this endowment was accepted, and the election of a Fellow duly made known. Upon this, in order to try the case, Mr. Tillyard, a Nonconformist, applied to be examined, but, being told that he was ineligible, did not actually present himself, and a Churchman was elected. Mr. Tillyard's next step was to go to the Court of Queen's Bench for a *mandamus* to compel the College to examine and elect him, and got a judgment of Mr. Justice Mellor and Mr. Justice Lush in his favour. Upon appeal to the Court above, however, this judgment was reversed, and Lord Coleridge, with Lords Justices Bramwell, Brett and Baggallay, decided in favour of the College.

The Government, by the mouth of the Attorney-General, have stated, in answer to Mr. Watkin Williams, that it is not their intention to bring in or support a Bill to extend the provisions of the Universities' Tests Act, and to make it apply to cases such as this. This is only what might be expected. At the same time, the hope of those who deprecate sectarian endowments in either of our great national Universities, must lie in legislation; for we cannot but think that an appeal by Mr. Tillyard to the House of Lords,

which is talked of, will prove futile. He made a mistake fatal to the prosecution of his object in this way in not presenting himself to be examined. Still, even if he had presented himself, it is difficult to see how he could have proved that he was the best qualified candidate, or have convicted the Principal and Fellows of illegal or unfair conduct if they had preferred a Churchman. The appeal in such a case seems, as Lord Coleridge said, rather to lie to the Visitor of the College than to a court of law. Of course it is plain that doctrinally limited endowments in Colleges, in which such endowments have been thrown open by Act of Parliament, are contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of legislation, and if carried to any great extent would necessitate the repetition of the work of 1871. At the same time, this principle cannot be long exclusively applied to Oxford and Cambridge. What is wrong at Hertford College cannot be right at Springhill or Regent's Park. The orthodox Dissenters will have to revise the whole subject of their own doctrinal trusts, if they are to come into court on such occasions as these with perfectly clean hands.

Articles containing much general information as to the Oxford and Cambridge Commissions will be found in our last and present numbers. To the statements made therein, we have only to add, that in the case of Cambridge the Commissioners have given notice to the Colleges that they contemplate a contribution to University purposes by each of them, to the extent of 10 per cent. of gross revenue. The Oxford Commissioners have issued a document indicating, in more or less detail, the line of reform which they have marked out for themselves. One main feature is the increased importance which it is intended to give to Professorial teaching. Twelve of the most important Chairs are to have their revenues augmented to sums ranging between £700 and £900. Ten other similar Chairs are to be furnished by division or modification of existing foundations. Nine Professors of less important subjects are to have from £400 to £500. Six new Chairs are to be founded; three at the higher rate of stipend—English Language and Literature, Pure Mathematics, Mechanics and Engineering; three at the lower—Persian and Zend, the Romance Languages, and Classical Archæology. After bringing up the number of Professors to thirty-nine, nine new Readerships are to be founded, with salaries of £400; namely, four in the Classical Languages, one in Ancient History,

two in Modern History, one in Roman and one in English Law. An additional provision of £3000 a year is to be made for the Bodleian, and a Museum of Classical Art and Archaeology is to be founded. Some of what are called Prize Fellowships are to be retained, tenable for a term of years, and with a uniform income of £200 per annum. This document, however, it must be distinctly understood, is not a report, but only a tentative scheme thrown out for consideration and suggestion, and in all its points liable to change.

E.

VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Basis of Faith. A Critical Survey of the Grounds of Christian Theism. The Congregational Union Lecture for 1877. By Eustace R. Conder, M.A. 8vo. Pp. 451. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

WE have had so much pleasure in reading parts of this volume, that we feel reluctant to proffer the criticism which, as a whole, it seems to require. The great charm of it, to us, is the acute metaphysical talent it displays: the great drawback to its merit, in our judgment, is the want of plan and purpose by which it is marked. Mr. Conder tells us that "the kernel and general outline of the present work, including a considerable part of the substance of the first four Lectures, was committed to writing some twenty-five years ago."* We remember that three of these "first four Lectures" were omitted when the others were publicly delivered. If the four Lectures in question had been printed alone, they would have formed a better book than the existing nine Lectures form, by reason of the more distinctive unity that pervades them. They would have needed re-writing in order to keep them up to their proper design; but they would not have had the scattered character which belongs to this production as it stands. What we have to do with, appears like a collection of treatises loosely put together, and answering in a very imperfect degree to the title prefixed to them. As an exposition of "The Basis of Faith," or "A Critical Survey of the Grounds of Christian Theism," we must pronounce the attempt to be unsatisfactory.

* Preface, p. xii.

That portion of the book in which the rational arguments for the existence and character of the Deity are stated and defended, is very superior in grasp of the subject to the portion in which the relations of Christianity to Theism are discussed. Something worthy of serious consideration may be gathered from the manner in which scientific objections to Theism are met. The fairness and the conclusiveness of what is said in the pursuit of that line of observation are honourable to the writer, and cannot but be instructive to the reader. When, however, we descend to the facts with which the history of our religion is concerned, the same skill is not manifest. There is a system of theology, never plainly stated, but underlying the total development, which sadly interferes both with the truth and the force of what is advanced. We say this in full sympathy with very much that characterizes this Christian advocacy. There is a Lecture entitled "Jesus," which, both in point of thought and feeling, is very fine; and there is a great deal besides which might have been equally effective, if it had not been for a prejudice in favour of certain dogmatic conclusions which vitiates the treatment adopted.

We will give an instance of what we refer to, in the way the authority of the Bible is treated. The seventh Lecture is headed, "The Voice from Heaven;" and the third division of it is called, "The Word of God." We are there told, "that the more thoroughly and honestly the Bible is studied, the more manifest it will become that it does contain such superhuman ideas, necessitating the belief that above and beyond its human writers, it reveals the existence of a superhuman Author."* The ideas insisted upon in proof of this assertion are those of Divine Law, Sin, Holiness, Love and Heaven. Surely it is sufficient to appeal to the common consciousness of men in favour of the conclusion that the presentation of such ideas is within the province of human endeavour. In order to sustain the superhuman character thus pleaded for, we are further told that "this argument involves a consideration of immense interest—that of the unity of the Bible."† Mr. Conder appears to be quite aware that such unity is matter of legitimate dispute, and he wishes it to be understood that his argument "involves no particular theory of inspiration, or of the relation of the prophetic gift to the written word."‡ But that cannot be conceded. The unity necessary to the argument does involve a "particular theory of inspiration,"

* P. 304.

† P. 314.

‡ P. 315.

viz. that theory which connects inspiration with "the written word." If such inspiration be denied, the whole doctrine of "The Voice from Heaven," in relation to the Bible, falls to pieces. After enumerating various instances of this kind of denial, our author affirms: "All this would in no degree affect the evidence for the reality of a Divine revelation, and consequently the existence of the Divine Being so revealed, provided it still remains true that those leading ideas of the Bible which form the backbone and vital marrow of Judaism, and the heart and brain, as well as skeleton, of Christianity, are such as the mind of man, without superhuman aid, could never have produced."* "Provided it still remains true"! Why, of course, if any one admits all this about the superhuman origin of the "leading ideas of the Bible," he gives in to the theory of its inspiration; but if he rejects that theory, he will not be likely to pledge himself to the superhuman revelation of certain ideas possessing a unity by which they are at once "the backbone and vital marrow of Judaism, and the heart and brain, as well as skeleton, of Christianity."

This Basis of the inspired unity of the Bible is at its best a very weak foundation to build upon. The real "Basis of Faith" is a different thing. It is the fact and truth we ourselves gather from the Bible, as a record of God's providential dealing with man in the matter of religion. In making this use of it, we take it for what it is worth, as a human, not a divine, composition. It is thus that Mr. Conder himself deals with Christianity in his Lecture on "Jesus." He sets forth his case in the form of personal manifestation, and thus gains a clear course to the sympathies of the human heart. It is a course similar to that which can only be legitimately pursued throughout the whole field of Biblical investigation and employment.

Γ.

Dr. Zöckler's work on "The Cross of Christ"† is rather difficult to describe; it is neither a digest of results, nor a dissertation; it is neither an archæological work, nor a purely theological one. It begins with ancient symbolism of most uncertain origin and signi-

* P. 315.

† *The Cross of Christ: Studies in the History of Religion and the Inner Life of the Church.* By the Rev. Otto Zöckler, D.D., Professor of Theology in Greifswald. Translated by Rev. Maurice J. Evans, B.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1877.

ficance, and it ends with modern hymnology and Christian missions. But in spite of a certain looseness of connection between the component parts, it is a careful and well-arranged piece of work; and the copiousness of the references to two circles of literature, the special monographic and the mystical, make it valuable to the independent student. Dr. Zoeckler's own views in theology and criticism are sufficiently known as distinctly orthodox; but where they become prominent in the book before us, they are presented with moderation, while the views of others are recorded and discussed with candour and fairness. This is evident at the outset, where the meaning of the pre-Christian cross, and the crosses occasionally found in connection with non-Christian religions, is discussed. Any one who has seen the works of Godfrey Higgins, of the late Dr. Inman, or of Mr. Hargreave Jennings, will know what a flood of pernicious nonsense has been poured around this subject. To none of these does Dr. Zoeckler make any reference. He gives a very comprehensive, but very condensed, survey of the various cruciform figures which have been gathered from all parts of the world. Of these he eliminates a great many, with perfect justice, as in their case there is at least the shadow of a doubt as to whether they may not have had a Christian origin. With regard to the remainder, he steers a middle course between the position of Mortillet,* who holds that all the cross symbols of ancient monuments are derived from the practice of a widely-extended secret fraternity which rejected idolatry, and that of some opponents of this strange hypothesis, who seek to minimize the significance of the emblem, and indeed represent it as only a persistent type of ornamentation. Though Dr. Zoeckler does not clearly state his views as to whether the various forms of the cross known, for instance, as the Nile-key, the Venus's looking-glass, the Swastika, and the Fylfot or Thor's hammer, are to be regarded as having a common origin, or declare his adhesion to any one of the meanings, such as Life, Light, Peace, Paradise, which have been suggested as radical, it is sufficiently evident that his mystical lore has strongly predisposed him to regard it as a two-fold symbol of the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge. He consequently has recourse to the old theory of a primitive revelation, and sees in the pre-Christian cross the memorial of a lost home and a forfeited communion of men with God (p. 45); and, under its other aspect, the hieroglyph of

* *Le Signe de la Croix avant le Christianisme*, 1866.

"That forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe."

Naturally, therefore, the "Cross as the Symbol of Blessing," and the "Cross as the Symbol of the Curse," receive a separate treatment at our author's hands; and it is not to be wondered at if the subject of the non-Christian use of the Cross is dealt with in a manner which, in consequence of this arbitrary bisection, is scarcely satisfactory to the scientific student of Comparative Religion. Especially in the "Cross as the Symbol of the Curse," Dr. Zoeckler is tempted to see all around "indistinct reminiscences of the fatal catastrophe in the primeval age," the expulsion from Paradise, "perpetuated amongst the most ancient peoples" (p. 72); though we are bound to admit that he is not by any means more wilful or more prejudiced than many other inquirers, who have no eyes for anything but sun-myths or phallic emblems. Under this head we have chiefly a history of crucifixion and impalement as means of punishment or expiation, with instances ranging from the children of Rizpah to the Servian corpses seen by Mr. Maccoll (this latter we suppose to be an addition by the translator). Some of the instances are far-fetched enough. On the authority of Diodorus, ii. 18, an Indian king, *Stabrobates*, is threatened by Semiramis with nailing to a cross: surely either the author, or the tradition he records, was guilty of a pun upon the king's name. And when Livy speaks of hanging upon an "*arbor infelix*" in the time of the Horatii, and Pliny of a crucifixion in the days of Tarquinius Priscus, we feel that this is not the kind of evidence upon which to stake very much. But to proceed: the Cross of Blessing and the Cross of the Curse receive a final synthesis, their full significance is restored and unfolded, when Jesus is extended upon the cross. "In the Cross of Calvary, the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge do certainly appear comprehended in one deeply significant prototypal unity" (p. 87). Into such scriptural arguments as this—"the green wood, the gloriously blossoming fruit-laden palm-tree (Psalm i. 3, xcii. 12), is hanged upon the dry bare tree of the curse (Gal. iii. 13),"—we will not follow our author; nor are we greatly interested in the question elaborately discussed in an excursus, whether Christ was crucified on a three-armed (T) or a four-armed cross. We are on firmer ground when we come to the history of the Cross in the early Church; this subject is very fully treated, and the "cultic" use of the cross, and the practice of "crucesignation" (or crossing

one's self), concerning which Catholics and Protestants once waged fierce warfare, seem to be established on abundant testimony. We observe that Dr. Zoeckler regards the rude sketch recently discovered on the wall of a vault in the Palatine, as being a "*Spott-crucifix*," as Ferd. Becker has named it in his monograph,—a "wretched caricature," scratched by a "heathen mocker." We had thought that considerable weight attached to the opinion of Mr. C. W. King, who sees in this a figure of Anubis-Christos, "in reality the work of some pious Gnostic, but usually looked upon as a heathen blasphemy, because the jackal's head is taken for that of an ass."* Dr. Zoeckler gives us a good sketch of the growth of that form of exegesis (by no means uncongenial to his own mind), which was directed to the discovery of "hidden crosses" in apparently the most barren passages of the Old Testament. The outstretched arms of Moses, the number of Abraham's servants, Jacob's peeled staves, and the wood with which Elisha made the axe-head swim,—all these and countless other things, pressed with equal caprice into the service of Christian typology, were called upon to bear witness to the true Cross. This kind of argument appears as early as the Epistle of Barnabas, and meets us in full force in Justin's Dialogue with Trypho, who might have told the Martyr, as another Jew told Archbishop Gregentius of Taphar four centuries later, that he could not see a bit of useful wood in the Old Testament without straight-way shaping it into a cross. Dr. Zoeckler is inclined to see a historical foundation for the vision of Constantine, and a "providential bringing about of his resolution henceforth to fight under the symbol of Christ," though he does not regard the Labarum standard as by any means a new invention; indeed, he acknowledges that it had been, in Bactria at least, a symbol of sun-worship, and perhaps, in its earlier forms, was a kind of astronomical diagram (pp. 17, 141).

The second half of the book discusses, with much interesting detail, the artistic use, the poetry and the theology of the cross in the Church of the Middle Ages and of the Reformation; brief as are the notices of particular writers, we are glad to have them, and the illustrative quotations, particularly in the case of the less known mystics. By the way, we notice that our author unhesitatingly ascribes to Theresa of Spain the hymn, so well known as St. Francis Xavier's (in a translation which would certainly not lead the reader to suppose that the original is in sonnet form):

* The Gnostics and their Remains, 1864, p. 90.

"My God, I love Thee ; not because
I hope for heaven thereby,
Nor yet because who love Thee not
Must burn eternally."

Among the appendices which close the volume, one, "Against the Assertion of an entire Irreligiousness on the part of certain Nations," is well worthy of attention, especially in connection with Professor Max Müller's remarks in a recently published Hibbert Lecture (*Macmillan's Magazine* for June). We cannot close the book without complimenting the experienced translator upon another very careful and fluent version. J. E. O.

Dr. A. Pierson's "Study" on the Prophets of Israel* can only be treated properly in connection with Kuenen's great monograph on the same subject, and we hope to have an opportunity of giving it what notice it deserves, as a criticism of that work, on a future occasion. Meanwhile we may call attention to it as a remarkably determined and embittered attempt to bring down the Prophets from the commanding position in moral and religious history which is allowed them by almost universal assent. Dr. Pierson maintains that we know nothing about any of the Prophets except their writings, which are mostly inexplicable ; that the whole of Jeremiah's biography, for instance, is purely fictitious, and that we have not the slightest grounds for believing that Amos was a shepherd or that he lived in Thekoah. The destructive criticism by which Dr. Pierson attempts to substantiate these conclusions is generally more perverse than ingenious, and very seldom succeeds even in raising any serious doubt in the mind of the reader.

With regard to the character of the Prophets as read by Dr. Pierson in their works, we can hardly do better than quote the description on pp. 108-9, which is one of the most striking passages in the book.

"But we must not forget that they [the Prophets] had something which perhaps is better [than a reasonable motive]. They had a passion. It was the passion of Yahvism. To use their own expression, they were drunk with Yahveh, and there was but one thing they needed, viz., to make Israel worship Yahveh, and Yahveh alone. Now to gratify this passion and meet this pressing need of their nature, they adopted any tactics, caught at any instrument (including that of pious fraud), adopted

* Een Studie over de Geschriften van Israels Profeten. Door Dr. A. Pierson. Amsterdam. 1877.

any tone of voice, and invented any representation of things! They could be calculating or reckless, they could be turgid or nervous, groveling or sublime, gross or tender, rough or gentle; they could threaten or coax like a wayward child or a despairing lover, if only they could reach their souls' desire. They would sing dirges or play on the flute to win over the children in the market-place to their God. And as they left no stone unturned in seeking their one great object, they might now and again adopt the tone of rational argument, but this was more or less accidental. As a rule, they had neither gifts nor patience for argument. Since they themselves had acquired their certainty, like veritable seers, by intuition, they never gave themselves time to prove to others what was a self-evident truth to them. With all the impulsiveness of their nation, they would thrust themselves forward and hem you in, seize you by the arm or the coat, sing the praises of their Yahveh to you, and with equal readiness embrace you if you would kneel down with them, or spit upon you if you would not."

No one who knows Dr. Pierson's works expects consistency from him, and we need not be surprised to find him complaining on p. 79 that the Prophets lack inspiration, and that he longs to see them "brim-full of their impulse, overmastered by their conviction, and giving it inartistic, perhaps, but at least unartificial expression." Dr. Pierson cannot write without being suggestive, but this "Study" is sadly marred by the conspicuous absence of scholarly impartiality and singleness of purpose. P. H. W.

MISCELLANEOUS.

That the life of George Combe was worth writing, no one who reads Mr. Gibbon's biography of him* will be disposed to deny; but we think it a pity that the accomplishment of the task should have been postponed so long. Combe has now been twenty years in his grave: the phrenology which it was the chief object of his life to expound and disseminate has faded into neglect: the young men to whom his "Constitution of Man" was a physical and practical textbook are themselves old, or have passed under the sway of other teachers. In the rapid progress of the last quarter of a century, it has become difficult to recall the precise character of teachings which were very wholesome and operative in their day, and we perhaps run the risk of unduly depreciating some of those who have helped us

* The Life of George Combe, Author of the "Constitution of Man." By Charles Gibbon. 2 vols. 8vo. London: Macmillan. 1878.

to our present height of attainment without at the same time bequeathing to the world any permanent legacy of finished truths. Mr. Gibbon's *Life of George Combe* is in this way a contribution of considerable value to the history of English, or more particularly of Scottish thought in the nineteenth century. And being well put together out of abundant materials, it is, in addition to this, a vivid and faithful portrait of a remarkable man.

It consists of two parts of very different biographical value: an autobiographical fragment of 67 pages, which tells the story of Combe's life down to the age of sixteen; and the author's narrative of the rest of a career which was largely devoted to the propagation of what is now generally recognized as a philosophical delusion. Mr. Gibbon does his work well: he uses his materials artistically: the impression of character produced by the autobiography is continued through the subsequent pages: but the reader cannot help having an uncomfortable sense of considerable powers and great perseverance applied to an enterprise predestined to failure. In this respect, the tale of Combe's long and exhaustive labours in America, and still more the story of his painful acquisition of German that he might lecture on Phrenology at Heidelberg, are almost pathetic. On the other hand, nothing can exceed the vivid interest of the autobiographical fragment. The picture of his parents, upright, religious, affectionate, yet lamentably failing in their duty by reason of gross ignorance and ingrained prejudice: the story of the way in which the large-brained and delicate child was more than once brought to the verge of death by sheer mismanagement: the caricature of education to which he was subjected, culminating in the brutal tyranny of the Edinburgh High School,—are worthy of a permanent place in literature. We do not particularly wonder that when George Combe wrote the *Life* of his brother Andrew, the relatives demanded that the tale of their common childhood should be told in a softened form. But it was his own sad experiences, the knowledge which he had early gathered at the peril of his life, which made Combe an educational and sanitary reformer, and it was only natural that he should finally resolve to leave these things on permanent record.

The story of George Combe's phrenological activity is a strange and, as we have already hinted, almost a pathetic one, to those who read the story of its hopes and fears and efforts in the light of subsequent failure. A Writer to the Signet, in business in Edinburgh, and in spite, perhaps in consequence, of his experiences at the High School, with all the mental characteristics of a self-educated man,

he was attracted by the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim, which were then coming into notoriety, and his fate was thenceforth fixed. He made them the subject of careful study ; found in them, as he thought, the resolution of every problem of human fate ; devoted himself to their propagation ; and at last, having realized a modest competence by the exercise of his profession, became an apostle of Phrenology *pur et simple*. Judging from the accounts given by Mr. Gibbon, we should say that, except in a few cases, he did not succeed in exciting a much deeper feeling than curiosity. His own ardent and all-absorbing faith met with little response of the same kind. He planted perpetually, and watered assiduously, but somehow the plants did not grow. His long expositions were listened to by select and attentive audiences, and many distinguished persons came to have their bumps felt and their characters analyzed, but it went no farther. The psychological methods which Phrenology was intended to explode were still employed, and people who craved self-knowledge persisted in consulting the inside instead of the outside of their heads. Reading the history of Phrenology for the first time in these volumes, which will have a lasting worth as a record of a curious phase of quasi-philosophical thought, it seems to us not difficult to discern the causes both of its temporary vogue and its ultimate failure. It professed itself a short and easy and infallible key to character, and so lent itself to the purposes of every quack who could feel a head and wield a pair of callipers with a grave face. And these men, whether conscious empirics or only half-educated enthusiasts, were much more the true products of the system than Combe himself, in his conscientious though mistaken efforts to elevate his art to the dignity and prerogatives of a science. Against the success of such an attempt, an insuperable hindrance was raised, if by nothing else, by the utterly unphilosophical classification and separation of human faculties which the exterior conformation of the skull seemed to render necessary. Whether the localization of mental function in the brain will ever be accomplished, we do not pretend to say ; but it is curious and instructive to compare Dr. Ferrier's cautious attempts in that direction with the minute and unqualified assertions of Gall and Spurzheim sixty or seventy years before.

Mr. Gibbon has shewn his true appreciation of his subject by describing Combe, upon the title-page of his book, as the "author of the Constitution of Man." In that work, which enjoyed, and for aught we know still enjoys, a very large circulation, Combe exercised a singular influence upon successive generations of young men, to

whom it was a new idea, full of impulse, to be asked to study themselves in the light of common sense and natural law. It was a forerunner of much of the physical literature which is just now so popular, and in some respects of sounder influence, inasmuch as it kept much more upon practical ground, and did not encourage its readers to the pride of a half-digested knowledge. And it is curious to note how this book, which would ever be considered a very moderate statement of obvious truth, procured for its author, in the Edinburgh of the first half of the present century, the reputation of an infidel. It is true he did nothing to brave public opinion; for the greater part of his life he went to church like other people, and it was only when his evil reputation was fixed beyond recall that he took the audacious step of driving out with his wife on Sunday afternoons. But he was put into the same category as Voltaire and Tom Paine. Few religious people would have anything to do with him. He could not associate himself with movements in which he heartily sympathized for fear of damaging them. All this led at last to his passing much of his time away from the city in which he was no prophet, but to which nevertheless he was ardently attached. On the whole, it is a new view of Edinburgh society which we get from these volumes, and not altogether a favourable one. But both on this account, and as giving a life-like portrait of a thoroughly honest and able man, with a marked individuality of his own, we heartily recommend them to our readers.

Recent controversies in the English Church have been bringing "Ancient Liturgies"* into prominence, with the result, so far, of producing some very wild statements as to their antiquity and authority. When Dr. Neale calmly declares that "the general form and arrangement of the Liturgy of St. Mark may safely be attributed to the Evangelist himself and his immediate followers," and that, "with the exception of certain manifestly interpolated passages, it had probably assumed its present appearance by the end of the second century," the ordinary student of early Christian literature may well rub his eyes, and wonder at the new world of fact and evidence into which he is introduced. Mr. Hammond may a little allay his astonishment by informing him that the single "important manuscript" of the Liturgy of St. Mark, which Dr. Neale acknowledges that he follows, the "Codex Rossanensis,"

* *Ancient Liturgies*: being a Reprint of the Texts, either Original or Translated, of the most Representative Liturgies of the Church, from various Sources. Edited by C. E. Hammond, M.A., Exeter College, Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1878.

belongs to the early part of the twelfth century, as well as by pointing out that there is no real foundation (Preface, p. 9) for the astounding assertion "that the Liturgies had assumed a recognized and fixed form so early as to be quoted in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Hebrews." Putting aside, however, these extravagant pretensions, with the doctrinal inferences which they are intended to support, it must be admitted that these early Liturgies are full of instruction as to Christian doctrine and practice. Naturally they have been peculiarly subject to change and interpolation. It is not easy to ascertain at what precise time they assumed their present form. The evidence derived from them must always be more or less liable to question. But these are reasons for using them with due historical caution, not for neglecting them altogether. And Mr. Hammond's excellent book is a first step in this direction.

His plan is to divide the Liturgies into families, of which he enumerates five—three Oriental, one Western, and the fifth to a certain extent intermediate between the two. There are, 1, the Liturgies of Western Syria and derivatives; 2, the Liturgies of Alexandria and derivatives; 3, the Liturgies of Eastern Syria and derivatives; 4, the Hispano-Gallican; and, 5, the Roman Liturgies. The structure of the Liturgies he shews by printing the succession of particulars in seven of the chief, in parallel columns, that of St. Chrysostom being taken as a norm, and then proceeds in a specific introduction to each to explain and illustrate its peculiarities. The greater part of the volume, however, is taken up by the texts of the Liturgies themselves. The Clementine Liturgy in Greek comes first: then the Liturgy of St. James in Greek is followed by a Latin translation of the same in its Syriac form. Next comes the Liturgy of Constantinople, giving, where needful, the forms known by the names of St. Chrysostom and St. Basil on opposite pages. The Liturgy of the orthodox Armenian Church is printed in English. Of the Alexandrian group, we have the Liturgy of St. Mark in Greek, the Coptic Liturgy (St. Cyril and St. Basil) in Latin, and in the same language two forms of the Ethiopic Liturgy. Next, as the representative of the Eastern Syrian group, is the Nestorian Liturgy in Latin. Finally, of the Western Liturgies, the Roman, the Ambrosian, the Gallican and the Mozarabic, are printed in parallel columns. The whole forms a compendium of the subject, amply sufficient for any student who does not wish to pursue independent liturgiological research, and makes a volume without which no theological library can be considered complete.

"Conscience and Faith," by the late Athanase Coquerel fils,* is a little volume consisting of five lectures addressed to a popular audience. This fact must be borne in mind in estimating their worth, which consists less in any scientific closeness of thought, than in the clearness with which great principles are apprehended, and the vivacity with which they are presented to the general mind. Mr. J. E. Odgers has performed the translator's task with great skill and success; and the French origin of the book as it stands is made less manifest in any turn of phrase or peculiarity of idea, than in the general treatment of the subject. We would direct particular attention to Mr. Odgers' Preface, in which the reader's attention is called—not without need—to the fact that the word "conscience" covers a much wider area of meaning in French than in English, and includes all that we mean by "consciousness." For the ingenious argument which Mr. Odgers bases upon this different use of language, we refer our readers to his own pages. The book is well calculated to serve the popular purposes for which it was written, and the British and Foreign Unitarian Association have done a good work in placing it within reach of English readers.

The last issues of the English translation of Meyer's Commentary on the New Testament,† for which, as for so many valuable works of foreign theology, we are indebted to the enterprize of Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh, include the Acts of the Apostles, Vols. I. and II., Matthew, Vol. I., Corinthians, Vol. I. To the Matthew, which we may take as the first volume of the complete series, is prefixed a short but exceedingly interesting memoir of the author by his son, who gives a vivid picture of the German pastor, first in a country parish, afterwards in the Residenz, busily engaged in ordinary professional duty, yet by help of early rising and unintermitted diligence accomplishing the great literary work which is now offered to the English public. Dr. Meyer never held any University appointment: perhaps he might not have accomplished so much, or done it so well, if he had. It is impossible not to associate with his devotion to the practical interests of life, the robust common sense of his

* *Conscience and Faith: Five Lectures* by the late Athanase Coquerel fils. Translated by J. E. Odgers. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association. 1878.

† *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament.* By H. A. W. Meyer, D.D. The Translation revised and edited by W. P. Dickson, D.D., and F. Crombie, D.D. The Acts of the Apostles, Vols. I. II. The Gospel of Matthew, Vol. I. Epistles to the Corinthians, Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1877.

Commentary. What he chiefly cares for is to draw out the grammatical and historical meaning of the words before him; nor does he think it needful to force the plastic, almost fluid, utterances of the New Testament into the mould of any theological theory. He stands midway between the unquestioning orthodoxy of the old commentators, and what we cannot help thinking the too fine-drawn subtlety of the newer interpreters,—a position which may probably give his book a permanent value in the time of soberer criticism which we are persuaded is drawing near. For all practical purposes, we know of no New Testament Commentary at all comparable to this, while its moderate price and elegant external appearance should recommend it to every earnest student of theology. Most English and Scottish divines will find it in advance of their present position; a very few may look upon it as too conservative; but if they wish to know what the words of the New Testament really mean, none can consult it without profit.

"*Chapters of Early English Church History*"* is the modest title which Professor Bright has given to a very complete and valuable volume which treats of the first conversion of England to Christianity. It begins with the first legendary accounts of the introduction of the faith, and goes down to the death of Wilfrid in 709. The Professor speaks of his book "as an expansion of lectures which have been delivered to my class, while we had Bede's '*History*' before us, with a view to the Final Theological School." Not only from this statement, but from the structure of the work, we should suppose that the Professor's method was to familiarize his students with the original authorities for the period under review—the only method, we need hardly say, by which accuracy and vividness of historical perception are attainable. The result is a very happy one. Canon Bright does not apparently profess to be a picturesque historian, but he places the materials for an historical picture before his reader, and enables him, if he wishes, to paint it for himself. The graphic words and vivid epithets of Bede are incorporated in Canon Bright's sentences; a large store of collateral illustration is supplied in his notes; while he follows Mr. Freeman's example in linking, by topographical or philological illustrations, the events which he describes with our own times and state of society. In short,

* *Chapters of Early English Church History.* By William Bright, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1878.

we know no work that can at all be compared with this in clear and minute presentation of the period to which it refers. Between the claims of the Irish and the Roman Church to the honour of having evangelized England, Canon Bright holds an even balance; but his work would have been more complete had its local limitations been less strictly observed. The early history of English Christianity can hardly be understood, so long as the field of narrative is narrowed to England alone. A preliminary chapter, giving an account of the Rome of Gregory the Great, would have thrown much light on the mission of Augustine, and the conflict of the two Churches might be better comprehended if the characteristics of Irish Christianity, and the labours of Columba and Columban, had been drawn out at length. It is, however, ungrateful to find any fault with a volume which is at once scholarly and delightful, and we can only hope that if Canon Bright has any more such courses of lectures capable of "expansion," he will give the public the benefit of them. It only remains to state that the book is well provided with indices and tables.

In "*The Light of the World*,"* the teachings of Christ are studied for the purpose of discovering and presenting their practical import, and there is thus offered a plea for Christianity more likely to win reverence for it than are many elaborate arguments on the evidences. The author announces at the outset that his purpose is not polemical, and the absence of a controversial tone throughout the volume is a pleasing feature in it. The successive chapters treat of the form, the method and the principal subjects of the teachings contained in the Gospels, and the style is simple but forcible. The pervading characteristic is calm judgment, a candid weighing of both sides in regard to every question, and a wise moderation of opinion and statement, which may commend the work to readers of various classes. It contains marks of exact and systematic thought, while it aims mainly at practical results. It may be safely recommended to all who desire to feel the spiritual influence and power of the Christian religion. The only fault they are likely to find is, that some of the chapters are too short, considering the importance of the subjects on which they treat. We would gladly confirm our estimate of the value and beauty of the book by lengthened extracts, did space permit; we can only advise a careful reading of it as a whole.

* *The Light of the World*. By David M'Laren, M.A., Minister of Humbie. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1878.

Originating in a lecture on the Articles, Mr. Miller's little volume* is the first instalment of what he designs to be an elaborate philosophical and scriptural dissertation. The references, quotations and phraseology, present an appearance of research and scholarship which is not confirmed by the substance of the treatise. It is stated at the beginning that the process of induction will be followed, each article being founded on a collection of texts from Scripture. But the section on Theism and the Trinity is almost entirely historical and philosophical. The conclusiveness of an inductive argument must depend on the reality of the facts on which it is founded, and the author is strangely defective in his array of scriptural evidences for his assertions. Whenever the reading of the Authorized Version has been shewn by criticism to be incorrect, he honestly states this, as in 1 John v. 7 and Acts xx. 28. But why are such texts brought prominently forward in a dogmatic treatise, merely to notice that they are corruptions? Is it in the hope that they may still have some weight with the unlearned and uncritical? The slight foundation on which important conclusions are based is shewn by such paragraphs as this :

"In the Gospel history there are numerous acts of worship paid to Christ—for example, by the eastern Magi, by the Samaritan woman, 'Yea Lord, but the dogs eat of the crumbs;' by St. Peter in the storm, 'Lord save me;' and by St. Thomas after the resurrection, 'My Lord, my God.'"—P. 97.

Nor is the philosophical argument more satisfactory than the scriptural one. There is in it no trace of originality, and there are portions which render it doubtful whether the exact meaning of the reasoning adopted from others has been comprehended.

Many thinkers and writers in the present day are exercised by the progress of what they consider "heresy," and are anxious to take their place in the ranks of those who are warring against "unbelief." But when the desire is not accompanied by the necessary ability, the only result is a work that produces regret in the thoughtful religionist, and must be a source of scorn to adversaries who find it easy to expose its baseless assertions and to overturn its fallacies. Such a book Mr. Carlyle has given us.† He tells us

* *The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. A Historical and Speculative Exposition.* By the Rev. Joseph Miller, B.D., Curate of Holy Trinity, Darwen. Vol. I. London : Hodder and Stoughton. 1848.

† *The Battle of Unbelief.* By the Rev. Gavin Carlyle, M.A. London : Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

in the preface that he studied at the University of Tübingen under Baur, but his work presents no indications of the results of such study. His watchword is, that "Christianity is the one distinctively divine religion coming from heaven," and he credits all who demur to his conclusions with a preconceived determination to reject the miraculous and a pantheistic theology, while he seems to have a somewhat unsettled notion as to what pantheism is. He has a remarkable knack of founding his conclusions on assertions he would find it hard to prove. For instance:

"There is a striking harmony of doctrine from the beginning of the Old Testament to the close of the New."—P. 22.

"There is traceable in all the books the person of a mighty Deliverer, prophesied of before He came, described after His appearance."—P. 23.

"There is no cause of slightest importance in the literature or language for removing Deuteronomy to a later age, for ascribing Psalms, avowedly written by him, to other than David, for regarding the second portion of Isaiah as belonging to the period of the captivity, or for bringing down Daniel to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes."—P. 31.

His power of appreciating scientific truth may be judged of by the assertion that the doctrine of Evolution "is really, though not always avowedly, in opposition to the idea of a personal God" (p. 149). The general result is a painful combination of illogical assertion, offensive dogmatism, and unseemly depreciation of theological opponents.

The next book* is also wild in its assertions and illogical in its conclusions, while running to the opposite extreme from that just noticed, in regard to belief. In three divisions, fancifully headed, "Morning," "Noon," and "Evening," the author attempts to trace, first, the geological history of the earth, then the evolution of organized beings, next the distribution of man and the growth of civilization. The third section seems intended to be a history of religion. A work of such wide scope, in order to be of any value, must be scrupulously exact and accurate in its facts. To test whether it is so, we turn to its statements in reference to Christ, and we find the following:

"Christ appears to have very closely gone into the Jewish traditions, to have studied the teachings of Zoroaster, and to have mastered the intelligence and utilized many of the legendary incidents of Buddhism."—P. 259.

"It is not a difficult task to detect that Christ had also an intimate

* *Phases of Modern Doctrine in relation to the Intellectual and Active Powers of Nature and Man.* By James Hawkins. London: Longmans. 1878.

knowledge of the writings of Plato, and was himself attached to his philosophy and intellectual power."—P. 261.

Of similar value are the statements, that the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse are both of them "significantly and idiomatically Greek in tone and structure" (p. 258); and that the patriarchal names in the Old Testament and the events associated with them "are mainly mythological figures and incidents, having direct and only reference to the sun, moon, dawn," &c. (P. 268.)

D'Aubigné's History, of which we have from time to time noticed the successive parts as they have appeared in the English translation, is now completed by the publication of the last volume.* It contains much interesting matter which cannot be touched on in a brief notice. There is here, as in former volumes, an introduction of various particulars of general history, bearing only indirectly, if at all, on the Reformation, which might with advantage have been omitted. In some instances the feeling of the historian too obviously tinges his representation of personages and incidents. Frequently he descends to gossip, and offers as facts relations of doubtful authenticity. With all this, perhaps in consequence of it, he furnishes abundance of interesting reading for the general public. But greater caution and rigorous condensation would have made the History more valuable to the student.

E.

* History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin. By the Rev. J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D.D. Translated by William L. R. Cates. Vol. VIII. Spain, England, Germany. London: Longmans.

THE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. LXIII.—OCTOBER, 1878.

THE GOEL.

THE legislative books of the Old Testament contain laws and narratives which have long been a stumbling-block to the devout, and are still a puzzle to many commentators. These laws and narratives are so remote from all that we are accustomed to regard as fit and moral, that we can only with difficulty imagine a state of society in which they could have formed a standard of morality. Yet they exist in the Old Testament without any note of reprobation or dissent,—quite accordant, to all seeming, with the social ideas of the historians. But we are not entirely without a clue to the origin of these phenomena. The science of Religion has taught us that “the disguises which piety puts on are not unfrequently suggestive of that which some would describe by a quite opposite name;” and that religious feeling embodies itself in forms which to us seem grotesque and even repulsive. So in sociology at large, research shews us that customs which, if practised among ourselves, would meet with instant reprobation, may among other peoples be the result and expression of a morality by no means contemptible. With this belief, I propose to investigate one or two curious customs of the Hebrews, not judging them by modern standards, but comparing them with similar customs of other peoples, in the hope that thus they will unfold the thoughts and feelings that prompted them. But as I array my facts before beginning any explanation of them, there will not improbably arise in the mind of the reader the question which often arose in my own: whether there be really any-

thing good in such customs? I can, I think, assure him that, however unpromising the outset, the end will both throw light upon several passages of the Old Testament, and perhaps shew us somewhat of the primitive Hebrew religion before ever the Torah began to descend from one generation to another of Lawyer-priests.

The custom to which I am specially desirous of directing attention is one attaching to the personage known in Hebrew society as the "goel"—the "redeemer of blood," the "next of kin." Himself a product of primitive times, he is the centre of an important group of archaic customs. The most peculiar of these is that contained in this Deuteronomic law: "If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband's brother unto her. And it shall be, that the first-born which she beareth shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not put out of Israel."* The operation of this law is referred to in the Old Testament more than once. Tamar is thus given in marriage to the sons of Judah;† and in the story of Ruth, compliance with the law is required from the kinsman who proposes to redeem Naomi's property.‡ This latter passage, however, differs from that in Deuteronomy as to the range of the obligation to "raise up seed;" the legislative passage confining the range to the brother-in-law, while the narrative regards it as co-extensive with the right of redemption. Hence there has been a divergence of opinion among scholars, some holding that the text in Ruth depicts the more archaic form of the custom,§ others thinking that the incident has been erroneously connected with the Deuteronomic law.|| Doubtless, if we view the brother-in-law or "levir" as the central point of the custom, we must confine

* Deut. xxv. 5, 6.

† Gen. xxxviii. 8 ff.

‡ Ruth iv. 5.

§ E.g. Ewald, *Alterthümer*, 3te Ausg. 277.

|| E.g. Fürst, *Lexicon*, s.v. גִּיבֵר; M'Lennan, *Fortn. Review*, May, 1877, p. 699.

the expression "levirate," by which the custom is usually known, to the legislative text. But if we view the "raising of seed" as the central point, we cannot refuse to group both forms of the custom in one category, unless indeed we are prepared to deny the historic verisimilitude of the custom as depicted in Ruth. But this can hardly be done; for apart from the fact that customs of still wider range are to be found elsewhere, there is another Hebrew custom which tends to shew that the Hebrew obligation was not confined to the brother-in-law. This custom is related in 1 Chron. ii. 34, 35, where we read that "Sheshan had no sons, but daughters. And Sheshan had a servant (ebed), an Egyptian, whose name was Jarha. And Sheshan gave his daughter to Jarha his servant to wife; and she bare him Attai. And Attai begat Nathan," &c. Jarha was thus absorbed into the family of Sheshan, being regarded as the son of the house, and married to the heiress-daughter.* This was contrary to the tradition of Zelophehad's daughters, who carried their inheritances away from the paternal home, and were absorbed into another family of the tribe.† It is evident that Sheshan selected one of his daughters to keep alive the family name by bringing into it her husband; and his act thus falls under the general category of cases where daughters are formally appointed that the family line may be continued in the person of their eldest son.

Passing over, for the present, the varying detail of these usages, it will be at once perceived that their common basis is a deep-seated desire to preserve and maintain the "family." Not, however, the family of modern times, but the family of pastoral life, including all blood-relations up to the "third and fourth generations." The preservation and continuance of each branch of this family was the bounden duty of all its members, according to their degrees of relationship.

Parallels to these usages, both as to aim and method, are to be found in each branch of the Aryan race—Hindu, Eranian, Greek and Teuton.

* Ewald, *Alterth.* 240.

† Numb. xxxvi. *passim*.

Among the Hindus, the code traditionally ascribed to Manu directs that on failure of direct issue, "the brother (or some other sapinda)" shall with due rites take "the wife, who has been duly authorized."* And the child succeeds to the name of the deceased husband. The law is repeated to meet the case of one who dies before the consummation of marriage, in which event the duty of "raising up seed" to the deceased devolves upon his brother.† And further provision is made for the case of a man whose wife has died, leaving him a daughter, but no son. In this event, the daughter marries upon the condition from her father that "the male child who shall be born from her in wedlock shall be mine for the purpose of performing my obsequies."‡

Among the Parsis, who represent the Eranian branch, exists a custom similar to the last-mentioned. If the father or brother of a maiden has died without male issue, her eldest son is considered the child of his deceased relative. And, according to Anquetil, when the child attains the age of fifteen years, there is a fresh betrothal of his parents.§

Among the Spartans, the custom appears in a somewhat different form. On failure of issue, the duty of raising up seed was assigned during the lifetime of the husband to some other citizen, "whose child then belonged to the family of the husband, although also considered as related to the family of the real father."||

The Teutons possessed a custom identical with that of the Spartans, for it took its place in Germany among those duties of mutual assistance which each member of a village community was bound to afford to his fellow-members.¶

The parallelism of these usages with the Hebrew is clear. They spring from the same idea, the desire to "continue the

* Manu, ix. 59, 60.

† Ib. ix. 69, 70.

‡ Ib. ix. 127. Cf. the incident of Shesban, mentioned above.

§ Spiegel, *Avesta, die heiligen Schriften der Parson*, ii. xxviii.

|| K. O. Müller, *The Dorians* (E. T.) ii. 207.

¶ Von Maurer, *Geschichte der Dorfverfassung*, i. 338.

house as nearly as possible with the same blood ;" and they agree closely in the methods they adopt to attain their desire.

Whence did this desire derive such strength as to induce peoples so numerous to adopt customs which in after times became repellent even to themselves? From religion. In Manu it is said, "by the eldest, at the moment of his birth, the father, having begotten a son, discharges his debt to his own progenitors."* His eldest son is the one "by whose birth he attains immortality."† "By a son, a man obtains victory over all people; by a son's son, he enjoys immortality; by the son of that grandson, he reaches the solar abode."‡ Without the funeral cake and rites, the soul of the deceased cannot be at peace, and none but a son may offer those sacred rites. So deeply is this idea rooted in the Hindu mind, that the obstinate survival of suttee has been traced to the same thought, that as these sacrifices can only be performed by a male, no woman ought to inherit the property "designed for religious uses."§ In the Rig Veda, wealth of children is a continual subject of prayer: "O Aditi . . . whom thou quickenest with precious strength and with riches in progeny, may we be they."|| "Wishing for wives and wishing for sons, offering sacrifices (we) call now upon Sarasvat."¶ "May we with many sons and without hurt obtain the great protection of Mitra and Varuna."** "The prayer for 'olive branches' is a constant theme of the Vedic poets."††

So too, the Parsis pray for many children: "Give me, O Fire, son of Ahura-mazda, quickly glory, quickly food . . . well-nourished heavenly offspring, to form a circle, to assemble together, to grow on, to last on, pure from guilt, manly, to forward my house, my clan, my tribe, my village, my neighbourhood, my district."‡‡ "Grant, O Air, who workest in the

* Manu, ix. 106.

† Ib. ix. 107.

‡ Ib. ix. 137.

§ Maine, Early Hist. of Inst. 332-3.

|| R. V. i. 94, 15; Max Müller, R. V. i. 248; Grassmann, R. V. ii. 96.

¶ R. V. vii. 96, 4; M. Müller, i. 96; Grassmann, i. 374.

** R. V. ii. 27, 7; M. Müller, i. 242.

†† M. Müller, R. V. i. 195.

‡‡ Spiegel. Avesta, iii. 17.

highest, that we may receive a lord who shall nourish us as long as we live, and bring us posterity."* "Whom," says Mithra, "whom shall I bless with heavenly posterity?"†

A similar feeling is frequently expressed in the Old Testament. "Children," it is said, "happy is the man who hath his quiver full of them."‡ "Instead of thy fathers," the marriage song promises, "thou shalt have children whom thou mayest make princes in all the earth."§ "The first-born," says the Deuteronomist, "is the beginning of one's strength."|| "Happy is the man," exclaims Job, "whom God correcteth. . . . Thou shalt know also that thy seed is great, and thine offspring as the grass of the earth."¶ The desire for the perpetuation of the house recurs again and again. We meet it in the promise to Abraham;** it re-appears in the story of Zelophehad's daughters; it is an integral part of the blessing to David;‡‡ it is the sole reward of the Rechabites for their filial obedience.‡‡ The parallel between Semite and Aryan is now complete. In both races, offspring are a constant subject of supplication—in one case that they may perform the sacrifice needful for the welfare of their ancestors; in the other, that the people of Yahveh may never become extinct.

Is this parallelism at bottom an identity? Does the Hebrew usage date from pre-Yahvistic times, a relic of ideas which Yahvism modified, but by which it also was modified in its turn? To answer these questions, we must endeavour to ascertain the stage of social life at which the usages most probably originated.

The four customs quoted from Aryan sources fall into two groups. In one, consisting of the Hindu and Parsi, great importance is attached to purity of blood. The "goel" is always of the family blood. Whenever the purity is at all likely to be dimmed (as in the Parsi custom), every precaution is taken that the child shall be duly absorbed into the house

* Spiegel. *Avesta*, iii. 156.

† *Ib.* iii. 96.

‡ *Ps.* cxxvii. 5.

§ *Ps.* xlv. 16.

|| *Dent.* xxi. 17.

¶ *Job* v. 17, 25.

** *Gen.* xv. 5.

‡‡ *2 Sam.* vii. 12 f.

‡‡ *Jer.* xxxv. 18, 19.

he is to represent. In the other group, consisting of the Greek and Teuton, these limitations are changed. Instead of limitation by identity of descent, there is limitation by contiguity of residence. In the place of connection by blood, we have connection by land. For the Family has been substituted the Village. The Greek and Teuton customs reveal themselves as not being primeval. The whole social structure on which they are built—the Village Community—is one founded on, and developed out of, the Hindu and Parsi. It is to these latter, as bearing the mark of the more primitive nomad-pastoral family, that we must look for the earliest form and the origin of the “raising of seed.”*

The law-book in which the Hindu usage is mentioned, is itself anterior to the rise of Buddhism, and speaks of our custom in a way which shews that it was then no new invention. It is termed “fit only for cattle,” and is admitted only because of the powerful tradition which upheld it. The “raising of seed” was not the only custom so admitted into the Brahmanic law-books. There were numerous “customs of countries and villages,” of which “there can be no doubt that they not only are not founded upon Brahmanic authority, but frequently decidedly against it.”† Nevertheless, the Brahmans were forced to admit them, imparting to them meanwhile such Brahmanic polish as they would receive. Among such customs were the polygamy of Pandu, and the polyandry of the Pandava princes.‡ Thus, by the way in which the custom is mentioned, it seems to be thrown back into a very early period of Hindu society. And, indeed, we should not be unsupported by authority if we inferred from its appearance in so many branches of the race, that it was in existence before any of them migrated from their primeval home.§ And although that inference seems to me rather doubtful, there is no doubt that this general prevalence of the “raising of seed”

* The arguments on which these statements are based will be found *in extenso* in Maine's *Early Hist. of Institutions*, 78 ff.

† Max Müller, *Hist. Sansk. Lit.* 52.

‡ *Ib.* 47, 48.

§ Cf. v. Maurer, *u.s. i.* 339.

warrants us in looking for its origin in ideas which existed before the Aryan migrations, and confirms the inference from *Manu* that the custom is of very early date. The social condition of the primitive Aryans is now well known to us. They were not altogether agriculturists, for the Eastern and Western branches have no common word for "ploughing."* Yet they were more settled than pure nomads, for in each branch "plough" is expressed by a word common to all the members.† The exact extent of their settlement is shewn by the identity of the Sansk. *vispati* with the Lith. *wiespatis*, of which the first component *vis* appears in the classic *vicus* and *οἶκος*.‡ This *vis*, as the meanings of its variant forms shew, was intermediate between the simple "house," *nmana*, and the developed "town," *zantu*.§ It consisted, apparently, of a cluster of houses (containing about five families)|| located around a cattle-fold, and forming a small village, which was probably easily erected and easily deserted. In these clusters the dwellers were arranged in families. Their habits were still to a large extent pastoral, their chief wealth is cattle, their language full of allusions to pastoral life. The primitive Aryan settlement, as thus outlined, is still to be found in the Joint Undivided Family of India. There the family joins still in undivided worship, takes its meals at the same board, and hands down its property undivided from one generation to another. This institution, "joint in food, worship and estate," is now constantly engaged in the cultivation of land, but is still "only accidentally connected with it." What holds it together is not land, but consanguinity. The earliest development of this primitive stage was into the "House Community," an institution inherited both by India and Slavonia. The House Community is "simply the Joint Family, allowed to expand itself without hindrance, and settled for ages upon the land."¶ It retains all the characteristics of the earlier insti-

* Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, i. 814.

† *Ib.* 814; cf. Kuhn, in *Weber's Indische Studien*, i. 338, 351.

‡ *Ib.* 796.

§ Pott, *Wurzel-wörterbuch*, i. 231.

|| Lassen, *u.s.* 797.

¶ Maine, *Early Hist. of Inst.* 80.

tution, and has in addition the stability which is given by increased numbers and a long existence in one hereditary village. Into this social framework the Hindu "raising of seed" fits exactly. We need a framework which shall allow scope for the growth of the feelings underlying our custom, but which shall also exhibit a distinctly family life, and particularly a joint undivided life. This is found precisely in the House Community. And more than this, the House Community satisfies every other condition of our problem. The Eranian custom is of the same form as the Hindu, and we look accordingly for a similar social framework. We shall not be disappointed. "The stem-constitution, which may probably* have been a characteristic of the entire Indo-Germanic race . . . had here (i.e. in Eran) remained in the most spotless purity. The Eranians were divided into families (*nmana*), a number of such families were collected into a clan (*vis*), a number of such clans into a community (*zantu*), the communities into a district." Over each of these divisions presided a master (*paiti*), who, however, was sometimes wanting in the higher grades.† The division, here so artistically carried out, rests upon precisely the same basis as we found in India. The house, the family, is again the unit. In Eran, then, the family organization is accompanied by a corresponding form of the "raising of seed."

The House Community, however, has always a tendency to develop into the Village Community. As the pastoral life falls into the distant past, the Community is apt to forget its descent by blood, and to look to the land as the source of its union. This was the stage reached in Greece and Germany. And it is reflected in the "raising of seed." Here the kinsman is, as I have already remarked, modified into the fellow-burgher. This evidence is, I think, conclusive. Not only have we found for the family form of the "raising of seed" a fit social framework in India, but we see that that framework

* After the results of later research, we may now say "certainly."

† Spiegel, *Avesta*, ii. p. iii. iv.; Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*, 2nd ed. 188.

was one in which in Eran the custom really grew up; and also that where the framework became more developed, the form of the "raising of seed" was correspondingly modified. Can we refuse to believe that the "raising of seed" by kinsmen arose during the early Aryan stage which we call the "House Community"?

With this result in our hands, we have now to inquire how far it will guide us in determining the age of the Hebrew "raising of seed." To what extent was the development of the Semites parallel with that of the Aryans? That the Hebrews were primarily nomads is acknowledged by all. There are still traces of a state of things among them resembling the Aryan village community, and in Phœnicia the Semites developed a government in many ways parallel to that of Greece and Rome, which we know to be simply developed village communities.* The outlines being thus parallel, we may fairly look for a correspondence in detail.

The transition from pastoral to agricultural life is almost as strongly marked among the Semites as among the Aryans. It seems indeed to have been more sudden, owing to the contact of the Semites with the old civilization of Sumer or Akkad, by which the nomads were suddenly brought under the influence of a developed city life.†

Parallel with the Sansk. *vis*, is the Hebrew *מִדְבָּר*, which is identical with the Arab. *اهل* and the cuneiform Assyrian *alu*.‡ In Hebrew it preserves its original meaning of "tent," but interchanges with *בֵּית* "house" in the sense of "family." In Arabic it passes from "family" into "people," and in Assyrian it means "city." These meanings seem to indicate that the Semites while nomad had already developed a "family," the organization of which was transferred first to the "house" and then to the "city." If this be so, the Assyrians who remained in contact with the Sumerian civilization ought to shew us a family life in the midst of their great cities. On this point a

* Cf. Movers, *Die Phönizier*, ii. (i.) ch. xii. on the Constitution of Phœnicia.

† Sayce, *Assyrian Lectures*, 134.

‡ *Ib.* 144.

tablet translated by Dr. Oppert will furnish us with evidence. The transaction recorded by the tablet appears somewhat like Ahab's with Naboth's vineyard. But the interest of the tablet lies in the description incidentally given of the "house of Ada" (bit-Ada), one of the contracting parties. This "house" was a great corporation possessed of extensive lands, with numerous "streets" running through them, and bounded by the estates of other great "houses." It received tribute, possibly from client houses. It had a complete organization of officers to deal with its internal management: a "master," a "prefect," a "speculator," and others whose offices are uncertain. But—and this is the important point—not only are all these persons officials "of the house of Ada," but the "house" itself is directly stated to be composed of blood relatives, "brothers, sons, near relatives, and allies."* The organization, in fact, is analogous to the Eranian, except that the Semite, instead of developing externally into a "commune," has developed internally.

Traces of a similar organization are said by Movers to exist in Phœnicia. According to him, the great tribe, the שבט הפלני, rested finally upon the *πάτραι*, *בירי אבור*, and these retained the "syssitia," the distinctive mark of the House Community, which lingered on still in Sparta.†

In Israel, there is abundant evidence of this early stage. There are the *משפחות* of Kirjath-jearim; of the "scribes,"‡ and of "them that wrought fine linen."§ In the book of Judges, legend pictures for us the "house" of Micah, the head of which, curiously, is a woman. It consists of a collocation of "houses near to Micah's house," and has, or had until the unfortunate arrival of the Danites, its own chapel, priest, vestments and gods.|| A similar custom is thought by Movers to

* Records of the Past, ix. 96 ff.

† Die Phönizier, ii. (i.) 480 f.

‡ 1 Chron. ii. 53, 55.

§ 1 Chron. iv. 21. The existence of hereditary trades and professions is a further interesting link between Aryan and Semitic communities. Cf. Maine, Village Communities, 125; and for a similar phenomenon among the Arabs, Burckhardt, Bedouins and Wahabys, i. 65.

|| Judges xvii. xviii. passim.

be referred to in the narrative of the common sacrifice-feast of the inhabitants of Samuel's city, and in Adonijah's feast in 1 Kings i. 9. And the whole organization comes out clearly in the excuse made by David for his absence from Saul's table: "Our family hath a sacrifice (a yearly sacrifice for all the family, v. 6,) in the city, and my brother, he hath commanded me to be there."* Here is seen not only the family united in property and in worship, but also exercising a certain authority over members at a distance.

To gather up the results of this somewhat discursive research. The primitive Semites while yet nomads developed a very definite family life, which each branch accommodated as best it could to the civilizations with which it came into contact. The irregularity of the transition to agriculture has left little trace of the pure "undivided family." The people seem rather to have at once formed the house communities which we see existing among Phœnicians, Assyrians and Hebrews.

We find, then, the same development among Semites as among Aryans. The result as regards the goel must be the same also. The Aryan "raising of seed" demanded a family life as the basis of its earlier form, and where the family life grew into the civic, changed with it into a civic form. Now among the Hebrews there is also the Village Community found, and that in a state of decay. It is impossible to contemplate the earlier family life as coming into existence after the development of the later. The decayed state of the later leads rather to the inference that it must have been long preceded by the earlier, and thus the house community, with its attendant "raising of seed," must be looked upon as a relic of the transition stage of the primitive Semites.

There now lies before us the further question, What were the antecedents of the "raising of seed"? what was the form of family life which caused it to take that especial form? If we can at all answer this question, we shall, to that extent, have reconstructed nomad Hebrew society.

* 1 Sam. xx. 29.

Among many causes that contributed to the disuse of the custom, one very powerful cause, as the book of Ruth shews us,* was the detriment to the prospects of the goel himself. In fact, compliance with the custom became equivalent, as Mr. M'Lennan has observed, to cutting oneself off from the succession. We therefore at once suspect that originally either no such disability attached to the custom, or that there was some counterbalancing advantage; in other words, that the custom has been transformed, and that what is now an obligation was originally a right. This suspicion is confirmed by the ceremony of repudiation which accompanied a refusal to undertake the obligation. The casting off of the shoe, which is mentioned in Deuteronomy† as a mark of disgrace, is evidently symbolical, not of repudiating an obligation, but of foregoing a right.‡ The Arabs have preserved the ceremony intact in this connection. A proverbial formula among them when a young man foregoes his prescriptive right to marry his first cousin is, "She was my slipper, I have cast her off."§ This proverb furnishes the clue to the mystery. The Arab has a right to the hand of his relative; had the primitive Hebrew a right to the hand of his brother's widow? Such is the suggestion of Mr. Herbert Spencer, and facts seem to confirm his view.|| The custom of inheriting widows is adverted to in the Koran, and Beidhawi in his commentary gives the whole ceremony, which consists in the deceased's relative throwing his cloak over the widow and saying, "I claim her."¶ So in Assyria, it was not unusual for women to be purchased for wives.** In Israel there is nothing so strong as this,†† unless we take the legislative prohibitions as indicative of existing

* Ruth iv. 6. † Deut. xxv. 9, 10. ‡ Cf. Ewald, *Alterthümer*, 241.

§ Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahabys*, i. 113.

|| *Principles of Sociology*, i. 691 f.

¶ Beidhawii, *Comment. in Coranum*, ed. Fleischer, i. 201. The substance of the note is repeated by Sale, *ad loc.*

** Cf. a tablet trans. by Dr. Oppert in *Records of the Past*, vii. 115.

†† But Ewald's emendation of Ruth iv. 6 (Thou must buy also Ruth the Moabitess, *Alt.* 278), compared with iv. 10, confirms the idea of the inheritance being the right of the goel.

practices ; but there are two passages which seem to me to rest upon this idea as their basis. One is the story, related in 2 Sam. xvi. 21, of Absalom's taking David's wives upon the advice of Ahitophel, "that all Israel may know that thou art abhorred of thy father, so shall the hands of all that are with thee be strong." The second is the somewhat similar story, in 1 Kings ii. 21 f., of Adonijah's request for Abishag, David's wife ; whereto Solomon replies, "Why dost thou ask Abishag for Adonijah ? Ask for him the kingdom also, for he is mine elder brother." Now, dissolute as Absalom is depicted, his conduct here can hardly have been introduced by the narrator to heighten his immorality, for it is not remarked that the people otherwise than approved Absalom's procedure. Nor is that hypothesis compatible with the gravity of the counsellor who gave the advice, nor with the words put into his lips, "so shall the hands of all that are with thee be strong." This, and the acceptance of Absalom's conduct by the people, seem rather to point to the conclusion that in Absalom's circumstances the act had a special significance. So with Adonijah's request. It was a simple thing in itself, and Solomon's refusal seems, even after allowing for rhetorical flourish, needlessly overbearing and passionate—unless there were some underlying significance in the request. If we may assume that widows once passed to the heir with the other property, and that hence marriage with the deceased's widow grew to be a sign (gradually become antiquated) of a claim to the deceased's possessions, we have a reasonable explanation of both passages. It fits with the circumstances of the two aspirants to the throne ; it harmonizes the advice with the sober lips whence it proceeds ; and it gives to Solomon's words an intelligible meaning :—"he is my elder brother, and claims the throne before me : if I accede to his request, I acknowledge the justice of his claim ; let him ask me at once to give him my kingdom."

Though only a hypothesis, this inheritance of widows throws light upon the strange lack of legislation for that class of persons. All over the Old Testament are reiterated injunctions to take care of the widow ; yet nowhere is any definite

provision made for her, save the exhortations to leave a few ears of the harvest, or a little fruit on the trees. This lack of legislative care, however, becomes explicable upon the hypothesis here suggested, for in such circumstances the widow would be provided for by the new arrangement of the family. A widow, in fact, would not exist as a separate individual, as indeed she does not exist in other places where the same rule is in force.

The "raising of seed" was often, as we have seen, and no doubt primarily, resorted to during the lifetime of the husband. Such a course was the most obvious to the men of that period. And as the communal life of the family imposed mutual assistance upon each member, it is not difficult to see, when one remembers the religious reason underlying the custom, that it was one which would very soon become sacred, not to be denied without grievous sin. If, therefore, such assistance were not afforded during the husband's life, there would be a religious obligation upon the goel to fulfil the claim after the husband's death. And it was here that the countervailing advantage appeared. For the widow, being brought into the family of the goel, could no longer make any separate claim on the family property. She shared the fortune of her new husband. And her child had, by the very communal nature of the society, no claim to a separate inheritance. The brother-in-law, as the eldest member of the family, was manager, and exercised authority over everything. It may seem strange to suggest that a son should inherit his father's name but not his property. It can only be answered that such are the facts in India. Even in Buddhist times it was requisite for a man to obtain the leave of his elder brother to dissociate himself from his family and devote himself to the religious life.* Yet religion had long before demanded the uninterrupted succession of father and son to perform the rites for the dead. And though it is impossible here to answer, it is impossible not to ask the question, whether there was not

* Cf. the legend of Purna in Burnouf's *Introd. à l'Histoire du Buddh. Ind.*, 2me ed., 222.

the same family religion in Israel ; whether, as Ewald and Mr. Herbert Spencer think,* "each house hallowed its great dead," and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob still retain traces of the "ancient awe" with which they were once regarded.

There are, however, traditions of the Old Testament which appear to give women a much higher status than would seem to be conferred by appropriation of them as chattels. Such legends as those of Deborah, of Jael, and the daughter of Jephthah, give us a very elevated idea of female worth. Here, again, India may come to our assistance. Notwithstanding the subjection into which Manu puts women, and notwithstanding suttee, there is evidence that women in India once had a very high position of independence.† Subjection in some points and freedom in others are curiously blended in primitive life.

Let us now gather up our results before applying them to the elucidation of one or two narratives of the Old Testament. The Hebrew custom of raising up seed was compared with similar Aryan customs. These were investigated and found to divide into two groups, the earlier of which rested upon the Aryan House Community. With this earlier Aryan custom the Hebrew corresponded in form, and a Hebrew House Community was accordingly sought for and found at the commencement of Hebrew settled life. Within this house community it was found that the raising of seed rested upon a religious basis, and was originated because the family life enabled the brother or other goel to fulfil his religious obligation without any personal loss.

Incidentally it appeared that sons did not necessarily inherit their father's property. And this brings us to the fact that the Hebrew records betray the existence among them of that system of relationship through females only, which is familiar to readers of Mr. McLennan and Sir John Lubbock. This system is simply that persons having the same mother are

* Ewald, *Lehre der Bibel* von Gott, iii. 425 f ; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, i. 316 f.

† Cf. Maine, *Early Hist. of Inst.*, chap. xi., on Property of Married Women.

considered as related, though they have different fathers ; and, conversely, persons having different mothers are not considered as related, even though they have the same father. It results from this that a man's brother is a nearer relative to him than his own child. Of the existence of this system among the Hebrews we have traces in the traditions of the patriarchal marriages, which were decidedly contrary to later priestly legislation. For instance, Moses' father, Amram, marries his father's sister. Nahor marries his brother's daughter. Abraham marries Sarah, "the daughter of his father, but not the daughter of his mother." The same idea occurs in the words, "thy brother, the son of thy mother," in Deut. xiii. 6: and the interpretation of these clauses, as mutually complementary, is confirmed by Gideon's expression in Judges viii. 19, "they were my brethren, the sons of my mother." It forms the motive of several incidents of early traditions, as in Judges xi. 2, where Jephthah is thrust out from his father's house by the sons of Gilead's other wife, because Jephthah is the "son of a strange woman." So in the legend of Abimelech, we see that his affection for "his mother's brethren" and the "family of the house of his mother's father," with whom he was "bone and flesh," was far greater than his affection for the brethren of his father's house.*

The ideas evolved by this system gradually formed themselves into a code of morals, and in this way form the ethical motive of some of the Old Testament stories. In the story of Tamar and Amnon, the lady uses these remarkable words, "Speak, I pray thee, unto the king, for he will not refuse me unto thee," which have sometimes been thought to be simply a kind of subterfuge or temporization. Far from it. If the genealogy of Tamar and Amnon be consulted, it will be seen that, being of different mothers, they come under the category

* Judges ix. 1, 2 f. The mother held also a high place in Akkad. Cf. Sayce, *Assyrian Lectures*, 153. M. Lenormant calls this precedence of the mother, une *donnée individuelle de race*, among the Turanians (*La Magie chez les Chaldéens*, 312); but it really appears wherever this system of relationship is in vogue, and counterbalances to a considerable extent the otherwise low position of women.

of persons whose blood-relationship under the archaic system is very weak, or rather non-existent. In the popular mind, therefore, there was no bar to their union. And Amnon's guilt lies in this—not so much that he transgressed the levitical law, but that, having conceived a passion which might morally be gratified by marriage, he deliberately refused to take that course, and thereby held himself up to the reprobation not only of priest, but of the people whose traditional morality he had openly violated.

But most gracefully does this primitive morality form the motive of the story of the earlier Tamar. She, the reader will remember, had lost one husband, and awaited her marriage with the second son of Judah. But Judah, the head of the family, refused to permit the marriage; he declined to allow Shelah to take upon himself the duties of the goel. By this act Judah himself, following the usage as depicted in Ruth, became the goel, and to him Tamar looked for the fulfilment of the sacred duty. But Judah too seemed unwilling to act. What was Tamar to do? Was the family name to be extinguished, were the family sacrifices to cease, and the spirits of the dead to be disquieted in their graves because of the neglect of the head of the house? Nay, if he would not do his duty, the end must be obtained by stratagem, and Judah's weakness must be the means of enforcing right. It was Jacob with Laban, Abraham with Pharaoh, over again. A great sin had to all appearance been committed. Then came forth the bracelets and the earrings, and the purpose of the device became manifest. Judah could only say, "She is more righteous than I." And I, and I hope the reader with me, agree with Judah's judgment. For taking the story thus as what it purports to be, there is no trace of immorality in all Tamar's conduct; and if one remembers that, notwithstanding their close connection with the same family, the ancient system we have investigated permitted marriage between them, every suspicion of incest vanishes, and nothing remains but the religious desire of Tamar for the prosperity of her house.

These stories clearly belong to the pre-Yahvistic period of

Hebrew history. Here and there, indeed, we can see the influence of the later creed, as in the downfall of Abimelech, which now is said to be the judgment of God upon his wickedness in slaying his father's sons, a feat which in early times entitled him (be he solar myth or not) to the place he now holds in Hebrew legend. But the stories of Judah, Tamar and Amnon, still remain in all their primitive beauty, and seem to indicate that the family worship and customs of Israel early developed a morality which was traditionally handed on by numerous popular stories, by a whole folk-lore in fact, of which these few remnants alone remain. Such at least is the view with which these legends impress me—that they are relics of the primitive “thorah” which the later priestly legislation was obliged to absorb, just as in India Brahmanism had to accept similar usages of preceding times.

JOHN FENTON.

THE ARCHAIC SOLAR-CULT OF EGYPT.—PART I. RA.

I. RA, AS THE SOLAR PHOTOSPHERE.

THE religious belief of ancient Kam-Aigyplos,* formed in the course of time into a system, maintained itself with astonishing permanence and vitality through the immense history of the old, middle and new empires; in which element of stability it resembles the Semitic faith of Kaldea; just as, on the other hand, it differs from the career of the primitive Vedic system of India as manipulated by the more progressive and changing Aryan mind. It must not, however, be supposed that the Kamic religion exhibits an iron rigidity and changelessness throughout its long existence; as a matter of course,

* In the hieroglyphics, Egypt is called Kam, the “Black;” hence al-*chemy*, the “black art,” and *chemistry*. The Greek *Aigyplos* is connected by some Egyptologists with *Aquipto*, “the mid-point of earth.” Prof. Goldschmidt prefers to derive it from the compound Ukh-hap-t, “the land of the good stream-sending spirit.”

at different periods certain divine personages become more prominent, while others retire into the background ; now one phase of thought is uppermost in the kingly, priestly or popular mind, and now another ; whilst occasionally invaders or heretics assail the faith with temporary success. But notwithstanding these necessary fluctuations, Kam, from the dawn of history until its acceptance of a qualified Christianity, held firmly to one particular and peculiar form of religious thought and belief, which, in the main, appears almost equally in the archaic chapters of the *Funereal Ritual* as in the Inscription of Daryavush Vishtaspa* at El-Khargeh. An amazing power of excogitating minor imaginary personages, of elaborating fantastic scenes in the unseen world, scenes many of which owed their birth to the actualities of the country itself, and of working certain simple ideas into multitudinous detail, combine both vastly to obscure the Kamic religion and to attach the idea of change and diversity to it in an unwarrantable degree ; for, in fact, the main elements of faith, the great outlines of belief, were drawn once and for ever. With the purely historical aspect of the matter, involving those questions of chronology whose difficulties are as familiar as their solution is occult, I am not here concerned ; but, on the whole, I am inclined to believe that the majority of modern Egyptologists unduly extend the duration of the empire. For my present purpose, however, it is sufficient to know that a succession of kings, extending from the dim but yet certain figure of Mena to Nekhtenebef, the last native Pharaoh, who fled from the Persian conquerors into Noub† about B.C. 340, reigned in the Hapi Valley through many generations. Without further historical detail, I will proceed to consider the ancient Sun-worship of the country as recorded in the monuments, commencing with Ra, the Sun-god proper, and first noticing him in connection with the sun, regarded merely or mainly as the photosphere of mankind. Here, as ever, our guide through

* Darius Hystaspes, i.e. "the Possessor of Horses ;" in later Persian, Guashtasp.

† Aithiopia. Also called Kasbi, i.e. Kush ; in Assyrian, Kusu.

labyrinth and intricacy is the unity of the human mind ; and proceeding from the more obvious to the less obvious, and standing on the banks of the stream of Hapimou,* we will gaze upon the sun of the rainless land with the eyes and intelligence common to mankind at large ; and then observe how the local element and colouring rises into being as a distinct division of the one universal school of thought.

I will first quote from a very fine hymn to Amen-Ra, translated by Mr. Goodwin, and considered "to belong to the 19th dynasty, or about the fourteenth century B.C. It purports to be only a copy, and the composition itself may be"—and doubtless is—"very much earlier."

"Praise to Amen-Ra ;
The Ancient of heaven, the Oldest of the earth ;
The Support of all things ;
The ONE in his works, single among the gods ;
Enlightener of the earth ;
Sailing in heaven in tranquillity.
Most glorious One,
Crowned in the house of flame ;
Whose fragrance the gods love ;†
When he comes from Punt [Southern Arabia],
Prince of the dew,‡ traversing foreign lands ;
Benignly approaching the Holy Land.
Salutation to thee,
Awake in strength, Amen :
Lord of eternity, strong with beautiful horns,
Lord of beams, Maker of light ;
Who stretches forth his arms at his pleasure ;
Hail to thee, Ra, Lord of truth !

* The Nile, personified as a divinity.

† Cf. the splendid lines :

"King of the East, and girt
With song and flame and *fragrance*, slowly lifts
His golden feet on those empurpled stairs
That climb into the windy halls of heaven."

Tennyson, *Lucretius*.

‡ Cf. the Hellenik myth of Kephalos, the radiant solar-head, the husband and slayer of Prokris, the Dew-drop.

Khepra* in his boat :
 At whose coming men live ;
 Proceeding from the firmament,
 Causer of pleasure and light ;
 Sovereign of life, health and strength,
 Who art visible in the midst of heaven :
 Amen, Sustainer of all things ;
 Amen, the beautiful Bull ;
 The ONE alone without peer ;
 Rising in the eastern horizon, and setting in the western
 horizon ;
 Dawning on his children daily ;
 Lord of the boat and the barge ;
 The great Hawk, making each body to rejoice ;
 Lord of the Wing.
 The diadem is on his forehead ;
 The hearts of men seek him ;
 He rejoices the earth with his goings forth :
 Hail to thee, Amen-Ra ! Lord of the thrones of the world."

In these lines—for I have carefully excluded such portions of the Hymn as complete the concept of the Sun-god by alluding to its more important characteristics—the writer's standpoint is more cosmopolitan than local. The sun is regarded almost entirely in a purely physical aspect, and, with the exception of a few local names, the words might nearly equally have fallen from the lips of archaic, reverent man in Kaldea, India or Mexico. Kam is the Holy Land, just as Pelasheth, Delphoi and other localities were similarly regarded. But the simple yet exceedingly important fact is, that here we have not so much Kamic man considering Ra, as Man considering the Sun ; and therefore Kamic thought upon the matter, although it may indeed be intricate in its full development, yet is not incomprehensible or darkly occult, but may, like other human ideas, be fully grasped by a "level consideration," without any very terrible effort or intense sagacity. Clearly seeing at first the simple outline of the question as reflected in the diurnal sky, we are in a position to detect and

* The Sun-god as producer and sustainer.

appreciate the rise of a distinctive Kamic individuality. Let us further consider the lines. Practically, as far as this planet is concerned, there is but a single sun, who therefore is pre-eminently the One. Subsequent thought, more or less artificial, may divide him into numerous phases, but this is a later development of the myth. He is manifestly the ancient-of-heaven, earth-support, enlightener, dew-prince, most-glorious, strong, beam-lord and light-causer. Almost instantaneously with the realization of these solar incidents, the sun becomes personified by an irresistible action of thought; and having become a personage, he must, in accordance with a similar necessity, be spoken of as acting more or less like a man; that is, the great principle of anthropomorphism instantly asserts itself. This step taken, another follows it with almost equal facility; namely, that which gives birth to Zoological Mythology; and beyond this, again, the faculty of comparison asserts itself, and objects inanimate but more or less motive are contrasted with the sun, the consequence being an ever-increasing mass of solar myth. Is there any real obscurity here? I think not. The result solely regarded might indeed seem a riddle, a sphinx; but the process of dissection reveals the apparently tortuous course of thought with crystalline clearness. To take the human comparisons in these lines: the Sun is crowned with a diadem of rays; he is the sailor of the upper sea of heaven; lord of the barge; he is the great traveller who visits many lands; he dispels doubt and darkness, and so becomes lord of truth, though here indeed we also touch the higher aspect of the Sun-god. To take the animal comparisons: he is the beautiful bull whose horns are the rays, the great hawk, the wing-lord. If, therefore, on the monuments, Ra, regarded anthropomorphically, is symbolically represented as hierakephalic, his head surrounded by the solar disk, Arau-* encircled, bearing the cross of life and with red-coloured flesh, is there any great mystery in the matter? Or again, either need we or can we for a moment suppose that this and a dozen

* The sacred serpent of good: Gk. Ouraios, Lat. Uraeus.

other similar representations were regarded by the wise as aught save pictures of divinity adapted to mortal senses and capabilities? In the abstract, the sun might equally have been regarded, as in fact he was elsewhere, as a horse, a charioteer, a running giant, a homeless wanderer. To take two Kamic instances where the comparison is less obvious: the beetle (*Ateuchis sacer*), on account of its prolificness and otherwise, was an emblem of Ra as the great producer and sustainer of life; and as such is found depicted within the solar disk and elsewhere in a solar connection. And, again, we read:

“The Great Cat which is in Tattu,
Is the Sun himself, called a cat.
For he has been called cat.
For it is like what he has done;
He has made his transformations into a cat.”*

This somewhat singular line of thought seems to be correctly explained by the writer we know as Horapollon, who probably lived early in the fifth century of the Christian era, and who states (whether truly or falsely) that the pupil of the cat's eye in harmony with the sun becomes larger as the great luminary advances, until at mid-day it is quite round, and that as the sun sinks it gradually returns to its previous shape.† Putting the prominent part for a whole, the solar eye is thus regarded as a cat.

My next quotation is from *The Litany of Ra*, the text of which is found at the entrance of several of the large tombs of the kings, “in the valley called *Biban el Moluk*” at Tape (Thebes).

“Homage to thee, Ra! Supreme power,
The beetle that folds his wings, that rests in the empyrean,
That is born as his own son;
He who discloses the earth and lights the Ament;
He who shines when he is in his sphere,
Who sends darkness into his sphere;
He who descends into the spheres of Ament;

* Funereal Ritual, cap. xvii.

† Horapollon, i. 10.

The brilliant One who shines in the waters of the inundation ;
He who enters and comes forth continually from his highly mysterious cavern ;
He who raised his head and lifts his forehead ;
The ram, the greatest of the creatures ;
The light that is in the infernal regions ;
Who makes the divine eye move,
The wonderful one who dwells in his eye ;
He who makes roads in the empyrean ;
The horn, the lock of hair that shines ;
His form is that of the great lion ;
The great walker who goes over the same course :
His form is that of the shining face,
The vessel of heaven ;
He who is armed with teeth, who consumes his enemies ;
The flame that lights the wick ;
The moving luminary who makes darkness come after his light ;
The double luminary, the double obelisk ;
The great god who raises his two eyes.
Bull of the country of the dead, thou art Ra !
Ra comes forth from the cow Mehur, he sets in Netur."

Here the symbolism becomes a little deeper, and we meet with several fresh ideas. Continuing the series of zoological comparisons, we find the sun described as the beetle whose wings are folded at night, when in one point of view he rests ; as the mighty ram whose butting head breaks through the darkness, an act in Hellenik myth performed by the axe of Hephaistos ;* and as the great lion armed with teeth, the latter beast being ever a solar animal. The sun of to-day may be regarded as the child of the sun of yesterday ; yet they are the same, so that he is "born as his own son." He is the road-maker, the horn, the shining lock of hair, the heavenly vessel, and, by a bolder piece of imagery, the flame that lights the kosmic wick. But in addition to these points, we are now introduced to the course of the sun through the under-world during the hours of darkness. At eve he sets in Netur, "the water of the west," to come forth in the morn from Mehur,

* Vide Pindaros, Olymp. vii. 35, et seq.

"the water of the east," which is personified as a cow. Thus we read,

"Oh Hawk, coming forth from Nu!"*
Lord of the great cow;"†

i.e. the triumphant Sun-god flies upward through the waters of the eastern sea. The unwearied Sun must also in his ceaseless course light the Ament, that mysterious heavenly region which extends far below as well as above the western horizon. He descends and shines in the waters of Netur, and enters his mysterious cavern below the surface of the extended earth-plain, and thus becomes the light of the infernal regions. But in so doing he becomes in idea a dual power, the diurnal and the nocturnal sun; a double obelisk, for the obelisk is the type of the solar ray; two eyes, as shewn on the Hellenik Dionysiak vases. As he rules above, by analogy he rules below, and hence is the Bull of Scheól, the land of the dead.

In a Hymn to Ra-Har-em-akhu, or Ra when on the horizon, we read:

"Adoration to Ra at the front of the morning!
Thou comest forth, thou ascendest,
Thou towerest in beauty, thy barge divine careers.
Arise, O Ra, from within thy chamber.
Acclamation in the bark of millions of years.
Ra's sailors are charmed at heart
To see Ra hailed as supreme of the order of great gods.
Diadem producing rays,
All roads are filled with thy splendours,
All beings make acclamations to thee in thy changes!
Princely hawk of glittering plume,
Mighty sailor-god, self-existing,
Thou roarest‡ in smiting thy foes,
Making thy great bark sweep on.

* The primordial water.

† Funereal Ritual, cap. lxxi.

‡ Being the "great lion." The terrible roaring of flame is a link between the Sun and the Lion. So the Akkadian hymn-writer says of Nindara ("Lord-of-the-darkness"), the Nocturnal Sun,

"Thou, during thy action, roarest like a bear."

Courier of heaven, outstripped by none;
Bull at night,* chieftain by day;
King of heaven, Sovran of earth."

The sun is still the sailor-god, like the Hellenik Helios in his golden boat-cup, and Apollon Delphinios, the Fish-sun. Being the captain of the ship, he must needs have sailors, purely imaginary beings, a faithful crew who delight in the greatness of their chief; for his majesty, as will be observed, is rapidly intensifying, and he will soon be second to none. As before, he is the gleaming crown, the hawk, the lion, the bull, and also courier, chieftain and king.

The inscription of Daryavush I. at the temple of El-Khargeh, "the ancient oasis of Ammon, lying to the west of Egypt, in the Libyan desert," a composition which may be placed about B.C. 490, is the latest monument I shall quote in this connection. Archaic ideas are very fairly preserved in it, but at the same time it is pervaded by a philosophical pantheism which does not obtain in religions until their early vitality has been worn away.

"Said by the adorers in praying to their father Amen-Ra.
Lord of the oasis, great god, self-produced,
The divine majesty of a hawk on his head,
The soul gleaming from his two symbolic eyes.
Thy left eye is in the disk at night;
Thou shinest in the morning out of the east of heaven.
Thou hast made the passage;
Thy secret is the depths of thy secret waters and unknown.
Thou art the sun over the gods,
Crowned, sweet, and delightful;
Thy horns are pointed;
Lamps are the light of the two symbolic eyes;
Thou risest from the waters as the hidden egg;
Thou hast been immersed in the cow Mehur.
Thou art the lion of the double lions.
O thou hawk of the nome of Han,
Sacred is thy temple in the city of Kar,†

* The nocturnal Dionysiak Sun is always represented as more especially bovine.

† Bab-ili (Babylon), i.e. "Gate-of-god."

Thy first birth is established in the face of the darkness ;
The luminous body ever golden for an age and ever."

Here the aspect of the sun as two-eyed is brought prominently forward, and another comparison which obtained from very early times, that of the golden egg which is concealed for a time beneath the eastern waters, is introduced. The myth of the sun as a sailor, and his triumphant passage through the sea, is ably illustrated by Dr. Goldziher, who alludes to Apollon as the patron of navigation, the voyages of Herakles and Helios, the golden Phœnician Chrysor, who "was the first man who fared in ships," "the Roman Sun-god Janus," the Kaldean Izdubar, and other solar sailors. "The Jewish Midrâsh compares the course of the sun to that of a ship coming from Britain, which has 365 ropes, the days of the solar year."* "The cow Mehur" has been previously noticed. The "two lions, two brothers," "the two lion-gods," to whom the Uasarian or justified man after death is made like, represent the diurnal and nocturnal sun, who, again, being in reality but one, is "*the lion of the double lions.*"

I shall conclude this series of extracts with a notice of the solar photosphere as it appears in the *Funereal Ritual*, or *Book of the Dead*. I quote from the Turin Papyrus, which belongs to a period not earlier than the 26th Dynasty, cir. B.C. 660, as translated by Dr. Birch. This version of the Ritual consists of 166 chapters, which treat of the Manifestation to Light, the Kamic Faith, the Reconstruction of the Dead, the Preservation of the Body, Protection and Diet in the Under-world, the Mystical Boat, the Passage to the Sun, the Hall of the Two Truths, the Discerning of Spirits, Solar Adorations, the House of Uasar called Aahlu or Elysion, and kindred subjects. As to the date of the Ritual, the composition of so large a work for national use would in all probability range over a vast amount of time ; the various chapters belong to different ages ; and it is to be particularly observed that from time to time scholia, rubrics and remarks, such as "Let him explain it," were added

* Mythology among the Hebrews, 101.

to the text and ultimately confounded with it. "In process of time," observes Mr. Cooper, "these glosses and rubrics became confused with the Ritual, and by the ignorance of the Egyptian scribes, who had lost the knowledge of the sacred language they copied."* Remains also of a previous Ritual occur on monuments of the 12th Dynasty. "The earliest appearance of Rituals is in the 11th Dynasty. It is then that extracts of these sacred books are found, covering the inner sides of the rectangular chests which held the mummies of the dead."† The 17th, 18th and 64th chapters are found in the period of the 11th Dynasty, and the 64th chapter "is as usual attributed to the age of" Menkaura, builder of the third pyramid and a monarch of the 4th Dynasty; but the composition generally "may be almost certainly traced back to the reign of Hesepti of the 1st Dynasty." The reader will naturally ask for dates, but the chronology is exceedingly doubtful, the opinions of authorities very conflicting, and the dates given only to be regarded as approximations. Sir G. Wilkinson places the 4th Dynasty of Pyramid Kings in B.C. 2450, and the 11th Dynasty in B.C. 2240. Bunsen places the 4th Dynasty cir. B.C. 3209, and the 11th as ending cir. B.C. 2782. MM. Mariette and Lenormant, accepting Manethon's lists and the principle that all the Dynasties were successive, give higher dates, placing the 11th Dynasty at B.C. 3064, whilst Lenormant places the 1st Dynasty at B.C. 5004. Dr. Birch regards the termination of the Old Empire and the 6th Dynasty as cir. B.C. 2000, which would fairly agree with Sir G. Wilkinson as to the era of the Pyramid Kings. The general evidence appears to be somewhat in favour of the shorter periods, but beyond this not much at present can be said. As regards the antiquity of the Ritual, Bunsen remarks that "chapter 17 is found inscribed on the coffin of Queen Mentuhept, of the 11th Dynasty," and that its text agrees, with some slight variations, with that of the Turin Papyrus centuries later. "This chapter

* *Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt*, 36.

† Dr. Birch in *Bunsen's Egypt's Place*, v. 127.

consists of short and obscure ejaculations, and of glosses and commentaries." "The text, confounded in every verse with its glosses, is written so confusedly both on the coffin and in the papyrus, that the scholia are jumbled into wrong places." Therefore, even at this remote period, the Hymn was so archaic "as to be all but unintelligible to royal scribes." The consideration of the whole subject brings Bunsen to the conclusion, that "the origin of the ancient prayers and hymns of the 'Book of the Dead' is anterior to Menes." He observes that any such hymn must have passed through at least five stages, each of which would almost necessarily endure a considerable time: (1) Its composition, adoption and recitation at the solemnity; (2) its reception into the Canon; (3) the composition of commentaries on it; (4) edition of Hymn and Scholia; and (5) their blending as one sacred text. Satisfied, then, of the "vast antiquity" of the Ritual, and still more of the truly archaic character of the ideas which it enshrines, we will consider an extract from the famous 64th chapter, which is throughout extremely difficult to understand. It is also by no means easy to detach in quotations the physical from the psychical element in the belief, and it is of course with the former only that we are at present concerned.

"The Paddle of the East,
 Lord of mankind, seen in all his rays,
 The Conductor coming forth from the darkness.
 Oh Hawk of hawks, listening to things whispered!*"
 I have made good my path through the doors of the gateway.
 I am a god in Kerneter [Hades].
 The scorpions repose, fallen on their backs;
 The Phoenix is in halves;
 Har has made his eye illumine the world.
 Let me not be surpassed by the Lion-god.
 I have rejoined the Eye;
 Rising-from-the-Great-Water is my name."

These lines are supposed to be spoken by the soul of the deceased Uasarian in the Under-world, while endeavouring to

* Cf. the Homerik Helios, who "hears all things."

be made perfect. As the sun is sailor and ship, so is he regarded as an oar or paddle, and is called "the good Paddle of the heaven." The sun, who has risen from the great water of the east, or cow Mehur, was the first to make a path through the doors of the mysterious western gateway, and to penetrate into the unseen region of Kerneter; and the only other allusion in the quotation which requires explanation is the somewhat occult reference to the Phoenix and the Scorpions. The mystical bird called by the Hellenes Phœnix, the Crimson, and of which the lapwing or Bennu was the actual counterpart, is simply the sun, and when considered as diurnal and nocturnal, the two symbolical eyes, "is in halves." Hesiodos mentions the Bennu-Phœnix,* which, according to the Kamic myth as we have it in Herodotos, appears "once in 500 years when the old Phœnix dies." This, as has been remarked, is an astronomical period; "but Tacitus says some give it 1461 years," another similar period. "The plumage is partly red, partly golden," as connected with the different colours of the sun; and the new Phœnix "brings the parent bird to the temple of the Sun, and there buries the body. Such is the story they tell of the doings of this bird."† Several passages in the *Funereal Ritual* illustrate the character of the solar bird.

"I am the great Phœnix which is in Annu.

Let him explain it.

The Bennu [Phœnix] is Uasar.

I rise as a good hawk of gold,

Whose head is in the shape of a Phœnix;

I lead the Bennu to the east."

And the lxxxiii. chapter of the Ritual treats "of turning into a Bennu," which is one of the transformations and processes by which the justified soul becomes like the Sun-god. The Scorpions, who have fallen down when the eye of the diurnal sun illumines the world, seem to represent the opposing darkness personified, as elsewhere, in monstrous form. In the Ritual the Scorpion is spoken of as "the daughter"—i.e., I presume,

* Fragment, L

† Herodotos, ii. 73.

"successor"—of the sun, as night follows day. And in another passage the Uasarian says, "I have come, like the Sun, through the Gate of the Sun-goers [i.e. the western horizon], otherwise called the Scorpion;" thus the Scorpion is the western darkness or Erebos.*

The Uasarian thus addresses the Sun of the Under-world :

"Hail, Sun, Lord of Sunbeams !
 Perfect is thy light in the horizon,
 Illuminating the world with thy rays.
 All the gods rejoice when they see the King of the Heaven.
 Unknown is thy gold, indescribable is thy colour.
 Thou hast been made the one alone in his being,
 In thy transformation in the ether.
 I do not dance like thy form, O Sun !
 Not being the great ruler borne along,
 In the river of millions and billions of moments. †
 Hail, thou descending light formed in his disk !
 Hail, thou greater than the gods,
 Rising in the Heaven, ruling in the Gate !
 O Sun in his egg, gleaming in orb,
 Who gives blasts of flame from his mouth !
 He is in the Eye and the Egg.
 The Sun rises from the horizon ;
 His gods are behind him.
 Thou placest thy face to the happy West ;
 Thy figure then is a figure of gold,
 Having the circle of a disk in heaven,
 Having the form of a circle seen daily."

The leonine Sun who especially rules in the gate of the

* The Homerik Erebos, which is in the West (*Od.* xii. 81), is the region of after-sunset-darkness, derived from the Assyrian *eribu*, to descend, enter or set, as the sun. The name appears in Erebo (i.e. Europe), the western region, and Arab, i.e. dweller in western Asia. For further illustration of the point, vide *The Great Dionysiak Myth* (by the writer), Vol. I. 374 ; London, Longmans, 1877.

† Formed by "the Serpent of eternal years," a personification of the circular, solar track. The Hellenes personified this as Kampe (caterpillar, i.e. the turning, twisting creature), a drakontic monster slain by the solar Dionysos (Apollodoros, I. ii. 2 ; Diodoros Sikelos, iii. 72) ; that is, the Sun speeds along the Serpent of eternal years, destroying the time in his progress.

happy West, entrance to the blissful land, breathes flame-blasts from his roaring mouth. His "figure of gold," which "follows above in yellow," dances in its career, reminding us of the old nursery rhyme so charmingly illustrated by Walter Crane, in which the black crow or raven of night entices the frog, the fish-sun of morning, out of the water; promising him that he shall, like others, the suns of previous days, become "a dancer in yellow" on "the high hill." The frog consents and leaves his watery retreat, and, like his predecessors, is ultimately swallowed by the bird of darkness.

Ere leaving this aspect of the subject, which though the simpler and far inferior, is nevertheless both highly interesting and should be clearly understood by the student before he advances, it will be well to illustrate still further the Kamic standpoint by noticing one or two of the more remarkable specimens of pictorial art. A papyrus in the Paris library contains a complete symbolical representation of the Kosmos. In the centre reclines a female figure representing the earth, whilst above her kneels Kam, represented as a smaller female figure holding in each hand, and also suspended from each arm, the ankh-cross of life. Above the head of Kam is the black disk or nocturnal sun, and without these personages and surrounding them except below, is the elongated and star-spangled figure of the goddess Nut, the firmament personified, her hands reaching down to one side of the earth-figure and her feet to the other. Over her arms and up the eastern hill of heaven the bark of Ra and his attendant sailor-gods is speeding, and down her legs and surrounded by spots to represent darkness, the same bark at a further period of its career is sinking in the west.

A remarkable amulet of the Helleniko-Kamic period, given by Caylus,* shews the sacred solar beetle, volant, with double wings, a pair for the diurnal and a pair for the nocturnal sun. Its four horns, two reaching upwards and two downwards, shew the golden solar track through the upper and under-

* *Recueil d'Antiquités*, vi., Plate viii., Fig. 1.

worlds.* Resting upon it and between the two upper horns, is the youthful head of Har, the young Sun of the morning, with his face towards the West; and upon his head rests the white solar disk of day,—a complete explanation of the whole elaborate symbolism, which, however, like everything else, is perfectly simple when once understood.

Another piece of art of the same period,† shews the closed human eye in the centre of a circle, surrounded by various animals and representations all turned towards it, and placed in the following order:—On the right hand or eastern side a cock, a serpent and a goose; on the north, a lizard and a thunderbolt; on the west, a scorpion and a winged phallus; and on the south, a lion and a dog. Here the symbolical combination is very varied and extensive, and the design is inexplicable when solely regarded either on Kamic or Hellenik principles. The single central eye is closed, shewing that the sun of the Under-world is chiefly indicated; and the lion, type of the diurnal sun, is placed in the lower part of the design to shew that the flaming sun of day has sunk beneath the horizon. Conversely, the lizard, emblem of the moisture and dews of night and slain by the Hellenik Sun-god Apollon Sauroktonos, is placed in the north, that is in the height of the nocturnal heaven, drawing a line through the centre of the representation from east to west, and regarding the part below the line as towards the south and in the Under-world. The thunderbolt, which comes from the sky, is also placed high in heaven. To the east, his head close on the horizon-line, stands the cock, the solar bird of day; immediately above him and due east is the serpent of light, a solar creature in Kamic symbolism, and the creeping dawn-gleam in Hellenik. Above the serpent is the goose volant, its neck stretched towards the sun and flying from east to west. Here, I think, we are on purely Kamic ground and have the soul of the Uasarian, which is said to

* Cf. the Orphik Hymn :

“ On each side are the two golden taurine horns,
The risings and settings, the tracks of the celestial gods.”

† Caylus, *Recueil d'Antiquités*, vi., Plate xxviii., Fig. 3.

"cackle like a goose," to fly, and to "alight on the road of the west of the horizon," flying towards the Sun-god Uasar. Near the western horizon, ready to seize the sinking sun, is his scorpion daughter the Darkness, which follows him, as already noticed. The phallus placed below the horizon illustrates the secret power of the sun in the renewal of the face of the world, and it is winged, to identify it with the solar orb. The expression, "the phallus of the sun," occurs in the Ritual. Numerous Kamic solar representations will doubtless be tolerably familiar to the reader from the works of modern Egyptologists.

Such is the treatment of the solar photosphere in Kam, and if this were the only aspect in which the sun has been regarded, those who believe that religion was evolved out of mythology would be justified in their opinion. But the soul exists as well as the body; in addition to light, there is justice; and besides the world, Deity. Let us now pass on from the physical to the psychical; from the Sun to the Sun-god.

II. RA, AS THE SPIRITUAL SUN-GOD.

Ra, the Sun-god, stands in the very centre of the primitive group of Kamic religious mythology. "The adoration of the Sun is the basis of Egyptian religion,"* and the modern investigator agrees with the ancient who declared that the primitive Kamites regarded the Sun as the first of the eternal gods.† The reigning monarch, who "was supposed to be descended from the gods themselves, was considered a kind of Sun on earth."‡ Ra in the Kamic Pantheon is one of "the eight gods of the first order"§ and the sire of many divinities; he is, moreover, peculiarly connected with Amen, the head of the Pantheon, whose "common title is Amen-Ra." The obelisk at Heliopolis, a work of the twelfth Dynasty, is also sacred to Ra, whose cult especially obtained at Han, the Sun-city, which Jeremiah accordingly calls Bethshemesh, the house of Shamas. The symbolical form of the representation of Ra on the monuments has been already noticed, and he also at times

* Lenormant, *La Magie chez les Chaldéens*, 333.

† Birch, *Egypt*, Introduction, xviii.

‡ Diodoros, i. 11.

§ Herodotos, ii. 156.

appears as androkephalic. The name Ra signifies "to make;" the Sun-god is thus appropriately denominated the **Maker** or **Creator**; and numerous allusions occur in the monumental texts to the production of various things from his divine eyes. I will next refer to passages selected from the Inscriptions already quoted, and which shew the Sun-god regarded as a sentient personage, deeply concerned with men and the general affairs of the world. Keeping the same order as before, I commence with the Hymn to Amen-Ra, in which the Sun-god, after being addressed as the One, is thus apostrophized:

"Lord of all existences, Chief of all the gods ;
Lord of truth, Father of the gods ;
Maker of men, Creator of beasts ;
King Ra, true speaker, Chief of the earth ;
Most glorious One, Lord of terror ;
Chief creator of the whole earth ;
Lord of terror most awful, greatest of spirits ;
Salutation to thee, Maker of the gods ;
Consuming his enemies with flame ;
Whose eye subdues the wicked ;
At whose command the gods were made.
Listening to the poor who is in distress ;
Gentle of heart when one cries unto him ;
Deliverer of the timid man from the violent ;
Judging the poor, the poor and the oppressed ;
Lord of wisdom, whose precepts are wise ;
Lord of mercy most loving ;
Whose name is hidden from his creatures ;
In his name, which is Amen.
Providing food for the rats in their holes ;
Lying awake while all men lie asleep,
To seek out good for his creatures.
Amen, sustainer of all things ;
Homage to thee in all their voices ;
Salutation to thee for thy mercy unto us.
We worship thy Spirit, who alone hast made us ;
The ONE alone without peer ;
Living in truth for ever.
Thy servants rejoice, beholding the overthrow of the wicked :
Fire consumes him ; his soul and body are annihilated."

Here the august figure of the Sun-god, peerless, creator, judge, rises before us. The votary implicitly believes in and relies on his justice, and worships his spirit,—not the body, the solar photosphere. Like the Shepherd of Israel, he neither slumbers nor sleeps, but his tireless energy is ever devising blessings for his myriad creatures who are constantly sustained by his almighty power. Nothing that he has made is deemed unworthy of his care ; as Yahveh-Elohim feeds the ravens that cry, and the young lions that seek their meat from God, so the beneficent Divinity provides for the very rats in their holes. But the true speaker and Lord of truth, in which he lives for ever, has his enemies—the wicked, who are consumed with the fire of his indignation, whilst his faithful servants rejoice on beholding their doom. As for the enemies of Yahveh, into smoke shall they consume away, and the righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance. The heart of the Sun-god is gentle ; he hears prayer ; the poor, the timid and the oppressed, cry unto him and are delivered ; even as the Hebrew Psalmist tells us that Yahveh hears and helps them. Cry they unto the sun ? No, indeed ; unto the Sun-god, mighty to save. See soul and body, as in the case of the living individual man indissolubly united, woven together in the tapestry of this grand old Hymn, not growing the greater out of the less in an imaginary evolution. The sun shines, the Sun-god judges ; the sun warms, the Sun-god hears prayer ; the sun sets, the Sun-god is sleepless. It has been said that the Hebrew Psalms are merely hymns to the solar photosphere : the assertion can easily be disproved ; but let those who rightly reject it as absurd, remember that it is almost equally ridiculous to treat the archaic psalms and hymns of Kam or of India as being no more than crass adorations of the visible. Again, it is no degradation to our own Sacred Books to compare them with those of other peoples ; they lose nothing by the contrast, whilst several other Bibles and Prayer-books are justly raised in our estimation, and crude notions which regard the most famous and ancient nations as being all ignorant Pagans and gross idolaters are properly modified by fact. Yet noble as is this Hymn to Amen-Ra, it affords in its entirety the clearest

evidence of degeneration in belief; the invisible God is becoming by degrees obscured behind or pantheistically united with His creatures.

I next make a selection from *The Litany of Ra* in illustration of the spiritual character of the Sun-god :

“Homage to thee, Ra ! supreme power,
The soul that speaks, that rests upon her high place,
That creates the hidden intellects which are developed in her ;
He who makes the spheres and who creates bodies ;
Thou hast sent forth those who are and those who are not,
The dead, the gods, the intellects.
Ra ! the mysterious, the hidden One ;
He gives the step to those surrounding him ;
The eternal essence who penetrates the empyrean ;
His form is that of the eternal essence ;
The high spirit who hunts his enemies ;
The great oldest One who dwells in the empyrean ;
His form is that of the master of the light.
Ra, who hast created the earth,
Who art in thy disk . . . the king of souls ;
He places the gods of the stars upon their legs.”

Here, again, is the Sun-god supreme in the spiritual, as erst in the physical world ; creator not merely of the world and all therein, but also of the gods or superhuman intelligences, of all intellect, and king of souls. His form—which expression from the context we must necessarily understand as denoting ontological quality, not physical shape—is that of the eternal essence, co-extensive with the empyrean, i.e. the star-lighted splendour of space, which through unlimited period he, the high and holy Spirit, the first and eldest, inhabits. He is not physical light, but its master, fount and origin. He, and he alone, orders the grand progression of the Kosmos ; and in its ceaseless march gives the time and step alike to the star-gods and to the lowest existences. Can Christian theologian say more for God the Father ? The later and more pantheistic Hymn of El-Khargeh, as may be imagined, contains but little that illustrates the spiritual character of the Sun-god, yet, faithful to ancient belief, it asserts that “the earth came from his devices,” and that “the goddess Truth is united to his

throne." The circumstance that the sun-light reveals physical facts is, it will be observed, parallel to, but perfectly distinct from, the belief that the Sun-god reveals truth.

Lastly, the spiritual and intellectual, as distinguished from the physical, character of the Sun-god is constantly apparent throughout the archaic *Funereal Ritual*; but as here, in order to preserve lucidity in a subject intrinsically intricate, I am considering the Sun-god *per se*, and as unconnected with the Uasarian dogma and the individual human soul, I shall on a future occasion quote some of these latter passages. Two detached legends relating to Ra deserve mention. The first, which belongs to the archaic period, shews him as the creator of mankind enraged on account of their wickedness; he holds a council of the gods to deliberate on their destiny, and determines to destroy them. Their blood floods the country, flowing as far as Han, and Ra, repenting, causes the flood to dry up, and swears with uplifted hand* not to destroy mankind again.† It is a Kamic version of the Deluge—the creator, the wickedness of the human race, his anger and determination to destroy them, a flood, and a promise to spare in the future. The other legend shews Ra as the judge, the customary function of the Sun-god,‡ in a scene called "the Egyptian representation of the Last Judgment," where "the four divisions of mankind" appear before him at the entrance to Kerneter, and the justified spirits receive their rewards.§ The Sun-god, whose bright and healing beams bless and cheer his faithful followers, is to the wicked a consuming fire, an "austere" or burning-one; and they are stubble to the flame and ashes under the soles of his feet.

ROBERT BROWN, JUN.

* Cf. Deuteronomy, xxxii. 40: "I lift up my hand to heaven."

† The legend has been translated by M. Edouard Naville, *La Destruction des Hommes par les Dieux*.

‡ So the Akkadian Sun-god Utu is the "King of Justice," and the Kaldeo-Assyrian Sun-god Samas (Heb. Shemeah) is Dian-nisi (Hellenik Dionysos), "Judge of men."

§ Vide M. Lefébure, *Les Quatre Races au Jugement Dernier*.

III.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant. With an Historical Introduction. By Edward Caird, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, &c. Glasgow: Maclehose. 1877.

It is probably the reflection of a real tendency of the present age that so much of popular literature devotes itself to the expression of thought rather than of feeling. Life is too short to think much, and at the same time to feel deeply. In these days of Positivism, science has ousted sentiment; consequently the public prefers to have its intellectual palate tickled with the results of *science* or the discussions of *philosophy*, rather than to have its emotions stimulated by poetry and fiction. Nor does the food supplied tend to lessen the craving to which it ministers. Never before has there been so much literary ability enlisted into the service of science and philosophy. Whether it is to illuminate the obscurity of the past, to reveal the marvels of the present, or to conjecture the mysteries of the future, we have a Max Müller, a Tyndal or a Farrar, able to fascinate the reader by the grace of his style and the lucidity of his exposition. When Milton wrote,

“How charming is divine philosophy!

Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,”—

we imagine there were few of his cotemporaries who echoed the sentiment. In his day, one had to approach the shrine of knowledge through the obscure portal of a dead language. To the great majority, therefore, the truths of science were as much a matter of faith as those of religion. Only in the last century it began to be considered not derogatory to the dignity of learning to write books on philosophical subjects in plain English. With Hume, the academic tone of thought and expression was abandoned for the popular style perfected by Stewart and Paley. The great Reviews to which Brown, Brougham and Hamilton contributed, gave a somewhat wider diffusion to scientific discussions; still it is only within the

last quarter of a century that the latest phases of thought on the gravest and most abstruse topics are as much at home on the drawing-room as on the library table.

To the student of human development, this complete obliteration of the distinction between the exoteric and esoteric is of the highest significance, marking as it does a two-sided advance, viz. the emancipation from prejudice on the part of the public, and the relinquishment on the part of professors of that monopoly of learning which the consciousness that knowledge is power has always tended to foster. No speculative flight, however bold, is likely nowadays to startle the susceptibilities of a sensitive public; in fact, the more daring the paradox, the more popular is it likely to become. And as to any attempt on the part of an explorer to restrict his discoveries to the initiated few, he is only too eager to share his treasure with the public in the pages of a monthly magazine. This popularization of philosophical inquiry, although it is of course a most healthful symptom, yet, like all good things, is not entirely without its disadvantages. When so much that has been hitherto hidden from the vulgar gaze is now revealed to every one who can read his native language, the opinion naturally prevails that there ought not to be any field of knowledge inaccessible to the public. The system of Newton, it is felt, can be compressed, if not into a nut-shell, at least into an apple; and the suspicion arises that if a branch of learning cannot be brought down to the level of the popular apprehension, the fault must lie in the subject itself. Sheridan, when told of the appearance of a new musical composition, used to inquire, "Will it grind?" Similarly a new doctrine of the present day is in danger of being rejected if it is incapable of being made readable.

Professor Caird has endeavoured to rescue the system of Kant from such a fate among English readers, by a wonderfully luminous exposition of the principal work of the Königsburg philosopher, which will doubtless attract a very numerous class of the community into the magic circle of metaphysics. We have often been asked, in a tone of scoffing incredulity, "What

did Kant ever write that was worth reading?" Professor Caird's work is the first in the English language which in our opinion has provided an adequate answer to this inquiry. His book is at once intelligible and accurate. It affords an authentic account of the philosophy of Kant, and it at the same time translates and transfuses the rugged dialectic of the German sage into the easier rhythm of English thought.

M. Cousin's Lectures on the system of Kant attempted to render his doctrines attractive to the ordinary intellect. And if point and brilliancy could have achieved this result, they certainly would have been successful; but, although they were admirably adapted to fascinate a French audience, they cannot be recommended to any one who is really desirous of getting a just idea of the scope and meaning of Kant's philosophical doctrines. The same remark may apply to the charming account of Kant and his writings in Mr. Lewes' History of Philosophy. Mr. Monck's little work on Kant is a useful handbook to lecturers and advanced students, but it is scarcely more than an epitome of the "Critique of Pure Reason," useful in refreshing the memory, but not of much assistance to a beginner.

The great difficulty which every exponent of Kant seems to have to contend with, and which perhaps is the stumbling-block of all commentators, is the tendency unduly to refract the opinions of his authors through the medium of his own predilections. Professor Caird has evidently something stronger than a Platonic affection for the hazardous dialectic of Hegel, with which he is liable unconsciously to colour the speculations of Kant. However, he manages generally to present his own views in the form of adverse criticism of Kant's teaching; so that if we remember that his criticism is from a purely Hegelian standpoint, we are not likely to be led into a false estimate of Kant's own position. The followers of Hegel, indeed, maintain that they are only pursuing the track which Kant himself indicated, but which he had not the courage to traverse; and Professor Caird is always at great pains to detect the cardinal notion of Hegelian unity lurking in the professed dualism

of Kant. Whether Kant himself would have considered the logic of Hegel as an advance on his own doctrines, or not rather a retrogression to the analytical method of Wolff, is a question which Professor Caird would be doubtless most ready and able to answer. It is not a little remarkable that in the work of Professor Caird, as well as in Professor Green's edition of Hume, we should meet with the unusual phenomenon of a commentator deploring and refuting the errors of his author. Perhaps some advantages are secured to a biography not written by one of the hero's indiscriminating admirers. At any rate, the tone of Professor Caird's work might certainly convey the impression to those who had not previously formed their own notion of the value of Kant's system, that for the present generation most of his teaching is obsolete, and that he bears almost the same relation to cotemporary philosophy that Bacon does to cotemporary science. We confess ourselves not to share this opinion. Among many of the German writers we hear the cry raised of, "Back to Kant," as the only chance of making a fresh start, and escaping the extremes of modern materialism and idealism. The mind of Kant has reached many editions, a sufficient proof of its original vigour. The most opposite poles of modern thought have had their direction determined by the teaching of Kant. It might not be suspected that the scientific positivism of Comte, which repudiates all speculative method as transcending the limits of possible knowledge, finds its justification, if not its demonstration, in the third Part of the "Critique of Pure Reason." Kant, in fact, undertook his work through the stimulus of a two-fold inspiration, and carried it out with a two-fold object in view. It is not surprising, therefore, that his speculations should have had a two-fold influence. His design was, on the one hand, to refute the plausible scepticism of Hume; on the other, to shake the scholastic dogmatism of the Wolffian school. To effect the former purpose, it was necessary for him to construct a new theory of human knowledge which might vindicate the claims of reason to be the criterion of truth, at least within the sphere of experience. Contrariwise, in his attacks on the

stronghold of German dogmatism, he found himself compelled to forge a set of sceptical weapons to aid him in his work of destruction. Kant's work is thus partly an analysis of the nature of knowledge, and partly a demonstration of the causes and necessity of human ignorance. There is, however, an organic unity connecting the two aspects of his system. The positive and negative, the constructive and destructive portions of his doctrines, are deduced the one from the other. The same faculties which guarantee the validity of science within certain limits, entail the penalty of assured nescience when the human mind attempts to transcend these limits. Thus agnosticism is made the necessary complement of knowledge; and those who admit on Kant's principles the possibility of knowledge, are constrained to allow the necessity of ignorance. We find, then, that Kant opposed the scepticism of Hume by a dogmatism of his own, and undermined the dogmatism of Wolff by a form of scepticism equally original. It is no wonder therefore, we repeat, that Kant's influence should manifest itself in very antagonistic schools of thought, according as the mind of his readers may be more apt to assimilate one or other aspect of his system.

Professor Caird devotes some introductory chapters of his work to an historical account of the development of philosophical thought which resulted in the speculations of Kant. In truth, however, there is no occasion to trace back his antecedents further than our own countryman, John Locke. Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* was followed in England by the writings of Berkeley and Hume, who each developed the sensational theory of knowledge to its most extreme consequences, Berkeley as the champion of the orthodox theology, Hume as the avowed opponent of all faith. In Germany, Locke's work provoked a retort from Leibnitz which made prominent the intellectualism of his successors as opposed to the sensationalism of this country. This intellectualism culminated in the empty analytic of Wolff, and thus we see that the double impulse which Kant received from England and Germany is ultimately referable to the stimulating *Essay* of

Locke. The aim of that work, as everybody knows, was to prove that all human knowledge was derived from experience, that the mind was the blank sheet of paper on which the diary of each man's life recorded itself from infancy to the grave through the agency of sensations. This theory of knowledge had been completely formulated two thousand years previously by the Greek Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. They had consistently combined this account of the nature of knowledge with a materialist system of Cosmology, which regarded the universe as a self-subsisting whole, and the phenomena of mind as merely a particular aspect of the play of physical forces. Locke reproduced the Stoical theory of knowing, but he did not base it consciously or avowedly on the materialist doctrine of being. Berkeley even made use of the sensational origin of knowledge in refutation of the doctrine of the independent existence of matter. The *esse* of things was (Berkeley maintained) their *percipi*, if sensations were the only evidence they afforded of their existence. Perceptions were facts; the existence of things which caused them is only an inference from these facts, an inference which rests on the unsupported testimony of sense. It is nothing but an inference from similarity of perception that I believe the table which is in the room to-day is the same table that was in the room yesterday. And it is manifest that there are no means of verifying such a belief. It is and must remain a belief. The whole course of life, therefore, is determined by our beliefs and not by our knowledge. It is easy to see what use the theologian would make of such an argument. But scepticism is a very dangerous weapon to employ; it is never certain in which direction it will explode. Berkeley reduced knowledge to belief; Hume proceeded a step further, and shewed that belief was only an illusion founded on habit, and had no objective validity. We only believe what we have experienced, and because we have experienced it. The future is to us but the reflection of the past, and the past is only a flux of sensations grouped with more or less regularity. For sensations to be a ground of belief in anything beyond themselves, there must really be

two notions assumed as premises, called the principle of identity and the principle of causation. These two principles are the foundation of our objective consciousness; that is, of that part of our consciousness which we feel is but the mirrored realization by ourselves of something not ourselves. These principles induce us to believe that similar sensations are due to an identically same object, and that there is a mutual interchange of action and reaction proceeding among objects independently of us, and of which we are only spectators. It was these ideas which underlie our convictions of objective permanence and objective change, that Hume selected as his special object of attack. Both he endeavoured to explain by habitual association. They had nothing objective in them. *Causation* is mere antecedence, *identity* is mere resemblance; they are only subjective relations, they do not indicate the existence of even the subject who is conscious of these relations.

The object of Hume was to annihilate belief, as that of Berkeley had been to annihilate knowledge. It is probable that neither the one nor the other was in earnest; but the effect of Hume's scepticism upon Kant was, as he tells us, to rouse him from his dogmatic slumber, and to induce him to enter upon a fresh examination into the nature and grounds of belief and knowledge. We may consider the problem which Hume suggested, and which Kant set himself to solve, to have been the nature and validity of our objective consciousness. Kant was a man of science, and as such he was constrained to believe that the averments of consciousness with regard to the object-world were not illusory. Science had detected the laws of nature. These laws were not subjective merely, because it was possible by experiment to verify them and to anticipate them.

"When," says Kant, "Galileo let balls of a particular weight, which he had selected, roll down an inclined plane; or Torricelli made the air carry a weight which he had previously determined to be equal to a certain volume of water; or when, in later times, Stahl changed metals into lime, and lime again into metals, by withdrawing and restoring certain elements of their composition,—

new light was thrown upon scientific inquiry. For henceforth men of science comprehended that Reason has insight only into that which she herself produces on her own plan, and that she must, according to fixed laws, anticipate nature with principles of judgment, and compel it to answer her questions, and not let herself be drawn by it, as it were, in leading-strings; for observations made on no previously fixed plan will never meet together in the discovery of a necessary law, which is the only thing that gives satisfaction to reason."

This passage gives us the clearest idea of the phenomenon which Kant intended to investigate. It also contrasts the points of view from which Hume and Kant respectively approached the problem of knowledge. Hume, as a historian, regarded knowledge chiefly as knowledge of the past. Kant, on the other hand, as a man of science, regarded knowledge as mainly dealing with the future. This aspect of knowledge, as anticipatory knowledge, cannot be too strongly emphasized as forming the starting-point of Kant's inquiry. Kant undertook an analysis of the nature of knowledge; but it must be borne in mind that he did not mean the knowledge possessed by an infant, an animal, or an idiot. It was the highest possible knowledge of the man of science. This is not always remembered when Kant is accused of neglecting the facts of psychology. Psychology is concerned with the *subjective* consciousness of the individual in its origin and development; but such subjective consciousness does not constitute knowledge. In Kant's meaning of the word, knowledge must imply *objectivity*; and it is the nature of this objectivity which he undertakes to examine, at least in the positive portion of his work. The method indeed by which Kant proceeds to investigate the nature of our objective consciousness, and the title of his chief work on the subject, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, might lead one to suppose that his principal aim was the analysis of the knowing process, rather than the nature of the thing known. Kant himself tells us, however, that he proposes to obtain his information respecting the object of knowledge by a consideration of the nature of the knowing subject. Pre-

vious inquirers had, he says, attempted to penetrate directly into the nature of objective consciousness, and had conspicuously failed in their undertaking. Like Copernicus, Kant determined to change his standpoint, and to endeavour to get at the object by first considering the nature of the subject. All knowledge consists of a *subjective* and *objective* element. Previous writers had more or less consciously made the subjective to depend on the objective. Kant proposed to invert the process, and make the objective depend upon the subjective. The *fact* of knowledge is the basis of Kant's inquiry. What then, besides, does this fact imply? Or, in other words, what are the conditions of knowledge? What is that without which knowledge would be impossible? How can a sensitive being know? Professor Caird gives the following outline of Kant's answer to this question:

"How can we know objects? Ere we can perceive any individual object as such, we must have a manifold before us, and we must combine this manifold into a unity. But to distinguish the elements of the manifold means, in the case of a successive consciousness like ours, to distinguish the times in which the manifold is given (for 'as contained in a single moment that which is presented to the mind can be only a simple unit'); and to combine the elements thus distinguished, means to reproduce the past sensations, and associate them with that which is present. To account for knowledge, therefore, we must admit also the agency of a reproductive and associative faculty of imagination; otherwise the data of sense will perish as they arise, and no unity of an object will ever be presented to our minds. But even this is not enough. Association cannot generate the objective consciousness: for the subjective combination of ideas in the individual consciousness already implies their objective determination. In order to produce the effect required, the elements associated must be definite, and 'definite' means 'defined in relation to each other.' When we speak of associating sensations, we mean by a sensation a certain state of the subject that has a general character, by which it is distinguished from other sensations, and can be recognized as the same on its recurrence. In other words, the associated sensation must be represented, not as it is to mere sense, but as it is when determined by the consciousness of an intelligent being; i.e. it

must be represented as an object which has a definite relation to other objects. And this is simply to say that the elements associated have an *objective affinity*, which is prior to their subjective association. If we could suppose the elements of knowledge to be *given*, without any definite relation to each other, we might suppose that, by a law of association, they were afterwards combined with each other (though their combination in that case would be quite accidental). But the elements of knowledge cannot be given in the character which they have to a thinking subject, except in so far as they are already related. In the consciousness of such a subject, therefore, the reproductive synthesis of imagination is chained down to certain definite conditions by the understanding; or, in other words, we can combine the manifold of sense in an object of thought, only in so far as we bring that manifold under some general principle of relation. Such a general principle of relation is supplied by a conception. When we bring the data of sense under a conception, we take them out of their mere singularity as feelings of the sensitive subject, and represent them as parts of an image or picture, which is put together according to a general rule, independent of the momentary sensitive state of that subject. And it is just this that we mean by reference to an object; for an object is that which is independent of the perception through which it is given. Thus we think of a triangle as an object only when we are conscious of combining three straight lines according to a rule, in conformity with which such a perception might always be set before our minds. All knowledge, then, requires a conception, however imperfect and obscure it may be, and this conception is always a general idea, which serves as a rule to the particular."*

We have in this account of the process of knowledge a direct refutation of the associationalist doctrine of which Professor Bain is the modern champion, and of which Hume was the original expounder. This doctrine derives the whole of knowledge from sensational experience. The opposing school, who take their stand on Kant's analysis which we have quoted, assume as conditions of knowledge some ultimate conceptions on the part of the subject knowing. The object of the second part of Kant's work, called the *Analytic*, is to map out and define these ultimate conceptions, to which he gives the name

* Caird's *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 339.

of Categories. The term Category was so familiar to the reader of Aristotle, that Kant was hardly justified in not inventing a new name for something so very different to that which the word Category had been hitherto employed to designate. With Aristotle, the Categories meant the highest classes of nameable things into which the objects of thought could be pigeon-holed. They were the highest generalizations of experience. The Categories of Kant, however, are not, like these, the *end* of experience, but the *beginning*. They are the highest and ultimate conceptions, but they are so as conditions of all experience, the forms according to which all experience is moulded, and without which experience could not be. Do these forms, then, exist in the mind previous to experience? If we assert this, should we not be returning to the exploded system of innate ideas? Kant avoids this position. The Categories are forms of experience, but they have no existence apart from experience; they are only manifested in the act of experience. This part of Kant's work is the most important, but it is in many respects the most difficult. Not only are these Categories, or ultimate conceptions, found necessary to the construction of objects by the mind, but there is also an array of subordinate conceptions called Schemata, which are intermediary between the form and material of knowledge. The nature of the Categories and of the Schemata, and the relation of one to the other, may perhaps be most clearly and briefly illustrated by a few remarks on the Category, or ultimate conception of Causality, and its corresponding Schema, viz., that of invariable sequence. Hume, and all succeeding writers of his school, including Mill, have sought to derive this idea or notion of Causality from experience. All that we know of the influence which one thing in nature exerts in producing or changing another, takes the form of the succession of one event on another; and they urge that the conception of Cause is only the general notion of a constant conjunction of phenomena. Uncontradicted experience, Mill repeats, is the ground of our belief in what is termed the uniformity of Nature, i.e. the aptitude of a given cause to be followed by a given effect.

Succession, or the realization of sequence, is, the same writer admits,* an ultimate unanalysable mental phenomenon, or, as Kant would call it, a Category. But from this consciousness of succession, the notion of causation may be derived. The exact counter theory of Kant is, that the ultimate notion or conception is *causation*, and the derived or secondary idea is succession. Professor Caird thus summarizes Kant's argument:

"Kant argues that the judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the presupposition of the judgment of *causality*. For time is a mere form of the relation of things, and cannot be perceived by itself. Only when we have connected events with each other can we think of them as in time. And this connection must be such that the different elements of the manifold of the events are determined in relation to each other. But it is obvious that the moments of time are so determined in relation of each other, that we can only put them into one order, i.e. that we can proceed from the previous to the subsequent moment, but not *vice versa*. Now if objects or events cannot be dated in relation to time, but only in relation to each other, it follows that they cannot be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order; or, in other words, unless they are so related according to a universal rule, that when one thing is posited, something else must necessarily be posited in consequence. In every representation of events as in time, this presupposition is implied; and the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time."†

Professor Caird does not consider this argument to be entirely satisfactory, but we have not space here to append his criticism, acute as it is.

From the passage quoted we see that, by a Schema, Kant means the mode in which a Category which is purely abstract is realized, imaged, or envisaged, by the mind. Time is the element which must be added to the pure conception to make this process possible, and time is the element which experience contributes. Time is the form under which all experience is

* Mill's Logic, Book i. ch. iii. § 11.

† P. 454.

received by the conscious subject. And from this one example we obtain a glimpse of Kant's doctrine of the relation between the subjective and objective consciousness. By the objective consciousness, we assert, Kant understood, not, as is sometimes supposed, the mere feeling of externality given in the consciousness of the present, and which could now be accounted for by the so-called muscular sense,—but, by the objective consciousness, Kant meant that knowledge of the laws of nature which is continually verified by the operations of Nature herself. How, then, is this objective or scientific consciousness, as we may term it, generated? How is this belief in the laws of nature justified? Or, as Kant puts it, how are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible? The answer is, that the laws of nature are the forms of experience, the mould into which all experience runs. *Whenever*, therefore, and *wherever* experience is possible, it will be encountered under the same form regarded subjectively, or obeying the same laws regarded objectively. Nature might and would work under other laws to beings who were capable of other forms of experience. The laws of nature are in fact only relative to beings constituted like ourselves. This cuts the ground from under the materialist who seeks to give an absolute existence to the laws of nature. Apart from mind, we cannot say positively that nature would have any laws at all. If we do assert as much, we transcend the limits of experience. There is no experience without a mind that experiences. Here we come in contact with the sceptical aspect of Kant's system, which, while allowing the greatest validity to human knowledge within the sphere of experience, emphatically denies the possibility of all knowledge beyond experience. The object of this part of Kant's doctrine, we have stated above, was to refute the scholastic logic of the Wolffian school, which spun out of its own reasonings the endless cobwebs of an empty metaphysic.

The object of the third Part of Kant's work, entitled the *Dialectic*, is to prove the impossibility or invalidity of the three so-called metaphysical sciences, viz., Rational Psycho-

logy, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology. The central ideas of these three sciences are the soul, the universe, and God. Each of these ideas, which are termed the ideas of pure reason, Kant seeks to shew has only a subjective or purely formal import. We have seen that the ideas, conceptions or Categories of the understanding have a two-fold significance, subjective and objective. As subjective, they imply the forms of experience ; as objective, they are the laws of nature. But the ideas of reason have not this double aspect ; they neither indicate the forms of experience nor the laws of nature. They are forms, indeed, but they are the forms in which the activity of reason is realized. It is a law of the human intellect that nothing can be apprehended by the mind as existing independently of everything else, or, as it is said in technical language, every existence seems necessarily conditioned by the existence of something else. Thus the mind of man has a continual tendency to seek for condition on condition till it has regressed to some ultimate form of existence or principle at which it can rest. This ultimate or unconditioned existence may be reduced to the three forms or ideas of reason specified by Kant, viz., the soul, the universe, and God. But the reasoning which is based on these ideas by the metaphysical sciences Kant shews is fallacious, because these ideas, although they simulate an objective validity, really have no such reference. They do not imply the existence of any object corresponding to themselves, and when we assume the existence of such an object we are misled by some sophism of reason. The soul, for example, is merely the assumed, fictitious, unconditioned principle of consciousness. The universe is the unconditioned and perfect sum or totality of all actual and possible experience. God is the unconditioned and absolute concurrence of all attributes. But by assuming the existence of each of these principles, Kant manages to land the reasoner in some logical quagmire, into which he sinks the deeper the more he tries to extricate himself. The well-known Antinomies, or dilemmas of rational Cosmology, are the best illustrations of Kant's sceptical method.

Has the world had a beginning in time? Has it a limit in space? Both these questions can be answered with equal plausibility affirmatively or negatively; and in whichever way we reply, we can demonstrate the answer to involve an absurdity. Hamilton and Mansel have made capital of this side of Kant's teaching, with the object of resting the religious instincts of our nature on a basis of faith instead of reason. Professor Caird, as the prophet of Hegel, deplors the short-sightedness of Kant, who failed to perceive that the same subject could, nay must, have a pair of contradictory predicates—a want of perspicacity which Professor Caird attributes to the circumstance that Kant was still overshadowed by the prejudices of his age. We cannot enter here into a controversy of so much subtlety. We shall conclude this paper by recommending those who are possessed by a desire to penetrate the mysteries of Metaphysics to commence their studies with Whately's "Logic," or Thompson's "Laws of Thought;" then to read the first volume of Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics;" next to attack Kant's own work, the "Critique of Pure Reason,"* and to follow it up immediately, or if possible keep going at the same time, with Professor Caird's most useful and easy exposition of the Philosophy of Kant.

THOMAS WOODHOUSE LEVIN.

IV.—THE RELIGION OF THE SIKHS.

The Ādi Granth, or the Holy Scriptures of the Sikhs. Translated from the original Gurmukhī by Dr. Ernest Trumpp. London. 1877.

History of the Sikhs. By W. L. M'Gregor, M.D. London. 1846.

History of the Sikhs. By Joseph Davey Cunningham. London. 1853.

THE immovability of the East has long been a proverb; and we are still accustomed to hear of the unchangeable habits and

* Meiklejohn's Translation, or Rosencrans' original.

beliefs of the dwellers in India and China. But the proverb, like most proverbs, is an unwarranted generalization from appearances imperfectly understood ; and the more we know of the history of India and China, the more we realize how frequent and how powerful have been the modifications of their customs and their creeds. No doubt there is a stable element, an essential likeness, in all the varying forms of Indian thought ; just as there is a stable element, an essential likeness, in all the widely differing theories of Christian teachers. This is but saying that no one can escape from the influence of the tone of the beliefs by which he is surrounded, that each step in advance is made from a standpoint already attained. The points of resemblance in Asiatic thought attract the immediate notice of the outsider—they are those points which differ most from his own belief ; but to one within the circle they seem little worthy of attention—they are those points which he thinks the least open to question. Let us not be misled with the complacent opinion that our own system is the only one capable of life and progress, and that Oriental beliefs are but the decaying result of movements long since dead. The differing schools of thought in India, both within and without the orthodox body of Hindus, rival in number the Christian sects within and without the Catholic Church ; though in each case the central body may overawe the imagination by the long record of its history, its seeming unity, and the present vastness of its power.

Among the Indian heresies, the religion of the Sikhs, or "Disciples," occupies a place of peculiar interest, both from the attractive charm of its ardent theism, and from the historical value of its curious resemblance to that Muhammadanism which it has so unceasingly and so bitterly opposed. Like Muhammadanism, it began with the protest of an earnest reformer, whom his relations thought insane, against the idolatry of the existing faith. It was due, in part at least, to the influence of an older creed, then superseded and almost forgotten. It grew into the struggle of a military caste, to carry conviction through the world at the point of the sword ; and its funda-

mental teaching might be summed up in a slight change of the Muslim saying, "God is the One, and the Guru is his Prophet!"

Nānak, the founder of the Sikh religion, was born near Lahore in 1469, and died in 1538 ; but though comparatively so recent in date, he has not escaped the fate of the founders of earlier and more widely-spread religions. The true story of his life has been so hidden by the haze of miracle and legend due to the piety of his followers, that it is difficult to glean from existing biographies more than a few historical details. There are several Sikh Gospels called Janam-sākhīs, or Birth Witnesses, now current among the "Disciples ;" but they are of late date, and are amplified from older biographies, now, with one exception, no longer extant. The exception is a work called "The Book of Nānak, the Janam-sākhī," the only known copy of which is in the India Office Library in London. It is written in old characters like those used in the original copy of the Ādi Granth (the Sikh Bible) still preserved at Kartarpur, and may therefore be approximately dated soon after the commencement of the seventeenth century, or about 150 years after the birth of Nānak. The late biographies contain many episodes identical with those related in this earlier authority, and as they frequently follow it word for word, it seems that they are more or less derived from the same source.

According to this authority, translated by Dr. Trumpp in the introduction to his Ādi Granth, Nānak was the son of a yeoman of good caste. Heavenly music sounded at his birth, and multitudes of angels paid him homage "because a great devotee has come to save the world." "When he became big, he began to play with the boys. But the views of the boys and his were different. In his spirit he was occupied with the Lord." He is taken to the village schoolmaster to be taught the alphabet ; but, like other children who afterwards became famous, he instead instructs his teacher, writing on his slate not only the alphabet, but a wise saying in verse for each letter. The whole of this composition is preserved in the Granth ;*

* Trumpp, p. 602. Similar stories are related of the Buddha (my "Buddhism," p. 186), and of the infant Christ ("The Arabic Gospel of the Infancy").

and the following extract from the first verses reveals a simple and earnest creed, which many Christians would be astonished to find among the so-called "heathen" of India :

"By S is meant He by whom all things were made, the Lord of all, He is the One !

And they who ever serve Him, who think of Him, their coming into the world has become fruitful.

By I. Before all things were, God was.
He himself gives freely, and is true.
The disciple who knows these letters
Has escaped the chain of destiny.

By U. Worthy is He of praise,
Whose end cannot be reached.
They who serve Him obtain reward,
They who lay hold of the Truthful One.

By N. If any one knows the knowledge of God,
He indeed is a learned man ;
If he knows that in all living there is God,
Then he will say no longer, 'I am I'."

That is, he will get rid of the delusion that living creatures have a separate existence apart from the Divine Being.

In this manner each letter of the alphabet has its verse. As might be expected, the Granth, though it contains several such alphabetical psalms, says nothing of its composition on this occasion, merely ascribing one of them to Nānak, and one to another of the ten Gurus, the successive chiefs of the new community. And, strangely enough, the very next statement in the Janam-sākhī is that Nānak learnt also to read some Persian. Can it be possible that the alphabet episode ran at first that he was taught his letters, and that when the psalm was afterwards written, it was inserted in the life on that occasion without the inconsistency being also corrected ?

Then comes a story of the young prophet being sent out to tend his father's cattle, and allowing them to stray into a field of corn. But when the owner of the field comes to complain, Nānak sent him back to look, and behold ! no injury was done.

Then Nānak is married and has two sons. He occupies himself with religious books, and associates with ascetics ; but neglects his family and his daily work. His relations are angry with him, and mourn over him as one who is out of his mind. They consult a physician, and procure a post for him under government, and there he gives general satisfaction. But he spends his nights singing hymns to God, a musician named Mardanā being his companion, and playing to him as he improvises his psalms.

One day he goes to bathe in the canal, and his servant, finding his clothes on the bank, thinks he is drowned, and spreads the news. He re-appears, however ; and the story relates that angels had taken him to the presence of God—a not unlikely perversion of the fact that he was in reality nearly drowned.

However this may be, he soon afterwards finally abandoned his home and retired into the wilderness, and presently appeared as a teacher and ascetic. His first saying, "There is neither Hindu nor Musalmān," created some commotion among the people, but it brought upon him again the charge of madness. He is taken before the governor ; only, however, to prove his wisdom by divining the thoughts of his accuser, and to be discharged with honour. Then, accompanied by the musician Mardanā, he sets out upon his travels ; and the story of his life is henceforward taken up with his four journeys—to the East beyond Benāres, to the South as far as Ceylon, to Kashmīr in the North, and finally to Mekka.

The record of these journeys consists of a number of episodes, mostly miraculqus, often purely visionary, and rarely seeming to contain a germ of truth. It is here that the later biographies give full play to the imagination, and rival one another in their appeals to the love of the marvellous. But though the details are untrustworthy, and though it is quite certain that Nānak never went (in the body at least) to Ceylon or to Mekka, the fact of his travels is indisputable, and the general impression which the stories give of his mode of life is probably correct. He wandered from place to place with one or two companions ; a faqīr himself, he associated wherever he went

with faqirs ; he listened to their talk, and did not grudge hard sayings of his own ; he learnt the views of the Vedāntist, of Hindu and of Muslim ascetics ; he read and pondered, and he poured forth his soul in psalms ; sometimes he met with honour, oftener perhaps with contempt ; here and there he gained a follower, and he did not lack support from those whose hearts inclined them to respect the real or pretended devotees of religious truth.

Beyond these general conclusions, these stories are only useful to shew what kind of things come to be believed of religious founders. One perhaps, though it is among the most visionary of all, deserves quotation ; it is from the first journey—the story of his temptation in the wilderness ; and it is so unlike the similar stories in the Buddhist and the Christian Scriptures, that there can be little doubt of its originality.

“Then the prophet departed thence. And in his journey he came to a desert and sat down. Then, by the order of the Lord, the Kali-yuga came to frighten him, having assumed a visible form. A storm arose and the trees began to fly about. Then Mardānā became greatly terrified, and said, ‘O King ! thou hast brought me into the desert and slain me. Even grave and shroud I must forego.’ The Teacher Nānak said, ‘Mardānā, be not troubled.’ Mardānā answered, ‘Up to this day I have now lived, but such a calamity I have not seen. For what has happened here to us ?’ Then the spirit took the form of fire ; smoke arose from every side, and all around fire was kindled. Then Mardānā covered his face, and fell down, and said, ‘Sir, I will stay even here.’ Then the spirit took the form of water, and gathered clouds, and came near, and water began to fall. But it fell at some distance from the Teacher. Then the Teacher said, ‘Mardānā, uncover thy face, rise, and sit down, and play the rebeck.’ Mardānā arose, and sat down, and played the rebeck. The Teacher uttered the song Māru [here follow four verses from the Granth].* Then the spirit assumed the form of a demon, and came near, and the top of his head reached to heaven. But as he came nearer and nearer, he became smaller and smaller. Then, joining his hands, he stood there, and said, ‘Lord ! take what you will at my hands, and walk according to my words.’ And the

* Not given in the published version of the Granth.

Teacher asked him, 'What hast thou?' Kali-yuga answered, 'I have everything. If thou but order me, I will build thee a palace of pearls, and stud it with rubies and gems. I will scent it with sandal-powder and with aloe-wood.' Then the Teacher uttered the verse as it is written in the song, 'The Holy Song :'*

'A mansion of pearls may be raised,
And with gems it may well be studded ;
And with scent the builder may be glad,
Of musk and aloe and sandal.
But seeing it, he may forget God :
God may not come into his mind.

[Pause.]

Without the Lord, life is consumed away !
This have I asked my own Teacher, and have seen ;
There is no dwelling-place but God.'

Then Kali-yuga said, 'Take what you will at my hands. Thou mayest become a Sultan, thou mayest exercise rule and sovereignty.' Then the Teacher uttered the fourth verse :

'I may become a Sultan and assemble an army :
I may put my foot upon the throne :
I may sit down in majesty.
O Nānak ! all is wind !
Having attained this, perchance Thy name
Will come no longer to my mind,
Will be forgotten !'

Then the Kali-yuga bowed down before the Teacher in adoration, and fell down at his feet, and said, 'Sir, how can I be saved?' and the Teacher Nānak answered, 'If among the multitudes some one shall become my disciple, his devotion shall work out thy salvation.' And the Kali-yuga fell down at his feet, and the Teacher allowed him to depart."

With this visionary story, which has very probably a basis of truth, may be compared a visit which Nānak is reported to have paid, on his third journey, to Sumeru, the Olympus of the Hindus ; and also a fifth journey, in which nothing is reported save a conversation with certain Siddhis (supernatural beings of magical power). Nānak's pilgrimage to Mekka is a

* Rāg Siri Rāg. Mahalla, i. Sabd. 1.

favourite subject with the Sikhs, and a whole book about it, entitled "*The Conversation of Mekka*," is very popular among them. One episode in this journey, also given in the Janam-sākhis, will perhaps repay transcribing :

"When the prophet had entered Mekka, he lay down to sleep, stretching his feet towards Mekka. Now it was the time of evening prayer; and the Kāzī Rukn-dīn came to say his prayers. And when he saw Nānak, he said, 'O servant of God, why dost thou stretch out thy feet in the direction of the house of God, and towards the Ka'ba?' The Teacher replied, 'Where the house of God and the Ka'ba is not, drag my feet in that direction.' The Kāzī Rukn-dīn turned the feet of Nānak round, but in whatever direction he turned them, in that direction the face of the Mihrāb turned also. And the Kāzī Rukn-dīn became astonished, and kissed his feet, and said, 'O Darvesh, what is thy name?' Then the Teacher uttered some verses" (which are not quoted, and which Dr. Trumpp says cannot be found in the Granth).

After his journeys were over, Nānak settled at Kartarpur, and became reconciled to his family, who seem to have accepted him at last as a teacher. When he felt his death approaching, he nominated his devoted servant and follower, Lahanā, also called Angad, as his successor in the Guruship, much to the disappointment of his two sons. The elder of the two, Siri Chand, founded a separate community, that of the Udāsis, or those who have abandoned the world; and the sect is still in existence, though its followers were excommunicated by the third Guru from the general body of believers.

Thus quietly passed away the earnest recluse whose teachings were hereafter to prove of such vital moment for the people of the Panjāb. His system of belief, his way of salvation, had one incontestable merit, that of extreme simplicity; and it appealed to the heart rather than to the intellect. It possessed, therefore, two of the surest passports to popular acceptance; and its diffusion was further facilitated by the previous religious movements in the northern provinces of India.

The pre-Buddhistic Hinduism had long ago succumbed or been transformed during its long struggle with Buddhism, and

with the rival animism of the non-Āryan tribes. The social reform and agnostic philosophy of Buddhism had been effectually put down, and its adherents had been driven beyond the frontier. But memories of its enthusiasm for wisdom and goodness still survived; and the Jain sect, against whom a whole poem in the Granth is specially directed, was numerous and powerful. The non-Āryan cults had been consecrated and adapted, rather than suppressed, and they were still becoming the source of new idolatries. And at the other end of the scale, the most pious and learned of the orthodox Hindus were adherents of a Pantheistic philosophy whose varying expression had given rise to antagonistic schools. Into this conflicting multitude of theological opinions, the Muhammadan conqueror had introduced a new element of discord, the belief in a one personal God omnipotent to hear and to save, to reward and to punish—a conception as remote from any of the gods of the multitude as it was from the impersonal abstraction of the Vedāntist dreamer. The Muhammadans in their turn were divided into sects; and eclectic teachers and ascetics were each seeking adherents to his views among a people peculiarly susceptible to religious impressions. It was a time—even for India, where religious ideas are never stationary—of unusual activity in theological speculation.

When Nānak visited the sacred city of Benāres, he must have found living there Ravidās, and perhaps also Kabīr the weaver. Both of these teachers were disciples of Rāmānand, who received men of all castes as his followers, and whose principal doctrine was the efficacy of the knowledge of God. The influence of this teaching on Nānak is evident, not only from his own writings, but from the fact that verses of Rāmānand and of three of his leading followers have been admitted into the Granth. Kabīr is especially honoured in this respect, his verses in that portion of the Sikh scriptures contained in Dr. Trumpp's stately folio being nearly half as many as those of Nānak himself.* There is still a sect in India called the

* By adding together the widely scattered portions ascribed to each, it will be found that there are 135 pages folio of Nānak's, and 61 of Kabīr's verses.

Kabīrpanthis, whose sacred book consists of the psalms of Kabīr alone; and to him may be traced back much of that reformatory movement of which the Sikh religion is only one of the many lasting results. There is a characteristic mixture in the rugged verses of Kabīr of hearty scorn for formalism and of triumphant assurance of personal salvation.

“O Mulla! why dost thou ascend the minaret?

The Lord is not deaf.

Realize Him in thy heart,

For whose sake thou raisest the call.

If by wandering about naked salvation can be got,

Then every deer of the forest will be emancipated.

What are the naked, what are those with skins,

When they know not the Supreme?

If by shaving the head perfection is reached,

The sheep is emancipated. No one is lost.

Kabīr says: Hear, O man and brother!

Without the name of God no one has obtained salvation.

Whose art thou, O Brahman?

Whose am I, the Sūdra?

Whose blood am I? Whose milk art thou?

Kabīr says: He who reflects on God (Brahm),

He it is I call a Brahman.

I do not die. The world in me will die,

Now that the Lord of Life has met with me.

How should I die now?

My heart is comforted by death.

Those die who know not God.”

But there are very few of his verses intelligible, without elaborate commentary, to those who have not already drunk deeply of his spirit, and can catch the meaning of his figurative language.

“See, O brother, a storm of divine knowledge has swept by!

All the walled shutters made by delusion

Are blown away; they remain no longer.

The posts of double-mindedness are pulled down:

The ridge-pole of spiritual darkness is broken:

The roof of thirst has fallen on the ground :
 The vessel of folly has burst :
 The pitcher is wet with the water falling after the storm.
 Kabir says : Light arose in my mind when the rise of the sun
 was known."*

That is: he who has felt the presence of God has got rid of the delusion of duality (of his separate existence apart from God); of the blindness of heart which hid from his sight the emptiness of worldly things; of that craving thirst arising from the fire of excitement and care which once burned within his mind. The same figure had been used two thousand years before in one of the most celebrated Buddhist verses, the song of exultation ascribed to the Buddha after his great victory under the Bo tree; and if for "nirvana" we read "the peace of God," it is impossible to mistake the general resemblance of the fundamental ideas expressed by the two reformers. We can trace in Kabir the effect of Muhammadan influence in the intense personality which he adds to the Pantheistic abstraction of the Vedāntist, and to the psychological foundations of Buddhist morality.

And these are precisely the points to which Nānak gave clearer and more popular expression. The salvation he looked for was not from hell as a consequence of disobedience, but from re-birth as a consequence of folly and excitement; and this salvation was to be accomplished here on earth by the attainment of a state of mind (*nirbān* = *nirvāna*) in which spiritual blindness (*moha*) and its daughter thirst, or craving (*trishnā*), was extinguished. The disciple who has reached this mental condition while he is still alive (*jīvana mukatu*), has got rid of lust and wrath and greediness, and the consciousness of distinct personal existence (*haṅkāra*), and when he dies will not again enter upon existence as a distinct individual. This salvation is open to all men, irrespective of caste or sect; and the state of all in this life depends upon the character and conduct (*karma*) in previous births. But all

* Bāg Gaurī. The Bhagat Kabir, No. xliii. p. 471.

who in this birth do not attain salvation, will again be born either as man or as some creature distinct and individual, will remain engulfed in the ocean of transmigration, in the waters of existence (*bhava jala*).

So far there is a very close resemblance to Buddhism (and it is worthy of mention that the Buddhas are several times mentioned in the Granth); but in the means by which Nirvāna is to be reached, the divergence is great and essential. The Buddhist is to rely on self-control and mental activity; the Sikh is to rely on the constant remembrance of God, the dwelling on His qualities, the repetition of His name. This key to salvation, the knowledge of God, the belief in the name of God, can only be received from the Guru, or Teacher, and can only be granted to those predestined to receive it. Rejoicing in their blindness, most men wander from life to life without obtaining "the nectar of the name."

"Thou enjoyest thyself, and livest in pleasure,
Art given to innumerable merriments.
The Creator does not come into thy mind,
Blind, ignorant, self-willed man.
O my heart, the giver of comfort is the Lord !
By the favour of the Guru He is found,
By destiny He is acquired."*

"All penance, all wisdom, has come to an end.
My Lord knows all. His glory is manifest.
All the world cries, 'Glory, O Lord !'
My virtues and vices He takes not to account.
The Lord remembers that He ever forgives.
Taking me to his neck, He has preserved me.
No hot wind touches me now. . . .
Where He is obtained by the favour of the Guru,
There the infatuation of Māyā is brought to an end.
He himself, out of his own mercy, unites man to himself."†

This remembrance of God is the solace in all sorrow, the refuge in all distress; and no knowledge, no penance, no righteousness, no religious rites, avail without it. Even Dr.

* Siri Rāg. Mah. v. p. 60.

† Siri Rāg. Jogi Andare, p. 100.

Trumpp's wooden and over-literal translation (faults, it must be confessed, on the right side) cannot hide the force and beauty of the following psalms :

- "1. Beside Thee I have none other. Thou art in my mind.
 Thou art my friend and companion, my Lord. Why should
 my heart be afraid ? [Pause.]
 Thou art my refuge, Thou art my hope.
 In sitting, rising, sleeping, walking, at every breath and morsel,
 mayst Thou not be forgotten.
2. Keep, keep me in Thy asylum, O Lord ! The ocean of fire*
 is terrible.
 O true Guru ! O Thou who art giving comfort to Nānak ! we
 are Thy little ones."†
- "1. Whom a great difficulty befalls, to him none gives an entrance :
 If his enemies lie in wait for him, even his friends keep aloof
 from him :
 Every asylum is broken down, every protector fails :
 But if he remember the supreme Brahm,
 No hot wind will touch him.
 The Lord is the strength of the weak :
 He neither comes nor goes ; He is always firm ;
 From the word of the Guru, the True One is known.
2. If one be weak, naked, in the pain of hunger ;
 If no money fall into his lap, if no one encourage him ;
 If no one do his aim and object, if there be no business what-
 ever for him ;
 If he remember the supreme Brahm,
 His satiety will be immovable.
3. Who has much anxiety, whose body much sickness pervades ;
 Who is surrounded by household and family, who has some-
 times joy and sometimes grief ;
 Who wanders about in the four corners of the earth, who sits
 not down nor sleeps for twenty minutes ;
 If he remember the supreme Brahm,
 His body and mind will be refreshed.

* That is, the ocean of transmigration, in which the fires of passion are ever burning.

† Rāg Āsā. Mah. v. p. 532.

4. He may be subdued by lust, wrath, and spiritual blindness ;
he may be a miser, given to greed ;
He may have committed the four sins, he may have perpetrated
an atrocious murder ;
He may never have caught with his ear any book or song or
poetry ;
If he remember the supreme Brahm,
He is saved by the remembrance of a moment.
5. He may go through the Shastras, Smriti, the four Vedas, from
memory :
He may practise two-fold more than the six duties ; perform-
ing worship, he may bathe :
The great ascetic may practise austerities, the Jogī may go to
a Tirtha :
If he has no love to the supreme Brahm,
He will surely be re-born in hell.”*

The last must not be misunderstood : re-birth in hell is only a temporary result, and will lead again to re-birth in some other world. But to the Sikh mind it is still a double calamity, as he holds that only men can be saved, not animals, nor dwellers either in hell or heaven. Birth as a man is therefore considered as a fortunate chance, and the desire for re-birth in heaven as the result of ignorant folly.

Much of the thought expressed in the last quotation might be matched from Christian books ; and the Guru's conception of the Divine Being comes nearer to the Christian ideal than that of any Indian pietist uninfluenced by contact with Muhammadanism.

“ At the beginning was the True One,
At the beginning of this age (Yuga).
The True One is, O Nānak !
And the True One also will be
True is the Lord, of a true name ;
In language his love is infinite.
If they speak and ask, He gives, He gives ;
The Liberal One bestows gifts. . . .

* Siri Rāg. Mah. v. p. 97.

He cannot be established : He is not made.

He himself is the Supreme Being. . . .

If I would know, would I not tell ?

O great Teacher ! let me know the One,

That the one liberal Patron of all living may not be forgotten
by me !

Great is the Lord, of a great name,

By whom creation is made. . . .

There is no end of his praises ; in saying them there is no end.

There is no end of his works ; in his giving there is no end.

There is no end in seeing his works, no end in hearing them.

No end is known, what counsel is in his mind.

No end is known, what his form is. No end, no limit. . . .

His seat are the worlds, his storehouses the worlds.

Whatever He puts down in them, is put down once and for ever.

Having made all things, He beholds them.

O Nānak ! the work of the True One is true.

Salutation to Him, salutation !

Who is first, spotless, without beginning,

Immortal, having the same dress through all ages !"

All the above stanzas are from the Japu, the introductory stanzas to the Granth. The word Creator is perhaps the only expression in them liable to be misunderstood. Nānak did not think of God as creating anything out of nothing, or as bringing into existence anything outside himself. The worlds, and all that in them is, are merely the expansions of God ; they are the dress in which He clothes himself, the sport with which He amuses himself.

"All is Govind, all is Govind. Without Govind there is no other.
As in one string there are seven thousand heads, so is the Lord,
lengthwise and crosswise.

A wave of the water, its froth and bubble, are not separate from
the water.

The world is the sport of the Supreme. Playing about, He
does not become another."*

* Rāg Āśā. Namdev. p. 665.

"Thou, O Lord, the one Supreme Being,
Art unintermittingly contained in everybody.
Some are donors, some are beggars ; all are Thy wonderful
shows.
Thou thyself art the donor ; Thou thyself the enjoyer :
Beside Thee I know no other."*

A logical conclusion from this thorough-going Pantheism would be a total denial of any free-will in man ; and indeed the Granth approaches on this point very closely to the strictest Calvinism.

"If it please the Lord, man obtains salvation :
If it please the Lord, He makes a stone cross over the water of
existence :
Sometimes man becomes a pundit and makes explanations :
Sometimes he holds his peace and meditates :
Sometimes . . . there is divine knowledge in his mouth :
Sometimes he lives as a worm, an elephant, or moth. . . .
As it pleases the Lord, so He makes him dance :
What pleases to that One, that is done."†
"The world's a dream in which a play is made :
For a moment He (God) makes her play a play.
United by God, those who are alike meet :
Separated by God, they rise and go.
What has pleased Him, that is done :
Anything else cannot be done."‡

Nevertheless, the conflicting doctrines of free-will and fore-knowledge have no more been practically reconciled in the system of Nānak, than in the Christian theories more familiar to us ; and it is constantly taken for granted that it lies in a man's own power to do well or ill, to remember or to forget God.

So, also, the exact nature of the connecting link between one life and another is left in the Granth in much uncertainty. The number of living creatures of all kinds and in

* Rāg Āsā. Mah. iv. Repeated in So Purkhu, p. 16.

† Rāg Gaurī, Mah. v. p. 399.

‡ Rāg Āsā. Mah. i. p. 27.

the whole universe is constant, and is fixed at 84 laks.* When one dies, another springs into being, neither having any real existence, but both being "expansions" of the Supreme. The new creature inherits the *karma* of its predecessor, that is, the sum of its merit and demerit, its character and conduct. But it is left in uncertainty whether each material body contains within itself a soul in the sense of a finite and distinct, though subtle essence (material or immaterial), which on death flies away from its body like a bird out of a cage. Such an idea, inherited by book-religions from the animism which preceded them, was very general among Hindu philosophers, though distinctly repudiated by the greatest Indian thinker. Nānak constantly speaks of intelligence (*surati*), body and mind (*manu tanu*), and of an infinite light (*joti apāra*) placed within the body;† and he nowhere clearly says whether, in his opinion, these died with the body or retained some kind of distinct individuality. He probably held, in some form or other, the latter view; and conceived the *joti* as the medium in which the *karma*, or character, was conveyed from one being to its successor in the chain of transmigration.

It is evident from the above extracts, illustrative of the principal doctrines of Nānak, that he was not an original thinker. But he must have possessed in a marked degree those mental qualities more necessary for an earnest reformer. Nānak had at least the rare activity of mind to see through the emptiness of the rites, and ceremonies, and creeds, and penances, on which most of his countrymen depended for salvation; he had the rare moral courage openly to proclaim his views among the people; and he had the spiritual insight which gave him the constant sense of the presence of God, and kept him ever face to face with the Infinite. His was no ordinary mind which, while accepting the best traits in Muhammadan Theism, could reject their hope of heaven; which, at that time and under those conditions, could declare

* Ādi Granth, pp. 42, 71, 96, 156, 480.

† E.g. Ādi Granth, pp. 30, 33, 66.

the fundamental unity of all religions. He had the boldness to raise once more the standard of revolt against the privileges of caste, and to undermine the power of the priests by denying the power of the gods. Above all, he had the merit of once more maintaining that man need not wait till after death in order to realize his noblest aim; that salvation is subjective, not objective; dependent not on a change of outward circumstances, but on a change of inward growth; a state of Nirvāna to be reached here and now upon earth.

Strange, no doubt, and even bizarre, much of his teaching must appear to those familiar only with Christian ideas; but to form a right estimate of its value, it should be compared, not with Christianity, but with the religions of the time. And no one will dispute its immense superiority both to the system advocated by the Brahmins, and to the idolatries of the people among whom Nānak was brought up. No doubt the Scriptures of a strange religion, the outcome of modes of thought entirely foreign to our own, may attract a more immediate, though temporary, interest, if they contain a number of passages in harmony with modern Christian ideas. But their more real and abiding interest lies in the picture they give of a stage in the development of religious belief; and the value of this picture is entirely independent of their agreement with what we may now consider logical or wise.

The rise of the Sikh religion amid the conflicts of other creeds, affords an instructive example of what may be considered one of the most important of the many conditions precedent to a new start in religious life. When circumstances are favourable to the comparison of systems of belief essentially different from one another, there is only wanting an earnest and resolute mind for a new system to take shape (though much more may be necessary to its life and progress). Christianity arose under just such conditions; and Muhammad grasped the idea of the Unity of God when he had compared Judaism with idolatry, and both with corrupt Christianity. There was no reform of the Catholic faith till after the Renaissance; Luther would have been impossible without the causes

that produced Erasmus ; and old Rome would not have shaken, had not new Rome fallen. And so also the short history of the Sikh community affords an example in miniature of much of the strength and of the weakness of churches more influential and more widely spread.

Nānak had possessed the faculty of impressing his zeal and earnestness upon those by whom he was surrounded. The power of his character survived his death, and preserved the church during the rule of his successor, of whom we know but little, and who has contributed only a few verses to the Granth. Angad gained his subsistence by his own handiwork, and settled at the village of Biāsā, which was probably his native place. His patriarchate lasted fourteen years, and he nominated before his death his servant Amar Dās as his successor. The third Guru was a humble, patient and pious man, round whom many disciples gathered, and there are many psalms of his in the Ādi Granth in which the views of Nānak are anew enforced. But he made a change of great practical importance by appointing his own son-in-law Rām Dās as his successor in the Guruship, and he excluded the *Udāsīs*, the followers of Nānak's son, from the ranks of the "Disciples."

Under Rām Dās (1574—1581) the Guru, as head of the increasing sect, began to experience the power of wealth. He restored magnificently an old tank, and called it *amritsar* (the tank of nectar). In the middle of it he built a temple ; and round this holy place a new town, called after the tank, rapidly sprang up, to which the "Disciples" began to make yearly pilgrimage. He also further weakened the spiritual nature of his office, now become lucrative, by appointing his son successor.

His name was Arjun (1581—1606), and he was the first Guru, after Nānak, of intellectual power ; but he was a great administrator, not reformer. He discontinued the voluntary offerings of his followers, and instituted instead a forced contribution, which soon developed into a tax, levied annually by deputies appointed in each district. He lived in state, keeping up a kind of court ; and, like other Oriental chiefs,

became a large landowner and extensive trader. He also closed the Sikh canon by the composition of the *Ādi Granth*, in which he included not only the psalms of Nānak and of the third and fourth Gurus, but also his own verses, and such writings of previous reformers as were in harmony with Nānak's teaching. He greatly magnified the position and office of the Guru, whom he styled *Sacha Pādīsāhi*, the True King,* and whom he declared to be the incarnation of God as well as of Nānak;† whereas Nānak made no such pretensions and loved to call himself "humble Nānak." But the political power to which Arjun had attained drew upon him the jealousy of the Muhammadan governor, and he died in exile and disgrace.

Then ensued a dynastic struggle for the vacant chair; but his young son Har-govind (1606—1638) was soon recognized as his successor. He avenged his father by the death of the complaining governor; and played the part of a military bishop, arming his followers and engaging in mimic wars. The succession had now become quite hereditary. Under his son and grandson, the military character of the community was still preserved, and it began to attract the attention of the authorities at Dehli. We need not be surprised, therefore, that his grandson Teg Bahadur was at last accused of insurrection, taken prisoner to Dehli, and there finally executed.

This led to the third great change in the Sikh movement. Wealth and power had already corrupted the simplicity of the reforming church; the violent death of Teg Bahadur laid the foundation of the bitter feud between the Sikhs and the Muhammadans. He was succeeded by his son, then only fifteen, the tenth Guru, Govind Singh (1675—1708), who for some years remained concealed in the mountains. But when he came forth publicly as the Teacher of the Sikhs, he had resolved to wreak a bloody vengeance on the murderers of his father, to mould the vanquished Hindus into a strong and

* *Siri Rāg. Mah. v. p. 61.*† *Ibid. pp. 69, 73.*

aspiring people, to subvert the Muhammadan dominion, and to avenge his country's wrongs by founding upon its ruins a new and native empire.

Full of his mission and sure of his destiny, he set about his great work with remarkable foresight and confidence. Thinking that their division into castes had rendered the Hindus an easy prey to the united Moslems, he determined to consolidate the brotherhood of the Sikhs by a kind of holy communion, called the *Pāhul*, which should more effectually than theories put an end for ever to caste distinctions. He called five of his most faithful followers into a room, made them bathe, and seated them side by side. Then he dissolved purified sugar in water, and stirred it with a two-edged dagger, and recited over it some verses beginning,

“The protection of the Timeless One is ours :
The protection of all Iron is ours :
The protection of the All True is ours :
The protection of the All Iron is ours.”

The All Iron is a new and a very suggestive name for God, first used by Govind Singh. He then made them drink some of this liquid, and anointed them with the remainder, and cried with a loud voice, “Now say, ‘The Khālsā of the Vāh-Guru ! Victory to the Vāh-Guru !’” He then in the same manner received the *Pāhul* from them, and caused it to be administered to all the Sikhs or “Disciples,” each of whom was to add to his other names the title of Singh or Lion. *Khālsā* is a word of Arabic derivation meaning “own, own property ;” and the community was thus stamped as the property of the Guru, or perhaps (and more probably) as the “peculiar people,” the “real kingdom” of God. Every one who joined the new body gave up his caste by eating with the Disciples in the initial ceremony, and adopting the name of Singh ; and he was further to vow to forsake his occupation, his family, and his trust in the efficacy of creeds and works (*Krit-nash*, *Kul-nash*, *Dharm-nash* and *Karm-nash*). He was also to make a permanent

distinction in outward appearance between himself and the world by the constant use of five things, the names of which begin with the letter *k*: long hair (*kesa*), a comb (*kanghā*), a knife (*karada*), a sword (*kirapāna*), and breeches reaching to the knee (*kacha*).

Having thus consolidated the brotherhood and divided it off from the world, the warrior prophet sought to infuse into it his own spirit of burning zeal. He mockingly remarked that the Granth, what there was of it, only gave support to a tame spirit of humility and meekness; and he sent to Kartarpur for Arjun's original copy, in order to "complete" it. And when the custodians refused to acknowledge his authority or to part with the precious volume, he boldly set to work and composed a new Granth, a small portion only being his own composition, the rest that of his scribes. Out of a thousand pages, the first seven by Govind are verses for use at morning prayer; the next twenty-three are praises of the Almighty. Then follows the *Vicitra Nātaka*, or the lineage, life and mission of Govind Singh himself. This is succeeded by some forty pages of Hindu legends, and 450 pages describing the different *avatārs* or incarnations of God (including Buddha and the founder of the Jains). After a chapter in praise of weapons, and a few verses condemnatory of the Vedas, the Purānas, and the Korān, there follow about 430 pages of simple stories which it would be interesting to compare with the Birth Stories of the Buddhists. It will be noticed how entirely this book differs in character from Arjun's volume, which was henceforth called the *Ādi* or First Granth, to distinguish it from the new one, the "Granth of the Tenth Reign," *Dasaviṅg Pādasāhī kī Grantha* (1696 A.D.).

Then began the crusade of Govind Singh. It is impossible to follow him through all his varying fortunes. In 1707, he did not hesitate to enter the service of Bahādur Shāh, the Mogul emperor, and accepted a military command in the Dekkan, hoping to use his provincial office as a step-stone to higher things. But this was not to be; he was stabbed at night by the inheritor of a private feud, and died in 1708 on

the banks of the Godāvari. His ardent fancy had outrun his power of accomplishment ; but he left as a legacy to the Sikhs his dauntless spirit and his patriotic fervour, and the results of his new institutions survived his death.

His two children had been buried alive by the Muhammdans, and Govind Singh was the last of the Gurus ; but the expiring warrior was still sensible of the power of ideas, and boldly bequeathed the Khālsā to God, who never dies.

“He who wishes to find the Guru, let him search for him in the Granth of Nānak. *The* Guru (that is, God) will dwell with the Khālsā. Be firm and faithful. Wherever five ‘Disciples’ are gathered together, there will I be present too.”

And firm and faithful the Khālsā remained. Slowly and with difficulty, but surely, it gained in numbers and in power ; whilst the inherent weakness of the Muhammadan power became year by year more manifest. Rude men, left to find their way to greatness without a leader, without a method, could not fail to meet with many reverses. But the Sikhs had the sense of union and the confidence of hope to aid them in the struggle against the enemies of their country and the persecutors of their faith. In the middle of the century they had already become a nation, a confederacy of clans ; and before its close their power was consolidated under an energetic chieftain ruling in the capital of the Panjāb.

The future seemed to be opening out before them ; and though it may be as vain as it is difficult to discuss the might-have-beens, one may safely hazard the conjecture that the enemies of the Moslem, like the Moslems before them, would have become a conquering and a mighty power. But the destiny of circumstances was against them. As they were growing, another cloud had been forming on their horizon ; and in the moment of their brightest hope, they found themselves face to face with the colossal dominion of the English. It is no part of our subject to trace the complications which led to war, to the subjugation of the Sikh provinces, their fall to the condition of tributary states, their annexation to the British empire. The same causes were at work as have led,

and are leading, to the inevitable spread of European power in Asia ; we are only required to notice that the course of the struggle produced among the English a genuine admiration of the indomitable courage, the noble bearing, and the ardent enthusiasm, of the members of the Khālsā.

But their ardour was of a kind entirely distinct from that of Nānak or his immediate followers. As soon as men began to join the brotherhood of "Disciples" from other than religious motives, its religious character faded into the background. Patriotism and crusading zeal were little in harmony with the peace of God, or with the attainment of Nirvāna according to the views of "humble Nānak." And now in the presence of the invincible power of a strange and growing civilization, the hope of the crusader has died out, and the power of the idea originated by Govind Singh has faded away. It flashed forth again for a moment when the brave Sikhs stood side by side with the English in the dread crisis of the Sepoy Mutiny, but the numbers of the brotherhood are slowly and steadily decreasing.

The history of the Sikhs does not therefore close without leaving that sense of great hopes disappointed and lofty aims abased, which adds its mournful and almost tragic feeling to the history of each and all of the great efforts after the religious advancement of mankind. But who will maintain that those efforts are therefore to be regarded without thankfulness for the past, without a new and surer hope for the future? The brotherhood of the Sikhs may be dissolved, but the lessons learnt by its formation will remain. The teachings of Nānak may be overshadowed by the legends and tales invented by the piety and dulness of those who glory in his name ; but the effects of their influence will not die. Nānak began a fresh struggle against formalism and superstition ; his principles have made a nation, and supported it in its first steps towards progress ; and his faith and the memory of past achievements will have prepared the Sikhs for further advances, and given them strength for a longer journey towards better things.

T. W. REYS DAVIDS.

V.—JAMES HINTON AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

Life and Letters of James Hinton. Edited by Ellice Hopkins.
With an Introduction by Sir W. W. Gull. London: C. Kegan
Paul and Co. 1878.

Selections from James Hinton's Manuscripts. Vol. I. (1856).
London: Printed for the Author by Theo. Johnson. 1870.

As the notices which we have seen of Miss Hopkins's able and interesting book have dealt mainly with James Hinton's personal history and characteristics, and have touched but slightly on his philosophical convictions and speculations, we purpose in the present paper to take the inverse course, and make our outline of his external career subsidiary to some account and criticism of his position as a professed interpreter and peacemaker between scientific culture and religious faith. It is the more necessary to study carefully this aspect of James Hinton's life, as philosophizing was with him the ruling passion; or perhaps we ought rather to say that in his case, as in that of Socrates, philanthropy and philosophy divided his heart between them, and he loved the latter all the more because through her he hoped to enfranchise and elevate mankind. In another respect, too, he resembled the Athenian sage. Aural surgery was with Hinton as much a mere *Brot-studium* as statuary was with Socrates; yet neither of them could do any work in a slovenly fashion; and while the latter wrought a group of Graces not unworthy a place on the Acropolis, the former reached the first rank in his profession, and on his retirement left for the benefit of his successors a text-book of high value. We cannot, however, carry the parallel between the two into their methods of teaching. Socrates, we know, excelled in eliciting the latent ideas of his hearers by shrewd questioning, but Hinton was so constantly bringing forth new speculations and illustrations of his own, that he had little leisure or taste for acting as mental *accoucheur* to others. Though intensely fond of philosophical discourse, he was, like Coleridge or Elihu the Buzite, so "full of matter,"

that it was not often practicable for his listeners to check the flow of his impassioned utterances, so as to gain a fair hearing for their difficulties and objections. As we once heard one of his acquaintances say, he seized upon you as "the ancient mariner" did upon "the wedding-guest;" and you could not choose but listen till he had unbosomed himself of all the theories which happened at the time to be uppermost in his mind. It would, perhaps, have been to the advantage of his permanent reputation as a thinker, had he talked less and listened more. In reading the "Selections from Manuscripts,"* which contains many profound and luminous ideas, we have frequently encountered startling doctrines, which seem to us beset with obvious and formidable difficulties; yet no hint is given that Mr. Hinton had himself felt the full force of these objections, or had submitted his views to the searching scrutiny of critical friends. But while reflecting that our author's method of discourse compares unfavourably with that of Socrates, we are pleasantly reminded of the singular contrast presented by the home surroundings amid which these two philosophers pondered over the mysteries of existence. Assuredly we see the very reverse of a Xanthippe in the lady who, when a young family was growing up around her, patiently acquiesced in her husband's proposal to give up his profession, and to seek instead a far more precarious living by literary labours, and

* A few words of explanation are necessary here. The work bearing the above title was printed about five years before the author's death, and designed for private circulation only. A copy, however, of the first volume (a closely-printed octavo of nearly 800 pages) is in the Library of the British Museum. We have been told that several other volumes exist, but the first is the only one to which we have had access. In the Preface we read: "These papers are not to be assumed to represent my present opinions. They are not a statement of my thoughts, but a *history* of them, and present, not the result, but the process. . . . I have, indeed, specially sought not to exclude my errors, wherever they seemed to have any vital connection with the progress of my ideas, because the chief value which I attach to the papers is that of being an exact transcript of a process that has taken place quite independently of any volition of mine, and the record of which may perhaps have the same interest that science finds in every natural event, quite apart from its intrinsic importance." Bearing in mind this statement, we shall not draw from this volume any opinions which there is reason to believe Mr. Hinton afterwards abandoned.

who uttered no reproaches when in their tiny home at Tottenham he intruded into the kitchen, and kept up such "a distracting blaze of metaphysics and physics, epicycles and parabolas, noumena and phænomena," that she put peppercorns instead of currants into her cakes, and ran a risk of making the light pudding or pastry at dinner-time one of the heaviest problems to solve of even "this unintelligible world."*

The circumstances of James Hinton's life, though not of much interest externally, were in some respects particularly favourable to the awakening in his sensitive nature of those emotional and intellectual elements which qualified him to enter into, and, as he would say, to "interpret" (i.e. to reconcile in a higher unity), the conflicting tendencies of our present faith and culture. He was the son of the much-respected and able Baptist minister and writer, the Rev. Howard Hinton, and was born at Reading in 1822, being the third of a family of eleven children. The relation between him and his mother was peculiarly tender and precious in its effect upon his character.

"She was" (says Miss Hopkins) "a woman who, in addition to her exalted piety, took the highest views of womanhood. She emphatically held, in Père Hyacinthe's words, 'that if the man is the head of the woman, the woman is the heart of the man.' She, therefore, infused into her son an enthusiasm of womanhood, which is a young man's best safeguard against vice—a sacred passion which effectually cast out all lower passions, and made it impossible for him ever in word or act to do anything to the dishonour of womanhood."†

Not only piety, however, but also a semi-Calvinistic orthodoxy, was diligently instilled into the children of the Hintons; and though James when he grew to manhood underwent the reaction, so common in superior minds, from bibliolatry to scepticism, yet he soon renewed, in part at least, his allegiance to the theology of his youth; and his habitual disposition to treat the Bible as a unique and infallible revelation has, we

* *Life and Letters*, p. 166.

† *Ibid.* p. 6.

think, somewhat lessened the value of his philosophical work. From his sympathetic insight into the deep religious experiences embodied in the Gospels and the Epistles, his philosophy derived, no doubt, its most precious and vital elements ; but his uncritical reverence for every belief and doctrine which was in his view supported by Biblical authority, strikes the unorthodox reader of the "Selections" with a painful sense of incongruity. Those who are most in sympathy with the general drift of Hinton's teaching, are the very ones who will be most impatient of his endeavours to find in his philosophical system some suitable niches for the lodgment of the Devil and the various good and evil angels whose existence the Bible assumes. It is true that in his presentation of popular doctrines he always dwells on their deeper mystic meaning, on the spiritual fact (if he can find it) of which they are a local and imperfect form ; yet he never admits that the Biblical writings are, like other writings of the same class, to be criticised and appraised by man's normal intellectual and spiritual discernment ; and he quietly assumes that the occasional appearances of error and inconsistency are due, not to defects in them, but rather to defects in our perceptive power. In fact, he always treats the Bible in the same way in which, as we shall afterwards find, he treats Nature, viz. as a perfect exhibition of the meaning of God, but which sometimes seems to us irrational and immoral because we cannot help importing into it some of our own mental and moral deadness. Accordingly he says :

"You will certainly make a mess of the Bible till you can have patience with it. 'Tis as large as Nature, and must be dealt with in the same way. If you do not understand a fact in Nature, you do not fidget yourself till you can see how it agrees with what you think you do understand. You say, There is a fact I must study when I have time, and meanwhile you go on your way rejoicing—not least in this, that you will be wiser by-and-by."*

This may be very good advice in regard to those utterances,

* *Life and Letters*, p. 131.

not only in the Bible, but in every sacred book, which elicit an emphatic response from our hearts and consciences, though we cannot yet co-ordinate them with other real or supposed knowledge. As a general principle, however, of Biblical criticism, this assumed analogy between the Bible and Nature is eminently unsound and mischievous. Is Colenso to postpone his verdict concerning the historical validity of the Pentateuch, on the ground that the numbers and dates in the Old Testament narratives are probably as unerring as the law of gravitation, and that it is only the defects of our arithmetical genius which create the apparent anomalies? It is, however, satisfactory to notice that Hinton, notwithstanding his indiscriminate faith in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, never for a moment falls into the monstrous but popular error of making theological beliefs the condition of spiritual well-being.

"I find" (he writes to his sister-in-law) "the Bible the secret of all truth : all I truly know I derive from it : and yet I would say to every man, Don't believe the Bible if you cannot see clearly that it is true. Deal freely, boldly, by it. Don't be afraid. 'Tis a friend, not an enemy : if you don't treat it straightforwardly, it cannot do its service to you. Don't be afraid. God won't damn you for not believing the Bible. God won't damn you, indeed, for anything ; 'tis not a future affair at all. To be damned is not to have eternal* life—'tis to be dead. Not to have love is the only damnation, and that is a matter for present consideration. The future is as the present. It can't be worse, save as more wicked."†

From this digression concerning our philosopher's somewhat curious theological position, we return to the sketch of his life. When James Hinton had reached the age of sixteen, his father removed from Reading to take charge of the Baptist congregation in Devonshire Square, London. Feeling the pressure of his large family, he now removed his son James from school,

* It will be observed that James Hinton (with the late Prof. Maurice) interprets the word "eternal" (*αἰώνιος*), not as "everlasting," but as "real" or "spiritual," in contrast with "apparent" or "phenomenal." Whatever is eternal transcends, he believes, the conditions of space and time : it partakes of the nature of God, to which all idea of succession is inapplicable.

† *Life and Letters*, p. 215.

and placed him in the first situation which chanced to offer itself, and which happened to be that of cashier at a wholesale woollen-draper's shop in Whitechapel, kept by a respectable member of his own congregation. His experience at the East-end of London exercised so great an influence over his future ideas and sentiments, that we must let Miss Hopkins describe it in her own graphic way :

"Hopelessly unfavourable as this first entrance into life appears on the surface, none who knew James Hinton well but can recognize in it 'the divinity that shapes our ends.' Whitechapel was the rough cradle in which his mind and spirit awoke to energetic life ; and to the last he bore its impress on him. Brought up as he had been in a pure home in a quiet country town, and drinking in from his mother a reverence for women which in him was always akin to worship, he was suddenly thrust into rudest contact with our worst social evils.

'The weary and the heavy weight
Of all this unintelligible world'

came crushing down on his young heart with a most cruel force, and the degradation of women possessed him with a divine despair. Indeed, on that point, he was always, if I may use the expression, divinely mad, the true *μάντις*, according to Plato's derivation, with a prophetic insight on some points which the world's history may yet justify. On Saturday nights, in the back streets and crowded courts of Whitechapel, he used to hear women screaming under the blows of their drunken husbands ; and come across others, wearing the same sacred womanhood as his own mother and sisters, with the same gracious dependence on man's strength and care, yet the victims of his passions, flushed with gin and trolling out obscenities. He got a sense of the cruelty of the world, and it got into him and possessed him and never left him. It became the 'unconscious constant' in all his thinking : he could think of nothing apart from this ; and at last, as he once said, 'it crushed and crushed me till it crushed 'The Mystery of Pain' out of me !'*

He retained this situation about a year, and after a short interval was placed in the City in an insurance office. It was here that that other great passion of his life shewed itself—the

* Life and Letters, p. 8.

passion to know. Occupied all day at book-keeping, at which he never proved an adept, he would often sit up half the night studying.

"At the age of nineteen," continues his biographer, "he first became attached to the lady [Miss Margaret Haddon] whom he afterwards married, after waiting for her many years. It was his first and only attachment. For some time his love met with no return; indeed, he must have appeared rather a formidable suitor at this time to any young girl, having much the air of an abstract idea untidily expressed, very different from the singular charm he afterwards possessed in ripened manhood. Wholly indifferent to appearances, his clothes could never be made to fit him; while his mental absorption at this period made him guilty of frequent lapses of politeness, which are the source of endless expressions of contrition in his letters to his elder sister, who evidently did her sisterly best to get him into shape."*

Uncongenial work by day, and over-much intellectual exertion during the hours that should have been given to sleep, brought on an illness; and the family doctor, seeing what was wrong, advised his entering the medical profession, as giving the necessary scope to his mental activity. Accordingly in his twentieth year he was entered at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and passed through the prescribed course of study with credit, and in much shorter time than is usually given to it. Before settling down in medical practice, he increased his knowledge of the world by two long voyages, one to China and the other to the West Indies. In the latter of these, he was placed by Government in medical charge of a number of free Negroes sailing from Sierra Leone to Jamaica. He gained some knowledge of their language, and studied carefully the Negro character both in its savage state and as affected by years of slavery. After a year or so of Jamaica life, he returned to England, and became for a short time the partner of a surgeon named Fisher. Soon after this he formed a friendship with Mr. Toynbee, the well-known aurist, with whom he worked a good deal, and thus prepared the way for his own

* *Life and Letters*, p. 10.

eminence in this department of his profession. In 1852, his marriage with Miss Margaret Haddon took place. It was, we are told, a marriage of singularly deep affection, and from thenceforward his wife became the sharer in his every thought. In 1856, Mr. Hinton first began to publish, contributing a few papers on physiological and ethical subjects to the *Christian Spectator*. In 1858, he published a paper in the *Medico-Chirurgical Review*, "On Physical Morphology, or the Law of Organic Forms," suggesting that organic growth takes place in the direction of least resistance, a generalization which Mr. Herbert Spencer has embodied in his *First Principles*. A few months later, "Man and his Dwelling-place" was published. The favourable reception which attended this his first connected attempt to bring his philosophy before the public, led him to think that he might support his family and at the same time gratify his own taste for scientific and philosophical thought by exclusive attention to literary work. He accordingly resigned his practice, resolved to reduce his expenses to a minimum, and settled down, with his wife and three children, in a tiny house in Tottenham. "Ah, me!" he exclaims in one of his letters, "I do love thinking!" Whether his amiable and accomplished lady was equally gratified by this startling change in the programme of his life is not so clear. At all events, as we have before remarked, she had unlimited faith in him, and proved a true helpmate in this as in all the phases of his noble but somewhat eccentric career. At this time he published some popular articles on physiological topics in the Cornhill Magazine and other journals, which he afterwards worked up into his treatises entitled, "Life in Nature," and "Thoughts on Health." In this narrow little Tottenham house, the "Mystery of Pain" also was written, though not published till some years later.

"It was," writes Miss Hopkins, "in his small suburban patch of a garden that the gathering of a few green peas gave rise to that train of thought which loosened the burden of years from his own heart, and, when afterwards given to the world, proved a 'door into heaven' to so many a troubled soul—a book of which even so profound a

writer on moral subjects as Dr. J. H. Newman said that 'it contained things both new and true.'"^{*}

After the first year, Mr. Hinton's new mode of life, which at first had promised well, turned out a failure, and by 1862 the force of circumstances had, much against his will, carried him back again to the practice of his profession. He was shortly afterwards appointed aural surgeon at Guy's Hospital, and on the death of his dear and valued friend Mr. Toynbee, in 1866, Mr. Hinton succeeded to his practice; and now resolutely concentrating all his attention on his profession, he rapidly increased his reputation and his income. In 1869, however, encouraged by the advice of the eminent surgeon, Mr. Bowman, he for the first time for six years unlocked his MSS., and devoted the evenings to writing down his thoughts. On this resumption of his favourite pursuit, Miss Hopkins remarks:

"Only those who knew Mr. Hinton intimately could realize the intellectual passion that thinking was to him; how certainly, once indulged in, it would resume its sway over him; and how impossible it was to carry it on safely in addition to the immense strain of a London practice. From this time, his brain was in a state of tension, which could not but prove fatally injurious in the end."[†]

At the close of this year he joined the Metaphysical Society on its inauguration, at the wish of the Poet Laureate, who had been much struck by some of Mr. Hinton's writings, and henceforth he regularly attended its meetings. In March, 1874, came the longed-for day of deliverance from the burden of professional life; and he gave up practice and the large income he had at his control, to devote all his energies to the great objects of human good he had in view.

"But, alas!" (adds his biographer) "in order to effect his purpose, he had for the last year or two been working recklessly, throwing, as he himself said, the strength of ten men into his profession, and at the same time passing six or seven works simultaneously through the press, while piles of MSS. bear witness to the remorseless activity

^{*} *Life and Letters*, p. 167.

[†] *Ibid.* p. 249.

of his mind ; and, though the injury his brain received remained latent for a year and a half, there is no doubt the seeds of the fatal malady which caused his premature death were already sown.”*

In the autumn of 1875, Mr. Hinton set sail with his eldest daughter for St. Michael's, in the Azores, to look after some property he had purchased in that island, and with the intention of spending the winter there with his family. A short time before his departure, Miss Hopkins urged him to work up some of his numerous MSS. for publication.

“‘Well, you see,’ he would reply, ‘the activity of my brain must die down. I sha’n’t be able to go on producing much longer, and then will be the time to work up old materials and get them into shape. There’s immense longevity in my family ; I shall probably live till I am eighty.’

“‘What !’ I exclaimed ; ‘do you look forward to such an undesirable thing as living till you are eighty ?’

“‘Oh, I think I can do,’ was the characteristic answer, with a slight shrug of the shoulders.”†

She noticed, however, that at this very time he was not well, having suffered from sleeplessness and depression. These bad symptoms increased before he left England. On his arrival at St. Michael's, he found he had been much misled as to the value of his property, and that he might have to return to the practice of his profession. He bore this blow with sweet and noble resignation, but it deepened the melancholy that had settled upon him. “Soon acute inflammation of the brain declared itself, and after a few days’ intense suffering, in which he knew no one, he entered into his rest on the 16th of December, 1875.”‡

His decease at this critical time, when he was about to systematize the vast store of reflections contained in his notebooks, is the more to be regretted, as, judging from the “Selections” which we have read, it will be a most arduous, if not an impossible, task to construct a self-consistent and organic body of philosophical doctrine out of the heterogeneous mass

* *Life and Letters*, p. 331.

† *Ibid.* p. 368.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 370.

of incomplete theories and speculations (of very unequal value) which he heaped together in such profusion.

At the opening of this paper we coupled together the names of Hinton and Socrates, but we believe that our author's mental type is far more that of a Christian apostle than of a Greek philosopher. His intellect was, it is true, almost preternaturally active; but for all that, what gives the real charm and power to his philosophizing is the intense spiritual faith and love which burned inextinguishably at the heart of his being and shone through all his reasonings, so that some theories of his which are not, we think, intrinsically favourable to a religious philosophy, catch a kind of beauty in the glow of this internal light and heat. It was not that he believed because of his scientific convictions and speculations, but rather that he believed in spite of some of the more important of them; and, indeed, his mental history is a conspicuous instance of the truth that real spiritual life and love will ultimately overcome and disarm (nay, for a time even enlist in its service) intellectual ideas which seem at first to threaten the annihilation of faith. It is to Paul rather than to Socrates that we must look, if we would find a high exemplar of the class of mind to which James Hinton belongs. "The greatest of these is charity," was the vital principle that gave light and power to the teachings of the great apostle; and in the fervent heat of this divine emotion, his Hebrew ideas and prejudices (though still retained) were melted and transformed into ingenious theorizings which appeared rather to subserve than to oppose the dearest faith of his heart. It was this identical spirit of self-sacrificing love that possessed Hinton's soul, and enabled him to satisfy himself, and perchance many of his disciples, that the doctrine of the Evolutionists, even in its most mechanical form, is rather favourable than detrimental to religious belief.

Our conviction that the chief interest that invests Hinton's life is poetical, moral and spiritual, rather than logical or intellectual, is borne out by the following estimate of his nature by one who, we suppose, must have intimately known him:

"He took to ideas with the passion of the poet, and more than

the passion of most poets, for the fires of conscience and self-sacrifice were always at white heat within him. Troubles and wrongs, which were in common speech no concern of his, consumed him with pity or indignation, or both. In addition to this, his heart was not in the work he had to do as a professional man, but in the work he never had time to do. The sins and sorrows of the world around him he felt the most acutely in the direction of his tenderest susceptibilities. He said of himself that his desire for human welfare exceeded in its intensity the sum of all his other desires, and it was very largely through his love and reverence for women that the wrongs and sufferings which give us all the heart-ache now and then hit him hardest. We never attended a 'meeting on any Woman's Question, educational or other, without meeting James Hinton.'*

Quite to the same effect is the following passage from the "Life and Letters :—"

"Late one evening," Mr. Berry writes, "James Hinton took me for a walk in the Strand. He led me into the Alhambra : we were very soon surrounded by women of loose character. He took no notice of them, but held me by the coat with both hands and looked me in the face, and began quietly talking about 'unconscious sacrifice.' Soon his gentle speech attracted the notice of the women, who grouped themselves around him, with the policemen who attend to keep order (the acting was all the time going on on the stage), and all were spellbound while he sweetly discoursed on Christ's hatred of sin and pity for the sinner ; and finished a most touching address of some ten minutes by saying, 'If our Saviour were on earth, where would He be ? Why here.' And then we left, and my dear friend wiped tears from his eyes."†

It is surely within the limits of the New Testament that we must look for the sublime archetype of men of this stamp. Miss Hopkins mentions that he sent his most valuable pictures to be exhibited at the East-end of London, and that had he lived he would have used his whole influence to make his gift the nucleus of a larger collection for the especial benefit of the very poor. "To make Whitechapel a little better," was ever the thought engraven on his heart. "At fifteen," he says, "I walked about the streets and cried about these poor people,

* *Contemp. Review*, May, 1878, p. 269.

† *Life and Letters*, p. 296.

and now I am fifty I do just the same."* In 1870, he recorded in his journal that his most cherished wish was to be able to live again in that East-end district, to mix intimately with and become the friend of the lowest and poorest classes, and to do all that was natural and straightforward to raise them, and convey to them truer thoughts of their own life and of the world. "For this life" (he adds) "I would cut off to any extent that might be necessary my intellectual work; and I long for it as a man longs for his wedding-day."†

But though we think it is the riches of the heart and conscience rather than of the head that will earn for James Hinton a very conspicuous place in the love and admiration of mankind, we do not for a moment deny that he possessed intellectual gifts of a very high order, or that in his writings are to be found noteworthy contributions towards a new philosophical Theodicy. With a great deal, however, that he has written in this department of thought, we are unable to feel ourselves in entire sympathy; but we believe that, both from his completed works and from his MSS., future thinkers will select much precious material, which will be gradually embodied in the literature of the future. Like the Essays of Emerson, his writings contain many profound and luminous but fragmentary thoughts, which it is very difficult to piece together into an organic whole.

Whoever wishes to get to the core of Hinton's thinking, must first thoroughly master his physiological ideas as they are presented in "Life in Nature;" for, on the one hand, his medical education accustomed him to approach all subjects by this path, and, on the other, his theory that the worlds of matter and of mind are both alike affections (or "passions," as he terms them) of spirit, called into being by the creative act of God, induced him to regard all the laws of mental development and progress as precisely analogous to those which prevail in the physiological sphere. So much does this consideration influence his phraseology, that the words "nutrition" and

* *Life and Letters*, p. 295.† *Ibid.* p. 290.

"function" occur on nearly every page of the "Selections," and serve to indicate a vast number of antitheses. At one time, Talent is the nutrition and Genius the function; and presently the same words serve to express the contrast between Science and Religion, or that between phenomenal and real Causation. Mr. Hinton, as we have seen, advocated the doctrine, afterwards adopted by Mr. H. Spencer, that the whole of Nature, organic and inorganic, is to be explained on the simple principle that motion always takes place in the direction of least resistance. The phenomenal universe may be regarded as made up of molar or molecular movements, and the above law is supposed by Mr. Hinton to furnish an exhaustive explanation of all these changes. He was also among the first to extend the doctrine of the conservation of force into the organic realm. All the power given forth by organisms in the form of heat and muscular movement, has been previously present in the form of a tension between the elements of the tissues and the oxygen in their neighbourhood.

"The imprisoned gases," writes our author, "pine for their wonted partner, and stretch themselves out towards their destined liberator. Set free from constraint, their affinities operate again, and the materials of the living body and the atmosphere re-unite themselves. But no 'affinity' need be supposed to hold together the organic substances; their elements are coerced into union by extraneous force, not drawn to it by attraction from within."*

The force which thus holds back the elements of the organism from obeying their chemical affinities, and so produces nutrition, is precisely the same force which is previously liberated by the decomposition of the food; and the reason that it is now transformed into this organic or vital force is, that the elements of the decomposed food and of the air have, when rushing together to form inorganic compounds, been checked in the course of their approximation by the force of cohesion in the organic body; and the consequence is, that the resisted particles take new and opposite direction (just as

* *Life in Nature*, p. 69.

the pendulum does when its fall to the earth is checked), and thus become qualified to perform the vitalizing act. This process, which, says Mr. Hinton, is quite in accordance with the general law of vibration, accounts for the passage of chemical into vital force, and the consequent growth of the body; and when taken in conjunction with the assumed principle that the *form* of organic growth is determined by the character of the resistances or pressures to which the expanding tissues are subjected, furnishes, he thinks, a full and satisfactory explanation of how, by the operation of the simple law of movement in the line of least resistance, the whole organic world is built up and propagated. Before passing on to consider the nature of the process by which Mr. Hinton manages to convert this very mechanical theory of the universe into an important branch of religious philosophy, we will briefly advert to one or two of his very numerous and ingenious applications of the above doctrine of nutrition and function to our intellectual and emotional life. It will be seen that the animal functions are dependent on the nutrition or state of tension which the approximating chemical elements have produced in consequence of their movements having been resisted or suppressed before they had effected complete conjunction. Well, the food of the mind is the observation of facts. Science analyzes or decomposes them; this process of disintegration and re-composition is at length checked or suppressed by some instinctive conviction of the soul; by this resistance nutrition is achieved and power stored up, which at length leads to function or "interpretation." And this comes about when in some gifted mind at once imaginative and logical this tension between the nutritive (or theoretic) and the instinctive view suddenly ceases by reason of the rushing together of two ideas, whereby there is revealed a grander truth, which takes up into itself the vital elements in each of the contending views, and thus reconciles them in a higher unity. As an illustration, let us take the idea of Cause. There is an instinctive conviction in the human mind that for every phenomenon there exists an adequate cause, or producing power, and the popular judgment is apt to locate

this power in the previous phenomenon. Presently science or theory is brought to bear on this doctrine, and the result of the application of criticism is, that no such assumed dynamic *nexus* between phenomena can be discovered. Whereupon the nutritive dogma comes into vogue, viz., that cause is a fiction of the mind. This new view strives to suppress the instinctive one, and thus power is stored up which one day manifests itself in the dawn of an interpretation which contains what is true in each of these polar views, viz., that all phenomena arise from an energy which is not itself phenomenal, but real or spiritual. It is now seen that the instinct of mankind was right in declaring that phenomena are produced by a power, and that the critical view is also right, in so far as it asserts that there is no causation between phenomena. Mr. Hinton insists that it is always Resistance that begets life and power. "It appears in the physical world as pressure; in the intellectual world as incompatibility, or contradictoriness; in the emotional world as disappointment and failure; in the moral world as self-control."*

The following passage from the "Letters and Life" gives an interesting sketch of the application of this theory to our emotional life:

"On the dynamic relations of evil, Mr. Hinton, as we see, laid great stress. It was to him an integral part of the process of correcting the premiss, by which man is educated in the true sense of the word, i.e. made to educe for himself the true from the false, the right from the wrong, working out his results by a process of moral evolution. Evil in the world, he held, had its analogue in nutrition. In nutrition, certain chemical elements are assimilated and held in a state of tension, their tendency to combine being resisted in the organic matter. The force thus held ready for use is set free in the function. . . . Or, to take a far simpler analogy, evil is the raising of a heavy weight, which in its fall raises something else. In one of the great world-sores, slavery, we can see this process ever going on in one form or another; but perhaps it is most strikingly exemplified in the movements that have led to modern emancipation.

* Selections from MSS. p. 515.

Naturally the premiss was assumed to begin with, that the stronger might impose his will on the weaker. Self-interest enjoined it; what was there so especially sacred in individual responsibility to forbid the stronger animal mastering the weaker? But slowly the selfish principle worked out its results of sorrow, degradation, cruelty and licentiousness; the evil grew more and more intolerable; slowly the force gathered, till at last it needed but a touch to set it free, and in the fall of slavery by its own weight of evil, to lift humanity for ever to the higher moral level that respects personal liberty, and recognizes the brotherhood of man and the sanctity of individual responsibility. May we not, therefore, believe, with Mr. Hinton, that that other great nameless world-sore, which eats like a cancer into the heart of our modern Christian and civilized society, with all its mystery of depravity, degradation and disease,—may we not believe it a force stored up to impel man to recognize the evil of self as a basis of life, the impotence of mere self-restraint engrafted on such a basis—a force to lift him to a higher level of a purity which is love, a chastity which is service? ”*

We must now turn back to our philosopher's view of the universe as a necessary result of the interaction of mechanical forces obeying the one simple law of action in the line of least resistance. To many persons this mode of regarding Nature would appear to be a decided step towards dispensing with the hypothesis of a God. On Mr. Hinton, however (as he tells us), it soon ceased to have any such influence, and indeed seemed to him to transform itself into a powerful confirmation of his theological convictions. He learns that the operations of Nature cannot fitly be termed “mechanical.” Sir W. Hamilton has enabled him to see that of Nature we know only phenomena. If, then, those things that we call the

* P. 355. In connection with this subject—the condition of women—to which Mr. Hinton gave the deepest attention, these words of his are worth pondering: “Do you call English life monogamous? Explain to me—I don't understand. Are we speaking of names and pretences, or of realities? The problem is not how to keep, but how to attain to monogamy.” The following remark was once made by him to a married friend: “If I am to be remembered at all, this is what I would be remembered by, that I was the man who said, ‘Man is so made that he can rise above the sexual passion and subordinate it to use.’ There, even if that is false, and all else I ever said was true, I would rather be remembered as having said that one falsehood than by all the truths.”—P. 284.

physical world—the substances and forces with which Science deals—are but phenomenal (that is, if they are but appearances of some existence which we perceive not as it is), then the reducing of physical life to the results of chemical and mechanical processes no more disappoints the intellect, or makes a discord in the soul.* This law of movement in least resistance then becomes a merely phenomenal law, and the question arises, Can the human mind penetrate deeper, and divine its real and ultimate significance? Mr. Hinton replies in the affirmative, but not on the ground usually taken by intuitive philosophers. His theory is, that as one sense, such as touch, is able to correct the illusions of another sense, sight, and as the intellect is capable of rectifying the misconceptions which all the senses together cannot detect, and thus to convert the “appearance” into the “scientific phenomenon,” so in like manner there is a still higher faculty in man, named by Mr. Hinton the “moral reason,” or the “religious emotions,” which, when acting in conjunction with the senses and the intellect, is competent to give us an insight into the nature of that reality (or noumenon) of which both the sensuous appearance and the intellectual phenomenon are but more or less imperfect images. As the intellectual reason banishes from the universe all supposed irrational appearances, so, thinks Mr. Hinton, will the moral reason, when fairly exercised, dissipate from creation all the illusions that now vex the conscience and the heart (in short, everything which now seems morally absurd), and reveal a living spiritual universe whose supposed materiality and deadness exists only in our defective perception. Thus, according to our author, the material world, when looked at in the light of the moral reason, is simply the spiritual world imperfectly apprehended. This doctrine, which in its simplicity strikes us as grand and true, is unfortunately marred in Mr. Hinton's treatment of it by two serious distortions. In the first place, it is unnecessarily complicated with the theological dogma of the fall of man, and of the redemp-

* *Life in Nature*, p. 154.

tion of humanity by the death of Christ.* It is very curious to notice the shifts to which our author is put (and which he faithfully records in his MSS.) in his endeavour to extricate himself from the dilemmas into which his two-fold devotion—to orthodoxy on the one hand, and to his favourite theories on the other—so often force him. To quote an instance :

“It is only to a fallen spirit that there is a *material* world ; only to the sinful is there any not-being ? Or, no, this will not do : for Adam when *sinless* was placed in this world. But the world was different to him before he fell : it first became the physical world when Adam fell. [What is the evidence of palæontology respecting previous death ? One does not know : these ‘things’ are forms. I have the fact here, but not the right form.] So when we leave this world, if perfectly holy, ‘things’ will not be to us : then only the ‘actual,’ the eternal : no image then of sin : i.e. no death, or ceasing to be, because no sin. There can have been no death before sin was, because no ‘actual’† death from which the image could arise : death is by sin. Things are the image of the ‘actual’ : death, the image of sin, could not precede it. So no ‘things’ that pass or die in heaven : no time. Is time then the result of sin ? And yet was not Adam surrounded by ‘things’ in Paradise, with a real body, &c. ? This I have to get right : but I know I am on the track, finding the Bible words necessary, i.e. right.”‡

It seems strange that it should not have occurred to Mr. Hinton that the very fact of man having the power to use this “moral reason,” and by its exercise to purge his vision and attain a true view of the spiritual reality of things, of itself sufficiently shews that our imperfect apprehension is rather the mark of a rudimentary and incomplete spirituality, than that state of spiritual extinction indicated by the Fall. It would appear that Mr. Hinton himself at times must have regarded the interview between Eve and the serpent as not so very regrettable after all, for he says the fall of man acted as “nutrition,” whence comes the power that raises us from the

* Vide “Man and his Dwelling-place,” *passim*.

† The only real or actual death, in Mr. Hinton's view, is the suicide the spirit commits by sinning. All other deaths are apparent only.

‡ Selections from MSS. p. 602.

primitive innocence to the far higher state of holiness. One is sometimes disposed to doubt for a moment whether our author on the whole lost or gained by the influence upon him of his hereditary orthodoxy. Still on reflection we see that the incalculable mental and spiritual good he derived from his intensely close relation to the Son of Mary of Nazareth, very far outweighs the mischief which his bibliolatry wrought upon his genius. And, indeed, though he seems to stick to the letter of the dogmas, he generally manages to make them mean what his philosophical theories demand.

The other mistake which seems to us to detract from the value of our author's central theory is of a more vital nature, and appears to be due rather to his professional than to his religious training, though we do not feel quite sure that Calvinism may not have had something to do with it. He truly declares that the spiritual reality of which the world of phenomena is the image, must be such as shall not do violence to the claims of either our intellectual or our moral reason. Both of these faculties, he tells us, take offence at "arbitrariness" on the one hand, and "mechanical necessity" on the other; therefore the spiritual reality must be neither of these.* Now by "arbitrariness" he really means "power of free choice," and we have yet to learn what valid ground Science has for taking offence at this as a possible attribute of that Eternal Love, which Hinton says is the only reality that satisfies both the intellect and the heart,—the spiritual fact, of which movement in the direction of least resistance is only the phenomenal image. Our philosopher does not deny the free-will of man, as many of his brother *savans* do, but he always refers to it as something peculiarly obnoxious to him, and tells us it is one of the consequences of the Fall—a state of defect which we are to aim to rise above, that we may be made partakers of God's freedom. But God's freedom is, in his view, synonymous with God's necessity, only that it is a necessity intrinsic to His own nature, and not imposed upon Him from without. We shrink

* Professor Tyndall and the Religious Emotions, by James Hinton: *Contemp. Review*, Dec. 1874.

from any attempt to characterize the relation between the consciousness of God and His activity; such questions utterly transcend our cognitive faculty; but we earnestly maintain that the above doctrine, which leaves only *one* line of action possible to God, is based on no necessary demand of either the intellectual or the moral reason, but is simply the corollary to that false assumption (which scientific men so readily slip into), that the uniformity of Nature is not a contingent matter of outward observation, but is an ultimate necessity of thought.

Closely connected with this view of God's necessary action is Mr. Hinton's vehement dislike to teleology, and his oft-repeated assertion that God never acts for results. His line of argument on this subject is not far removed from that of the author of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," and, like Von Hartmann, he believes that God's act in creation resembles that of a genius who in his highest performances acts from inner impulse rather than with an object in view. But if inspired men are borne on to great results without conscious purpose of their own, is it not because the Divine Inspirer, who knows the end from the beginning, is leading them by a way that they know not?

It must also be remarked that although Mr. Hinton so speaks of the "moral reason" as if he believed that it would afford, when fairly exercised, the same conclusive evidence of the absence of unmoral and unloving traits in Nature which the intellectual reason affords of the absence of the anomalous and the absurd, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the two faculties stand in this respect on an entirely different footing, and that we cannot expect from the use of the former the same banishment of uncertainty and the same gradual growth of universal agreement in belief which prevails in respect to the world of phenomena. The "moral reason" is after all equivalent to *faith* in God as He is revealed in our hearts and consciences: and though such faith will survive and flourish in spite of the moral difficulties suggested by some of the aspects of Nature, there is no sufficient evidence that increase in the purity and warmth of the "religious emotions" gives us an intuitive *knowledge* that the seeming

indifference and physical and moral ugliness in Nature are as much an illusion resting on our imperfect perception, as the apparent motion of the sun is in the phenomenal world. Men with the sweetest and divinest spiritual affections are often those by whom the apparently unmoral activities of Nature are the most keenly and painfully felt.

Our criticisms of Mr. Hinton's central theory have nearly exhausted our space, and left us no room to do justice to the really grand and engaging features in his philosophy. In one sense he is a mystic, believing in our power to apprehend the Absolute and to escape from the illusions of space and time. Indeed, he is so far from allowing that man can only know phenomena, that he forcibly maintains that it is precisely phenomena which we do not and cannot know, seeing that they are not themselves real, but owe their apparent being to our imperfect apprehension of the real. Spirit and its moral activities are indeed real, and in fact the only realities. Spirit is the absolute or the unconditioned, and therefore we know these at first hand, inasmuch as our own moral action is an instance of a reality and an activity which is uncaused and eternal. But James Hinton's mysticism is a mysticism of a practical and noble sort. It does not favour our absorption in meditation or our withdrawal from Nature and her revelations. Would we penetrate to the glorious secrets of the spiritual and the real, then he bids us remember that in Nature are they all involved, that she *is* the spiritual being of which we are in search; and if we are to know her really, it must be by a careful and loving study of her as she is phenomenally presented to us. The ideal is not *above* the natural, but *in* the natural; and he who ceases to court Nature intelligently and lovingly, thereby loosens his hold both on true philosophy and noble art. Nor must we fancy that we can win spiritual life and blessedness by the death of our passions and seclusion from the world, for it is by the control of these passions and desires that the soul gains health and strength, and as we resist them their might passes into and fortifies our own moral character.

Miss Hopkins deserves eminently well both of James Hinton and of society. She has done a needful work faithfully, ably and lovingly. In one respect only does she seem to us to have unintentionally misrepresented her hero. She says that, "like most of the eminent thinkers of the day, he passed through materialism, and came out at the other side."* The eminent thinkers to whom she refers are obviously such writers as Mr. Herbert Spencer and Professors Tyndall and Huxley; indeed, she mentions the name of the last of these in this connection. No doubt Mr. Hinton's Berkeleian views do, like the views of the gifted men referred to, break down the essential barrier between matter and mind; but there yawns a gulf, wide and impassable, between the thinkers who hold that matter and mind are the two aspects of one unknown reality, and him who held that both mind and matter are affections or passions of a *Spirit* that is and knows itself to be this very reality, and which is a Will morally free to control and direct the passions by which it is invested. We very strongly suspect that James Hinton would have felt no inclination to congratulate these eminent men on their having "come out at the other side," but would rather have warned them that their supposed escape is altogether illusory, and that if they are no longer materialists strictly so called, they are just as far off as ever from sound spiritualism.

We had hoped to have been able to have examined the beautiful idea which Mr. Hinton has embodied in "The Mystery of Pain," and also to have said something about his characteristic Altruism. We should also have liked to have criticised his doctrine that sin is negative in its character—our refusal to act, or rather to let God act. And then, again, his highly imaginative theory that our bodies and minds are elements in a universal body and mind, invites notice. But all these we must omit for the present, and bring to a close our account of the life and teachings of a man for whom, though we knew him not on earth, we have come to feel deep respect and warm affection.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

* Life and Letters, p. 82.

VI.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. DR. KALISCH ON JONAH.

Bible Studies. By M. M. Kalisch. Part II. *The Book of Jonah, preceded by a Treatise on the Hebrew and the Stranger.* London : Longmans. 1878.

EVEN before my review of the First Part of Dr. Kalisch's "Bible Studies" can be published in this Journal, the second has reached me ; and I must attempt in briefer compass to give some idea of its contents. In one important respect this volume differs from its predecessor. Each has a "Preliminary Essay ;" but while in the former volume the Essay was a discussion of the character of the prophet (Balaam), the date of the book, and a history of its exegesis, and consequently a mere introduction to the Commentary, in this it takes a far wider range, and is only slightly connected with the Book of Jonah. It is an independent treatise, which will profoundly interest many who are indifferent to the charms of the small and perhaps not very wise Book of Jonah. It surveys the whole history of the relations between "the Hebrew and the Stranger"—between Israel as a nation and the foreigners living among or near them, and between the Jews after the loss of their political existence and the nations of the world. It will readily be anticipated that the Jewish writer who dwelt with peculiar pleasure on the claim of the heathen prophet Balaam to be regarded as a true Prophet of Jahveh, and who now selects the Book of Jonah for elucidation because it illustrates the care of the God of Israel for the heathen Ninevites, must deal with this subject in a remarkably generous and even cosmopolitan spirit. In this he betrays his political affinity with his co-religionists in Germany, who are often the most outspoken and the ablest members of the Left or Radical party, but is far superior to most of them in historical and biblical learning. But a cosmopolitan Jew holds a very peculiar and difficult position. The traditions of his race, including the history and principles contained both in the Bible and in later literature, condemn him to isolation—the more perfect the more virtuous he is ; in his religious observances—and especially the Sabbath, which is patent to all the world—in his marriage and in his diet, he feels himself an alien incapable of assimilation to the nation to which he belongs as a citizen. Cosmopolitan sympathies must be constantly warring against this prescribed exclusiveness ; and if the struggle is not to be a life-long vexation or an uncondi-

tional surrender of one of the opposing principles, the solution must be such a one as Dr. Kalisch has worked out. He passes in review the history of the Hebrews since Abraham, and discovers that Jewish unfriendliness towards strangers and pride in purity of blood are not aboriginal characteristics of the Hebrews at all, but later accretions, adopted partly from political necessities, partly from sacerdotal scheming. It may be said that inasmuch as the exclusiveness cannot be denied or explained away, the question of the date of its origin has only very minor importance to the world generally, though to the Jew it may be a vital point to know whether the ordinances that prescribe isolation are of the highest antiquity and possess religious sanction or not. But this cannot be allowed, unless the whole history of the development of ideas is an unprofitable study. Dr. Kalisch's treatise furnishes another contingent to the forces which are assembling from all sides for the reconstruction of the Old Testament history, and is especially valuable from the fact that it confines itself to one special branch of the subject, which it treats very perspicuously and perhaps exhaustively.

Dr. Kalisch lays down four distinct ages of Hebrew history, each of which marks a development of the religious system. The first terminates with the reign of Solomon and the division of the kingdom; in this, religion was generally free and local, but entered into no competition with the civil power, being subordinate to the state. The second occupies the period of the double kingdom till the Babylonian Captivity; in this, religion was centralized by the establishment of the temple at Jerusalem for the kingdom of Judah, and the gradual abolition of other local sanctuaries; and the forces of religion and the state may be described as co-ordinate yet not mutually aggressive powers. The third extends through the Captivity to about the year 400 B.C.; in it, the power of the state was greatly enfeebled, and that of religion so far enhanced as to rule and colour the state. The fourth age extends from thence to modern times, and witnessed the gradual extinction of the state, and the absorption of its power by religion. The general correctness of this division is justified by the difference of the spirit of the literature which characterizes each. In the first, not to mention less important works, was composed the older part of the Pentateuch, which Dr. Kalisch (without specifying its exact extent, but evidently referring mainly to the Jahvistic portions) designates the Book of the Covenant. The second is mainly characterized by that new reading of the Law which is represented by the Deuteronomist. The third witnessed

that gradual and steady further development of the Law under priestly influence which we are now accustomed to call the Levitical Legislation ; this completed the Biblical Torah. The fourth age is justly designated as the period of Rabbinism in conflict with Hellenism—the foreign element of civilization with which the Jews then first came into contact ; and is represented in literature by the single Book of Daniel in the Canon, and by “the Apocrypha, Philo and Josephus, the Mishnah, the Talmud, and an endless host of Rabbinical writings.” I believe Dr. Kalisch has nowhere previously given a clear conspectus of his views on the gradual development of the Torah, and we have them here expressed with remarkable lucidity. The best defined ages, respecting which few scholars representing the “new learning” would differ from him, and on which his rare combination of Rabbinical learning with appreciation of the spirit of Western philosophy and theology—both old Greek and Christian—render him an authority, are the third and fourth. On the second age there may well be various opinions as to its commencement. Does its new spirit originate with the adoption of Jerusalem as the capital by David, with the centralization of worship by the consecration of the temple by Solomon, or with the disruption of the kingdom after Solomon’s death ? I think the only serious doubt is now between the two latter, and as both events must have largely affected the system of religion, and lie very close together in date, the question is more of words than of fact. That it is wrong to see any great modification in the spirit of the religion before Solomon’s temple was established with its new functions for the Levites, and to commence a new era with the foundation of monarchy (as Ewald does) or with David’s reign, must, I think, be evident to all who have sifted the facts of David’s personality from the mass of tradition concerning his reign. The first age might, no doubt, be subdivided into several ; but the time for doing this has not come yet ; we must wait till we can better pick out the facts of the Exodus and the period of the Judges from the fables with which they are overloaded ; and Dr. Kalisch acts very prudently in treating the whole period down to Solomon provisionally as one.

On the special subject of his essay, the attitude of the Hebrews towards foreigners, Dr. Kalisch contends that the exclusiveness which forms one of the most marked characteristics in later times, especially in the time of Jesus and Paul, and created the main obstruction against which the latter had to struggle all his life, was not original, but grew up, like the Law itself, gradually and by

stages. He calls it a "triple wall of separation," which was built up from the materials of exclusive marriages, circumcision, and dietary laws. The dietary laws were the last to be enforced, as we see from history; for the Book of Daniel is the only canonical book in which they are acknowledged; even in the very late Book of Esther they do not appear, for Esther herself partakes of the banquet of the king and Haman. The Levitical laws which distinguish clean and unclean animals must therefore belong to the very latest period of the code, towards the end of the fifth century. The question of foreign marriages had become of political importance, and attracted attention somewhat earlier. On the return from Babylon, Ezra was intent on fashioning the new state in the spirit of what was then accepted as the Mosaic system—the precepts of Deuteronomy (for we cannot be too careful to remember that the three books which we are accustomed to regard as preceding that—Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers—were not yet in existence, except in fragments, and that Deuteronomy was the only systematic declaration of the Law). The corruption of the "holy people" (Deut. vii. 6) through the unions of their princes with heathen and foreign wives, troubled him and Nehemiah, as it seemed likely to wreck all attempts to preserve the religious purity demanded by the Deuteronomist. Then, therefore, the foreign marriages which had been tolerated and even approved before, came to be looked upon as irreligious, and were strongly discountenanced (Ezra x. 18—44; Neh. xiii. 23—30); though it is evident that the power to put them down completely was lacking, since the books of law contain no precept on the subject. The third barrier proved perhaps the most effective in the end for the purpose of isolating the Hebrews—the rite of circumcision. In a certain sense, it justly claims a very high antiquity. But Dr. Kalisch distinguishes between a *custom* and a *law*. That it was a very ancient custom, practised probably ever since the time of Egyptian bondage, and perhaps learned from the Egyptians, cannot be reasonably doubted. The dislike of the Philistines as uncircumcised is expressed precisely in books of considerable antiquity, and in stories of the old times of the Judges and of David—a.g. in David's dirge for Saul and Jonathan. But Dr. Kalisch says, "until long after the Babylonian exile, circumcision was in Israel only a custom, not a law." In Deuteronomy, circumcision is not even mentioned, and still less is any law on the subject recorded. It is not spoken of as a divine institution in any book of history or by any prophet prior to the Babylonian captivity; the later Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel,

only alluding to it as a custom distinguishing the Hebrews from heathen nations. However, the metaphorical use which is made of the rite by the Deuteronomist and Jeremiah (Deut. x. 16; Jer. iv. 4) shews not only that the rite was familiar in practice, but that it had already become invested with a religious, if not a moral, significance, as indicating purity: the circumcision of the heart denotes the attainment of purity of soul. It became a positive law, incumbent on all Hebrews, only through a single verse belonging to the Levitical legislation of the fifth century, Lev. xii. 3. The story of its institution as a symbol of the covenant between Elohim and Abraham, told in Gen. xvii. 10—14, was invented, according to Dr. Kalisch, at the same time. This certainly appears the necessary conclusion from the evidence; for if that story, imposing such a solemn responsibility upon the Hebrews, had existed before, the Deuteronomist and the prophets who describe the mutual obligations of Jahveh and his people as a covenant, could not fail to enjoin with their most solemn exhortations this sign of the covenant. The necessary inference is, that, however general the custom was, however strongly it suggested purity and religion, it was not yet a symbol of the covenant at all. But that it was general may be inferred from the extreme brevity of the law, which enters into no detail whatever, manifestly because it was too well known to necessitate any exposition.

I rejoice greatly that Dr. Kalisch has taken up the historical method of dealing with the *Thorah*. The result, as might be foreseen, accords in the main with Kuenen's system; and Kalisch does not shrink, like Colenso, from finding the writing of the same Elohist and Levitical writer of the fifth century even in the stories of Genesis, whose high antiquity used to be simply taken for granted. The argument that I have recapitulated may be taken to be satisfactorily established. The moment we are thus relieved from the burden of the Levitical Law, points of history previously not easily explicable become perfectly simple. The story of Ruth, for instance (if anything is to be learned from a romance of late date), is told with manifest sympathy for the Moabitess, who steals the hearts of two Hebrews in succession; very different from the righteous disgust expressed by Ezra and Nehemiah at the similar instance of Jews who had married wives of Ashdod, of Ammon, and of Moab, whom Nehemiah cursed and beat and pulled by the beard for their behaviour. David was none the less esteemed for being great-grandson of the Moabitess Ruth. At the same time it is questionable whether

for his present purpose Dr. Kalisch's argument is adequate. When he would fain prove that the sentiments of the Hebrews towards foreigners were not so unfriendly as is commonly supposed, it is scarcely of much avail to say, "There was no positive legislation, only an old custom." Popular sentiments are expressed quite as much in customs as in laws; and only the learned could know whether a universally observed rite was enacted by law or by custom, which is often said to be stronger than law. The argument respecting circumcision, therefore, I cannot accept as justifying the inference, though I do not dispute the facts on which it is based.

In tracing the position of the foreigner dwelling amongst the Hebrews, Dr. Kalisch is remarkably clear and successful. In the first age he shews that the stranger (*גֵּר* *ger*) dwelling permanently among them was treated with kindness and almost as one of themselves; he required the rest of the Sabbath no less than the Hebrew, and the latter having been a stranger in Egypt could sympathize with his position (Ex. xxiii. 9, 12). In the second age the same kindly feelings find frequent and powerful expression in Deuteronomy. So far from Jahveh being generous only to his own people, it is declared that He "executes justice for the orphan and the widow, and loves the stranger, giving him food and raiment; and ye must love the stranger, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Deut. x. 18); and in other passages the stranger is coupled with the orphan, the widow and the homeless Levite, as deserving objects of charity and of the protection of the law against oppression (Deut. i. 16, xiv. 29, xxiv. 14, 15, 17, 19—21, xxvii. 19). He was likewise to attend at the Feasts of Weeks and of Tabernacles and the presentation of first fruits (xvi. 9—15, xxvi. 11—13). To these evidences of sympathy between the Hebrews and the strangers living with them, I am surprised to find that Dr. Kalisch adds that at the great Passover-celebration ordained by king Hezekiah the strangers also from all parts of the land repaired to the common sanctuary, and "rejoiced," like the whole congregation of Judah and Israel; for this Passover, unnoticed by the Historian, is only described by the Chronicler (2 Chron. xxx.), and is itself one of the most glaring instances of pure fiction invented by that romancer. At the commencement of the next period, the Captivity, the strangers were placed by the prophets in a still closer union with the Hebrews. Ezekiel (xlvi. 22, 23) says that when the land is divided by lot, the strangers that live permanently and have children in a Hebrew tribe shall have their share of land and devise it precisely like natives;

and the later Isaiah as explicitly gives even to the "foreigner" (גֵּר־יָנֶכְדָּר) an equal place with Israel in the "holy mountain" for their offerings, provided they abandon idolatry and worship Jahveh : "for mine house shall be called a house of prayers for all peoples" (Is. lvi. 3—7 and elsewhere). But, Dr. Kalisch says of these prophets,

"The great men in Israel had expected to win over the Hebrew people to so firm and fervid a faith in Jahveh, that the surrounding nations would be drawn into the same circle of a refined religion and an elevated morality by the power of truth manifesting itself in a holy enthusiasm and in nobleness of conduct. But the Hebrew people evinced neither the capacity nor the zeal necessary for so great a mission. . . . Men equal to the momentous emergency were not wanting, and Ezra and Nehemiah performed the arduous task in a certain sense with an ability and a success which saved and consolidated the Hebrew nation—but *created Judaism in the place of the old and freer Hebraism*: for they merged the state in their religion. . . . They endeavoured, like their fellow-workers in the next generations, to separate Jews and Gentiles with the utmost rigour; and for this purpose they deemed two measures especially effective—the unconditional interdiction of foreign marriages, and the solemn appointment of circumcision as a 'sign of the Covenant.'"

The Passover became at the same time a crucial test of full admission to the Jewish community; and a distinction was made between the domiciled *stranger* (גֵּר *ger*), known before, who could not be excluded, and the *sojourner* (תּוֹשָׁב *toshav*, a word not used before), who was not admitted to the Passover, and consequently not to the congregation of Israel. It is unnecessary to pursue further the principle of exclusiveness which thus gained head, if it did not arise, in the age of the Restoration. It led directly to the sentiments of pride of birth and fanaticism, which culminated in the ideas current in the fourth and last age, of Israel being a holy people, a people of saints, under the special protection of God and the archangel Michael, and their enemies being the enemies of God. I have not, in this notice of the Hebrews' attitude towards strangers, recorded the many exceptions to be found more in history than in legislation to the beneficent precepts inculcated, though Dr. Kalisch carefully presents both sides. It would take too much space, and serve no useful end, as many of them will occur to the mind of every well-informed reader. Many of these exceptions illustrate the general difference between principles and practice; some are accounted for by the necessities or the natural excesses of war.

Dr. Kalisch winds up his most interesting essay by a protest against the idea that "a purified Judaism" or "a purified Christianity" can be identical with "a religion of absolute humanity;" for "Judaism inseparably involves the ceremonialism and exclusiveness of the Old Testament and the Talmud, and Christianity by its very name comprises the Incarnation and the Trinity." This judgment sounds rather strange in the mouth of one who has done so much to prove the late—we might say apocryphal—origin of the ceremonial and exclusive laws, which gained authority mainly by taking the name of Moses in vain. Or, if he merely means that "Judaism" established by Ezra involved all the ceremonial, why does he not offer to the Jews who thirst for a wider and more spiritual religion a return to the older pre-Judaic religion of Israel, which knew nothing of the later exclusiveness? The observation on Christianity is open to a similar criticism. If the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity are stumbling-blocks in the way of its becoming a religion of humanity, is it not open to us to go back to a time before these were formulated into Athanasian dogma, and to find a simpler and less scholastic form of faith in the life and sayings of Christ himself, when we have submitted the New Testament to the comparative criticism necessary for eliminating its less trustworthy elements? Nevertheless, Dr. Kalisch does find in the Old Testament the doctrines which are "the sum of all wisdom and all sanctity,*" and looks hopefully forward to the time when "there will be no distinction between Hebrew and Stranger, no separation between Jew and Gentile, no division between race and race, because all alike shall be holy."

On the Commentary on Jonah I must be brief, and there is in truth no need to say much. Dr. Kalisch's ability in this department is well known, as well as his practice of pressing into his service all possible witnesses. Jonah took ship at Joppa, so he thinks it necessary to give us a full history of that place, seven pages long. Jonah is swallowed by a great fish, and he gives not only instances of similar stories among the ancients, but stories of the dimensions and habits of real monster-fishes, occupying eleven

* Viz. "The Eternal He is God" (1 Kings xviii. 39); That man dwells in God and God in him "who walks uprightly, and works righteousness, and speaks the truth in his heart" (Ps. xv. 2), and "Forsooth, we have all one Father; forsooth, one God has created us" (Mal. ii. 10). It is curious that Dr. Kalisch should in the second precept substitute a New Testament formula, "that man dwells in God and God in him," for the simpler original, "shall dwell in thy holy hill."

pages therewith. In citing the various interpretations that have been given of disputed passages, he aims at being exhaustive, and is therefore here also extremely lengthy. On this I must observe, that where an interpretation is adopted palpably, not because the critic thinks the words by the necessity of language must have that meaning, but because any other meaning would be inconsistent with his arbitrarily adopted speculative opinions—e.g. on the inspiration and consequent objective truth of the statement—it is scarcely worth consideration; thus Pusey's and Huxtable's sillinesses may be amusing enough, but can be of no use whatever as criticism, and it is hardly kind to quote them at length for the benefit of the scoffer. Dr. Kalisch's style, though marvellously correct and sometimes rising to real eloquence, is unfortunately very wordy; I always long to cut out about half the words in his sentences as unnecessary or tautological. All these causes combined render his Commentaries very voluminous; the essential matter would be far more effective if it were more easily found, and not buried among so much that is superfluous. The history of Joppa would be in its place in an Encyclopedia. If the fish were called by some special name, there would be good reason for inquiring what fish was intended; but as it is simply "a great fish," and the story is admitted to be a fiction, what reason is there to enter on an inquiry into the habits of whales and sharks? But, whatever may be thought of the strictly expository portion of the Commentary, I think there will be few students who will not be impatient under the infliction of many pages of such "improvements" of the Biblical text as the following, which explains nothing, tells nothing new, and only attempts to realize the moral and religious state of mind of Jonah at a crisis which after all is admitted to be fictitious.

"Did Jonah, yielding to the shipmaster's request, call upon his God? The narrative is silent on this point. If Jonah offered up a prayer, its tenor was surely very different from that of the other occupants of the vessel. How could he entreat for the cessation of the storm which, as he well knew (?), was sent for his own retribution? . . . He is certain that both he and his companions are in the hands of an Omnipotence able to find means to call him, the offender, to account without destroying the innocent. *He hears therefore with equanimity the proposal of the passengers to ascertain the guilty person by lot, in the infallibility of which he, the Hebrew, believed as firmly as the pagans,*" &c.

This style of commentary fills up the gaps of the text by conjecture; and I draw especial attention to the words printed in italics,

as the narrative gives no hint on the subject, and there is an unwelcome inconsistency between the severity with which Dr. Kalisch lashes those critics who have imputed to Balaam modes of greed not indicated by the history, and the readiness which he here betrays to penetrate by pure speculation, speaking as fact, into the mind of Jonah.

Dr. Kalisch's remarks on the probable sources of the book rather disappoint me. After disposing of the idea of its literal truth, he declares it "impossible to agree with those who regard the Book of Jonah as a pure fiction, . . . and do not allow it to possess any historical foundation whatever, not even the feeble support of a tradition," and says that the truth probably lies between the two extreme views; for that, as De Wette observes, "such stories are not purely invented in antiquity." De Wette may justly be called a "thoughtful critic," as here by Kalisch; but his observation was limited to "antiquity," and his mind was not made up as to the age of this book. I should say, on the other hand, that towards the end of the ancient world, of Greece, Palestine, and I believe Egypt, Syria and other countries of which I cannot claim any knowledge, the form of literature called romances or novels did spring up and attain a marvellous popularity. Mr. Cheyne, in an admirable article in this Journal (Vol. XIV. p. 211), speaks of the Books of Ruth and Jonah as belonging to "a new style of literature—the novelistic"—to which he afterwards adds Esther and Tobit. It need scarcely be observed that a novel may attach itself to the names and lives of historical persons, as Old Mortality to Claverhouse; and so the story before us finds its hero in the old prophet Jonah mentioned in 2 Kings xiv. 25. When Dr. Kalisch says, "It cannot be doubted that the main incidents were derived from legends based on real occurrences," I find the burden imposed on me as beyond doubt too heavy. The only tangible incident is the account given in this book; I am required to believe in a legend as the source of this, and again in a real occurrence as the source of the legend. But the written statement need not be based on a legend, of the existence of which there is no other proof; and, if this be conceded, we know very well that a legend is quite as likely to have a purely mythical as an historical origin. Dr. Kalisch's exemplification of his assertion does not inspire confidence. "A Hebrew prophet in the time of Jeroboam II. *may have been in political or spiritual connection with Nineveh, and may have contemplated a diplomatic or missionary journey to this town, whether on his own account or by command of the king,*" &c. Verily, the

liberties taken by legend with the history of a diplomatic mission from Jeroboam II. to Assyria, in converting it into Jonah's abrupt declaration, "Yet forty days and Nineveh will be overthrown," are greater than Sir Walter Scott ever took with his historical incidents! Mr. Cheyne, in the article referred to, which it is unfortunate that Dr. Kalisch has not seen, so as to insert it in his very full list of the bibliography of the Book of Jonah, treated the writer as a sort of Ovid, who has made use of an ancient nature-myth of the dragon or fish, representing darkness, that tries to swallow the sun—a conception which is found in the early Babylonian mythology, and evidently from a Babylonian source in the later Hebrew books, such as the second Isaiah and Job; and Goldziher speaks very similarly.*

In conclusion, I think—not that much study of single words with microscopic exactitude has caused Dr. Kalisch to appreciate less the tone of the whole, for his remarks (even when, as I have complained, too wordy) generally perform this duty remarkably well—but that he fails to impress upon the reader with adequate distinctness the wonderful and really immeasurable distance of mind, literary appliances, and all that goes to make up *style* both of soul and of expression, between this book and the Prophets. This is the more to be regretted because it stands among the Prophets, and superficial readers will not at once detect the difference. It is an example of the age of free romance, that a writer is able to invent the largest machinery—the threatened destruction of Nineveh, the marvellous growth of the ricinus tree over Jonah's head, and the worm that destroyed it in a day, and then the fearful east wind with its heat, all miraculously prepared by God for Jonah's instruction—only to inculcate the simple moral lesson with which the book closes: "Thou didst regret the ricinus tree . . . and should I not spare Nineveh, that great city?" In short, it is more of an Agadah than of a Biblical book; and even as the latter, its natural place would certainly be in the Hagiographa rather than among the Prophets. Mr. Cheyne very properly remarks: "Ordinary readers, especially when influenced by theological prejudice, are unable to realize the inveterate love of romance common to the ancient Jews with the other nations of the East. Yet surely the marks of a story are as patent in the Book of Jonah as in any of the tales of the Thousand and One Nights. The hero, no doubt, acts most properly under the

* Eng. tr., p. 102.

circumstances, but how grotesquely improbable those circumstances are!" A sense of this grotesqueness is just what is wanting in Dr. Kalisch; it would substitute an air of natural feeling for a kind of solemn artificial propriety which scarcely accords with the freedom of the discussion.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

2. SEMITIC PHILOLOGY AND RELIGION.

Sir W. Martin has published the second and concluding Part of his "Inquiries."* The remarks I made on the first Part (Theol. Rev., Vol. XIII. pp. 573—575, for 1876) may be applied to this also; and I see no indication that he has observed my recommendation to study Mr. Driver's treatise "On the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew," which, while strengthening his general position on the force of the tenses, would have preserved him from many errors of detail. That he is not a safe guide throughout (although frequently right) might be shewn from many cases. In his comment on the use of the imperfect in Joel ii. 17—19, he quite correctly gives to the imperfect with ׀ in vv. 18, 19 (וַיִּזְכֹּר, וַיִּתְּנֵם, וַיִּזְכֹּר) the only possible sense of a past aorist: "Then was the Lord jealous—and pitied—and answered." But on the simple imperfects וַיִּתְּנֵם, וַיִּזְכֹּר in v. 17, he observes, "The verb, being in the imperfect, and *without anything in the context to mark or suggest a future time*, must be taken to indicate a present act," and then translates it as relatively present, "Between the porch and the altar *were* the priests *weeping*." The fact is, however, that there *is* something in the context to indicate future time: these imperfects are, as the imperfect so often is, simply a continuation of the imperatives that precede. In fact, Sir W. Martin himself allows וַיִּזְכֹּר in the preceding verse to retain the imperative sense; and the following verbs continue the same construction. In a long series of commands, the imperative is rarely used beyond the first few verbs; it is taken up by the imperfect. And as there is no third person to the imperative, a command in the third person is of necessity expressed by the imperfect in the first instance, and in succeeding instances generally by the perfect with ׀ conversive. Sir W. Martin then enunciates the following rule: "When, in a statement of a fact, it is desired to give emphasis to some words which would ordinarily be placed after the main verb

* Inquiries concerning the Structure of the Semitic Languages. Part II. London: Williams and Norgate. 1878.

of the sentence, such words are brought forward to the beginning of the sentence, and *the verb (in the imperfect) is placed before the noun* which indicates the agent or subject of the verb ;” and again, “On the other hand, where a fact is announced without a stress being laid on any circumstance of the act, *the noun stands before the verb.*” The words italicised are surely utterly erroneous. The normal position of words in the independent sentence in all the Semitic languages is, that the verb precedes its subject. The idea that the precedence of certain words for the sake of emphasis occasions an inversion of the relative position of verb and subject, must surely have been suggested to Sir W. Martin by the German idiom. Whence he has derived the further development of this idea, that under these circumstances the verb is necessarily put in the *imperfect*, I cannot conceive. In the five passages that he quotes, the verb would in any case be in the imperfect ; even in 1 Kings iii. 4, as it indicates a repeated or habitual act ; but where the act is completed, the verb is in the perfect, whether other words precede or not : see the very next verse, 1 Kings iii. 5, ib. 13, Gen. iii. 16, 17.

The dissertation on the particle “*ע*” is mainly wasted labour, because the writer has not distinguished between the particle that indicates a definite object of the act expressed by the verb and the preposition *with*. Prefixed to a noun, both these particles appear in the form *אִתּוֹ* ; but before personal pronouns their difference appears distinctly, the former being *אִתּוֹ, אִתָּךְ, אִתָּנוּ, אִתְּכֶם*, &c., and the latter *אִתִּי, אִתְּךָ, אִתָּנוּ, אִתְּכֶם*, &c. The scriptura plena (*אִתּוֹ*, &c.), which is very frequently used in the former word, precludes the idea that the distinction is only invented by the punctuators. The error is the same as that of a Latinist who should attempt to harmonize the various uses of the word *os*—forgetting to look beyond the nominative case, when the genitive would have shewn a divergence : *os oris*, and *os ossis*.

The main contention of the chapter on the Tetragrammaton, concerning the fundamental meaning of the verb *הָיָה* or *הָיָה* (which Sir W. Martin accepts as the root of the name JHWH), that it is properly *to come into existence* or *into a certain state*, *to happen*, is perfectly sound, though supported by examples among which are found grammatical errors as serious as those previously indicated. But the writer might have noted that the distinction between *to become* and *to be* is one of tense only, not of radical conception. *To have become* at a past time is *to be* now. Liddell and Scott shew this of *γέγονα, πέφυκα, ἔφην* ; and similarly it is impossible to restrict

the force of the Hebrew verb in all cases to the change of state which in the great majority of passages it undoubtedly expresses. The Divine name is explained, I think probably rightly, if its origin can be fixed upon Hebrew ground, and does not really date from an earlier stage of Semitism, of which we know as yet too little to speak confidently—a possibility which a cautious critic ought to leave open—from the causative sense “to bring into existence.” Whether Sir W. Martin is right in interpreting this, not of creation in general, but specifically of creating new conditions for Jahveh’s people Israel = delivering or redeeming them, is a point well worthy of consideration, and ably discussed by him. It was mentioned in my Dissertation on the pronunciation of the Divine name (Ewald’s History, Vol. II.), § 9, since writing which I have discovered that the Greek translation called Cod. Ven. sanctions the causative meaning, translating “by *ὁνείας* “he that causes to be.”

Of the chapter on Semitic roots, in which for the hundredth (?) time an attempt is made to reduce the triliteral roots into more primitive biliteral ones, I can only say that it may be neither better nor worse than similar guesses by Gesenius, Fürst and other less distinguished predecessors; but that such labour, based on such developed and recent forms of Semitism as Hebrew and Arabic, is perfectly idle, liable to be overthrown any day by discoveries of the more ancient language. To be worth anything, such speculation must attach itself to the oldest accessible language—Assyrian, Himyarite, &c.—and wait till we know more of these.

The Rabbi of the Sinai congregation at Chicago, Dr. Kohler, sends us a German translation of the Song of Songs,* which is in many respects a remarkable work. Since the common sense and the historical sentiment of the present age decided, against the time-honoured traditions of both Jewish and Christian medieval interpretation, that this little poem is not a mystical allegory, but a song of literal and earthly love, many attempts have been made to discover and restore its proper form. For it has been pretty generally acknowledged to be dramatic in form—i. e. to consist of speeches assigned to various speakers, and to be divided by recognizable pauses into several parts which may be fittingly called acts or scenes. But a drama from which all indications of the names and changes of the speakers, of the locality and divisions of the scenes, and all

* Das Hohe Lied, übersetzt und kritisch neubearbeitet von Dr. K. Kohler. New York: B. Westermann. 1878.

stage-directions, have been excluded, must tax to the utmost the ingenuity of the most experienced dramatic critic to restore its proper form ; and when there is so little action and so much lyrical writing as in the Song of Songs, the task may well become almost impossible. Still, however uncertain the result, it must be attempted when once it has been recognized that the poem is dramatic. That it is dramatic appears (independently of the sense of the words) from the frequent changes of gender and number in the first and second persons, which shew that sometimes a man is speaking, sometimes a woman ; here a man is addressed, there a woman, &c. ; and from the refrain at ii. 7, iii. 4, and viii. 4, which apparently winds up a scene and introduces a pause in the action. In so far as a multitude of speakers go to constitute a drama, the book of Job, the only other work of fiction strictly so called in the Hebrew Scriptures (unless we are to regard Ruth and Esther as pure romances), is one ; and Ewald long ago spoke of that as the one Biblical tragedy, while the Song of Songs was comedy. In so far as tragedy concerns itself with perplexed and painful moral problems and employs the grand figures of gods and heroes, while comedy moves along the lower level of ordinary human life and natural unexalted sentiment, the comparison is just. But it is not to be pressed too far. Job, at least, is more like a Platonic dialogue or "symposium" than a drama ; it has no real action. The Song of Songs has certainly a more decidedly dramatic character ; but if it is absolutely the only proof of any dramatic genius among the Hebrews, we might well hesitate about treating it as a true drama. It is therefore important to notice that Dr. Kohler is able to bring this work into contact with other evidence of the existence of popular plays (*Volksspiele*) of a similar character among the Jews in ancient times. He says, "It is undoubtedly an ingenious idea of Bruell, to put this lyric play into combination with the popular festivals on the fifteenth of Ab and at the conclusion of the Feast of Atonement (mentioned in the Mishnah at the end of Thaanioth), at which the "daughters of Jerusalem," festively attired, chanted antiphonal songs of an idyllic and erotic character like the Song of Songs, with dancing and acting in the vineyards." But, he adds, the cumbrous language of the specimens there given prove them to be only a feeble echo of what must have had a far more vigorous life in the freer times before the Captivity and the benumbing influence of Levitism and Rabbinism. In support of the same idea, he refers to the festal plays still performed in Syria at weddings, which are described and compared with the Song

of Songs by Consul Wetzstein in an Appendix to Delitzsch's Commentary on the latter.

Dr. Kohler prepares us in his Preface for considerable emendations and transpositions in the text, "of convincing probability," and "awaits with confidence acknowledgment from unprejudiced (*vorurtheilsfrei*) Biblical critics." His confidence, I think, is excessive; for he yields to the temptation to emend, not only when the text is manifestly corrupt and gives no sense without undue straining of the words, but even when he wishes for something different, although his wishes may be only the product of a preconception which may be altogether erroneous. As he has these preconceptions (*Vorurtheile*), he can scarcely expect critics who are free from them always to assent to conclusions based upon them. As an instance, I may quote the three opening verses, which he puts into the mouth of a chorus of ladies of Solomon's court, because he wishes to make the shepherdess-heroine enter at verse 5. Verses 2—4 are given as follows:

- "2. *Kiss us* with the kisses of *thy* mouth, | for thy love is better than wine, | *and the smell of thy mouth than all spices.*
3. *Like oil of myrrh are thy kisses*, | therefore do maidens love thee.
4. Lead *us*, we will hasten after thee, | *bring us*, O king, into *thy* chambers, | we will exult and rejoice with thee, | *we will drink our fill of love like wine*, | *we will give ourselves up to flirting.*"

The words in italics are based upon conjectural emendations of the text (not of the points alone); or, in other words, sixteen out of thirty-one words of the original are altered; of which ten are changed by unsupported conjecture, and six from hints furnished by the Septuagint. The conjectures sometimes appear untenable because the words proposed belong to a late period of Biblical Hebraism, or are not Biblical at all; the former is probably the case with *נְקִימָה* and *נְקִימָה* proposed in v. 4, and the latter with "*che'orah*," translated "black," by which I presume the Rabbinical *קְעִיר* (or *קְעִיר*) *turpis* to be meant, which is substituted for *נְקִימָה* in i. 5. But some of the conjectures, especially those that demand no change of text, seem very happy; among these I would place the substitution of the second person feminine for the first person in the verbs in v. 1, *בִּאתִי*, &c, as the former is frequently written with *תִּי* instead of *אִי*, and was originally pronounced *ti*, as in Aramaic and Arabic; "*I came into my own garden*," is much less likely than "*Thou camest into my garden*," especially as the vocative "my sister-bride" follows. This old form of the second person was certain to be mistaken in

later times for the first person. But while I must characterize the corrections of the text as very hazardous—somewhat in Grätz's style, only worse—the transpositions of verses or groups of verses appear often very happy, and to have an intrinsic probability. They are sometimes suggested by the text itself. Thus after i. 15, Dr. Kohler inserts iv. 1—5, 7; and the repetition of i. 15 in iv. 1 makes some such displacement very probable. So also he says that the last two verses in the book are obviously isolated verses that have been dropped out of their proper context; he therefore inserts viii. 13 after ii. 13, and combines viii. 14 with ii. 17. Two important suggestions as to the supposed persons of the play deserve mention here. Dr. Kohler follows Bruell in regarding iii. 6—11 as a description of an actual royal bridal procession, which the words of v. 11 certainly seem to justify. If this is correct, then (after the removal of iv. 1—5, 7) the following words, iv. 6, 8—15, must be addressed by the king to his bride, not to the fair shepherdess with whom he has been hitherto flirting. This seems to be justified by the form of address, since here alone the term *כלה* *bride* (also *כלתי* *my sister-bride*), and in the other places *רעייתי* *my dear*, is used. After this wedding the shepherdess is not again solicited by the king. The second suggestion is, that vi. 10 introduces a new scene, in which a "sword-dance" is performed in honour of the king and his bride, by a dancing-girl girt with the sword. This idea would probably never have been extracted from the text itself by the wildest ingenuity, but is due to Wetzstein's account of similar performances in Syria at the present day. Still, it has a good deal to recommend it. It explains the military similes in vi. 10, 12, 4 (the order assumed is vi. 10, 12, 4, 5, vii. 1—10 [vi. 13, vii. 1—9 A.V.]); explains the obscure "Return, return, O Shulamite," &c., as the applause of the spectators crying *encore*; and makes the lascivious tone of the verses at the beginning of chapter vii. for the first time intelligible as the praise showered upon a half-nude ballet-dancer. By this device the heroine is saved the humiliation of having to hear any words of this nature even from the king. It should be observed that if this conjecture be adopted, the heroine can no longer be called "the Shulamite;" this term occurs only in vii. 1, and belongs to the dancer. Whatever be the meaning of this epithet, it is more likely to belong to a secondary person: the lover is anonymous, and it is scarcely likely that his lady would have a name assigned her; moreover, if she had, it would occur oftener, she would be addressed by it, and the piece would probably be called after it.

The notes are exceedingly meagre, indeed scarcely sufficient to shew accurately what readings the editor adopts in all cases, and certainly not to justify the alterations to those inclined to question them. The Chicago press appears to have no Hebrew type, and the Hebrew words in the notes are given in a transliteration which is not always intelligible. Dr. Kohler, apparently from carelessness rather than ignorance, makes several slips: thus *hibim*, *ebony*, for *הִבִּים*; *maanaddoth*, *chains*, for *מַעַדְוֹת*; and he proposes to read in i. 4, *nishgeh ahabim*, in accordance with Prov. v. 19, where, however, we have the preposition *בְּ* used after the verb *נִשְׁגָּה*.

Pastor Löhr commences a short essay on Isaiah xl.—lxvi.* with the assertion that Delitzsch, in his concluding observations on Drechsler's Commentary, has proved Isaiah's Babylonian prophecies to be genuine—i.e. from the pen of the historical Isaiah, the contemporary of Hezekiah. I have not threshed again this grain, which I thought had been finally beaten out and housed long before Delitzsch came into the field; and am therefore not in a position to criticise Delitzsch or his present disciple, who endeavours to find an ethical ground clearer than Delitzsch had discovered for the ante-exilic composition. But the first words that meet me are, that Delitzsch asserts that in the contents of these speeches not a trace is found which could lead to the idea that this book is by a prophet of the ante-exilic age; truly an eccentric mode of proving its origin in that age! Here Löhr is directly at issue with Delitzsch, and asserts the existence of such traces. Between the two I am fairly bewildered, and turn to my Isaiah for light, where the opening words "Comfort ye" awake again my constant feeling of the commencement of a new book, and the first introduction of a new personality, whose mind and literary style are very far indeed from those of Israel himself. Whence this constantly recurring desire to attribute this anonymous book to Isaiah? It was tacked on at the end of Isaiah because no one knew what it belonged to, and it was against the over-methodical principles of the founders of the Canon to allow a foundling to remain unclaimed—much as Judges xvii.—xxi. were tacked on to the book of Judges, Prov. xxx. and xxxi. to Proverbs, and as two independent books were joined together and called Zechariah.

I can only mention in a few words the establishment of a German

* Zur Frage über die Echtheit von Jesaia 40—66. Ein realkritischer Beitrag von Löhr. Berlin. 1878.

Society for the exploration of Palestine, prompted by emulation of the success of our Palestine Exploration Fund. Its object is to promote the scientific investigation of Palestine in every sense, and to extend the interest in it among the general public; and this end is to be attained by the publication of a journal and by the promotion of investigation of the soil of Palestine itself. It starts with a list of nearly 200 members, including most of the names which would naturally be looked for; almost all are from Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia and Switzerland. The best known names on the committee are Kiepert, Gildemeister, Delitzsch, Philippi, Bädcker, Brüll, Socin, Kautzsch, and Count von Moltke. The first number of the "*Zeitschrift*"* contains an account by the architect (Baurath) Schick, now at Jerusalem, on lately discovered rock-graves on the Mount of Evil Council and antiquities on the north-west wall of Jerusalem; also a very full bibliographical notice of publications on Palestine in 1877 and somewhat earlier, by Socin (including articles and letters in literary papers), amounting to 168. It is a highly promising commencement.

"Notes"† by a Clergyman, acutely criticising the defence of Daniel's authorship of the Book of Daniel by Pusey, Westcott, Keil, Fuller and others, is a tract of some significance. It is interesting as shewing what an influence a large book by a vigorous writer and an authority in the Church may acquire over the minds of the clergy independently of its merits in argument, and what courage is required to come forth and impugn such a book. Dr. Pusey's book on Daniel presented no such terrors to lay readers, who could not but be more struck by its rudeness of manner, its offensive imputation of motives, and its fussy assumption of dogmatic superiority, than by the cogency of its reasoning; and this was duly noticed at the time in this journal. The Clergyman examines what has been said by the above-named writers in defence of the authorship by Daniel under the following heads: Greek words; Persian words; Belshazzar; Darius the Mede; Porphyry's objection; Daniel and the Canon; Internal evidence of authenticity. By his own judgment, unaided by what he calls the "advanced books on Daniel," to none of which he has had access, he works out his conclusion, that "its

* *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palaestina-Vereins. Herausgegeben unter der Redaction von Lic. Hermann Guthe. Leipzig: Baedeker.*

† *Notes on the Defence of the Book of Daniel, addressed to the Clergy. By a Clergyman. Dublin: W. McGee. 1878.*

defenders have failed on every point on which I have tested them." His notes contain no matter and no reasoning that will be new to those who have studied the book ; but the argument is as terse and vigorous as Colenso's, and the testimony is peculiarly valuable. The only thing wanted to make it as important as it might be is the publication of the writer's name.

Professor Tiele's lecture on Assyriology,* delivered on his assumption of the chair of the General History of Religions at Leiden, is published in a German translation. Its tone is one of hopeful anticipation of the future results of Assyrian studies, and of faith in the best of the scholars now engaged in them—he names Sayce, Schrader and Delitzsch, but would surely not refuse to the French scholars, especially Lenormant, a place beside them. I extract one important paragraph. After reminding us that the comparative study of religions commenced with Aryan nations only, owing to the new and abundant light shed on the antiquity of those peoples through the discovery and interpretation of the Indian and Persian religious books, and that we are only now beginning to possess the means of initiating similar investigations concerning other races, he continues :

"The sources from which we could draw a knowledge of the Semitic religion have till now been but few. We could see in the Old Testament the height to which the national religion of Israel had been elevated, thanks to a Moses, a Samuel, and a brilliant series of prophets. But its origin could scarcely be reached even by conjecture from some few scattered hints, which the pious champions of the exclusive worship of Jehovah had been unable entirely to extirpate. The religion of the Phenicians had become known through the Greeks and from inscriptions, generally very short. Of that of the Syrians even less (if possible) was known. Almost all memory of the religion of the Arabs before Mohammed was obliterated by Islam. Lastly, the Himyaritic inscriptions, which give information about the religion of the Sabeans in South Arabia, were then not yet discovered, and even now when they have been deciphered are found to be very laconic. What a gain to science, therefore, was the discovery and deciphering of written documents which give us the knowledge of an old Semitic religion more cultivated than any other, and which was, if not the mother, at least the elder sister, of all the religions of the northern Semites ! Here we find again a great number of stories of gods and heroes, which are met with throughout the whole district between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean, and even

* Die Assyriologie und ihre Ergebnisse für die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte. Aus dem Holländischen, von K. Friederici. Leipzig.

as far as the shores of the Nile. We find them here in a much more antique, and a more intelligible, form than anywhere else. . . . The religious literature of Babylonia and Assyria is destined to play in the comparative theology of the Semites a part similar to that held by the Vedas in the system of the Aryans."

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

The value of Mr. Macnaught's inquiry into the history of the Lord's Supper* is diminished by the facts, that he looks at the subject solely from the standpoint of a member of the English Church, and that he evidently keeps in view throughout his work a controversial purpose, namely, to disprove every form of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and all ritual practices in connection with the celebration. His volume, nevertheless, will be found useful, especially by the members of his own Church, and by those who are accustomed to treat the New Testament writings in the same manner as he does. This is not in all cases consistent with the principle he has laid down in such passages as the following :

"So true is it, in this sense as in all senses, that the letter killeth and the spirit giveth life. This lesson of charity and wisdom we may well learn from the proved and important omissions occurring in some portions of the sacred volume, from the various readings and various arrangements of words to be met with so frequently in other portions, and not least in the history of the institution of the sacred Supper."—P. 29.

"In such displacement, and abridgment, and variations, we are again taught how the Gospels are the sacred instrument for awakening and sustaining the spirit of Christianity in all devout and earnest students, but are not a literal transcript of words and sentences out of which, by the mere formularies of logical definition and inference, apart from the temper of beneficence, love, and salvation, sentences may be constructed which shall be reliable dogmas of the faith."—P. 33.

A detailed examination of the four narratives contained respectively in the three Synoptical Gospels and in the Epistle to the Corinthians—probably they might more truly be described as two narratives—shews that we have two distinct accounts of the words used by Christ in the institution of the Lord's Supper. Mr. Macnaught lays stress on the fact that the one represents him as saying,

* *Cœna Domini: an Essay on the Lord's Supper; its Primitive Institution, Apostolic Uses, and subsequent History.* By the Rev. John Macnaught, M.A., ex-Incumbent of St. Chrysostom's, Liverpool; of Laura Chapel, Bath; and of Trinity Chapel, Conduit Street, London. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1878.

"This is my blood of the covenant," and the other, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood;" and preferring the latter, as yielding "a definite and intelligible signification in harmony alike with the writings of the Old Testament, the usages of the Passover, and the ideas which were current among the Christian Hebrews of the apostolic age," he suggests that this phrase, "the new covenant in my blood," may be taken as defining the signification of the parallel phrase in the first two Gospels. He urges that it is at any rate in the highest degree probable that Jesus in like manner said, "This bread is the new covenant in my body which is given for you." The supposed scriptural foundation for the theory of an objective change in the elements is thus removed. Whether such reasoning will have weight with any believers in that doctrine may well be doubted. It may be regretted that in the minute comparison of the records, stress is not laid on the fact, that only in the accounts given by Luke and Paul (so similar as to be evidently derived from the same source) are found the words, "Do this in remembrance of me." It would have been well to notice, either for confirmation or refutation, the deduction that has been thence drawn, that the maintenance of the celebration as a memorial rite was the work of the Apostle Paul.

The rest of the first book is occupied with a careful examination of all the passages in the Acts and Epistles bearing on the subject, and the conclusion is fully and satisfactorily established, that they contain no trace of any teaching like that of the Roman Catholic Church. The second book traces the history of post-apostolic doctrine in reference to the Lord's Supper. The simplicity of the early usage is powerfully contrasted with the ceremony of the Mass, the translation of the Salisbury Mass-book being given at length. It will strike the reader, however, that the idea of a conversion of the bread into the body of Christ appears very early in the Fathers, and the only explanation offered of the phrases found in the Ignatian Epistle and in Justin Martyr is, that there was a misconception of the words of Christ. Henceforward there was a "bifurcation of Christian thought. At one time the imperfect and abridged and paraphrastic version of the Saviour's words, This is my body, This is my blood, will cling to each mind and impress it. At another time the same Christian mind will be under other and truer and more spiritual influence, and there will be a powerful reaction against the materializing of spiritual things which is sure to arise out of this curtailed and misleading statement of our Lord's real words, as he employed them at the institution of the Eucharist, and as they stand

recorded by St. Luke and St. Paul" (p. 148). To those who attach supreme importance to the usage of antiquity, this must appear a weak point in the argument.

The third book, occupying half the volume, is devoted to a consideration of the Lord's Supper in the Church of England, a comparison of the service as it appears in successive English Prayer-books, and an elaborate analysis of the form now in use, with comments on its several parts. No better idea can be given of the spirit that pervades the whole work, than that conveyed by a quotation from the last page :

"We have striven to make it plain that whereas Christ is ever in all men as the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world ; and whereas the Lord ever abideth especially with and in all his disciples ; yet, such is our weakness, we are not able at all times to realize his presence ; but there are sent to us, nevertheless, times of refreshing, means of grace ; and so it comes to pass that in prayer or praise, in joy or sorrow, in baptism or the eucharist, in some deed of benevolence, or in some period of self-abasement—in either of these events, or in any of a thousand other modes of God's dealing with us, there is an awakening on our part ; we become conscious of Christ's indwelling ; the electric spark of divine love makes us aware of his presence ; and this occasional consciousness, whether it is connected with the Lord's Supper or with aught else, is a real, true, and subjective evidence of Christ's presence. No material object has come into our mind ; but the spirit of Christ, ever present there, has moved and quickened some nerve of our spiritual and subjective life."—P. 429.

The subject of the former part of Mr. Voysey's volume*—"The Mystery of Pain"—is so difficult a problem, and one so practically important to every religious mind, that any well-considered treatise on the subject deserves a hearty welcome. This one would have been much more valuable had the series of discourses of which it consists been re-written, with a view to a better arrangement of the materials, and a careful statement, and in some instances an amplification, of the arguments. Some of them only too fully justify the author's phrase when he speaks of them as merely "hints." His object being to refute "the Atheistic objection that there cannot be a moral Ruler of the universe, because the world is full of pain and sin," he urges that "pain is necessary for our very safety ; that it is indispensable likewise to our pleasure ; that it is the spring and

* *The Mystery of Pain, Death and Sin, and Discourses in Refutation of Atheism.* By the Rev. Charles Voysey, B.A., of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford ; late Vicar of Healaugh. Williams and Norgate. 1878.

source of all our intellectual activities, and the parent of civilization ; that it incidentally calls into existence some of our noblest virtues." We miss the reference we should expect to the effect of "the reign of law" in the material universe, as tending to the explanation of the existence of pain. Of moral evil it is observed, that it is due to the addition of the moral sense to man's animal nature, that by it man's dignity and worth are augmented, that without sin there could be no virtue, and that it is probable the final issue will be the ultimate attainment of moral excellence. The second half of the volume, which from an examination of the various parts of man's nature, argues for a belief in God, is the more satisfactory portion, especially the discourses referring to the conscience and affections. But here, again, we have to regret that what were originally only addresses for delivery from the pulpit—and no doubt answered this purpose well—are presented without change of form, with their evidences of haste in preparation, and sometimes with looseness of thought as well as of expression left uncorrected.

"The Parousia"* is an attempt to ascertain the true meaning of Scripture in reference to the second coming of Christ. The author shews his estimate of the Bible by habitually speaking of it as "the Word of God." It is in conformity with this view that he quotes every part of the New Testament with equal reverence, overlooking all considerations of criticism. But for one who takes this position, he manifests good sense and candour, and steadily refuses to acknowledge the possibility of a double sense and non-natural interpretations. A laborious examination of each book of Christian Scripture in succession leads to the conclusion, that the destruction of Jerusalem was the second coming, and that all the parts of the predictions of Christ were then fulfilled. A very interesting part of the volume is the lengthy and detailed explanation of the Apocalypse, which the writer considers to refer almost entirely to the personages and events of the first century. While he is successful in many of his arguments, he meets with some difficulties he cannot cope with, since he refuses to grant the possibility of any mistake in the expectations of the apostles, and yet more to suppose that Christ himself can be reported to have uttered prophecies never to be fulfilled. With such premisses, it is hardly possible to land in a conclusion which shall meet all the circumstances of the case. But

* The Parousia: a Critical Inquiry into the New Testament Doctrine of our Lord's Second Coming. London: Daldy, Isbister and Co. 1878.

this writer does all that can be done in this direction, and everywhere wins our sympathy by his careful discrimination, his earnestness of purpose and calm sobriety of judgment.

It seems a pity that the Committee of the Theological Translation Fund Library did not publish their last issue* earlier in the series, for one can have little power of appreciating the modern criticism of the New Testament till one has a tolerably clear conception of the circumstances under which the Epistles and Gospels were written, i.e. of the early history of the Christian Church. Now Baur has performed a work something like that of Darwin in inaugurating a new era of speculative thought, and shewing how great historical phenomena are developed out of antecedent stages. In the first part of the book before us he exhibits with striking force the causal connection between the success of Christianity and the state of the existing world, especially in regard to the universalism of the Roman Empire and the wide-spread influence of Greek philosophy and Jewish theology. The second part introduces us at once to the conflict between Paulinism and Judaism and their subsequent reconciliation, the correct understanding of which gives the key to this whole period of Church history and all its literature. No wonder if so fruitful an idea has sometimes been pushed to extremes! It is more remarkable that Baur treated as insoluble, and therefore beyond the sphere of history, certain problems, such as the resurrection of Jesus and the conversion of Paul, upon which the further application of his own principles has already thrown considerable light, as the English reader will see by consulting Mr. Macan's Essay on the Resurrection. Mr. Menzies' translation is extremely satisfactory, very readable, and in numerous places where we have compared it with the original, quite accurate. Occasionally, perhaps, the breaking up of long German sentences into short English ones has been carried too far, so as slightly to alter the original meaning; and we doubt if a translator has a right to make new paragraphs where he does not find them. But all this will make the general scope and argument of the work more comprehensible to the English public.

The "Expositor,"† now in its seventh volume, pursues its useful

* The Church History of the First Three Centuries. By Dr. F. C. Baur. Third Edition. The Translation from the German edited by the Rev. Allan Menzies, B.D. London: Williams and Norgate. 1878.

† The Expositor. Edited by the Rev. Samuel Cox. Vol. VII. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

task of mediating between learned and liberal theology and the mass of preachers. It is not very bold in its assertions, not very sweeping in its conclusions, and occasionally admits articles which, in their concessions to old-fashioned orthodoxy, are a little incongruous with other and, as we think, more valuable papers. But perhaps on this account it is all the fitter for the literary function which it actually performs. The articles in the present volume which have most interested us, are those of Dr. Sanday and Dr. Roberts, who are engaged in a lively controversy as to whether Christ spoke Aramaic or Greek. Dr. Sanday, who stands up for the Aramaic hypothesis, seems to us to have much the best of the argument.

Poetry, as such, is certainly outside the sphere of a Theological Review, and yet we cannot refuse "*Hilda*"* a word of welcome. The second part of the title, "*among the Broken Gods*," seems to indicate that the story moves among religious interests: and so in truth it does; yet they are subordinate to personal ones. *Hilda* is the wife of Claud Maxwell, a half-believing poet, whose heart is more with his verses than with anything else, and who does not perceive till it is too late the alienation which grows up between himself and his wife, who is true to her early conceptions of religious truth and duty. Other characters in the story are Winifred Urquhart, a hateful young person, formerly a school friend of *Hilda*'s, who flatters and flirts with her husband, and by her crude assertions of scientific materialism, to which Claud half assents, helps to deepen the growing breach between the pair. There are also Luke Sprott, a blacksmith revivalist preacher, from whose teaching Claud strongly revolts, while it is yet able to strike a responsive chord in *Hilda*'s heart, and the Rev. Elphinstone Bell, a High-church clergyman, under whose influence the heroine at last leaves her husband, though as she thinks only for a time, goes out to the Crimea as a member of a nursing sisterhood, and dies of fever. The story is told by Claud himself, but we have also *Hilda*'s diary, and Miss Urquhart's view of the parties, and account of her own share in the transaction. The effect is dramatic: the various characters stand clearly out, and the reader is interested from first to last. Perhaps it is unnecessary to say that no theological questions are settled; indeed, they are hardly raised in any definite form. Luke Sprott's rough revivalism, Miss Urquhart's exultation in emancipation from all faith, Mr. Bell's

* *Hilda, among the Broken Gods.* By the Author of *Olrig Grange*. Glasgow: James Maclehose. 1878.

assertion of the rights and functions of the Church, are all clearly and forcibly stated, as well as Hilda's simple and emotional religion, and her husband's poetical, though somewhat careless, universalism ; but they are presented, not as materials from which any religious theory is to be evolved as preferable to every other, but simply as developing contrasts of character and as elements of the necessary plot. There are fine passages in the poem, both descriptive and lyrical ; but the author's muse is essentially pedestrian, and the interest lies more in the story than in the numbers in which it is told. Claud is certainly not particularly happy either in his choice of metres or in his management of them ; and Miss Urquhart still less so. Her contribution to the volume is a pain and a grievance to a musical ear. It is however possible that the author may have deliberately selected his metrical vehicle as appropriate both to story-telling in general and the particular story he had to tell ; yet even so, more pains might have been taken to avoid rhymes that are hardly assonances, and lines that no ingenuity can scan. At the same time, we feel as if we were ungrateful in thus marking blemishes in a volume which we have read with real interest and pleasure ; and we cordially recommend "Hilda" to those of our readers for whom the garb of pleasant verse and the excitement of a plot add an interest to the discussion of the religious difficulties of our time.

We wish for Mr. Copner's translation of Erasmus' "Praise of Folly,"* a success which we are certainly unable to predict. No *jeu d'esprit* more than three centuries and a half old can easily be interesting, except to scholars who, in this particular case, find a flavour in Erasmus' Latin, which will entirely escape the readers of a translation, however well executed. If Mr. Copner, however, can re-awaken the faintest echo of the excitement which called for twenty-seven large editions of this book during the lifetime of its author, we shall not grudge him his good luck. His translation appears to be well executed, and runs trippingly off the tongue.

E.

* The Praise of Folly. Translated from the Latin of Erasmus, with explanatory Notes, by James Copner, M.A., Vicar of Elstow. London : Williams and Norgate. 1878.

1

INDEX TO VOL. XV.

ARNOLD, MATTHEW, AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER, 88.
 BALAAM, 327.
 BERLIN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS IN, 142.
 BUDDHA, THE ORIGIN OF LEGEND IN THE LIVES OF THE, 77.
 CAMBRIDGE COMMISSION, THE, 236.
 CHRISTIANITY OF CHRIST, THE, 63.
 CLEMENTINE HOMILIES, THE, 1.
 CUDWORTH'S MSS. ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT, 267.
 DRUMMOND'S JEWISH MESSIAH, 205.
 EGYPT, THE ARCHAIC SOLAR-CULT OF, I, 513.
 GOML, THE, 495.
 HINTON, JAMES, AND HIS PHILOSOPHY, 572.
 KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF, 534.
 LEICESTER CONFERENCE ON FREE COMMUNION, THE, 366.
 NOTICES OF BOOKS, 167, 307, 477, 595.
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY COMMISSION, THE, 388.
 RENAN ON THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS, 116.
 SCOTLAND, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN, 444.
 SERVETUS, I., 281; II., 408.
 SIKHS, THE RELIGION OF THE, 548.
 SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS, 154, 470.
 THIRLWALL'S REMAINS, 216.
 VOLITION AND ATTENTION, 129.
 WESTMINSTER CONFSSION OF FAITH, THE, 189.

A. C., author of notices of books, 811.

ARNOLD, MATTHEW, AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER, article by William Binns, 88.
 Arnold, M., "Poems," "Last Essays on Church and Religion," "St. Paul and Protestantism," "Culture and Anarchy," "God and the Bible," "Literature and Dogma," "Essays on Criticism," reviewed, 88.
 Arnold, Thomas, D.D., "Sermons," noticed, 817.

BALAAM, article by B. Martineau, M.A., 327.

Baur, F. C., "The Church History of the Three First Centuries," Vol. I., translated by A. Menzies, B.D., noticed, 619.

BEARD, CHARLES, B.A., author of articles, "Bishop Thirlwall's Remains," 216.
 "The Leicester Conference on Free Communion," 366.

- Berchthold, "Ein Neues Buch vom Wahren Christenthum," noticed, 312.
- BERLIN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS IN, article by A. Chalmers, 142.
- BIRNS, WILLIAM, author of article, "Matthew Arnold as a Religious Teacher," 88.
- Bible, "The Holy Bible according to the Authorized Version, revised," noticed, 319.
- Bright, W., D.D., "Chapters of Early English Church History," noticed, 490.
- BROWN, ROBERT, Jun., author of article, "The Archaic Solar-Cult of Egypt," I, 513.
- Bullinger, E. W., "Critical Lexicon and Concordance to the English and Greek New Testament," noticed, 179.
- Caird, Edward, M.A., "A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant," reviewed, 534.
- CAMBRIDGE COMMISSION, THE, article by P. M. Laurence, M.A., 236.
- Carlyle, G., M.A., "The Battle of Unbelief," noticed, 492.
- C. B. U., author of notices of books, 167.
- CHALMERS, ANDREW, author of article, "The Ecclesiastical Crisis in Berlin," 142.
- CHEYNE, T. K., M.A., author of article, "Drummond's Jewish Messiah," 205.
- CHRISTIANITY OF CHRIST, THE, article by J. Page Hopps, 63.
- "Classic Preachers of the English Church," edited by J. E. Kempe, M.A., noticed, 176.
- CLEMENTINE HOMILIES, THE, article by S. P. Gould, M.A., I.
- Conder, E. R., M.A., "Basis of Faith," noticed, 477.
- "Congregational Year Book, 1878," reviewed, 366.
- Congreve, R., "Religion of Humanity," noticed, 322.
- Copner, J., M.A., "The Praise of Folly, translated from Erasmus," noticed, 621.
- Coquerel, A., fils, "Conscience and Faith," translated by J. E. Odgers, M.A., noticed, 489.
- "Counter-Reformation Movement, the," noticed, 184.
- Crozier, J. B., M.B., "God or Force," noticed, 184.
- CUDWORTH'S MSS. ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT, article by Courtney Kenny, M.A., 267.
- Cunningham, J. D., "History of the Sikhs," reviewed, 548.
- D'Aubigné, J. H. Merle, D.D., "History of the Reformation in Europe in the time of Calvin," translated by W. L. R. Cates, Vol. VIII, noticed, 494.
- "Decay of Churches, the," noticed, 326.
- DRUMMOND'S JEWISH MESSIAH, article by T. K. Cheyne, M.A., 205.
- Drummond, J., B.A., "The Jewish Messiah," reviewed, 205.
- DRUMMOND, R. B., B.A., author of article, "The Westminster Confession of Faith," 189.
- Drysdale, J., M.D., "Is Scientific Materialism compatible with Dogmatic Theology?" noticed, 171.
- EGYPT, THE ARCHAIC SOLAR-CULT OF, I., article by Robert Brown, Jun., 513.
- "English Independent, the," reviewed, 366.
- "Erskine, T., of Linlathen, Letters of," Vol. II, edited by Dr. Hanna, noticed, 174.
- Evans, M., "The Gospel of Home Life," noticed, 318.
- "Expositor, the," Vol. VII., noticed, 619.
- FENTON, JOHN, author of article, "The Goel," 495.
- Flint, R., D.D., LL.D., "Baird Lecture on Theism," noticed, 167.

- Γ., author of notice of books, 479.
- Gibbon, C., "Life of George Combe," noticed, 484.
- Giles, Dr., "Hebrew and Christian Records," noticed, 180.
- GOML, THE, article by John Fenton, 495.
- GORDON, ALX., M.A., author of articles, "Miguel Serveto-y-Revés," I. 281; II. 408.
- GOULD, G. P., M.A., author of article, "On the Clementine Homilies," 1.
- Grant, P. W., "The Bible Record of Creation true for every Age," noticed, 326.
- Guthrie, M., "The Causational and Free-will Theories of Volition," noticed, 173.
- Hammond, C. E., M.A., "Ancient Liturgies," noticed, 487.
- Hawkins, J., "Phases of Modern Doctrine in relation to the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man," noticed, 493.
- Haym, R., "Herder," noticed, 310.
- "Hilda, among the Broken Gods," noticed, 621.
- HINTON, JAMES, AND HIS PHILOSOPHY, article by C. B. Upton, B.A., B.Sc., 572.
- "Hinton, James, Selections from his MSS.," reviewed, 572.
- Hood, Alfred, "The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ," noticed, 184.
- Hopgood, J., "An Attempt to define Unitarian Christianity," noticed, 184.
- Hopkins, E., "Life and Letters of James Hinton," reviewed, 572.
- HOPPE, J. PAGE, author of article, "The Christianity of Christ," 63.
- HOPPE, J. PAGE, "The Plain Truth about the Bible," "Alleged Prophecies of Jesus Christ in the Old Testament," noticed, 183. "The Kingdom of God in the Spirit of Man," noticed, 184.
- "Is Theism Immoral?" noticed, 321.
- "Jahrbuch der Historischen Gesellschaft Züricher Theologen," noticed, 311.
- Jenner, S., M.A., "Whom do Christians now Worship?" noticed, 183.
- J. E. O., author of notice of books, 479.
- J. F. S., author of notices of books, 307.
- Kalisch, M. M., "Bible Studies," "Balaam," reviewed, 327. "Jonah," noticed, 595.
- KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF, article by T. W. Levin, M.A., 534.
- Keim, Dr. T., "The History of Jesus of Nazara," Vol. III., translated by Arthur Ransom, noticed, 182.
- Kennedy, J., M.A., D.D., "The People called Independents," reviewed, 366.
- KENNY, COURTNEY, M.A., author of article, "Cudworth's MSS. on Future Punishment," 267.
- Kohler, Dr. K., "Das Hohe Lied," noticed, 608.
- Langhans, E. F., "Das Christenthum und seine Mission," noticed, 312.
- LAURENCE, P. M., M.A., author of article, "The Cambridge Commission," 236.
- Lechler, K., "Die Confessionen in ihrem Verhältnisse zu Christus," noticed, 309.
- LEICESTER CONFERENCE ON FREE COMMUNION, THE, article by Charles Beard, B.A., 366.
- LEVIN, T. W., M.A., author of article, "The Philosophy of Kant," 534.
- Löhr, Pastor, "Zur Frage über die Echtheit von Jesaias xl.—lxvi.," noticed, 612.
- MACAN, B. W., M.A., author of article, "The Oxford University Commission," 388.
- Macnaught, J., M.A., "Cena Domini," noticed, 615.